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The dissertation develops an empirical basis for evaluating plea
bargaining as both a behavioral phenomenon and as a formal model of opera-
tion for the courts. It rejects the assumption that bargaining occurs
primarily at the plea stage, and instead, argues that bargaininq is the
dominant mode of decision making from arrest through appeal of a criminal
case. The model of bargaining that it develops suggests that proposals
-which concentrate on either the elimination or the regulation of plea
bargaining will be unsuccessful due to their lack of recognition of the
pervasiveness of bargaining in the courts and their lack of understanding
of the dynamics of the process by which criminal cases are bargained.
The research questions are drawn from an analysis of proposals
for reform of the courts and from arguipents commonly made about the
dynamics of plea bargaining. Proposals, for eliminating plea bargaining
through procedural and administrative change are examined critically and
then compared with more recent proposals for "negotiated justice," which
seek to regulate rather than abolish plea bargaining. In each case an
attempt is made to isolate the assumptions which the proposal makes about
the process of plea bargaining and especially to emphasize the assumptions
that would be critical to the success or failure of reform through
"negotiated justice."
A second source of research questions is the debate which has
arisen over the existence of plea bargaining in the courts -- both as
reflected in the decision of the appellate courts, and in the few attempts
to build a theory of plea bargaining. The debate over the desirability of
plea bargaining is traced through four major arguments: that plea bargain-
ing is unconstitutional; that it is necessary to the efficient operation of
the courts; that it is a logical outgrowth of the discretionary power of
court personnel; and finally that it is an effective mode of sentencing.
The theoretical debate is organized around a series of propositions con-
cerned with the dynamics of the bargaining process itself. Is bargaining
based on a cooperative or a conflict model of behavior" Is it a process
resembling economic exchange or is it more closely related to the negotia-
tion of reality? Finally, is the defendant an active participant or merely
a vehicle for bargaining?
The research questions attempt to explore the variables that
shape plea bargaining at two levels. First, they are intended to lead to
a positive analysis of plea bargaining which would suggest who the actors
are, what their interests are, and the factors which determine when and
how they bargain. A more normative set of questions asks whether plea
bargaining is indeed a necessary adaptation of the courts and what, in
fact, its impacts are on the goals of the criminal curt.
Case studies of criminal cases from arrest through appeal pro-
vide the empirical basis for understanding plea bargaining. At each stage
of the criminal process, the factors which seem to be influencing the
outcomes of cases are discussed and specific reference is made to conver-
sations and events in cases which provide illustrations of bargaining. In
presenttgg the empirical material, special attention is given to the
mechanisms used by defense attorneys to prepare a case, to the relationships
between the defendant and the defender, to the interchanges between the
defender and the prosecutor, and to the diverse roles of the police, proba-
tion officers, and judges in their relations with each other and with
other actors.
The case study data describes a process by which each stage of
a case is comprised of a series of bargains which build characteristically
toward the outcome of the case. A model is built which indicates that the
specific course of this process is determined by the purpose of each
bargain, the currency being exchanged among actors, and the interests of
the actors involved. The strongest influence on each bargain, moreover, is
found to be the type of crime with which the defendant is being charged.
The model also indicates that each stage of the criminal process tends to
produce a predictable configuration of purposes, currencies, actors, and
interests.
The findings indicate that proposals which focus on the elimina-
tion or the regulation of plea bargaining will have little impact on the
courts. Their focus on the plea stage ignores the dynamics of the larger
bargaining process. Even the assumptions they make about the plea stage
itself ignore the number of actors involved, their interests, and their
tendency to bargain for many more purposes than obtaining sentence con-
cessions. Finally, the normative analysis indicates strongly that bargain-
ing is not a response to an overcrowded docket but rather a necessary
mechanism for resolving the conflicting goals and pressures on the courts.
It is argued, moreover, that the process of bargaining is guided by its own
normative system which appears to constrain actors to work for a bargained
"due process" for the defendant.
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Court Reform and the Genesis of Negotiated Justice
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The realization that justice in our criminal courts is dispensed
through bargaining rather than through trial has met with considerable
alarm. The concern is less for the fact that bargaining may not serve the
goals of the criminal process than that it departs from the courtroom pro-
cedures that have been traditionally associated with fairness -- particu-
larly those dictated by the powerful models of due process and the adver-
sarial system. For many reformers, then, the issue of what to do about
'led' bargaining is stated as a problem of making the court's decisions
about defendants "return" to these standards. One approach has been to
work through procedural reform -- regulating the decisions of the court so
that they must be made equitably. A complementary proposal is to eliminate
the need for bargaining by relieving whatever administrative pressures have
made the court abandon its traditional procedures.
This dissertation is concerned with yet a third type of reform,
which we have chosen to call negotiated justice. Rather than trying to
eliminate bargaining, this approach accepts bargaining as the dominant mode
of operation for the courts. Proposals for negotiated justice define their
task as the regulation and formulation of the bargaining process, to create
a due process of bargaining.
Negotiated justice is not an articulated reform, but rather a trend
we have observed in a number of proposals for change in the decision making
practices of police and courts. Because of their fragmentation, little
attempt has been made to judge the accuracy of the claims these proposals
make for negotiated justice. What impacts would formalization of bargain-
ing have on the courts? Is it a potentially feasible or effective mechanism
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for reform? There is even less information available with which to judge
the assumptions these proposals make about the process which is usually
labeled plea bargaining. Are these assumptions accurate? What interests
determine the nature of bargaining? Can the process, in fact, be regulated?
Evaluating proposals for negotiated justice is made even more
difficult by the lack of empirical basis for judgment. At this point no
major proposals for negotiated justice have been implemented, and there is
no known analogy in the reform of social service organizations. In this
respect, the conclusions of this dissertation must be predictive and
normative -- asking how the implementation of negotiated justice might
affect the quality of decisions made by the court. In part, those conclu-
sions will be drawn by comparing the assumptions which negotiated justice
makes about plea bargaining with an empirical examination of bargaining
in the criminal courts. The results of that analysis will be reported in
Chapter IV.
The focus of this section will be to develop some criteria for
evaluating negotiated justice as a reform. In particular, we will compare
the contentions and assumptions of negotiated justice with the traditional
goals of the courts and with other approaches to reform. What are the
requirements which the due process and adversary models impose on the
courts? How have other proposals for reform responded to these goals?
What assumptions are made in proposals for negotiated justice and how do
they differ from other types of reform? How effective are procedural and
administrative reforms likely to be in eliminating bargaining? This dis-
cussion indicates the issues to which court reformers have generally
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responded, the assumptions which they have made about decision making in
the courts and the model of plea bargaining from which they have drawn.
Negotiated justice can then be examined as a response to these issues and
assumptions.
Though this dissertation will be limited to an analysis of
bargaining as a model for court reform, the issues raised lie as well at
the roots of dilemmas in other social services. It is clearly true that
most decisions to dispense or withhold services involve negotiation between
clients and service agencies. Understanding the dynamics of plea bargain-
ing may provide a basis for knowing what variables shape the bargains which
social service agencies make with their clients. Reforms which stress the
formalization and regularization of the discretionary decisions of agency
personnel, moreover, are as common to welfare, health, and other public
organizations as they are to the courts. This dissertation should suggest
criteria by which this kind of reform can be evaluated and the variables
which may be critical in determining its potential success or failure.
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Models of the Criminal Court
The goals of the court and the bargaining model
Perhaps more than any other social service agency the criminal
courts may be victims of the high hopes society has for them. Not only
are they part of a complex system which identifies, apprehends, and
processes criminals, but, as an institution with strong symbolic signif-
icance, they are often described as possessing special responsibilities
for the protection of civil rights, and indeed, of criminal defendants
themselves. As they structure the ways in which they process defendants,
the courts implicitly select from among this diverse set of functions.
This has lent to each individual court -- or judge -- an aura of being
hard on criminals, being progressive about treatment, or processing cases
very quickly.
If any single agency attempted to perform all the duties that are
at one time or another ascribed to the criminal courts, it would most likely
demonstrate that the tasks were inherently conflicting. Can an institution,
for example, both deter criminal defendants from committing subsequent
crimes and act as the protectors of their civil rights? Can a court process
criminals efficiently while still pursuing the complex questions-that must
be answered before treatment is prescribed?
These same kinds of concerns have plagued those who have wondered
how to make the criminal courts work. Most of the attempts to reform the
courts, in fact, have been fostered by a desire to redirect the court's
attentions from what is seen as an over-emphasis on administrative conven-
ience to a focus on the court's special role.as a dispenser of justice. In
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particular, the charge is very often made that the need to fulfill its role
as a processor of criminal defendants through a system interferes with its
ability to protect the rights of the criminals being processed. The focus
of several major reforms in the courts has been to try to make it possible
for the courts to give more attention to the procedures by which defen-
dants are processed -- either by decreasing the pressure on the courts to
make decisions rapidly or by imposing strong sanctions where procedures
are not strictly followed.
The interest of court reformers,then,has been primarily concerned
with those functions of the courts which relate to decisions made directly
about defendants or which are directed toward efficiency of operation --
and how these are interrelated. Lloyd Ohlin provides a useful categoriza-
tion of these functions by suggesting that the courts must convict or
acquit offenders; they must pass sentence at least with reference to the
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and community protection; and they
must accomplish their objectives within a relatively limited time and with
restricted personnel and budgets. This list .is, of course, a minimal
statement of what courts often attempt, but it highlights those goals on
which reform has focused. As we will see, reform has turned to asking not
how well these functions are filled by the courts, but rather to how they
are fulfilled.
As a kind of gatekeeper agency, the courts sort out defendants
by the question of innocence and guilt. In this regard, they are not only
determining whether a defendant will be subject to their own sentencing
processes, but also whether the decisions of the police to arrest the
defendant were in some sense justified. This function, then, apparently
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requires two roles of the courts -- the determination of a defendant's
innocence or guilt and the review of decisions made by the police.
In addition to the evident difficulty of deciding innocence and
guilt, this function presents a number of other problems to the court.
First, the two problems of sorting and review are organizationally quite
closely linked. It is at each stage -- not merely in the court -- that
the criminal justice system is intended to filter out those who are law
violators, at the same time that it provides an avenue of freedom to those
2
who are innocent or who are casual law breakers. Thus, there is already
an organizational presumption of guilt when the police arrest someone and
refer him to the courts. In this sense,the court is not considering the
question of guilt on the basis of courtroom evidence alone.
As subsystems, too, the police and the courts are mutually inter-
dependent, with the caseload of the courts supplied primarily by the police
and the conviction rate of the police determined by the action of the courts.
In a sense, the very ability of the court to decide innocence and guilt is
most often based on evidence available from the police -- and for this,
too, they must encourage working relationships.
The interest of reformers has not settled so much on whether
those the court finds guilty are guilty, but rather how the court-made that
decision. In the absence of any reliable ways to assess whether courts are
doing a good job of sentencing, reformers have turned to watching the
process by which sentencing decisions are made. The unavailability -- and
therefore the absence -- of complete presentencing information is evident
in most courts. Even more important, it is clear that sentences are
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affected by many considerations other than their probable impacts on the
defendant and society. The skill of the defense counsel, the anger of the
arresting officer, the appearance, prior record, and economic condition
of the defendant are only a sample of the observed influences on sentenc-
ing. The critical question, therefore, has become whether -- and how --
courts can design a sentencing process that will limit what reformers see
as illegitimate considerations in sentencing.
The possible organizational presumption of guilt, combined with
the friendliness between the police and the courts has aroused the sus-
picion of would-be reformers. The high incidence of findings of guilty
(between 75% and 90%) has clinched the case for those investigating the
.procedures by which the court decides guilt. It is, then, on the pro-
cedures by which the court reviews and employs the evidence which police
submit that reformers have concentrated their efforts to reform the
courts' approach to finding guilt or innocence.
While in the narrowest sense sentencing is the strict application
of a specified penalty appropriate to an offense, sentencing may, in fact,
be an even more ambitious task for the courts than the determination of
innocence and guilt. In the contemporary court the judge has nearly un-
limited sentencing discretion, even where minimum and maximum sentences
are specified.3 This is the case in part because of the growth of rehab-
ilitation and deterrence as proper goals for sentencing. Sentencing is no
longer even officially a simple meting out of punishment, but rather a
juggling of the goals of punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, and com-
munity protection. Hogarth goes so far as to say that "it is the burden
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of the courts alone to reconcile conflicting goals, through the offices of
the sentencing judge."4
Little progress has been made in deciding either how it is that
judges make these sentencing decisions or, more important, in understand-
ing the relationship between the sentence and the goals it might fulfill. 5
There is no convincing evidence, for example-, that the severity of the
sentence is related to deterrence of crime -- either (to borrow Packer's
terms) as the general deterrence of criminals by the threat of punishment
or as the specific deterrence of an individual from further crime after he
is punished.6  Even more problematic is the question of rehabilitation,
which requires that a court be able to look "forward to the likely impact
of the sentence on future behavior of the offender and on potential
offenders."7  Even if it were known what kind of information would support
a forecast like this, and it were collected by the criminal justice system,
the variety of correctional alternatives necessary to individualize treat-
ment would not exist.
What observers see, then, is a criminal court system which may be
fulfilling its tasks of making findings and passing sentence, but in ways
which seem to compromise traditional notions of justice. In particular,
they charge that the courts are not extending to defendants their right to
be judged under a system which gives them due process or which makes its
decisions as a result of adversarial contests. The model by which the
courts do operate is variously labeled plea bargaining, bargained justice, or
crime control.
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What is this alternate model, and how did it come to take control
of the courts? Critics of the present modes of operation in the courts
believe that under the pressure of an overload of cases, the courts had to
displace other objectives to concentrate on only one of their goals -- the
efficient processing of cases. Because the courts were being evaluated
primarily on the extent of their delay in processing cases, there were
almost overwhelming pressures to clear cases as fast as possible. The
overriding objective then became to increase the speed with which the
courts could screen subjects, determine guilt, and secure dispositions.
When courts streamline their procedures,the trappings associated
with the elements of due process and the adversarial ceremony may be the
first to be sacrificed. The trial, for example, is an especially expensive
procedure, and pressures to find other means of disposing of cases are
great. Instead of depending on the trial to reveal evidence, the focus is
shifted to pre-trial processes, and particularly to'administrative fact-
finding. In theory a defendant reviewed in this manner can then be
exonerated or encouraged to enter a guilty plea, but as Packer points out,
the likelihood of exoneration is decreased by the fact that a presumption
of guilt is the most efficient theory to adopt for processing defendants.
As Packer suggests, the court under this model becomes a mechanism for
routinely screening out those cases for which it looks as if conviction is
unlikely and assuring as rapidly as possible the conviction of the rest.8
This model describes what critics see as a real shift in the
ways in which courts process defendants, brought on by a rapid change in
the demands of the courts. Most admit, however, that rather than a
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literal representation of the operations of the court, the model is a pole
on a continuum of choices available to the courts. The actual work of the
courts is a constant series of adjustments between this model and a second
pole represented by the ideal of due process and adversarial justice.9
Thus, court reforms have tended to focus on the tensions between the due
process and bargaining models, and to advocate the need to move closer to
the due process ideal.
Three themes dominate this critique of the bargaining model of
justice -- and the advocacy of due process and the adversary model -- as
we will see in the section that follows. First there is assumed to be a
necessary conflict between the procedures the court uses to facilitate its
administrative duties and the procedures it must follow to dispense justice.
In short, reformers claim that only an adversarial process, not administra-
tive procedures,can guarantee justice. A closely related contention is
that the bargaining model fails to attend to the ways in which defendants
are processed, in its haste to see that they are processed. An emphasis
on procedure, then, dominates most current reform efforts in the courts.
Finally, decisions which are not public and formalized are open
to suspicion. The greatest fears are that such decisions will not be sub-
jected to appellate review and that there will be no mechanism for assuring
that a defendant receives any bargains he is promised. Under the due
process adversarial model, the assumption is that everything that is
relevant to the defendant's case takes place within the confines of the
courtroom and can be watched and regulated by the court.
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The concept of due process
Due process is a concept which is invoked more freely and more
often than any other standard applied to the decisions of the criminal
courts. While it refers formally to a phrase in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution,,1 it is employed with much more abandon than even
very free interpretation of the Constitution might allow. Nearly everv
observer of the courts has strong conceptions of the court's obligation
to its defendants and that this obligation is discharged by adhering to'
standar-s of due process.
Though their implications may be auite different, for instance,
due process is often used interchangeably with legality, to mean that the
actions of the court must be constrained by the legal definitions of
criminal conduct and criminal sanctions; the court must make sentencin'
decisions by using legal guidelines only. The term due process is also
used to refer to the right of an accused to have his "day in court." This
focus asserts the obligation of the courts to apply standards of proce-
dural regularity to the individual defendant, by allowing him to con-
front his accusers and prepare a case.
What all these interpretations of due process appear to have in
common is the belief that it is the manner in which courts make decisions
which will determine whether the decisions are fair. It is the fact that
the defendant is given the opportunity to confront accusers, for example,
that is his due process. Given this emphasis on the procedures by which
the court makes its decisions, what is being constrained by due process
standards is the behavior of individual actors in the court. Interpreta-
tions of what it means to give due process may limit judicial sentencing
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discretion, the clerk's freedom to schedule a case, or the policeman's
power to gather information. In this sense, due process is linked with
the belief that official power must be restricted when it interferes with
the rights of an individual defendant.
It is this concept of due process which has probably had the
most influence on reformers in the criminal courts. This is true in part
because the concept of balancing public and private rights is a powerful
inheritance from the Common Law, which recognized that the powers
of a government had to be restrained when it began to deprive a citizen
of life,,liberty, or property. Thus, due process has a strong symbolic
significance, in that it appears to embody the right of citizens to call
government into account for unlawful acts.
The-view that due process is the regulation of public decisions
in the court has also been important because it has called into question
the relationship between due process and the efficient processing of cases.
The argument is that following due process standards slows down the opera-
tion of the court by imposing technically unnecessary processes on court
personnel. Writers like Packer, then, have seen due process and efficiency
as trade-offs. As Packer concludes, it is "precisely because of its potency
in subjecting the individual to the coercive power of the state [that] the
criminal process must, in this model, be subjected to controls that prevent
it from operating with maximum efficiency."11
This view of due process, then, has served as a theme for re-
formers who deplored the interest of the courts in efficiency and who saw
"due process" and efficiency as polar concerns. The meaning of due process
as it is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, however, has remained
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uncertain,and the Supreme Court's efforts to interpret it have been
fragmented at best. This situation, of course, has left few specific
provisions for the evaluation of procedure in local courts. Despite their
lack of coherence, the attempts of the appellate courts to apply the due
process clause to the operation of local trial courts are interesting in
themselves because they provide a sense of the diverse meanings it has
developed as a model for reform, if not a standard for the operation of
local courts.
The direct consequences of the appellate rulings which have
relied on the due process clause were, for many reasons, fragmented and
slow to reach the trial courts. This could have been due in part to the
general reluctance of the Supreme Court to apply the Bill of Rights to
the States12 and in part, to specific problems in the interpretation of
the due process clause itself. Before the turn of the century procedures
in local trial courts were developed without interference from the
appellate courts. According to the practice of the day, as long as the
particular rules of criminal procedure in a state did not violate "those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our
civil and political institutions...they will be permitted to stand." 13
When the appellate courts did begin to rule on procedure in the
trial courts which appeared to differ from practice in the federal courts,
the debate had to shift to the meaning of the due process clause itself.
The crux of the Supreme Court's attempts to decide what it meant for a
court to conform to due process was the question of how much specific pro-
cedural reform must be included. The question became defined as the extent
to which the Fourteenth Amendment might, in fact, incorporate the provisions
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of all the other amendments. Palko v. Connecticut makes the argument for
"incorporation":
The argument for the appellant is that whatever
is forbidden by the 5th amendment is forbidden
by the 14th...in the appellant's view the 14th
amendment is to be taken as embodying the prohibi-
tions of the 5th. 'Whatever would be a violation
of the original Bill of Rights if done by the
federal government is now equally unlawful by
force of the 14th amendment if done by a state.'14
A consistent decision that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
the substance of even the Fifth Amendment alone might have had critical
implications for procedure in local trial courts. The right to avoid
compulsory self-incrimination, for instance, might have been ruled
applicable to the States more than fifty years earlier. Appellate deci-
sions, however, waivered from arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was
an omnibus statement of other amendments defining basic rights to arguing
that the due process clause only selectively incorporated other amendments.
For the local courts, then, what procedural requirements might
be implied by due process standard remained inconsistent and elusive. If
anything, the decisions of the Supreme Court reflected a growing tendency
to posit that the due process guarantee had a meaning apart from any other
amendments it might include. Perhaps the most ambitious attemptto define
due process without reference to other amendments was Adamson v. California
which argued that judicial review of the guarantee of due process requires
the court to judge whether criminal proceedings have "offended those canons
of decency and fairness which express the notion of justice." 15 Thus, the
Court argued that, in fact, it was possible to determine what principles
'were so rooted in the traditions or conscience of our people as to be
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ranked as fundamental"16 and whatever rights were implicit in these prin-
ciples could then be applied to the States through the due process clause.
What has emerged from these attempts to define and apply due
process standards is a piecemeal application of procedural requirements to
State criminal cases and a powerful, but ill-defined ideal. During the
past ten years, for example, the due process- clause has been the vehicle
for establishing the right against unreasonable search and seizure (through
the Fourth Amendment) and the right to counsel in all criminal cases
(through the Sixth Amendment).18 While other provisions of these amend-
ments and provisions of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments have also been
applied in the same fashion, coherent standards for the conduct of criminal
trials are still absent. Provisions relating to the right to a speedy trial
(Sixth Amendment) and to the prohibition against excessive bail (Eighth
Amendment) have still not been ruled applicable to the states. Even amend-
ments which have been applied to local courts provide only sketchy guide-
lines for evaluation of local practice. Does Gideon v. Wainwright19
require that counsel be supplied to the indigent during the bail hearing?
What standards of indigency satisfy the spirit of the right to counsel?
Though specific provisions for evaluating the procedures used in
a trial have yet to be applied to the State level courts, due process is
still employed as if it were a standard with a precise meaning. The argument
is frequently made, for instance, that the courts should be able to conform
to the spirit of due process regardless of the extent of its application to
the States or the specificity of its requirements. Abraham contends that
even where there are not specific standards, court procedures should "amount
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to due process." "In other words, the concept of a fair trial demands
safeguards which may not fall below a certain minimum even if it be that
vague minimum of due process." 20
An even greater leap of faith is made by those who speak of pro-
cedural due process as a reform. Procedure -- the manner in which a law
or practice is carried out -- is more often the object of reform than is
the substantive law itself. This emphasis on procedure can be attributed
primarily to the fact that challenge on due process grounds is most likely
to occur in the execution or administration of statutes, and thus, in
21
reference to court procedures. When reformers call for procedural due
process, then, they invoke a standard for judging the decisions of a court
by the manner in which it makes its decisions, but one which the appellate
courtsat least, have yet to define.
The adversary model
While due process remains a strong, but ambiguous standard for
judging the equity of individual defendants' treatment in the criminal
courts, the adversarial model is equally powerful, and clearly, if not
operationally, drawn. In fact, the assumption that ours is an adversarial
system of criminal justice has undergirded most of the recent applications
of the due process clause to the criminal courts. Some of our understanding
of what constitutes an adversarial process is shaped by these decisions.
The cases which have established the right of indigents to be supplied with
legal counsel, for example, have portrayed a counsel who advocates the
rights of the accused as an adversary to the prosecutor.
A model of the adversary process has been even more dutifully
defined by the legal profession, through its guidelines for the role and
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ethics of the criminal lawyer. Traditionally, the American Bar Association (ABA)
has viewed the lawyer's obligations to the public interest as being met by
the vigorous advccacy of the rights of a single client. If the interests
on both sides of the adversary contest are represented single-mindedly,
the Bar Association view assumes that the results would reveal the truth
in the case and the lawyer would have done his duty.
From both Supreme Court decisions and the professional statements
of the ABA emerges a fairly consistent conception of what might be meant
by an adversarial model of the court. The major feature is, of course, that
disputes are two sided and that by airing the views of each side the truth
will emerge. For this model to be credible a number of assumptions have
to be accepted -- that truth is discoverable, that this process can dis-
cover it, that each side wants to win, and that each can muster the
resources that will make a contest. Finally, the model demands the faith
that it is possible for the adversaries to discern the difference between
innocence and guilt and to recognize fact when it is presented.
Even the most thorny of these assumptions have found their way
into most models of decision making in the courts. The single most in-
fluential has probably been the underlying notion that there are two sides
in the court -- the prosecution and the defense -- and these two' sides are
in conflict with each other. Evidence of cooperation among prosecution
and defense must in this view be taken to mean that the defendant is not
being fairly represented, since his case is not "fought." Thus, fairness
under an adversarial model requires the maintenance of conflict within the
court structure and implies some strict guidelines for procedure. These
guidelines have, in turn, become critical to proposals for reform: the
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defendant must openly "confront" his accusers, equal resources must be
given to the defendant and the prosecution, and the roles played by court
personnel must support the "battle" between the two sides.
A minimum requirement for an adversarial process, then, is that the
defendant has a right to be personally confronted with the evidence against
him and then to respond in his own defense. Less attention has been given
to defining what constitutes this kind of accusatorial system than has
been devoted to depicting its opposite -- the inquisitional system -- as
inequitable by comparison. Lawyers point with pride to what they see as
the differences between the manner in which defendants are treated by the
police and by the courts. Yale Kamisar's vivid -- though ungrounded --
analysis of the courts contrasts the fact finding methods of the police
to the truth finding focus of the courts by reference to the police as the
"gatehouse" and the courts as the "mansion."22 Kamisar argues that while
the police tend to gather evidence through inquisition, it is in the safety
of the criminal court, that "the enemy of the state is repersonalized,
even dignified, the public invited, and a stirring ceremony in honor of
individual freedom from law enforcement is celebrated."23
However exaggerated, Kamisar's description conveys what appears
to be central to most conceptions of an accusatorial system -- tliat it is
public and that it is a trial, with all of its attendant ceremony. Court
reformers have argued, in fact, that the trial is the only mechanism which
can allow the defendant to review the evidence against him, and that the
practice of plea bargaining as an alternative to trial is a form of the
inquisitorial not the accusatorial system.24
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Just as the roots of the adversary model may lie in the need to
provide mechanisms by which citizens can challenge the actions of govern-
ment in open court, it requires that the citizen is given sufficient
resources to bring about his challenge. In this sense, the adversarial
model requires that the interests of the State and the accused are some-
how "balanced." Balance has always been an issue for the criminal process
because of the strong sanctions the State has available in comparison to
the weak position of the defendant. Equity under an adversary model lies,
in matching the resources of the State with a lawyer for the defense -- and
thus,in theory, reducing the power of the State.
Under the assumption of an adversary process, provision of counsel
to indigent defendants has been argued to be a way of restoring balance.
A second mechanism presented as insurance that the interests of the
defendant are adequately represented is traditionally the use of the jury
system. The jury in this sense is seen as a community judgment of the
accused that can act as a buffer between the State and the defendant and
help balance the defendant's resources.25
A critical point for debate is whether balance can be achieved
in the absence of a defense counsel, a jury, or more important, a trial.
Recently adopted rules of criminal procedure have argued that balance might
be assured somewhat if the defendant is given enough information with which
to judge his own situation. He should not be allowed to plead guilty with-
out being informed of the consequences of a guilty plea, for example. Pro-
cedures which allow the defense the privilege of discovery of the State's
case also constitute an attempt to balance the resources available to the
accused.
- 25 -
In the adversary model as it is most often used by court re-
formers, however, balance between the two sides can only be restored
through trial and representation by counsel. The emphasis of the adversary
model is fundamentally the process by which defendants are adjudicated
and not whether the outcome is equitable. In this view the public interest
is better served each time both sides square off, than if the same result
could be achieved without trial. According to one observer, creating a
balance of interest and conducting a trial is critical even if the out-
come of the process is to permit errors in favor of guilty defendants.26
Since the prosecutor and the defense counsel represent the "sides"
in the adversary model their roles are more clearly implied by the notion
of conflict than are those of other court personnel. Because he represents
the State's side, the prosecutor is usually seen as a kind of junior judge,
with the discretion to determine what charges are in the public interest:
He must approve the evidence on which' the indict-
ment may be demanded and the accused defendant
tried, if he be indicted, and in that service
must judge of its availability, competency, and
probative significance. He must on occasion con-
sider the public impact of criminal proceedings
or again, balance the admonitory value of invar-
iable and inflexible punishment against the
greater impulse of the 'quality of mercy.' He
must determine what offenses and whom to prose-
cute.27
While the prosecutor has the clear discretion not to charge the defendant,
it seems true that in the best adversarial tradition his decision is to be
guided by some conception of the good of the State. Prosecutorial decisions
are viewed as being made on the basis of the possible public image the case
might present, and on an assessment of the strength of the State's case.
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In the face of the power of the prosecutor, the defense counsel
has been at least recently assumed to be critical to the balance of the
adversary model. His role is usually defined by reference to the role of
his opponent -- the prosecutor. Since the adversary model assumes that the
prosecutor is "skilled," the counsel becomes a person who can provide the
defendant with a comparable set of skills. The appellate decisions re-
lating to the right to counsel have articulated a number of skills which
lawyers can provide for their clients during the course of a trial. Since
the prosecution is trying to minimize the chances that the defense will
win, Williams v. Kaiser, for example, admitted that the prosecutor was
likely to become "overzealous" in his prosecution and violate the rights
of the defendant.28  In this definition of his role the lawyer is seen as
a protection against a prosecutor with unbounded desires to win.
The trial itself is also viewed as a threat to the defendant,
since its tensions "make him unfit to give his explanation properly and
completely."29 Thus, by another interpretation the role of the lawyer is.
to become a kind of coach who prepares the defendant to deliver his"lines"
during the trial.
Because of the view that the criminal process is a contest between
the resources of the prosecution and the skills of the defense, the parts
played by the judge and the defendant have been less well defined. The
adversary model asks only that the judge act as a guarantor of fair pro-
cedure and that his sentencing decision be based primarily on his assess-
ment of the facts which emerge from the cases presented by the prosecutor
and the defense counsel. The degree to which the judge may become involved
in the work of the prosecutor or to which he may provide assistance to the
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defendant who is not receiving adequate counsel is not ordinarily treated
in discussions of the adversarial process. There is clearly a tension,
however, between traditional judicial theory, which argues that the judge
must be free of any associations which might affect the objectivity of his
decisions, and the adversarial model which dictates the necessity of
balancing the sides of the conflict.
The defendant is mentioned less often as an actor in the
adversarial process then is the judge, perhaps since it is assumed that he
will be represented by counsel. Most court cases which assume an adver-
sarial model have depicted the defendant as incapable of acting in his own
defense, frightened, and inarticulate. One case, for example, argues:
When the average defendant is placed in the
witness chair and told that nobody can ask
him questions and that he may make such a
statement to the jury as he sees proper in
his own defense, he has been set adrift in
an unchartered sea with nothing to guide
him; he may be overwhelmed by the situation
and embarrassed; it will not be surprising
if his explanation is incoherent or if it
overlooks important circumstances. 30
This view of the defendant appears to be in conflict with the basic tenet
of the adversary system that a defendant has a right to confront his
accusers and to act in his own defense.
Within the strictest limits of the adversary process, these
images of the defendant are not in conflict. While the defendant as an
individual may be confused and helpless, in court he can become part of a
well-prepared "side" in case. An argument for aid to indigent defendants,
for example, explains that the Court's attempt to subsidize transcripts
for indigent defendants "does not presuppose a general commitment on the
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part of the federal government to relieve impoverished persons of the con-
sequences of limited means," but that it acts to rid the criminal nrocess
of all problems that might tend to defeat the ends of the adversarial
system.31 Thus, from this perspective, the court may believe the defendant
incapable of understanding the criminal process and still assure that he
is informed of his rights, if that information is necessary to build a
balanced adversarial contest.
Especially in light of such bold assumptions as its view of the
defendant, the survival of the adversary model may seem surprising. In
fact, its resistance to challenae has been unusually strong. As it has
become clearer that many decisions in the criminal courts are the product
of bargains, not contests between the prosecution and the defense, it
should have been difficult to retain the assumption that the courts
operate -- or ought to operate -- on an adversarial model. While the
existence of plea bargaining has been acknowledged since at least the
turn of the century, however, there has been reluctance to accept it as
an alternative to the adversary system. Even when it has been argued that
plea bargaining is a more efficient mechanism for processing cases than
the more time consuming trial system, new grounds have been found to
explain the desirability of retaining an adversary system.
One argument, for example, has been that while the adversary
system is not efficient, it is at least more equitable, since it does not
depend on the defendant's skill in striking a good bargain. Thus, when the
adversary model is attacked as infeasible or inequitable, the response is
often similar to that of Pbraham Blumberg. "No known scientific procedures
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have demonstrated in scientific rigorous terms that they can, in fact,
more readily sort out the innocent from the guilty than the adversary
combative system of due process." 32
It is just this kind of dogged faith in the adversary model --
however it might be questioned on empirical grounds -- that has spurred
major reform movements in the courts. Reforms have most often been
directed at trying to recover the due process standards of the courts,
even though they do not always agree on precisely what due process means.
Similarly, adversarial assumptions undergird most of the proposals for
reform of the courts, though it is widely acknowledaed that the courts
have never actually achieved an adversary sYstem of justice.
In the sections that follow we will review the ways in which
reformers have tried to snatch the courts away from the grips of bar-
gaining and "crime control" and assert due process, adversarial standards.
The procedural reformers face this task head on, proposing rules and
procedures to enforce these standards. Administrative reformers posit
a more indirect model of channe, resting on the belief that relieving
administrative pressures will make it possible for court personnel to
pay attention to the rules the procedural reformers have tried to levy.
We will try to examine these claims critically, showing what asiaumotions
underly each approach to reform and whether they seem justified. Our
purpose is, of course, to provide a backdrop with which to look at
negoitated justice -- the reform which has reacted to the procedural and
administrative reforms by rejecting the adversarial, due process model




The hope of lawyers, judges and law reform groups has long
been the reform of the courts through modification of procedure.
During the past twenty years the pace of procedural reform has quick-
ened, culminating most recently in the efforts of the Supreme Court
to define the rights of the criminal defendant to counsel and to
limitthe ability of the courts to use evidence. Even with this
flurry of activity, attempts to return to the adversary model are
slow. Successful efforts at defining the process of assigning
counsel and limiting access to evidence must be balanced by the
myriad of procedural decisions the court has yet to consider. In
fact, all the arrangements by which the court exercises official
power are fair game for procedural reformers: "the information which
must be secured, the people whose views must be listened to, the
findings and justifications of the decisions which must be made, and
the formal requisites of action which must be observed." 33
The advocates of procedural reform argue that, however slow,
procedural strategies can change the criminal courts on at least two levels.
While the immediate goal is to help assure a just disposition for an
individual defendant, the imposition of new procedures is also directed at
shaping the court as an institution.34 To argue that a procedural change
will affect the disposition of any individual case requires a great deal of
faith in the court's system of review. It assumes that if court personnel
do not follow procedural guidelines, some mechanism in the court will inform
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defendants of their right to appeal. The court itself has yet to deal
with the question of whether informing defendants of a right is enough to
assure either that they understand its meaning or that they will assert it.
The argument that procedure also shapes institutions is not
clearly drawn. It appears to be based less on the assumption that pro-
cedure will alter the objectives of the institution as much as that it will
reinforce the adversarial model, even at the expense of individual cases.
In this sense, procedural reform seems based on a kind of social utili-
tarianism. While procedures may sometimes allow a "guilty" defendant to
escape punishment, reformers argue,"if the criminal goes free in order to
serve a larger and more important end, then social justice is done even if
individual justice is not."35 This "larger and more important end" appears
to be the need to assert the adversary model. New procedures are likely to
be judged successful in shaping the court so long as they "[give] each of
the participants in a dispute the opportunity to sustain his position" and
"[do] not create conditions which add to the inequality of position between
the parties."36 The hope of procedural reformers is that the actions of
court personnel can be regulated to produce a criminal process closely
resembling the adversary ideal through revisions in procedure, but without
interfering with the basic goals of the court.
The long history of procedural reform raises several questions
about the efficacy of procedural reform -- at the level of both individual
cases and the court itself.37 Before the 18th century there were very few
procedural safeguards in criminal courts, and the assumption was that since
the defendant was guilty, the only role of the State was to prove it.
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As concern for balancing the power of the State grew up in other sectors,
juries in criminal courts began to exert pressures for reform by refusing
to indict defendants or to convict them. The result was a modest attempt
to develop minimal procedural safeguards for the defendant, focusing
especially on establishing a presumption of innocence and requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the 19th century under the banner of humanitarianism,
court rules and procedures underwent a massive reformulation. The very
enthusiastic procedural reformers of this period hoped that if rights could
be defined in enough detail the courts would be constrained to deal justly
with defendants. The result was an exhaustive specification of procedures,
.and by the beginning of the 20th century the courts possessed a tangle of
highly formalistic rules, which, according to many observers of the period,
nearly clogged the courts into inaction. It was at this point that pro-
cedural reformers began to wonder whether courts could indeed be proced-
urally correct and handle the volume of cases that was flooding the courts.
The period that followed this deluge of procedure was charac-
terized by skepticism about what procedural reform could accomplish. Was
it protecting defendants orin fact, coddling them and interfering with
the goals of punishment? In which direction was the balance of advantage
shifting? How sensitive was procedure to the administrative needs of the
courts or was it a burden? Did procedural reform merely alter the symbols
of the court or did it actually impact the structure of the courts? These
questions are worth considering in some detail since they have remained at
the center of the debate over procedural reform.
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The first hard look at the interests being served by procedural
changes came immediately on the heels of the procedural revolution at the
turn of the century. The debate that followed is at best still a stale-
mate. The charge that procedural modifications had given undue advantage
to the defense stemmed from the observation that a large number of criminal
defendants who admitted guilt were released on the grounds of "technicalities."
Because of its evident interest in securing convictions, the prosecution
viewed this situation as evidence of an altered balance of interests. The
most quoted spokesman for this point of view was the judge in U.S. v. Garson
who argued that "our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the
accused. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery
sentiment that obstructs, clogs and defeats the prosecution of crime." 38
Those who see the weight of procedural advantage as lying with
the prosecutor, of course, do not recognize punishment as the goal of the
30
criminal process. Abraham Goldstein has argued in an often ouoted article "
that procedure has always favored the prosecutor and that recent procedural
reforms have aggravated this situation by "loosening standards of pleading
and proof, without introducing compensatory safeguards earlier in the
process."40 What concerns Goldstein is that the new rules have lessened
judicial scrutiny of the level of proof which a prosecutor must present for
conviction, at the same time that no corresponding change has occurred in
ability of the defense to request pre-trial disclosure of evidence. In
Goldstein's view the result is that the prosecutor's power to convict is
increased while the ability of the defense counsel to prepare a case is
not.
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Goldstein's concern over the equity of procedural reform could
also have been expressed as an indictment of the reformers for not con-
sidering how one procedural change would affect the rest of the system. A
strong attempt to take the impacts of procedure into consideration followed
closely on the heels of the procedural revolution at the turn of the
century.
Borrowing heavily from the lessons of a successfully reformed
civil procedure, a group of "legal realists"41 argued that court procedure
should avoid becoming overly complex. Especially in the face of the
urbanization of the court system and the resulting rise in caseload, a
new kind of procedure, more sensitive to the administrative demands on the
courts, would be required. The vision of this kind of procedure was that
it would be simple enough that its meaning would be as visible to defendants
as to court personnel, and that it would be flexible enough to change as
the organization of the courts changed.42
Certainly the rash of Constitutional decisions which characterized
the past twenty years is testimony to the failure of the legal realists to
reduce either the fragmentation or the volume of procedural changes. Critics
of procedural reform also add that even if procedure could be streamlined,
its structure runs counter to the reality of the criminal process. The
means emphasis of procedure and its assumption that the criminal process
is -- or should be -- adversarial leaves procedural reform vulnerable to
charges of being insensitive to the nature of the criminal process.
Since procedural reform tries to impose an adversarial model on
the courts, it logically deals only with those problems which are charac-
teristic of an adversarial system. An example of this problem is the
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procedural revision made in Mallory v. United States43 -- that criminal
suspects should be brought promptly before the court, to allow the de-
cisions of the police to be reviewed. This change is based on the assump-
tion that the court will review police decisions, because it operates on
a presumption of innocence, and thus, questions whether arrests and
charges were made on valid grounds. Mallory may be successful in changing
the arrest practices of the police, only if the court structure in fact
provides incentives to review -- or to threaten to review -- their de-
cisions. Those who believe the criminal process is a series of bargains --
rather than a formal contest -- argue that the court personnel cannot formally
question the police, and that Mallory provides no incentive to change.
The means emphasis implied by procedural reform also leaves it
open to charges of being blind to the nature of the criminal process. The
cases which have established the right of counsel illustrate this problem.
Though thorough in other respects, these cases never articulate the specific
role that would be played by a counsel to the indigent. Instead there was
a strong indication that it was the presence of counsel -- whatever his
specific duties and skills -- that was to help insure that the defendant's
rights would be upheld.
In fact, it is reasonable to think that it is the presence of the
lawyer that prevents some unjust practices by making the defendant's treat-
ment more open to scrutiny, and thus, discouraging the court from taking
advantage of the defendant. In addition, because the lawyer is also in a
position to make the defendant aware of his own rights, the defendant himself
becomes less vulnerable. But here, too, the emphasis on means is evident,
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since the intent is less making certain that the defendant asserts his
rights and more to assure he has been informed of them. This distinction
is well-articulated by Yale Kamisar in an argument for procedural reform:
I do not claim that the state has an obligation
to prevent a suspect from incriminating himself.
I do contend that it must ensure that the sus-
pect is aware that he need not and cannot be
made to incriminate himself.- I do not claim that
the state should or even that it can eliminate all
the subtle and personal 'inequalities' which
'disadvantage' some subjects of police interroga-
tion more than others. I do contend that so far
as it is reasonably possible that the state can
and should ensure that the choice of the weak
* and the ignorant and poor to speak or not to
speak is as free and informed as their more
fortunately informed bretheren. 44
Thus, in this view the success of the procedures like the assignment of
counsel is to be assessed not so much on its impact on the outcomes of
cases, but for its success in changing the mode by which conclusions are
drawn.
A critical question,then, is how effective procedural reform can
be in bringing about change in the court, if it is indeed not addressed to
its operating structure. Certainly, there is little empirical evidence to
support or dispute the claims made by the critics of procedural reform.
We do know, however, that since procedural reform, many more crii"Inal
defendants have been acquitted because they were illegally searched or
interrogated, and that, increasingly,courts are instituting procedures for
informing defendants of their rights. Are any of these uses of procedures
likely to be more than symbolic -- providing routes of appeal only in cases
where the court structure would already have supported them?
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Thurman Arnold argues that it is in the nature of courts to per-
form acts which are purely symbolic -- but that the strength of that
symbolism is critical to the image of the court as a dispenser of justice.45
He suggests that since symbolic institutions lose prestige unless they
appear to be firmly founded on reason, their principles must be flexible
enough to allow for conflicting perspectives and goals: "A people will
never accept an institution which does not symbolize for them the simul-
taneously inconsistent notions to which they are at various times emotion-
ally responsive."46 By this interpretation, procedure is a way of main-
taining the conflicting goals of the court -- of visibly demonstrating that
the rights of individual defendants are being protected, at the same time
that the court ceremony and its sanctions can demonstrate the role of the
court in correcting criminals. As an advocate for the rights of even the
indigent defendant, for example, the court-assigned lawyer is an eloquent
public symbol of the court's intent-to be fair, and to conduct an adversary
contest.
While it does establish the importance of procedures at one level,
this argument begs the question of whether procedures can alter the funda-
mental structure of the courts. Its harshest critics suggest that it
cannot, since court personnel employ procedures selectively at the same
time that they often do have strong interests in not altering the ways in
which things are done. In this sense, there is evidence that procedures
are viewed by court personnel as the "rules of the game," which will be
strongly valued by those they benefit. In the case of new rules of dis-
covery which might favor the defendant, for example, Goldstein points out
that they have been publically resisted by court personnel on the grounds
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that a defendant who knows the case against him can then fabricate evidence
47
or intimidate witnesses. In fact, Goldstein suggests, it was more likely
that court personnel opposed the changes because they worked out informal
relationships under the "old rules," which satisfied all the conflicting
interests in the court.
This view of procedures as strongly held values is also supported
by Lemert's case study of change in the organization of juvenile courts in
California.48 Like Goldstein he found that changes in procedures were often
resisted because each member of the court was able to view the old proce-
dure as meeting his own interests. The sheriff likes a procedure because
he thinks it allows him to increase his salary, the prosecutor, because it
enables him to get convictions,and the judge,because it clears his dockets.
In this respect procedure in courts may be even more resistant to change
than rules in other kinds of organizations.
Court procedure is highly specialized, bound by concepts of
precedent, and the province of a profession, not merely an individual court.
A specific procedure may.be strongly valued not only because it serves the
informal structure of the court, but also because it is rooted in the
authority and tradition of the court.
Administrative reform
Though both argue from a concern for the prevalence of bargaining
in the courts, proposals for reform through administrative strategies
articulate a model for change markedly different from that implicit in pro--
cedural reform. Where the procedural reformers are hopeful that regulations
will constrain the behavior of court personnel, those advocating administra-
tive measures express skepticism that the behavior of court officials will
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change until the organizational pressures on them are eased. While pro-
cedural reform sees plea bargaining somewhat as an invention of court
personnel, administrative reformers focus more on its genesis as a systemic
response to massive changes in caseload. In each instance, the model
advocated by proposals we have categorized as primarily.administrative
stresses the need to begin with measures that will increase the efficiency
of the courts so that eventually the pressures which are believed to cause
the departure from due process can be reduced. Typically, the tools of
management and systems analysis are called upon to achieve these ends.
The acceptance of this kind of reform in the criminal courts has
been difficult, especially in contrast to the history of procedural reform.
Though procedure is the natural tool of the legal system, the technology
of other fields has been long and stubbornly resisted by the courts.
Certainly, there has been a traditional reluctance to subject
the courts to external influences of any kind. Until quite recently the.
concept of judicial isolation prevented the acceptance of any administra-
tive assistance in the judiciary for fear that the judge might be subjected
to pressures which could affect his objectivity. Most judges, as a result,
even now have not surrendered their.dual roles of adjudicating cases and
acting as chief administrators of their own courts. The control of court
policy by the legal profession has undoubtably further strenghtened this
reluctance of the courts to focus on their administrative problems. Since
court related problems have traditionally been expressed as specialized
legal issues, the legal profession has most often emerged as the source of
expertise on court administration.
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Had there not been a close association between the development
of procedural reform and the identification of the administrative needs of
the court, administrative reform might have occurred even more slowly.
Since the procedural tangle which engulfed the courts in the late 19th
century pointed up the need to rationalize procedure, proposals for alter-
ing the administration of the courts emerged as a response to the courts'
procedural overload. Borrowing from the experience of reformers who had
reorganized civil procedure in the same period, administrative reformers
were able to argue that elaborate procedural systems had to be counter-
balanced by efficiency in the organizations charged with implementing them.
Early in this century the report of the Wickersham Commission,
for example, argued for this position, suggesting that proper administra-
tion could indeed mitigate the ill-effects of an over-elaborate procedural
system. "Good organization, equipment, methods, and principles of admin-
istration on the part of the police, prosecution, and the courts would
largely nullify the power of so-called 'technicalities' to do harm.49"
While many of the early arguments for administrative reform did appear --
like the Wickersham Commission -- to take the form of attacks on the in-
efficiency of procedural reform, most of them did hasten to add that it
was important to protect the rights of defendants through procedure. Their
avowed intent was to provide an efficient enough organization that court
personnel would have the opportunity of giving time to procedural safe-
guards.
Riding on the heels of procedural reform, administrative reformers
could argue that they provided a complementary strategy. The factor which
clinched the case for administrative reform was its currency in other parts
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of the criminal justice system. By the turn of the century police depart-
ments had begun to adopt increasing numbers of investigative tools, includ-
ing,even at this period, ballistic and fingerprinting devices.50 The
courts were interested in the technology available to the policeand this
interest was heightened by the recognition that court administration in
Europe was the province of technologists and "experts" in management, not
lawyers and judges. As experts from other fields -- especially social work
and medicine -- gradually began to play roles in American courts, it became
more feasible to argue that, like the police, courts could accomplish their
work more efficiently if they were supplied with technical assistance from
outside the legal profession.
Recent proposals have broadened the range of technology to be
applied to the courts from court management and investigative devices to
personnel programs, information systems and case scheduling. With the
initial attempts to introduce new technology into the courts they share a
belief that the departure of the courts from due process is a result of
inefficient organization -- forcing the courts to compromise justice in
order to process cases. They have responded to this problem by recommend-
ing a large number of piecemeal modifications in the methods by which cases
are handled.
The very diversity of these proposals makes it difficult to
analyze administrative reform as a single coherent effort. Instead, we
have chosen to isolate one of the issues on which these proposals have -
focused and to ask how they have responded to it. The most common theme
in administrative reforms -- especially those which advocate changes in
scheduling and information gathering -- is the elimination of delay in the
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processing of cases. How have administrative reformers defined the problem
of delay? What justifications have they offered for its elimination? What
kinds of strategies have they proposed?
The speed at which cases are processed has been one of the most
frequently used criteria for evaluating courts. How much delay courts
allow is of particular interest to administrative reformers, because delay
is a primary measure of administrative inefficiency. Delay is usually
defined as the time between the arrestof an offender and his first appear-
ance in courtorasthe total time between the arrest and the trial and dis-
position. In some courts, delays as long as a year and a half from arrest
to disposition and as long as one year between arrest and trial have been
recorded.
Administrative reforms have offered at least two explanations for
the existence of delays of this magnitude: the resources of the court
cannot accommodate the demand generated by urban caseloads, and scheduling
techniques cannot make adequate use of the resources which do exist. Both
views of delay treat the problem as an anomaly, not an outgrowth of the
courts' structure. These proposals suggest, for example, that the court is
prevented from absorbing large caseloads because it has a fixed budget and
labor force. In fact, courts cannot easily respond to their casbioads by
increasing their resources,since their budgets are controlled legislatively.
The result is that, in courts like the District of Columbia Court of General
Sessions, four judges in one court process nearly 1,500 felonies, 7,500
misdemeanors, 38,000 petty offenses, and an equal number of traffic cases
in a year.51 Even when a court is allowed to. increase its personnel,
adding judicial'and prosecutorial resources is often difficult. Within a
- 43 -
profession whose numbers are somewhat restricted by its specialized train-
ing, the practice of criminal law has been an increasingly unpopular choice,
and the result is only a small pool of criminal lawyers from which to draw.
Drawing on the earliest arguments made for administrative reform,
these proposals also invoke procedural overload as a reason for the
prevalence of delay. In this view the court is even now clogged by
elaborate procedures, including "archaic" methods for scheduling cases. In
its policy statement on crime, for instance, the Committee on Economic
Development commented that "certain otherwise commendable Supreme Court
decisions, such as those assuring legal counsel for defendants at all
stages, have slowed court processes." 52 This argument reiterates the belief
that the procedural reformers failed to consider the impacts of their
proposals on the courts, but that, in fact, being procedurally correct
should not cost the court in time or efficiency of operation. It now costs
dearly, the argument goes, because courts have not introduced effective
systems for allocating time to cases. In some jurisdictions, the judge and
the clerk manage all cases, and in most, complex records are kept by hand.
The one explanation for delay not possible within these arguments
is that courts intentionally delay the disposition of their cases. Other
sources make strong arguments for delay as a functional tool in-the court's
handling of cases. 53 Delay may be employed by both judges and lawyers to
provide time for gathering evidence, locating dispositions or putting
pressure on defendants and witnesses to cooperate. The model implicit in
proposals for administrative reform would not tolerate this view of delay.
Unlike procedural reform which attempts to control the decisions of court
personnel directly -- through regulation -- 'administrative measures depend
- 44 -
on the theory that changes in the organization of the court will result in
predictable, but indirect changes in the behavior of court personnel. To
fit this model, then, delay must be a problem which will be sensitive to
organizational changes -- an intentional use of delay by court personnel
would not be predictably affected by changes in the court's resources, or
perhaps, not even in its scheduling devices.
The justification for decreasing delays in case processing is
most often expressed in terms of the costs of delay. Indeed,the invest-
ment of resources in speeding the disposition of cases could be justified
in these terms alone. The time incurred in waiting for trial is clearly
costly to lawyers and witnesses. The lost opportunities suffered by
.defendants and their families, especially while defendants await trial in
jail, lose wages, and incur costs for child support, cannot even be cal-
culated. It is evident that both the economic and human costs of waiting
for trial can be high.
Proposals for administrative reform appear to feel that they must
also justify their actions in the same terms as procedural reformers.
Their arguments try to link the impacts of delay with the bargaining
process. According to the model which administrative reformers build, 54
the courts attempt to reduce delay by emphasizing the settlement'of cases.
Because courts are monitored on the basis of their average delay in pro-
cessing cases, court personnel become preoccupied with moving cases and
clearing the docket. Thus, wherever a bargain can be struck which speeds
the progress of a case, in this model, court personnel are likely to
sacrifice the rights of the defendant to trial or to other basic procedural
safeguards. The sentencing decision may then not be based either on penal
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or correctional considerations, but rather on the success of court personnel
in suggesting a good bargain to the judge.
In this model, delay, clearly, is seen as a direct cause of
bargaining. In effect, then, administrative reformers are allowing their
justification for interveninq in the courts to rest heavily on the nature
of bargaining. They argue that delay in the- processing of cases ought to
be reduced because delay produces pressures for bargaining. Like procedural
reformers, they make only an ex post facto case for the evils of bargaining.
In fact, their case rests on a very specific set of assumotions about
bargaining. They depict it as a process which has efficiency of case
processing as its goal and which succeeds well enough in speeding up
cases that court personnel employ it intentionally when they are pressured.
They imply, in addition, that bargaining is not in the interests of the
defendant, because it gives his case only short shrift, though they also
argue that speedy justice is to the benefit of the defendant.
Though their justifications speak of eliminating bargaining, the
strategies proposed by administrative reformers all attempt to increase the
resources of the court for dealing with its caseloads -- with a decrease
in bargaining as only an indirect result. Adding to the personnel of the
courts is, of course, the most direct means for meetinq the increased
demands on the court. Indeed, manpower strategies are commonly proposed
by administrative reformers, but as a response to the problems of delay,
they are often rejected as infeasible. It is estimated, for example, that
under present conditions four times the current level of personnel would
be required to meet current caseloads, were bargaining to disappear.55
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The costs of added personnel have tended to concentrate the
attention of administrative reformers on less direct strategies. Par-
ticularly common are proposals for improving the scheduling of cases and
the flow of information within the court. Models for scheduling cases are
usually simple listings of ideal intervals between each stage of the
criminal process. The President's Crime Commission, for example, suggested
a goal of no more than four months from arrest to disposition and no more
than five additional months if elaborate appeals are made.56 This would
mean, for example, that the period from arrest to first court appearance
should be no more than 24 hours. Though this approach tries to provide
rather precise guidelines which courts can use to monitor cases, the ex-
pectation is clearly that cases cannot be scheduled precisely. Strict
adherence to guidelines is seen as impossible, not because court personnel
are not willing, but because it is assumed that contingencies like failure
of witnesses to show up or the discovery of new evidence in a case would
make only approximate scheduling likely.
The necessity of keeping track of how long cases have been in the
system, if scheduling procedures are to succeed, often couples scheduling
and information system strategies. Proposals for systems of this type
stress that information is necessary for setting priorities amor cases
(deciding which are "routine" and which must be allowed a longer processing
time), for locating witnesses, attorneys and other principles in a case,
and for making certain that no case exceeds the recommended guidelines.
Courts could be asked to create files of information, for example, relating
to the schedule a case follows and its history, the projected loads on
judges and court facilities, and management statistics on the overall
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workload of the court.57 The assumption is that given adequate informa-
tion, court personnel will have no reason not to maintain a more efficient
flow of cases, and that this increased efficiency in scheduling will re-
sult in a reduction in delay.
These strategies place a great deal of faith in the power of
information to change the behavior of court personnel. Because they do not
assume that the court intentionally causes delays in cases, they can also
assume that given enough guidelines for timing and information for moni-
toring cases court personnel will have no reason not to move them quickly.
As a model for change, thoughthis argument remains undirected, especially
compared to that offered by procedural reformers. Procedural strategies
posit that decisions about criminal defendants must be regulated directly.
If the rules for processing defendants are made explicit enough,then de-
cisions can be reviewed and court personnel censured for violations of
procedures. Administrative strategies, on the other hand, posit that there
are general pressures on court personnel which make them bargain. Stra-
tegies are aimed at creating a more generally efficient court organization,
but without any specification of the pressures at which t; are aimed.
The model depends very heavily on the theory that the ove :1 efficiency of
the court has direct impacts on the decisions of individual pers'dnnel and
that administrative changes will "filter down."
Negotiated justice
Most proposals for reform reflect astubborn faith in the ability
of 'the courts to operate on an adversarial model. Very few question the
model -- whether it is a realistic description of the kinds of relationships
that might happen in the criminal courts or whether it is still appropriate
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at all in the face of the changing goals of the criminal justice system.
A handful of advocates for reform of the courts through negotiated justice
have asked these questions. Though fragmented and tentative, their
answers do point to a growing acceptance of plea bargaining -- not the
adversary system -- as an operating model for the courts and a feeling that
the adversary'system can no longer respond to the changing demands on the
courts.
Despite what seems like a radical departure from other proposals for
court reform, advocates of negotiated justice do share much with adminis-
trative "nd procedural reformers. Rather than abandoning the possibility
of due process, they argue that it can be maintained even while bargaining
is taking place. What is required is a set of rules, standards, and goals -
much like those envisioned by procedural reformers -- which could regulate
bargaining to give defendants due process. In this sense, due process
serves less as a model for organization of the courts and more as a general
guideline which can be upheld during bargaining.
Employing bargaining as an operating model appears to represent a
complete shift in the formal structure of the court, The flavor of pro-
posals for negotiated justice very much contradicts this assumption. They
deny quite strongly that what they are proposing is essentially - civil,
not a criminal system.58 It is true that like the civil courts, negotiated
justice would allow for the settlement of the majority of cases without a
full trial of issues, and would encourage an emphasis on "fact" finding
rather than "truth" finding. The critical difference between the civil and
the criminal systems, however, is that criminal cases are initiated by the
state and the state is a formal party to the case. Civil cases, on the
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other hand, involve disputes between two private parties who are, at least
in the eyes of the law,"equals." If the state and the defendant are
inherently in conflict, even though they bargain with each other, some
provision has to be made for safeguarding the defendant against the power
of the state. Unlike the civil system, then, proposals for negotiated
justice have 'accepted this idea that there is conflict between the state
and the accused, and on this premise they justify the regulation of the
bargaining process.
Advocates of negotiated justice, then, do not argue that they are
transforming the criminal court to a civil model, nor do they all admit that
they are shifting the structure or goals of the courts at all. Instead,
they suggest that they are merely formalizing and regulating the decision
making process that has been the dominant model in the courts for decades.
Even the most recent do not enthusiastically embrace plea bargaining as a
mode of operation, and instead, almost grudingly admit that since bargain-
ing cannot be dispelled, it should at least be regulated.
The roots of negotiated justice
The assumptions of the few, fragmented proposals we have identified
as negotiated justice are easily traced. The earliest merely call for
recognition of the discretionary nature of decisions made by criminal
justice personnel. A second set make some suggestions for how this dis-
cretion might be retained and still be regulated. In either case, it would
be pretentious to label these proposals"reforms "since they are merely
isolated attempts to make sense out of informal methods for processing
criminal defendants.
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The first proposals we have labeled neootiated justice are found in the
traditions of police administration, and very modestly attempt to fathom
the problem of police discretion. The public recognition of the discre-
tionary powers of the police necessarily spawned interest in mechanisms for
limiting the scope of police discretion. Control through strict legisla-
tive definition of police powers had often been proposed but the police
resisted actively, arguing that legislative involvement in law enforcement
would weaken the force of the criminal law and the judiciary.
An option designed to be more acceptable to the police was to
establish a board that would divide the ex post facto evaluation of police
decisions among police representatives and personnel from other agencies.
The purpose of this board was to devise a means "whereby abusive judgments
[could] be minimized or neutralized and conscientious judgments guided to
ensure consistency with the totality of goals of a criminal law system."59
The assumption, then, was that the discretionary powers of individual
policemen could be balanced if enough interests were represented in a
reviewing committee.
It was evident that ex post facto review only very indirectly --
and slowly -- affected the decisions of the individual policeman. The next
obvious step was to encourage him to exercise judgment, but withi5i a set of
guidelines.60 A number of ambitious attempts have been made to see that
the policeman is provided with rules for making an arrest decision -- who
to arrest, on what grounds, and what alternatives to use when arrest is not.
indicated. Wilson suggests that this approach represents the attempt of
the legal profession to "judicialize" the police:
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The remedy, therefore, is to bureaucratize or
judicialize the police: make them subject to
more and more explicit rules, have these rules
reviewed by the courts or other non-police
agencies and reduce their discretion whenever
possible. Lawyers for whom "clear standards"
is always a favorite remedy for administrative
discretion are especially inclined to take this
approach.61
In the sense that they do work for change through the imposition
of rules, these proposals appear to be similar to procedural reforms. If
enough explicit guidelines can be provided, decisions made by individual
policemen are likely to be consistent with official goals. Where these
proposals depart from procedural reform in the courts is that they admit
that regardless of rules some police decisions will still be discretionary,
and in fact, that the policeman should have the ability to individualize
decisions on a case by case basis. Because of the nature of the police-
man's job, they argue, it is only possible to define the conditions suf-
ficient to arrest a suspect for a crime, not to predict the actions to be
taken when the job is one of "maintaining order."62 Order maintenance,
especially, is still left to be defined and executed by the individual
policeman with whatever means he chooses.
For many reasons, the courts have been much slower to admit that
their personnel in fact make equally discretionary decisions. The prev-
alence of plea bargaining,in particular, forced attention to the ways in
which court personnel make decisions. A handful of proposals has attempted
to give recognition to the informal decision-making practices of the court
and to suggest that they could make a workable basis for decision-making if
they were properly regulated. Unlike attempts to define guidelines for
regulating police decisions, however, all but the most recent attempts to
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regulate plea bargaining still assume that bargaining is an aberration of
a still preferable trial system.
These few proposals share a common approach to plea bargaining
and point to the critical elements of negotiated justice. Though they
deplore the practice, they implicitly agree that bargaining is a legitimate
method for processing some kinds of cases. Their efforts are directed
toward making bargaining "public" enough that inequities can be reviewed.
A proposal to require written explanations of bargains illustrates one
option for opening up bargaining to scrutiny,and two others articulate guide-
lines which might be used to detect inequitable bargains.
An early, modest approach tried to expose prosecutorial bargains,
with the hope of discouraging bargaining, or at least of exposing abuses.
What would constitute an abuse of bargaining was at this stage left to the
imagination. With this approach in mind a number of States created statutes
requiring that prosecutors file a description of their reasons for granting
a plea to a lesser charge.63 These statutes constituted a grudging accept-
ance that prosecutors were offering reduced charges in exchange for guilty
pleas, but their intent was that blatant cases of abuse could be reviewed
by a higher court.
It was evident from the experience in these States that bargain-
ing could not be successfully evaluated after the fact. Prosecutors rarely
made explicit that bargains had occurred, and even where review was pos-
sible, criteria for judgment were difficult to develop.64 An obvious next
step was to develop guidelines for the bargaining process itself, check-
points which would help decide whether the emerging bargain was equitable
for the defendant. The two examples offered here try to develop these
guidelines and create a kind of "due process" for bargaining.
- 53 -
Abraham Blumberg, for example, elaborates a set of checkpoints
to be used in protecting a defendant whose case is being bargained. He
suggests such steps as publiclyprobing a defendant's reasons for agreeing
to a guilty plea, assessing what factors might have made the defendant
tractable to plea bargains, and determining whether any "secret" arrange-
ments have been made which might unduly influence the defendant. 65
Blumberg's criterion for judging the equity of a bargain is clearly whether
the defendant is voluntarily engaging in the bargain or whether he is being
coerced by the prosecution. Because he sees coercion as the critical danger
in bargaining, Blumberg does not trust court personnel to implement these
procedures fairly. He supplements his proposal by suggesting that an
"'ombudsman" who is not enmeshed in the organization of the court should
conduct this review of the guilty plea.
A smiliar but more complex process of review was suggested by
Judge Bazelon in Scott v. U. S. In this case Bazelon attempts to extend
Blumberg's criterion of coercion to a more elaborate test for the equity
of bargains. His intent was to compare the proposed bargain with the
probable outcome of the case if trial had occurred. This comparison
required an ambitious calculus. A bargain would be considered equitable
for the defendant if his motive were "to acknowlege his guilt of-the lesser
charge rather than risk conviction on the more serious, or to accept the '
promise of a lighter sentence to escape the possibility of conviction after
trial and a heavier sentence."66 If these motivations could indeed be
evaluated, a bargain which violated the defendant's rights to due process
would be one which was motivated only by the prosecutor's need to deter
people from exercising their rights to trial and not by an assessment of
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the defendant's probable outcome with a trial. Like many other attempts
to guide and evaluate bargaining, Bazelon's formula requires a very com-
plex set of judgments about the motivations of both the prosecutor and
the defendant. At the same time, the process by which these judgments are
to be made remains sketchy.
Recent proposals by the American Bar Association67 and the
President's Crime Commission68 provide by far the most comprehensive
attempts to define negotiated justice. Like earlier proposals they try to
transform bargaining into a more open, formalized process. What they add
to propo'als like those made by Blumberg and Bazelon is a sense of how a
court might conduct a due process of bargaining. In particular, they
delineate some of the roles which court personnel might play and the judg-
ments that might be made at each stage. The assumptions the two proposals
make about the desirability of bargaining and its relationship to the
adversary process are quite different, and provide a good sense of the scope
of negotiated justice -- as an outgrowth of both procedural and administra-
tive reform.
The ABA proposal
The reports of the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice are the most ambitious statement on court procedure to c-ome from
any group other than the appellate courts. Its report is a very successful
attempt to systematize the work of the procedural reformers. Of particular
interest are the sections of the project which focus on the plea of guilty
and argue for its regulation. Taken together the recommendations in these
sections describe a formalized plea bargaining process, try to justify the
disposition of cases by this mechanism, and even design safeguards for mak-
ing it fair.
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Despite its relative comprehensiveness, the ABA proposal's
acceptance of plea bargaining is no more enthusiastic than Blumberg's or
Bazelon's. Its perspective is that of an organization which would like to
make even bargaining conform as closely to the adversary process as pos-
sible. Indeed, its proposals for negotiated justice are concentrated on
those aspects of the process which have been of greatest concern to the
appellate courts in their attempts to enforce due process requirements:
determining that a plea of guilty is made voluntarily by the defendant;
defining the role of the prosecutor and the defense counsel; and delimiting
the judge's involvement in the bargaining process. Reviewing each of these
elements in turn provides a nearly complete statement of the ABA proposal.
In the standards proposed for evaluating the defendant's guilty
plea, the ABA tries to blend traditional conceptions of the plea with the
recognition that it is an efficient administrative device. The criteria
which emerge are both ambitious and perhaps, conflicting. Not surprisingly,
as a minimal standard for the acceptance of guilty pleas, the ABA suggests
the traditional standard of "voluntariness."69  If the defendant has not
been coerced or otherwise forced to cede his right to trial, then the plea
can be assumed to have been a voluntary act on the part of the defendant,
and thus sufficient for maintaining due process.
A logical -- and traditional legal -- corequisite to the test of
voluntariness is that the defendant understand the significance of his
plea. In the ABA proposal this standard is translated into the require-
ment that the court determine from the prosecutor and the defense attorney
whether the prosecutor has offered the defendant any bargains. When a
bargain is discovered the court can then inform the defendant that the
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bargain is not necessarily binding and that there is a risk that it may not
be kept. Like the test for voluntariness, this method of deciding whether
a bargain is equitable requires considerable ability to communicate with
the defendant and to judge whether he understands the risks he runs.
While these are standards dictated by the appellate courts as
much as by the ABA, a second set is a real departure from appellate tradi-
tion. Voluntariness and understanding are standards which emerge when the
plea is seen as a confession; if the defendant is entering a plea, he should
understand its seriousness, and not be forced into taking the associated
risks. When the plea is seen as a tool for providing more flexibility to
the criminal process, however, the standards can be inherently administra-
.tive rather than legal. The least daring of these is the suggestion that
the guilty plea can be seen as a mechanism for providing more correctional
options. In this view a bargain is valid if the "concessions will make
possible alternative correctional measures which are better adapted to
achieving rehabilitation, protective, deterrent or other purposes of cor-
rectional treatment, or will prevent undue harm to the defendant from the
form of conviction. "70
A final standard openly recognizes the role of bargaining as an
efficient method for processing cases. Because of its concentrafion on
the protection of the defendant -- and its suspicion about bargaining -- the
ABA links even this standard with the well-being of the defendant. A
bargain can be justified if "the defendant by his plea has aided in avoid-.
ing delay (including delay due to crowded dockets)-in the disposition of
other cases and thereby has increased the probability of prompt and certain
application of correctional measures to other defendants."71
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This last requirementespeciallyleaves the ABA without a clear,
unambiguous position on the guilty plea. The plea is at the same time the
means to an end and a critical decision for the individual defendant. The
Standards seems to suggest that the guilty plea is not merely an ameliora-
tive device to provide the defendant with better correctional programs, but
that the plea'must also be a sincere admission of responsibility for a
criminal act. By maintaining this kind of tension they may succeed in
fulfilling the requirement established under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure -- that there be a factual basis for the guilty plea -- at the
same time6 that the efficiency of bargaining can be tapped.
The efforts of the ABA virtually stopped with the designation of
standards for judging the plea. It left few clues as to the way in which
these judgments might be made or what roles should be played by the prose-
cutor and the defense. What attention is directed to this process leans
heavily on the adversary model and clearly conflicts with some of the
attitudes toward bargaining conveyed in the standards for judging the
guilty plea. While the assumption is made that a bargain must be worked out
between the two sides, for example, the prosecutor may confer only with the
defendant's attorney, not with the defendant himself. Similarly, though
the court must ascertain precisely what kind of a bargain has been made,
no official record is kept of the bargain or the process by which it was
reached, and thus, it is not an official element of the decision making
process. Finally, the Standardsexplicitly recognize that the prosecutor
does have the discretion to engage in bargains, at the same time that they
require that the court as far as possible limit the grounds for accepting
guilty pleas --. thus, severely limiting the prosecutor's discretion.
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Ironically, given the centrality of prosecutor-attorney relation-
ships during bargaining, only the judge's role is clearly drawn. This
emphasis is perhaps expectable if the posit'on of the ABA is that bargain-
ing should be constrained and certainly not accepted by the court to the
jeopardy of the adversary process. The thrust of their discussion of the
judge is to help prevent the judge from stepping out of his proper adver-
sarial role and becoming a party to the plea agreement. Instead his func-
tion is only to review the plea agreement after the bargain has been made,
and to indicate to the defense counsel and the prosecutor whether he agrees
with the proposed disposition of the case. In this respect the judge may
be able to increase the probability that the bargain will be kept, while
at the same time not abdicating his role as an objective truth finder,
aligned with neither side in the case. By this definition it is the judge
who retains the most formally recognized power in the bargaining process,
since he can at any time withdraw his concurrence with the bargain, with
only the requirement that he notify the defendant.
The President's Crime Commission Proposal
Unlike the ABA Standards Project's focus on procedural reform,
the President's Crime Commission report on the courts72 focuses on the need
to improve the efficiency of the courts through the development'6f new
techniques for scheduling and monitoring cases. It also begins with the
premise that ours is a system of justice without trial and develops an
extensive analysis of the nature of plea bargaining:
Many overburdened courts have come to rely upon
these informal procedures to deal with the over-
powering caseloads, and some cases that are
dropped might have been prosecuted had sufficient
resources been available. But it would be an
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oversimplification to tie the use of early dis-
position solely to the problem of volume...
the flexibility and informality of these dis-
cretionary procedures make them more readily
adaptable to efforts to individualize the
treatment of offenders than the relatively
rigid procedures that now typify trial, con-
viction, and sentence... Moreover, by placing
less emphasis on the issue of culpability,
discretionary procedures enable the prosecu-
tor to give greater attention to what disposi-
tion is most likely to fit the needs of those
whose cases he considers.73
The process of plea bargaining, then, is seen primarily in admin-
istrative terms -- as a necessary result of both prosecutorial discretion
and the burdens on the courts. Unlike the ABA Standards, this proposal
does not consistently view plea bargaining as an aberration of the adversary
process, but rather as a system of justice which has virtually replaced the
traditional trial system. As a result, the Crime Commission report assumes
that using bargaining as a system for processing criminal cases must also
lead to altered roles for court personnel and to changed goals for the
process itself. On this basis, the report also tries to develop a new set
of goals and ideologies for the criminal process, avoiding an uncritical
dependence on the adversary model.
The result of the Crime Commission's attempts to define negotiated
justice is a proposal for ordering, evaluating, and reviewing the plea
bargaining process, and for structuring the roles of those involved in
bargaining. Though the report still suggests a process which is closely
tied to the adversary model, it does ma-intain the premise that it is trying
to formalize -- not eliminate -- bargaining. In this respect it is moder-
ately successful in designing a process focused on fact finding, not on
determining truth -- and thus, guilt and innocence.
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Even this shift of emphasis profoundly affects the kind of assump-
tions that can be made about the behavior of court personnel, about the
uses of information in the criminal process, and about the sentencing
decision. In particular, three elements of the Crime Commission proposal
depart somewhat from the adversary model and from the recommendations of
the ABA report: the process by which the prosecution,defense, and the
judge negotiate a bargain; the role of the judge in the bargaining process;
and the correctional goals of bargained pleas.
Under the Crime Commission model the negotiations between the
prosecution and the defense are legitimate, open functions of the criminal
process. Like procedural reform, this report assumes that bargaining
decisions should occur with procedural regularity -- that even during plea
bargaining the means by which decisions are reached are as important as
the end result. Also like the advocates of procedural reform the authors
of the Crime Commission report posit that, given an'adequate store of
information, equitable bargains between the prosecution and the defense
can be better assured. Thus, the Crime Commission suggests that two major
changes be made in the procedures by which bargaining takes place; that
provision be made for adequate discovery and -that records be kept at each
stage of the negotiation.
The concept of discovery is both closely related to the adversary
model and is a critical feature of bargaining. Under the assumptions of
an adversary model, it is necessary for the sides in the contest to be
balanced, and to create a balance of information the defense may need to
"discover" the prosecutor's case. By nature, bargaining, too, involves
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exchange of information about a case before trial, but this exchange is
voluntary -- motivated by a mutual need to arrive at an acceptable
bargain.
Retaining some of the notions of adversarial conflict, the
Crime Commission does not leave the cooperation of the prosecutor and
defense to chance. The Crime Commission report stipulates early and com-
plete disclosure of attitudes and facts relevant to a criminal case.74
Because little information is now systematically collected by courts, to
make complete discovery work, the Crime Commission must propose changes
in the way in which information is gathered. The Commission envisions an
extensive presentence report detailing the defendant's history and what-
.ever information is available about the facts surrounding the offense
itself. This ambitious task might fall to the probation office or to some
other specially created fact-finding body. Armed with such a presentence
report the prosecution and defense could presumably engage in free dis-
covery early in the case, at least unhampered by the burdens of inadequate
information.
Beginning with this preplea discovery, the Commission suggests
that records be kept of the negotiations at each stage. The purpose is,
of course, to make plea bargaining as much a matter of record as the-
criminal trial process and as open to scrutiny. Since the bargaining
process still does not take place "in public," it is even more critical
for all the terms of the bargain to be put into writing. The Commission
identifies at least five types of information about the bargaining process
that ought to be recorded:75 statements of the facts of the offense from
each side; opening positions of the parties; the terms of the agreement,
- 62 -
as it evolves; background information, both on the offense and on the
defendant; a statement from each side explaining why the negotiated dis-
position is appropriate; and the judge's evaluation of the bargain.
The assumption that this kind of information is feasibly recorded
draws directly from a belief in the value of trial transcripts. Just as
the transcript is expected to make courtroom proceedi-ngs amenable to
after-the-fact review -- and the actors more procedurally careful during
the process -- this record is expected to open up the bargaining process.
If bargaining is indeed a meeting in which prosecutor and defense decide
what kinfs of benefits the defendant might receive if he pleads guilty,
then the kinds of information specified here might be easily recorded. If
bargaining occurs before or after this stage, involves more actors than
merely the two sides, or in effect alters the facts of the case, then the
kind of record described will be difficult to maintain. Even more important,
the success of the record clearly depends heavily on the willingness of
the actors to provide information, since they are not in an open courtroom,
where their interactions can be observed. If their "agreement" involves
currency or interests not likely to find sympathy with the judge, they
will undoubtedly choose not to record them.
Even if no other directions were offered by the Commission for
the roles to be played during bargaining, the prosecutor and defense might
be constrained greatly by the necessity of engaging in discovery and
especially of coming to terms suitable for the record. What the Commission
does reveal about its expectations for the prosecutor indicates some further
deviation from his adversarial role. Most significant is its proposal that
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the prosecutor not only engage in friendly discovery with the defense
counsel, but also that he freely advertise his bargaining procedures.
According to the Commission he should "publIsh procedures and standards,
making clear his availability to confer with counsel and listing the
factors which are relevant." 76 Interpreted literally, this requirement
certainly departs from the traditional role of the prosecutor as challenger
to the defense counsel and as champion of the State's case.
The roles specified for the defense and the judge are much more
conservatively drawn. Here again, the Commission is skeptical that the
relationship between prosecutor and defense can be open and cooperative --
even where provision is made for discovery and review. To minimize the
chances that the prosecutor will take advantage of the defendant, the
defense counsel is asked to take on his adversarial role of protecting the
defendant, at the same time that he is bargaining freely and openly with
the prosecutor. The Commission suggests that the counsel helps ensure
that the plea is reliable, that the risks of litigation are considered,
and that no unfair advantage is taken of the defendant. In this respect,
the duties of counsel as envisioned by the Commission vary almost not at
all from those described by the ABA.
While its strict adversarial assumptions made the ABA iary of
judicial involvement in bargaining, the Crime Commission allows the judge
much closer contact with the bargaining process -- on the grounds that he
ought to determine the equity of the bargain. Some of the criteria the
Commission specifies for identifying an equitable bargain are the same as
the judge might use to assess a sentence levied after trial. In particular,
the bargain should be evaluated against the defendant's need for correctional
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treatment, the circumstances of the case, the defendant's willingness to
cooperate with rehabilitative programs, and the requirements of law
enforcement.78 -1 addition, the Crime Commission asks the judge to apply
the more traditional standards dictated by the ABA standards and by the
requirements of due process. Is the plea an understanding choice on the
part of the defendant? Was the plea a result of inducements by court per-
sonnel?
Some supporters of the Crime Commission's approach have greeted
these criteria with enthusiasm, suggesting that they will foster a real
shift in the sentencing process to focus on correctional goals. Arthur
Rossett tries to make this case in a comparison of the ABA and Crime
Commission proposals.79 Rossett believes, for example, that the ABA pro-
posal leaves the substance of the negotiations unchanged. "Parties will
continue to bargain about how many counts of what crime the defendant will
plead guilty and how many years the offense is worth ... "80 In contrast,
he argues that the Commission created guidelines that will shift the
negotiating process to a focus on correction. "A plea [bargain] is
fundamentally a negotiation about the correctional disposition of a case
and is, therefore, a matter of moment to both the defendant and the
community. 81
At least on the face of the two proposals, neither these dif-
ferences or the shifts in goals attributed to the Crime Commission are
evident. In fact, the standards prooosed by the ABA and the Crime
Commission seem to raise very similar issues. They both seem to mix
assumptions about the bargaining process. At the same time that it is a
positive attempt to provide correctional alternatives, it is still viewed
as an effort to cheat the defendant out of a trial (and thus, care must
be taken to see that the defendant has not been coerced.) Because both
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conceptions of bargaining remain in tension, the judge's task is essentially
the same as it is in sentencing, to balance these potentially conflicting
standards for judgment. In this respect, it is difficult to see that the
Crime Commission proposal has created any incentives for the judge to
emphasize correction more than other goals, or to view bargaining as a
"positive" process.
In addition to the potential difficulties in applying these stan-
dards, the judge in the Crime Commission proposal must play a very delicate
role. While he is not seen as a party to the negotiations he must maintain
careful scrutiny over the process. One observer points out that in view-
ing him in this way, the Crime Commission is actually depicting a judge
much more like that in civil cases"involving minors or representatives of
a class of litigants." Under these circumstances the judge must audit the
disposition to assure that it is fair and advise the defendants accordingly,
but he does not actively participate in fashioning the disposition.82
In order to fill this role, the judge must observe the negotiating
process closely enough to be able to advise the defendant of the issues.
This may meanfor example, that the judge attends some of the preplea con-
ferences. It always requires that the judge question the defendant and the
prosecutor about the plea and the bargain. If the judge is then'fiot satis-
fied that the criteria for a fair disposition have been met, he must inform
the defendant and give him an opportunity to withdraw his plea. At any of
these stages, the judge's attempts to watch the bargaining process and
advise the defendant could direct -- and in fact determine -- the course of
bargaining. Even the Crime Commission proposal is not ready to allow the
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judge to be an active participant in the bargaining process, but in the
judge's case the line between participation and observation is obviously
shaky.
In the Crime Commision's attempts to describe the judges' roles --
and indeed in the rest of its proposal -- the heritage of the procedural and
administrative approaches to reform is very evident. Both the ABA and the
Crime Commission have tried to combine the critical elements of administrative
and procedural reform; they aim for a process which will increase the ef-
ficiency of the courts at the same time that it more reliably regulates the
activities of court personnel. Implicitly the proposals suggest that these
two goals are not incompatible, and that a highly regularized kind of bargain-
ing can indeed accomodate both. In the same way, proposals for negotiated
justice also hold the due process, adversarial model in tension with the
reality of bargaining. Both try to retain the major components of the
adversary process -- the objective judge, the careful scrutiny of the guilty
plea, and the "two sides" in the case -- while still making decisions
through bargaining.
Whether either proposal could in fact succeed in establishing a
"due process of bargaining" depends to a great extent on the assumptions
they make about bargaining. The impact of the ABA proposal, for'ixample,
may be critically dependent on whether decisions which shape a particular
bargain can be constrained within the narrow context of the guilty plea
review. The regulations proposed by the Crime Commission are much broader,
in the sense that they try to trace a process of bargaining from discoverY
to p1 ea review. Even at that, the effectiveness of their procedures may
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hinge on aspects of the bargaining process which their model does
not address. Wlhat criteria guide the decision to bargain and the
choice of particular bargains? Are court personnel in conflict when
they bargain (as these proposals assume)? Is it at all possible to
regulate a latent process like bargaining?
What emerges from both the ABA and the Crime Commission
proposals is a model of bargaining which is incomplete, but which
does make some definite assumptions about the process. For both,
bargaining appears to be a single decision point, focusing on the
guilty plea, in which prosecutor and defense counsel vie for the
better deal. During this process they are inherently in conflict,
while the judge remains detached and protective of the defendant.
In the sections that follow we try to examine these assumptions in
light of other conceptions of bargaining -- both as they have
emerged from the appellate courts and from empirical studies of the
trial courts. Our intent is to develop a framework for evaluating
proposals like these made by the Crime Commission and the ABA, by at
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Chapter II
Bargaining: the Development of a Model
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Conceptions of Bargaining
The incidence of bargaining
The observation that criminal defendants are usually processed
without trial has become commonplace. The defendants who enter pleas of
guilty are thought to make up as much as 90% of the total caseload of the
courts. The suspicion runs high that these defendants plead guilty and
forgo trial in exchange for special considerations from the court. As
early as 1929 the high incidence of guilty pleas was noted and thought to
indicate just this kind of bargain between the defendant and the court.
According to a survey of Cook County courts made in that year:
When the plea of guilty is found in records it
is almost certain to have in the background,
particularly in Cook County, a session of bargain-
ing with the State's attorney. If the prisoner is
charged with a severe crime which for some reason
or other he does not care to fight he frequently
makes overtures to the State's attorney to the
effect that he will plead guilty to a lesser
crime than the one charged... These approaches
particularly in Cook County often are made through
another person called a fixer. We found many cases
in which the plea accepted and the punishment in-
flicted seemed trivial in comparison to the magni-
tude of the crime committed.1
Conceptions of bargaining in the courts have changed little since
1929. Identified variously as plea bargaining, plea negotiation, or
bargained justice, the process by which cases are decided without trial is
still assumed to be a conscious exchange between the State and the accused.
The defendant offers to plead guilty and the prosecutor -- who needs to
maintain his conviction rate efficiently -- offers a reduction in the
defendant's penalty. Like the Cook County fixer, the prosecutor who makes
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a bargain of this type is seen as acting outside the law, and the practice
is hidden in most courts.
In part because bargaining has remained clandestine, little is
known about the process, or even whether it resembles the model described
in the Cook County survey. Indeed, what is the evidence that bargaining
exists at all or that it is actually "plea" bargaining? What we do know
about bargaining is confined almost entirely to statistics which measure
the incidence of guilty pleas and to one ambitious survey of prosecutors
and judges.
Statistical views of bargaining provide evidence of the high in-
cidence of guilty pleas, but do not convincingly link pleas to a bargaining
process. As a nationwide average it is estimated that nearly 90% of all
defendants plead guilty. Many analysts imply that the very frequency of
guilty pleas indicates that pleas are used for bargaining devices. Realiz-
ing that this claim is unsubstantiated, other studies have looked for
evidence that these pleas were related to pressures from the court. One
found that at least one-third of those who plead guilty had originally
plead not guilty and then chosen to change their pleas. 2 The study reasoned
that defendants would not have changed their pleas to guilty unless they
had been offered inducements. A third attempt to make this same iargument
looked at the rates of dismissed charges, which in some courts is as high
as one-half of all cases entered.3 While no further evidence was available,
it was contended that this rate is too high to be attributable to anything
but bargains which trade guilty pleas for the dismissal of charges.
The inferences drawn from these studies fail to establish the
existence of bargaining. Even as measures of guilty plea rates they are of
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questionable validity. The estimated incidence of guilty pleas, for
example, is based on the aggregate of both felonies and misdemeanors. If
the figure is calculated for felonies alone, it is reduced from a spectacular
90% to as low as 70%, indicating that perhaps the meaning of guilty pleas
may be different in more serious cases. There may even be some evidence
that the use of the guilty plea is declining. In 1967, guilty pleas were
entered in 73% of cases in the United States Courts; since then the rate
has dropped to nearly 60% in some courts.4 This declining rate could
indicate a new fervor for trial or,perhaps, efforts to limit guilty pleas.
In either case it weakens further the credibility of the guilty plea rate
as evidence of bargaining.
Types of bargains
To measure bargaining by focusing on the guilty plea clearly re-
quires substantial leaps of faith. The fact of bargaining must be inferred
from the indications that large numbers of defendants are pleading guilty.
The need for more convincing measures of bargaining prompted the American
Bar Foundation to sponsor a study of the processes involved in the convic-
tion of criminal defendants.5 The results of the study -- especially as
reported by Donald Newman -- and those which followed it have produced a
second kind of data for establishing the existence and the nature of the
bargaining process. The study focused not on the plea, but rather on the
kinds of inducements available to the prosecutor and the judge and estimated
how often each was used to urge a plea of guilty. It observed that the
prosecutor through the discretionary powers given him by the court can, for
instance, reduce or even drop the charges against a defendant. The prosecutor
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with the judge's cooperation can also promise to secure a lighter sentence
for the defendant, in trade for his guilty plea.
The results of Newman's study provide not an empirical observation
of bargaining but a comprehensive statement of the kinds of bargains that
might be offered by a prosecutor. By focusing on inducements to bargaining
it avoids the fallacy of inferring inducements from the incidence of guilty
pleas, but it still fails to give insight into the dynamics of bargaining.
What we do learn from Newman is that there are four types of bargains which
might be offered to a defendant in direct exchange for a plea of guilty:
bargains over the charge, bargains over the sentence, bargains over con-
current charges, and bargains involving dropped charges. Newman also
speculates on the interests a defendant might have in accepting each type
of bargain and on the differing roles of the prosecutor and judge in the
process.
Newman found that the power of the prosecutor to reduce or modify
the defendant's charge gives him a powerful set of inducements to offer.
While in theory the judge reviews the decision of the prosecutor, it is
clear that he takes little active part in controlling the charge. Before
the charges have been filed the determination 'of the offense category is
strictly the province of the prosecutor. After the charges have been
determined, there is usually too little information available about the
crime or about the defendant to enable the judge to evaluate the charges.
Even after sentencing there may be little indication in the record that the
charge has been modified as a result of the defendant's plea of guilty, and
therefore, scant basis for judicial review on appeal.
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Newman believes that the prosecutor makes use of this power to
offer defendants the chance to change their charges in about 20% of the
bargains which take place. To the defendant he attributes several motiva-
tions for accepting the prosecutor's offer. The most evident is, of
course, to reduce the seriousness of the change -- and thus, the penalty.
By charging the defendant with a less serious offense the prosecutor can,
in effect, confine the upper limits of the judge's sentencing power.
Especially in courts in which there are maximum penalties set through the
penal code, the reduction of a charge to a lesser offense is tantamount to
a less serious penalty.
In courts in which mandatory minimum sentences have been set, the
.pressures on the defendant to enter into this kind of agreement with the
prosecutor may be even stronger. The goal in this kind of agreement is to
see that the defendant's charge is changed to a category for which there
is no minimum sentence. In many courts, this process of charge reduction
appears to have been routinized. Prosecutors are suspected of routinely
overcharging defendants in order to increase the chances that they will
bargain for a charge reduction. Sudnow found that in public defenders'
officesprosecution and defense may even possess a common set of formulas
which they use as routine mechanisms for reducing one charge to'another.2
While the motivations Newman assigns to defendants are primarily
associated with "getting off" lightly, he also acknowledges that some
might be concerned with the ways in which they could be labeled by asso-
ciation with some kinds of crime. Especially in the case of "victimless"
crimes like prostitution, homosexuality, and drug abuse, the defendant may
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seize the opportunity to be charged with a related but less stigmatizing
crime in exchange for agreeing to plead guilty.
The judge replaces the prosecutor as the central figure in bar-
gains which promise light sentences rather than reduced charges. In 50%
of the cases observed by Newman the judge -- or sometimes the prcsecutor --
promised the defendant a more lenient sentence in trade for his waiver of
trial. Both in its initiation and its consequences, this kind of bargain
is different from bargains over the charge. In charge-related bargains,
the prosecutor has the power to control the offense category and counts
heavily on receiving no interference from the judge. In bargains over
sentences, however, Newman found that,though the prosecutor recommended
a bargain to the judge, he had no guarantee that the bargain would be
kept. For this reason it was often the defense attorney, the judge, or
even the defendant himself rather than the prosecutor who initiated the
proposal for a sentence-related bargain.
The basis for bargains which lead to dropping or consolidating
charges is quite different from the pattern of bargaining over the sentence
or the charge. Newman found that the court most often offered the defen-
dant a reduced sentence or charge when it lacked evidence to establish his
guilt. Even when the State's case is strong enough to support a'~convic-
tion, however, the prosecutor may want to bribe the defendant anyway, in
exchange for information or merely for the ability to process the case
rapidly. If the defendant is cooperative, the prosecutor may agree to
forget some of the defendant's charges, or at least, make it possible for
him to receive concurrent, rather than sequential, sentences for his
crime. Often bargaining involving concurrent or dropped charges takes
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place when the defendant is a first time offender who needs to minimize
his record or where the victim is a relative or friend of the offender,
and thus,is not eager for conviction.
As ideal types, Newman's categories are a fair statement of
current conceptions of the bargaining process. He provides a comprehen-
sive list of disposition-related inducements to bargaining and a good
sense of the motivations of the judge and the prosecutor for agreeing to
compromise the disposition of a case. The typology which organizes
Newman's findings, however, may in fact describe only a limited portion
of the bargaining process and only a single set of roles and motivations.
Because Newman has concentrated on those inducements to bargain which
relate to the outcome of the case, he can identify only one kind of bar-
gaining currency which might be offered by the prosecutor and the judge.
His concentration on the guilty plea as the defendant's vehicle for bar-
gaining similarly ignores other possible inducements the defendant him-
self might offer to the court and fixes bargaining only at one stage of
the criminal process -- the entering of the plea.
Other studies also indicate that the behavior Newman attributes
to the actors during bargaining may be more complex than he has described.
His prosecutors and defendants share knowledge of bargaining possibilities
and make bargains calculated to affect the disposition in predictable ways.
The President's Crime Commission, however, describes a completely different
set of bargaining relationships which create "tacit" not overt bargains. 9
In this kind of bargain, the defendant pleads guilty only because he senses
that guilty pleas do "better" in court. Without prompting from court
personnel or any negotiations, the defendant enters his plea and hopes for
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favorable treatment. While the defendant has no stable expectation that
he will be given a concession for his plea, the attitude of many judges
that a guilty plea indicates the defendant's commitment to correction,
combined with the court's preference for processing defendants without
trial probably assures that the defendant will indeed get his "tacit
bargain."
As will be argued in the next section, however, the debate over
bargaining has not recognized the possibility that bargaining might be
tacit, or even that it might be broader than Newman's categorization.
Essentially, the debaters have usually seized on the high incidence
of guilty pleas as evidence of "plea" bargains. Like Newman, participants
.in these discussions of bargaining have rarely strayed from notions of
bargains between prosecution and defense over the sentence or the charge.
As we will show, the motivations attributed to the bargainers do not
often differ significantly from those Newman found: a prosecutor who
wants information, speedy cases, or protection from losing a case;
and a defense which wants to minimize penal time or avoid a damaging
criminal label.
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The Debate Over Bargaining
A major source of definition of the bargaining process has been
the debate which has arisen over its domination of the courts. Regardless
of their lack of empirical base, the studies which called attention to
the frequency -with which cases were processed by bargaining sparked en-
thusiasm for evaluating bargaining. Is bargaining inherently coercive
to the defendant? How is the defendant affected by the process? How
well does bargaining serve the diverse goals of the court?
* The rush to address these issues has involved the appellate
courts, professional court administrators, lawyers, and sociologists.
The thrust of appellate court activity has been primarily -- though
not consistently -- to establish the unconstitutionality of bargaining.
Much of the rest of the debate has been directed toward seeking a justi-
fication for bargaining, especially on the grounds that it is necessary
to the operation of the court. Each position in the debate has been based
on an implicit model of the bargaining process -- suggesting why bargain-
ing exists, how it is conducted, and what roles it requires.
This section will present four major questions which have dom-
inated the debate over plea bargaining: Is bargaining Constitutional?
Can it be justified on the grounds of its necessity for the efficient
operation of the courts? Is it a necessary extension of discretion given
to court personnel? Or can bargaining be justified by its role in further-
ing rehabilitative goals? Since each of these questions has been addressed
by a number of groups with differing roles in the criminal justice system
and conflicting.interests in bargaining,we cannot provide a complete
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chronicle of the debate. Instead, our focus will be on identifying the
assumptions and on evaluating the arguments of each general stand on
bargaining.
Constitutionality
The issue of whether bargaining is equitable is most often
translated into questions about its Constitutionality. Certainly the
preponderance of lawyers and judges among the critics of bargaining have
encouraged the debate to be framed as a legal, as much as a philosophical
or moral argument. What the appellate courts have asked about bargaining
is the .same question they would ask about any practice which involves
giving up a right: is the citizen giving up his right freely? Because
this is the proper legal issue, the appellate courts' considerations
have taken place on very narrow grounds and centered entirely on deciding
what it means to bargain "freely." The results are ambiguous and present
conflicting views of bargaining.
The most direct reason why the courts can consider bargaining
on Constitutional grounds is that it requires the sacrifice of a right.
In agreeing to plead guilty and waive the right to trial a defendant
invokes one of the most time-honored principles of law:
When an individual forgoes the exercise of a
Constitutional right in order to obtain or
retain a benefit from the State, established
doctrine requires that the courts examine
such an exchange to determine if it places
an undue burden on the exercise of the right
and hence, is unconstitutional. 10
By its nature as the exchange of a right for a benefit, then, bargaining
is subject to suspicion as potentially unconstitutional.
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Because of the particular right which bargaining trades away,
the attention to the Constitutionality of the process has been unusually
vigorous. For the appellate courts the Fifth Amendment right to trial
has been the critical element of the adversary system, differentiating it
from the inquisitorial model of justice. The appellate courts have long
emphasized the importance of trial. Trial is fundamental, for example,
because it prevents the State from overwhelming the defendant and thus
preserves the balance of interests in the court. It is only during a
public trial, these opinions argue, that the defendant can be assured the
right to remain silent, to offer evidence in his behalf and to compel
witnesses to appear. Duncan v. Louisiana insists so vigorously on the
-importance of the trial that it appears to argue that a trial must be
held even in cases in which the defendant himself would be satisfied with
a waiver of his trial rights. 12
While the liveliness of the appellate courts' activity can
probably be attributed to these strong opinions about the importance of
trial, its focus has been determined by legal tradition. The role of the
courts is not to consider whether a citizen can sacrifice a right, but
rather the manner in which that right is relinquished. From practice in
the appellate courts, from the requirement of due process of lai, and as
specified by the Rules of Criminal Procedure the standard for judging the
sacrifice of a right is whether it is made "voluntarily and knowingly."
In the case of bargaining, this means that the practice might.
be said to be Constitutional if the defendant is not coerced into plead-
ing guilty and if he understands the significance of the guilty plea.
The history of appellate decisions regarding bargaining has been a series
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of attempts to decide what it means for a defendant to understand a plea
and how to determine whether he has been coerced. The question has been
defined as determining the characteristics of a "knowing" and a "voluntary"
plea.
The knowing plea
The courts' attempts to define what it might mean for a
defendant to "understand" a guilty plea reflect conflicting assumptions
about criminal defendants, their abilities to use information, and their
role in the bargaining process. At one extreme, cases have determined
that a defendant can be said to understand the act of pleading guilty if
he is merely told what the charges are to which he is responding. A
1941 Supreme Court decision argued that the "first and most universally
recognized requirement of due process" was to give the defendant "real
notice of the true nature of the charge. ,3 In many jurisdictions this
standard is interpreted merely as requiring the reading of the charging
papers andthus, bringing to the defendant's attention the seriousness
of the charge. Where the defendant is also represented by counsel even
this minimum standard is often not followed.
In contrast, however, more recent cases have implied that the
defendant cannot understand the significance of pleading guilty unless
he is given accurate information about all the implications of the plea.
In Pilkington v. U.S.,14 for example, the trial court had explained to
a defendant that the maximum sentence he might be given was five years.
When the defendant agreed to plead guilty under this assumption and was
then given a six year term, he appealed the case. The appellate courts
held that when the court advises the defendant that he will receive a
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specific sentence and a different sentence is imposed after he pleads
guilty, the plea should be voided on the grounds that it was based on
inaccurate information and, therefore, "not knowing." Other cases can
be interpreted similarly as arguing that,whenever a defendant is in-
fluenced by inaccurate information, the plea should be declared not
knowing, regardless of whether the information was the result of deceit
or of oversight on the part of the court.15
What has emerged as a standard, then, is that a defendant under-
stands the significance of accepting a bargain (and has a "knowing" plea)
if he has been advised of the nature of the charges against him and
given an accurate statement of the consequences of entering a guilty plea.
The courts make no attempt to take into account whether the defendant
absorbs this information or whether he can, in fact, employ it to make a
decision. Rather, possibly because courts must review cases via their
transcripts, they have developed standards that can be applied to the
recorded statements of actors in the court. Thus, the focus becomes
whether the court actually told the defendant about his charge, whether
the charging papers were read, or whether the judge remembered to explain
the pleading process -- not how the defendant reacted.
The deliberations of the courts, then, have been limited to try-
ing to refine the requirements for what information the court must give
the defendant. The courts have grappled continuously and unsuccessfully
with what it might mean to inform someone of the "consequences" of accept-
ing a bargain. Their decisions do reflect some understanding of the com-
plexity of the bargaining process -- that it might not be possible to
assist a defendant in predicting all the variables which might determine
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whether a bargain is kept. "Consequences" have been interpreted variously
by the courts as entailing a knowledge of what grounds might establish
guilt in a trial, how a court might view a particular crime, and what the
theory is that guides the choice of penalty for a crime. Just as the
influences on a bargain are limitless, then, there is no limit to the
consequences of a guilty plea -- and to what a defendant might need to
be told in order to "understand" a plea. Must he understand the possible
correctional alternatives open to him? Does understanding entail knowing
about the effects of a guilty finding on future criminal cases with which
the defendant might be involved? Should the defendant be informed of the
loss of rights that can be associated with criminal conviction?
Because the courts failed to establish a consistent, operational
standard for judging a knowing plea, they have often fallen back on
secondary indicators. Having not decided how much a defendant should be
told to assure that he understands the implications'of bargaining, the
courts have tended to rule that the presence of a defense counsel is
assurance enough that the defendant's plea is knowing. Here their
assumption of the adversarial model is strong, even with reference to the
bargaining process. Though the counsel for the defense is acknowledged
to be bargaining with the prosecutor, he is assumed to be able to repre-
sent the interests of the defendant fairly -- by telling him the benefits
and limitations of the bargain the prosecutor is proposing.
This is not to suggest that the courts have always considered
the presence of counsel to be a sufficient condition for establishing
understanding. Cases like U.S. v. Davis, in fact,16 argue that a
defendant can charge that he did not understand the meaning of his plea,
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even if he was represented by counsel at the time. Instead, the Court
seerms to have viewed counsel as a means of helping the court communicate
with the defendant by providing a more informal means of contact and a
"check" on the court's information. In U.S. ex rel Wissenfeld v.
Wilkins,17 for instance, the Court implied that counsel provided a link
to the informal decision making structure in the courts and could inter-
pret the consequences of the defendant's plea in light of that structure.
In this case, the Court felt that the defendant should have been told that
a particular prosecutor usually failed to honor his bargains. It is this
kind of intelligence that the appellate courts have envisioned the defense
as supplying.
The voluntary plea
The question of how to determine whether a plea is made volun-
tarily has been more alluring to the courts than the issue of a knowing
plea. The role of the prosecutor and his power to set charges have
created more than the suspicion that defendants might be routinely forced
into pleading guilty through the threat of a prejudiced trial or a severe
penalty. Evaluating the degree of pressure which might have been applied
to a defendant to elicit a guilty plea has proven to be much more dif-
ficult than deciding whether a defendant was properly informed. '~Measuring
the defendant's understanding of his plea might at least be accomplished
by an indirect measure -- the level of information the court communicated
to him. There is no analogous measure for the degree of coercion the
defendant might have suffered, since either implicit or explicit threats
are not recordable.
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The strategy of the courts, then, has generally been to turn
from looking for evidence of coercion in specific bargains, to arguing
that bargains are inherently coercive. If the courts could establish
grounds for this contention, any offer from the prosecution in exchange
for trial rights could be seen as placing undue burdens on the defendant
and rendering his plea involuntary. One article which supports this
position argues that, in fact, any plea."taken to avoid the risk of
being convicted of a more serious crime...is truly no more voluntary
than is the choice of the rock to avoid the whirlpool." 18
The courts' search for Constitutional grounds on which to base
a denunciation of bargaining as necessarily coercive has been largely
-unsuccessful. A long series of cases has appealed to both the provisions
regarding self-incrimination and those specifying the nature of voluntary
confession in the hopes that these standards could be applied to bargaining.
In each case, however, bold assumptions about the nature of bargaining
were required. To argue that bargaining is a form of self-incrimination,
for example, is to suggest that a defendant has a right not to plead
guilty. In other words, the question becomes not whether bargaining
coerces the defendant merely to enter a plea, but rather whether it forces
him to admit guilt and thus to incriminate himself.
Similarly, to make the case that bargains and confessions are
analogous, the courts had to assert not only that they involved like
admissions of guilt but that they used similar methods to force "con-
fessions." In this respect, then, bargaining and confessions were viewed
by the courts as alike in their reliance on inquisitorial methods, allow-
ing the State to work through coercion to prove its charges against an
accused "out of his own mouth." 19
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The analogies between bargaining and other "confessions of guilt"
fail to hold for a number of reasons. Even the courts have been forced to
acknowledge that the processes by which bargains are made and confessions
are given might be critically different. Since the confession is secured
in the context of police interrogation, and the plea, in the context of
sentencing in open court, the pressures on defendants may not be com-
parable. If it is also true that counsel is more often present during
the plea than the confession, there is presumably a greater check on the
court's ability to be coercive.
Because of its belief in the power of the courtroom to "open up"
the criminal process, the Supreme Court itself has had to acknowledge
differences in the environments of confessions and bargains. In a number
of decisions the Court has conceded that given the proper conditions
(counsel present, open court, etc.) there could be "honorable" plea bar-
gains that are not inherently coercive.20 In a remarkable decision, the
Court, in Cortez v. U.S.,21 can even be interpreted to have argued that
despite the danger that his pregnant wife might be convicted if he went
to trial, the defendant's guilty plea was "honorable." The Court held
that the circumstances under which the plea was offered made the plea
itself honorable regardless of other pressures on the defendant.,
An even more critical assumption made by the courts in their
attempts to establish that bargaining was coercive concerns the nature
of the guilty plea. A confession which is suspected of having been
coerced is overthrown because the circumstances under which it was in-
duced cast doubt as to whether the facts expressed ever actually occurred.
A similar argunient made about the guilty plea would have to suggest that
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any bargained plea is inadmissable because the circumstances under which
it was secured make it doubtful that the defendant is actually guilty.
Requiring that a guilty plea be allowed only under conditions
of factual guilt, however, would represent a significant shift in the
attitude of the appellate courts toward the guilty plea. Even the most
conservative interpretation of the guilty plea acknowledges that it is an
admission of facts sufficient to find guilt, not necessarily of actual
guilt:
The guilty plea is not necessarily an admission
that the defendant engaged in a criminal inci-
dent but is a conclusion that there is suffi-
cient evidence for a judge or jury to find
that he did so.. .The court is no longer con-
cerned with whether given facts occured, but
only with whether the defendant has made an
informed determination that a judge or jury
could find such facts on the prosecution's
evidence.22
The President's Crime Commission extends this argument one step
further to suggest that a guilty plea offered in exchange for a bargain
must be judged on even more flexible standards than a guilty plea entered
for other reasons and -- certainly -- on more flexible bases than a con-
fession. According to the Commission, the plea should be evaluted on
ethical gounds, not on factual grounds. The question becomes one of
deciding what the defendant's motivation is for pleading guilty. In the
Commission's words the task becomes to "distinguish the psychological
experience of the defendant who is induced to plead guilty by a prosecutor
or judge's promise of sentencing leniency from that of a defendant who
is induced to plead guilty by his desire to begin service of his sentence
so that he will be released soon."23
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The judge and voluntary pleas
Just as the courts turned to the defense counsel to be a guar-
antor that the defendant understood the significance of pleading guilty,
they turned to the judge to assure voluntariness. Defining the judge's
role, however, has proven to be more difficult. The decisions of the
courts reflect a great deal of uncertainty about the ability of the judge
to protect the defendant from coercion without getting too close to the
bargaining process. Their intent is to maintain a judge who is neutral,
in the best adversarial tradition, while still responding to the special
roles the bargaining process imposes. The cases which try to resolve
this dilemma largely fail again to produce an operational standard for
.recognizing a voluntary plea.
The decisions of the courts regarding voluntary pleas most
often cast the judge in the role of the disinterested observer. The
courts count heavily, for example, on the image of the judge to help
discourage coercion. The presence of a procedurally correct judge is
expected to prevent prosecutorial excesses, including overcharging. In
addition, the judge can play a more active role in seeing that procedures
are followed. If the defense counsel fails to make the defendant aware
of the significance of the guilty plea, the judge can step in arid provide
the defendant with the proper information. Finally, the judge also eval-
uates the plea itself. He is expected to gauge the acceptability of the
plea by determining that it was voluntary and by deciding whether it is.
"factual." ("Factuality" in this instance is usually measured by the
substantiality of the prosecutor's case; if the prosecutor can sustain a
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strong case then the plea is probably factual and the defendant probably
"guilty" for the purposes of the court.)
The possible tensions, even among these roles, are clear.
Presenting a neutral image to the prosecutors may require that the judge
retain his observer's stance. Evaluating the plea, of course, may neces-
sitate information that can only be gained by involvement in the bargain-
ing process. The courts have acknowledged these possible contradictions
by trying to create a judge who can remain neutral while occasionally
stepping close enough to the negotiations to gather information or advise
the defendant.
The court's reasons for stubbornly trying to exclude the judge
from bargaining are clearly articulated. They fear that judicial involve-
ment will prejudice a bargain and compromise the symbolic stature of the
judge. Because of the power of the judge, his participation in the early
stages of the bargaining process could place undue pressure on the defen-
dant and therefore coerce him into entering a plea. The argument is
that if the judge appears to concur with the bargain, the defendant will
have no choice but to accept the arrangement since he knows that the judge
will determine the outcome of the case. As Euziere v. U.S. 24 argues,
there is also danger that judicial involvement in bargaining will actually
prejudice the results of the case. "A judge who has already started
thinking about the defendant's sentence before the trial begins.. .may
have negated the presumption of innocence."25
The assumption that it is the judge who will determine the out-
come of the case and who has sufficient power in the court to coerce the
defendants, is, of course, strongly adversarial. In the adversarial model
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the judge -- not the prosecutor or the defense counsel -- is the central
actor in the court. When the judge participates in a bargaining process,
the appellate courts argue, he compromises his judicial stature and
becomes only a kind of quasi-prosecutor. In each of the cases that argue
for the separation of the judge from the bargaining process the logic
hinges on the symbolic role of the judge in the adversary process. The
judge should appear as a "symbol of even-handed justice" 26 and thus, not
engage in compromises with either side in the case.
Appellate decisions have not been able to hold consistently to
this position in the face of evidence that new roles might be required of
the judge if the defendant is to be given due process. In particular,
recent procedural reforms, relating to assigned counsel, focused the
courts' attention on the fact that despite adversarial assumptions to the
contrary, counsel is not always present during the bargaining process.
An unrepresented defendant may not have the benefit' of advice about the
merits of a bargain. A number of appellate cases have also recognized
that even represented defendants may receive inaccurate or incomplete in-
formation. Without any guarantee that the defendant will be given guid-
ance in evaluating a bargain, the courts have had to re-evaluate the dangers
of judicial coercion.
In light of these considerations, it has been difficult for the
courts to ignore the potential value of the judge's advice to the defen-
dant and the possible inequity in denying it. As a result, a number of
cases have suggested that the judge can offer advise to a defendant
evaluating a bargain, as long as he is being "fatherly" (and thus, not
coercive). An indication of what might be meant by fatherly judicial
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advice is illustrated in U.S. ex rel McGrath v. La Vallee. The trial judge
is quoted as offering the defendant an assessment of his case, with and
without a bargain. "...If the District Attorney proves the case as he has
outlined the likelihood of your being acquitted is not good. Or do you
want to take a plea to robbery in the second degree and have some oppor-
tunity of receiving a shorter sentence?" 27 The resulting appellate de-
cision held that the judge's remarks did not constitute a denial of due
process since they were "not an enticement or threat by means of a prior
commitment, [but].. .merely a fair description of the consequences attendant
on the defendant's choice of plea."28 The distinction being drawn is
evidently that a fatherly judge gives the defendant a fair evaluation of
.a bargain, without in any way shaping the bargain.
Despite the courts' efforts to maintain an adversarial model of
the judge, while still serving the needs created by bargaining, the dis-
tinction between the coercive and the fatherly judges remains elusive.
It is certainly hard to believe that a judge can advise a defendant on the
value of a bargain, without in fact shaping the defendant's responses --
and thus, the bargain. Even if the distinction drawn by the courts seems
operational, it is not clear whether bargaining actually subjects the
defendant to the levels of coercion implied. The argument of th6 appellate
courts suggests a bargaining process which does not involve the defendant
until a final plea decision must be made. Even at that stage the defen-
dant is seen as vulnerable and passive, waiting for advice from either the,
defense counsel or the judge.
Depicting the judge as the objective evaluator of bargains also
has implications for the social structure of the courts. Even staunch
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defenders of the adversary model acknowledge that the judge must maintain
friendly relationships among his court personnel.29 Is the judge likely
to override consistently bargains made at the discretion of the prosecutor?
Is he, in fact, likely to be divorced from the negotiations of people
whose interests and bargaining patterns are well known to him?
Administrative necessity
Underlying the courts' deliberations about the equity of the
bargaining process is a reluctant admission that the process might indeed
be administratively efficient. To a limited extent, the courts have also
had to address this issue head on. As a device which may facilitate the
speed with which a case is processed, bargaining raises the issue of the
defendant's right to swift, efficient justice. Facing this question of
whether bargaining actually facilitates the exercise of individual rights
has forced the courts to consider what the tradeoffs are between admin-
istrative efficiency and procedural safeguards.
The debate over the administrative benefits of plea bargaining
has centered on two kinds of arguments. The appellate courts defined the
problem as an issue of necessity. Under what circumstances can it be
argued that it is necessary to the general welfare of defendants that
bargaining exist in the courts? Though the weight of appellate 'cases
falls on the side of denying that bargaining is necesse some cases
have recognized its value as an administrative device. Since the acknow-
ledgment that bargaining might be efficient is not tantamount to admitting
that it is necessary to the operation of trial courts, the debate also
adopted a second line of argument. For some purposes the proper question
is not whether bargaining is efficient, but whether, in fact, the same
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ends might not be achieved through less drastic means. Court administra-
tors have, of course, joined the discussion from the position that bargain-
ing is necessary to the courts precisely because no other means are
available for assuring an efficient court system.
Appellate court decisions which have tried to.weigh the benefits
of bargaining have reached conflicting conclusions. Cases can be uncovered
which appear to say that the general welfare of defendants is served by
the efficiency of bargaining. Barber v. Gladden, for instance, views the
bargaining process as a justifiable -- if not desirable -- accommodation
to the burdens of the courts.30 "We do it in the Federal district court.
On multiple count indictments, we often accept pleas of guilty to one or
two counts...It is an integral part of the administration of justice in
the U.S."31 An even more direct endorsement is found in People v. Guiden
which argues that "the acceptance of pleas of guilty to lesser offenses
with consequent lighter sentences is perfectly appropriate where the
proper and efficient administration of justice will be best served
thereby. "32
In general, it is difficult to find appellate court decisions
which give unambiguous support to bargaining. While many cases discuss
its efficiency, most imply that the need for efficiency is somehow out-
weighed by the need for maintaining procedural correctness. The delicacy
of this relationship between efficiency and due process, as viewed by the
courts, is undoubtedly best illustrated by the debate which arose over
United States v. Jackson. In arguing that the death penalty clause of
the Federal Kidnapping Act ought to be struck down Justice Stewart stated
that "...the evil in the federal statute is not that it necessarily
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coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly
encouraoes them'. Would-be interoreters of the case seized on the
term "needlessly" suggesting that it implied an acceptance of the fact
that some circumstances might necessitate the encouragement of guilty
pleas and jury waivers.
By other readers, Jackson has been interpreted to have the
opposite implication. In particular, the case is made that pursuing
the goal of efficiency is a "needless" sacrifice of trial rights. Justi-
fication for this position comes primarily from precedent. It is argued
that the history of procedural reform is a history of continual sacrifice
of efficiency to the protections of the individual; to do otherwise would
be a violation of the purposes of the Bill of Rights. The majority
opinion in Bruton v. U.S. is often cited as support for this argument.34
The court ruled that two co-defendants cannot be tried together if one
has already confessed, but will not take the stand. The accompanying
opinion read,
Joint trials do conserve state funds, diminish
inconvenience to witnesses and public authori-
ties and avoid delays in brinoing those accused
of crime to trial...[But to] secure greater
speed, economy and convenience in the adminis-
tration of the law at the price of fundamental
principles of constitutional liberty" was to -
pay too high a price. 35
A number of other cases do appear to place the same value on
"fundamental principles of Constitutional liberty" as Bruton: Miranda v.
Arizona36 requires that involuntary confessions be inadmissible despite*.
the courts' needs for information; and the right to counsel decisions
provide counsel to indigent defendants, regardless of the costs. The
A
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applicability of this line of argument to bargaining, however, is not con-
vincing. While joint trials, involuntary confessions, and unrepresented
defendants may indeed be more efficient for the courts than are their
opposites, they are not necessarily analogous to bargaining. While a case
can be processed without confessions, it is not clear that many cases can
now be disposed without bargaining and on the assumption of an adversarial
system.
The argument has been made, for instance, that bargained pleas
are the necessary embodiment of the new roles to be played by the courts.
The President's Crime Commission report argues that the courts are no
longer actually "truth finders" in every case but, instead, they must
focus on "settling" most cases.37 Trial under this view becomes a luxury,
an elaborate mechanism to be used when the facts of the case are not in
dispute, but settlement cannot be easily reached. In this view bargain-
ing is the necessary mechanism for the routine settlement of cases.
This stance taken by the Crime Commission and others may appear
to be an unenthusiastic acceptance of bargaining, viewed merely as a
substitute for an outmoded trial system. Instead, the Crime Commission
report argues vigorously that the increased use of bargaining may actually
increase the effectiveness of the trial system for those few cases in
which it is still the appropriate mechanism.38  If trials were to continue
to be used routinely, the Report suggests, they would lose their role as
an accurate mechanism for truth finding, compromise the presumption of
innocence, and violate the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. If, on the other hand, trials are restricted solely to those cases
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which allow thorough preparation on both sides, principles of innocence
and proof might remain meaningful to the court. In this sense, then the
report argues that bargaining is necessary not only to fill new fact
finding roles demanded of the court, but also to preserve some elements
of the trial system.
The courts have sometimes conceded even this point -- that most
cases might be more efficiently processed by bargaining than by trial.
What they have been unwilling to concede is that bargaining is the best --
or the only -- means for realizing this efficiency. Instead, the prin-
ciple of "less drastic means" becomes a second grounds for argument. One
critic, who begins with the premise that the primacy of the individual in
the criminal process should be protected regardless of administrative
concerns, uses the principle of less drastic means to argue that other
strategies could just as effectively replace plea bargaining.39 Alterna-
tive strategies include allocating-additional court'personnel in order to
provide more resources for handling cases and decriminalizing some forms
of behavior to reduce the total number of cases the courts must handle.
Even if bargaining is justified on grounds other than its efficiency,
the principle of less drastic means is still .used as an argument. The
contention that bargaining makes possible alternative correctional measures,
for example, can be countered by suggesting that a less drastic proposal
would be for the legislature to lower or eliminate harsh mandatory minimum
sentences and give judges more sentencing discretion.
The crux of this debate becomes whether these other mechanisms
can indeed make possible the same level of efficiency as bargaining. In
fact, there is no empirical evidence that measures the efficiency of
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bargaining itself. There is reason to believe, however, that the mechanisms
offered as alternatives to bargaining would result in considerable in-
creases in expenditure and time to the court. One analysis predicts that
if the number of judges and prosecutors were increased to respond to the
current demand for trials,an increase of nearly four times the present
level of personnel would be required.40  If, on the other hand, bargaining
were eliminated and personnel not increased to this level, the result
undoubtably would be an overwhelming backlog of cases, and an increased
need for facilities and defense counsel. Evidence suggests, too, that
decriminalization might actually increase the demand on the courts'
resources. Where some types of "victimless" crimes have been decrimin-
,alized, the result has been an increase in the number of cases requiring
trial, since the same defendants are then arrested on more "serious"
charges. 41
The debate over the impacts of bargaining on the operation of
the courts may suffer more than anything else from a lack of empirical
base. Little is known about the efficiency of bargaining, and certainly,
there is only sparse evidence as to the effects of increasing the number
of cases processed by trial. In this respect, the tendency of both sides
to link the efficiency of bargaining with an argument for its ne'cessity
to the courts is particularly interesting. Most of the supporters-of
bargaining assume that it is necessary to the courts because the courts
could not manage their caseloads in any other way. The search for "less
drastic means" also implies a belief that bargaining would be necessary
only if it were the most efficient device for processing defendants.
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The premises on which both sides argue seem as similar as their
willingness to believe that bargaining is efficient. Both the appellate
courts and court administrators apparently view bargaining and the pro-
tection of individual rights as direct tradeoffs.42 Both imply that if
the efficiency of the court process is to be maintained, then some
element of due process must be compromised.- Even the strongest supporters
of bargaining most often fall back on the utilitarian argument that while
bargaining may not honor the rights of any individual defendant, it does
aid the general welfare by making the system more efficient. Just as the
contention that bargaining is efficient cannot be supported, however,
the argument that it compromises individual rights bears empirical
examination. It is true that bargaining and the adversary process are
inherently contradictory, but there is no evidence that bargaining does
not strictly maintain the "rights" of defendants through its own processes.
Bargaining as discretion
A third issue which has dominated the discussion of plea bargain-
is whether bargaining can actually be justified as an extension of the
discretionary powers of court personnel. In a sense, it, too, becomes an
argument for the necessity of bargaining since it suggests that court per-
sonnel use bargaining as a way of correcting problems in the court. What
bargaining accomplishes in this view is meeting what one observer has
called the inevitable need for mediation between laws and human values.43
It may be that through bargaining the prosecutor is able to juggle his
needs to maintain a conviction rate and an efficient case schedule with the
individual needs and rights of defendants.
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Most of the basis for discussing bargaining as a form of dis-
cretion comes from experience in other parts of the criminal justice system,
and what does derive from a consideration of the courts focuses strictly
on the prosecutor. Traditionally, it is prior to accusation and after
conviction that notions of due process are most often subordinated to the
power of personnel to exercise discretion.44  Before accusation there is
extensive police and prosecutorial discretion to determine what laws to
enforce, against what people, and under what situations. After guilt is
ascertained there is de jure discretion of sentencing, parole, and cor-
rectional dispositions.
The stage at which this exercise of discretion is most fully
recognized is prior to accusation, when the police must make decisions
about arrest. This is true despite decisions of the appellate courts
which have insisted on a goal of full enforcement of the law by the police45
and despite formal goals articulated in police manuals. Instead, the
dominant argument has been that strict interpretations of the law cannot
guide the operating decisions of the police, and thus,full enforcement of
the law is not possible.
The basis for supporting the exercise of de facto discretion in
the decisions of the police is the argument that no guidelines provided
by statutes and manuals can predictably guide the decision to initiate the
criminal process. 46 The initial decision about whether to deploy equip-
ment or investigatory forces is dictated to a great extent by availability
of resources and thus, is at the discretion of the police leadership. Once
the individual policeman is placed on duty, he is faced with the decision
to arrest, and he can take at least four different courses of action:
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arrest and initiate proceedings; arrest and then release the suspect; pro-
vide an on-the-scene solution to the problem; or ignore the incident and
take no action at all. The standards for choosing among these options are
certainly not statutorially dictated, and even informal guidelines for
action are nonexistent for those cases which appear to require immediate
action.
The closest analogy to the kinds of decisions made by the prose-
cutor during bargaining are those cases in which the police may potentially
make the decision not to institute the criminal process. In arrest deci-
sions, the most commonly cited example of this type are those offenses
which are considered to be "overcriminalized." With typically unenforced
.crimes like gambling, prostitution, and other "victimless" offenses it
falls to the police to decide when, if at all, this kind of conduct should
be defined as criminal. In the case of those offenses which have a clear
social objective, but relate to private sexual conduct, strict enforcement
could require an understanding of the legislative intent. Even where
statutes may provide a clear description of other offenses, it still falls
to the police patrolman to reinterpret the statute in light of the par-
ticular circumstances involved in the incident.
The case for de facto police discretion rests on a belief that
the policeman's decision to arrest -- especially in these "overcriminalized
offenses" -- cannot be strictly regulated or even guided. A similar case
is made for the necessity of prosecutorial discretion. It falls to the.
prosecutor to decide whether to bring charges and which charges to bring.
Like the policeman's decision to arrest, this decision is not regulated by
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any clearcut set of guidelines. Among the factors which may play a role
are the evidence that an offense took place and that the defendant was
probably involved, the likelihood of conviction, the strength of the sanc-
tions against the offense, and the costs of conviction. In a sense, the
prosecutor is being asked to decide whether bringing a charge would be in
the societal interest, as viewed by the court; the threat to the community
represented by the defendant is to be weighed against the probability that
the case can be inexpensively and successfully prosecuted.
The primarily link between the role of the prosecutor and bargain-
ing exists because the prosecutor has the discretion to engage in this
kind of calculus. In this respect the power of the prosecutor to bargain
may be merely an extension of the prosecutor's discretion to control a
case before trial. If the prosecutor can refuse to prosecute or to prose-
cute only in certain cases, then he can also select and alter charges when
he chooses. Appellate court cases can be generally interpreted as upholding
the prosecutor's right to exercise this level of discretion.47 For the
observer eager to support the practice of bargaining this can be said to
constitute an a fortiori case for bargaining as an extension of prosecu-
torial discretion.
By a liberal interpretation, then, the prosecutor has-the dis-
cretionary power to bargain -- or at least to control the charges against
the defendant. But why must he bargain, so that bargaining actually
becomes viewed as "necessary?" The response offered by many observers of
bargaining is related to the responsibilities of the prosecutor. In addi-
tion to bringing charges against defendants, he must also maintain a satis-
factory conviction rate and see that the criminal process "works." Bargaining
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may be one mechanism for filling these roles -- and in this sense may be
necessary.
The relationship which is believed to exist between bargaining
and conviction rates is by now almost trite. The prosecutor must demon-
strate that he has won enough cases, or more often, that he has not lost
many cases. His problem is that he must predict the chances that a given
case can be successfully prosecuted, though at the time the decision to
charge must be made he has little information with which to make a judg-
ment. Bargaining, then, may be a way to resolve the uncertainty about
conviction in a case. In this sense the argument can be made that bargain-
ing is necessary to allow the prosecutor to control the number of convic-
tions, without wasting his resources on any but the most contested cases.
Lloyd Ohlin, in fact, observes that the job of the prosecutor is designed
on just this assumption -- that few of the prosecutor's cases will have
to come to trial.48 Since the prosecutor is given resources on that
basishe must assure that there are either real or apparent sentencing
concessions to urge defendants not to elect trial.
As the State's representative in criminal cases, in theory the
prosecutor has a broader responsibility than conviction. He must also
see that the criminal process "works" to punish, deter, or rehabilitate
defendants. Just as the ad hoc decisions of the police may make it pos-
sible for law enforcement to be flexible enough to apply to operating
situations, prosecutorial discretion is seen as necessary means for
ameliorating the problems of the court. If trial is an imprecise method
of finding the truth, for example, it is of benefit to both sides if the
prosecutor can exercise his discretion to bargain a case where the facts
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are in doubt. Thus, by this kind of logic, it can be said that one of the
inadequacies of the trial process is being corrected when the prosecutor
chooses to bargain rather than chance the uncertainties of the trial. In
a discussion of the Responsibility of the Defense Lawyer, Steinberg takes
the position that bargaining can also be a means of humanizing the
criminal process. 49  In those cases in which trial might be especially
stigmatizing the attorneys can exercise the option to bargain.
Whether bargaining can fill this ambitious role is unclear. As
a creature of the court, there is certainly no evident reason why bargain-
ing should be more "humane" or less risky than trial. Arguing that a
policeman should make flexible interpretations of statutes to fit indi-
vidual arrest situations may be a realistic case for the exercise of dis-
cretion in law enforcement. Does the analogy in fact hold for the
exercise of bargaining in the courts? If bargaining centers on the de-
cision to reduce or drop charges and, thus, necessitates the prosecutor's
ability to intrepret charges liberally, then it is necessary on the same
grounds as police discretion. If, on the other hand, it is a process
which goes beyond this decision or which is controlled by personnel other
than the prosecutor, the case for bargaining as discretion may be weak.
Bargaining as sentencing
In a real sense bargaining is a form of sentencing. Just as it
can be argued that the bargaining process is an extension of the discre-
tionary power of the prosecutor it is also an outgrowth of the judge's re-.
sponsibilities for pleading, adjudication, and disposition, combined into
one process. The debate over bargaining has frequently settled on this
view of the process to ask how bargained sentences differ from those made
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after trial. Because criteria for evaluating even sentences levied at trial
are sparse, the arguments have most often fallen back on less direct com-
parisons. The appellate courts have concentrated on the opportunity struc-
ture provided to the defendant whose case is being bargained,charging that
bargaining is not offered to all defendants equally. A vocal rebuttal has
been that it is this very ability to treat defendants differently and
individualize sentencing that makes bargaining a successful device for
meeting rehabilitative goals.
"Differential sentencing" is an issue to the courts because it
violates traditional notions of how sentencing decisions are made.- Among
the factors which have been held up as equitable guidelines for sentences
are the gravity of the offense, the social history of the defendant, and
the kinds of correctional alternatives available. Any other grounds for
sentencing are seen as evidence of "differential" treatment of defendants.
This would include personal characteristics of the defendant, pressures
from the court, or in the case of bargaining, the fact that the defendant
has made an agreement with the prosecutor.
The case that bargaining is a kind of differential sentencing,
however, has not been clearly made by the courts. By some interpretations
bargaining is differential sentencing because it bases the sente'rce on
factors other than those traditionally accepted as "valid" correctional
considerations. In particular, one intent of bargaining is, of course,
to circumscribe the grounds the judge may use for sentencing and his ability
to give a severe penalty to the defendant. The effect, then, is to limit
the range of punishment the judge can impose and to make it impossible for
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him to sentence the defendant with only the offense, the defendant's
record and correctional alternatives in mind.
Perhaps because no one is confident that considering only the
offense, the record and correction produces equitable sentences, bargain-
ing is also attacked as differential sentencing on other grounds. The
argument is made that not all defendants have an equal opportunity to
bargain. The evidence for the "equality" of bargaining opportunity is
ambiguous. Though the court requires that the plea be entered only if the
defendant understands his situation, it is certainly not evident that all
defendants have equal access to information about their circumstances.
Also unknown is the extent to which court personnel extend the offer to
bargain to all defendants or how they decide what bargain each defendant
"deserves."
The few appellate court decisions which have considered the
equity of bargained sentences have accepted the theDry that not all de-
fendants are treated equally during bargaining and that this constitutes
differential sentencing. They have become involved primarily in those
cases where defendants were supposedly "punished" for not cooperating with
a trial court in its efforts to bargain. The well-known case, North
Carolina v. Pearce, for example, is often used to justify this critique
of bargained pleas.50 The court held that it is a violation of due process
when a state punishes defendants who appeal lower court convictions, by
imposing harsher sentences on those who insist on appealing. The court
argued that a defendant's sentence can be increased on retrial only if
there have been events subsequent to the original trial that cast new
light o- The defendant's "life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and
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moral propensities," 51 and certainly not because the defendant appealed
his case. Implicit, then, is an analogy to bargaining. In this view
bargaining may impose a harsher, or at least disparate, sentence on de-
fendants who choose to exercise their trial rights, just as in Pearce
harsher sentences were imposed on those who exercised their rights of
appeal. This indictment of bargaining has been evident in a limited num-
ber of cases in which different penalties appeared to be given to defendants
who admitted to charges than to those who chose to defend their case through
trial.
It is possible to respond to these charges against bargaining
only with partial success. No evidence exists with which to deny that
bargaining produces sentences which are based on factors other than the
defendant's record, his offense, and his correctional potential. Certainly,
if nothing else, the sentence may be influenced by the bargained agree-
ment itself. There is also no data to support or dispute the claim that
bargaining rewards some kinds of defendants more than others and in this
sense does not provide equal opportunities to bargain. Probably because of
the lack of data on these aspects of bargaining, the supporters of bargain-
ing have avoided the temptation to argue that bargaining is not differential
sentencing, and instead, they have attacked thegrounds on which the appellate
courts and others have argued. They reject the underlying premise of the
courts that bargaining necessarily affects the sentence at all, and they
charge that in those instances when a sentence is actually bargained the
results are no more differential then are sentences after trial. Finally,
they suggest that differential sentencing actually supports the goalsof
the courts.
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The evidence that bargaining is not a consistent factor in de-
termining sentences comes primarily from sentencing institutes held for
trial judges and, in particular, a 1959 Pilot Institute on Sentencing.52
Each judge in attendance was asked what he thought would be the difference
in sentences given to defendants who had pleaded guilty as compared to those
who were found guilty following trial. Only one group of judges felt that
a defendant would be penalized for taking his case to trial, since an
admission of guilt is the first step toward rehabilitation and ought to be
encouraged. A second group expressed the opinion that the defendant who
elects trial deserves a harsher penalty only if his defense seems -contrived,
and thus, he appears not to have demonstrated his interest in rehabilita-
tion. The rest, however, felt either that the admission of guilt should
be rewarded only in consideration of the particular crime charged or that
the willingness of the defendant to plead guilty should have no independent
significance in sentencing. In each case, the judges' perception of proper
sentencing policy apparently rested less on the fact that the case was
bargained than on the significance of the guilty plea as an indicator of
rehabilitative potential.
The validity of this data is clearly dependent on the degree to
which a judge would admit that he was influenced by the "latent"~process
of bargaining. The problem of discovering what factors actually influence
a judge's sentencing decision also haunts efforts to prove that all sentenc-
ing, whether bargained or not, is "differential." If nothing else, studies
which attempt to prove that sentences are based on non-correctional factors
are more extensive than those which have looked at the relationship of
bargaining to sentence
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These studies have most often tried to measure the outcomes of
a large number of cases and to show that disparate sentences have been
imposed in cases in which neither the offense nor the defendant appeared
to be different.53 The basis for these disparities is usually sought in
judicial prejudice against particular types of defendant. Most commonly
cited as factors which prejudice sentencing are the defendant's age, sex,
and race, though none of the studies which have attempted statistical cor-
relation of these variables to case outcome can be said to be conclusive.
More recently it has been fashionable to reject the idea that
judges base sentences on their own attitudes toward defendants. Instead,
disparities are thought to be a oroduct of the judge's interpretations of
local policy. The most comprehensive statement of this position is
supplied by John Hooarth, who argues that the loqic used in most analyses
of sentencing is to infer judicial attitudes from the already inadequate
data on the outcomes of cases. 54 Ps support, he aroues that if factors
such as the type and severity of the crime, the number of criminal acts
charged, and the offender's past record are taken into account in
analyzing sentences, much of the apparent variation by age, sex, and
race disappears. Hogarth believes that if the sentencing behavior of
judges were studied directly and not merely inferred from case o6utcomes,
variation in sentences would be explained less by the attitudes -of
individual judges and more by the context in which they work. "Apparently
unequal sentences for similar offenses may also result from difference in
the social contexts in which the courts operate, such as differences in
crime rate, or in public opinion, or in the resources to deal with
offenders available locally."5 5
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Whether Hogarth's analysis of influences on sentencing is cred-
ible is, of course, dependent on how accurately the behavior of judges can
be observed. Hogarth put his faith in auestionnaires on which judges were
asked to record the factors behind each sentencinq decision. If sentences
are indeed the result of a sinqle decision by a judge, if judges are aware
of the decision processes they use, and if they would record their percep-
tions honestly, then Hogarth's conclusions are probably valid. All that is
documented is that different sentences are given to defendants with what
appear to be the same offense, record, and correctional possibilities.
Whether the differences are due to defendant characteristics, differences
in local courts, or some other factors, is yet to be determined.
A final line of argument turns this issue around, by saying that
sentencing ought to be "individualized." If the court is indeed to be
enforcer of local mores, then it must be able to take local expectations
and definitions of crime into account, along with the more traditional
factors.56 Accepting this view of sentencing, ogarth suagests that we
might alter our attitude toward sentencing disparities. "The best that
can be hoped for is equality of consideration...in rouahly similar situa-
tions courts ought to consider similar factors and have similar reasons
for selecting particular forms of sentencing."
5 7
A stronger motivation for condoning "disparities" is the need to
consider treatment goals in the sentencing process. While sentencing
theories have traditionally stressed the need for uniformity, such innova-.
tions as the indeterminate sentence, parole, and the juvenile court have
been based on the belief that the particular personality the offender
and the circumstances of his offense should be taken into account if the
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defendant is to be "treated" for his problem. Thus, individualized sen-
tencing is closely linked with the concept of treatment as the goal of the
criminal process. This implies further that sentencing which looks to
treatment should emphasize "fact finding" over"truth finding." In the
penology of individualization "...the judgments called for are professional
and diagnostic in character, rendering legal. controls inappropriate and
destructive, and unnecessary to afford safeguards against abuse." 58
The perceived relationship between bargaining and this theory of
sentencing is clear. Bargaining is viewed as a mechanism which allows
court personnel to engage in a process of fact finding, leading to a recom-
mendation unique to the circumstances of the case. Whether the recommenda-
tions which result from bargaining actually are guided by any conscious
goal of treatment is yet undemonstrated. To those who argue for bargain-
ing as a means of achieving rehabilitative goals, the belief is less that
bargaining does emphasize treatment and more that it is potentially a
better mechanism than trial for enabling individualized sentencing.
Sanford Kadish suggests that there are a number of reasons why
individualized sentencing cannot be implemented through the criminal trial
process.59 According to Kadish, the half-hearted efforts to implement
individualized sentencing have been plagued by doubts about the-ability of
a treatment oriented court to accomplish deterrence. There is a. strong
suspicion among courts that the goals of rehabilitation and deterrence
are mutually exclusive and a court which is visibly treatment oriented
will lack the image of authority necessary to deterrence. A second factor
may have been the fear that gathering the information necessary for
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individualization of sentencing will cost the courts in time and resources.
This becomes an especially strong fear, since the ideology of treatment
is often so ill-defined as to provide no substantial basis for decision
making.
Sentencing as part of the bargaining process is thought to be
free of these constraints. If bargaining maximizes efficiency, it is not
bound by the formal goals of the criminal justice system. Because it is
also not an overt process, it is not burdened by formalized procedures or
requirements for information. In this sense,then, it may permit a con-
vergence of the bureaucratic goals of the court with the ideology of in-
dividualized sentencing and treatment.
Blumberg suggests, in fact, that there is a symbiotic relation-
ship between treatment and bargaining.60 Just as bargaining is thought to
facilitate individualized sentencing, Blumberg assumes that ideology of
treatment has fostered the growth of bargaining. Rather than being limited
to the offense and the defendant's record as an indicator of the sentence,
by borrowing the theory of individualized sentencing, the court can turn
to.the defendant himself, his behavior, personality, and social circum-
stances. This shift in the concerns of the court allows flexible and
rapid disposition of each case through bargaining. In particulaT-, it has
the effect of eliminating the need for proof beyond a reasonable doubt and,
instead, allows a decision making standard of a "fair preponderance of
evidence,"61 based more on the characteristics of the defendant than on the
facts of the offense.
Blumberg's attitude toward bargaining here is hardly sympathetic.
In fact, he is deploring the degree to which the treatment ideology has
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provided a favorable climate for bargaining: "The deflection of due
process goals to those of efficiency and production has been aided and
abetted by the emergence of 'socialized' courts, which have furnished the
means for achieving the new aoals."6 2 Ironically, the same argument is
used by supporters of bargaining to justify the process as a means of
treatment. They contend that bargaining is the only sentencing process
which can take into account the particular needs of individual defendants.
The case for bargaining as a necessary part of the treatment
process is still reak. It assumes that since bargainina is not regular-
ized it can and does take into account the unique attributes of each case.
The factors on which bargains are based, however, are as unknown as those
on which sentences are based. Bargains may, in fact, be struck on grounds
which are even less compatible with "individualized" sentences than are
the premises of traditional sentencing. Even if they do tend to reinforce
treatment goals -- whether intentionally or not -- bargains may be less
predictable in their outcomes than are sentences after trial. In fact, as
we have seen, there is evidence that bargains may not even consistently
determine subseauent sentences, if the judge elects not to be influenced
by a bargained recommendation.
- 118 -
Toward a Model of Bargaining
The debates over bargaining have generally combined very ambitious
proposals for its evaluation with very insufficient evidence about the nature
of the process itself. The case for its Constitutionality, for example,
rests on whether adequate information and the good offices of the judge can,
in fact, protect the defendant from coercion, self-incrimination, or any of
the other suspected evils of bargaining. In turn, this answer hinges on
the ability of the defendant to use the services offered to him or the judge
to be "fatherly." In very similar ways, the validity of the other arguments
over the proper evaluation of bargaining is dependent on critical features
of the bargaining process: bargaining might be justified as administratively
necessary if it does not require complete sacrifice of due process; it might
be seen as a legitimate extension of prosecutorial discretion if, indeed, it
is only a decision made by the prosecutor over the charges; and it could
probably be looked upon with more favor if it is capable of making respon-
sive "rehabilitative" decisions.
What is missing from these arguments is any strong empirical basis
for deciding exactly what it is that is being bargained, who it is who
participates and on what basis, and how the defendant fares throughout the
process. As a way of organizing our own empirical study of bargaining we
have made use of the very few studies which have suggested even tentative
answers to these questions. They provided us less with hypotheses to be
tested than with a sense of the directions in which our questions might be
focused and our research organized.
The work from which we have drawn to suggest alternative models
of bargaining comes primarily from the efforts of a very few sociologists,
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though from two distinct traditions. The first emphasizes organizational
theory and sees the courts as a bureaucracy whose focus is the processing
of criminal cases: logically, this view depicts bargaining as an exchange
of goods within this organization and views the bargainers as bureaucrats
responding to oraanizational pressures. In contrast, the tradition that
begins with an interest in how deviants are labeled by society identifies
a different kind of bargaining in the courts; court personnel bargain over
the way in which a defendant is to be defined and exchange perceptions
rather than goods or services.
While these two perspectives hardly capture the range of approaches
which might be made to the study of bargaining or even perhaps, the extent
of the work that has been done, they allow us to test the major propositions
that have emerged from the debate over the proper mode of reform in the
courts. Using this work we examine the arguments that bargaining is an
exchange of services and that it is an exchange of perception of reality.
Similarly we can look at the case for bargaining as a process which happens
in an atmosphere of cooperativeness among the bargainers and that which con-
tends that it operates on a conflict model. Finally, these observers pro-
vide conflicting testimony as to the status of the defendant during this
process -- whether he is indeed the passive victim, the active bargainer,
or perhaps merely a willing participant. Since these possible interpreta-
tions of the bargaining process seem to us the most consequenceful for a
study of reform through negotiated justice, we are perhaps less apologetic




Probably the most expectable connotation of "bargaining" is
economic exchange -- an agreement is made to give up one kind of commodity
for another. The transactions between prosecutor and defense in the
criminal courts have not escaped this interpretation of bargaining and, in
fact, there is a modest set of analyses which appear to view bargaining in
just this way. What they have in common is an emphasis on the currencies
that are used in bargaining, especially the guilty plea and the ability to
process cases rapidly. They also share a common perspective, that the
court should be viewed as a formal organization. While the metaphor of
exchange and the theory of formal organizations are useful for examining
bargaining, they have yielded only a partial model of the bargaining
process.
Studies which have concentrated on the court as a formal organiza-
tion tend to be bound by a number of assumptions borrowed from classic
organizational theory.63 Viewing the courts as formal organizations
focuses attention on their activities as a "business" and not primarily as
a sanctioning agency. This perspective assumes that the starting points for
analysis of the court are the tasks it must perform and the organizational
structure it uses to accomplish them. Even more important for a'considera-
tion of bargaining is the assumption of organizational theorists that the
legal outputs of the court are a product of the personal interactions of
court personnel and the defendant.
Focusing on the tasks of the court has prompted these analysts
to devote their attentions to the courts' increasing caseloads, in parti-
cular their effects on the behavior of court personnel. It is in addressing
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this issue that bargaining is most often "discovered." Abraham Blumberg,
for example, contends that urbanization caused shifts in expectations about
the court's tasks and increased society's reverence for administrative
efficiency.64 Instead of being evaluated by their adherence to courtroom
procedure or by the outcomes of cases, courts were then pressured to keep
their budgets up and to decrease delay in processing 'cases. In this way,
Blumberg argues that a shift occurred in the operating goals of the court,
from due process to maximization of production:
The official goals of the crimial court based
on ancient values: due process, justice, and
the rule of law are necessary ideologies. But
concerns of secularism and rationality, based
on modern values of efficiency, maximum pro-
duction and career enhancement have deflected
and perhaps displaced those goals. So there
is a new angle of vision more harmoniously
in accord with the rationalization of justice.
These perspectives are organizationally geared
through bureaucratic discipline to mesh with
the new goals.65
What Blumberg sees then, is an organization which has had to
adopt as its latent goals "efficiency, maximum production, and career
enhancement," but which must still appear to maintain an ideology of due
process. He contends that the court is able to maintain this dual per-
sonality because it is organized according to a bureaucratic model. Here
Blumberg borrows heavily from the notions of the ideal bureaucracy developed
by Weber, who depicted bureaucracies as organizations held together by a
high degree of specialization, hierarchical organization, impersonality of
relationships between organizational personnel, and finally, recruitment
on the basis of technical knowledge. 66 By this view,thenBlumberg must see
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the court as an organization maintained by these same kinds of hierarchical
impersonal relationships among professionals and by the routines they
dictate.
Bargaining emerges, then, as one of the efficient routines
developed in the context of the bureaucratic authority of the court. Because
of its heavy emphasis on organizational and bureaucratic theory, Blumberg's
analysis is only interested in considering how the organizational needs of
the court lead personnel to bargain,and what ideology is used to justify
bargaining in the face of due process requirements. In fact, Blumberg
focuses almost no attention on what bargaining is. All that can be learned
from Blumberg about the bargaining process itself must be inferred from his
discussions of bureaucratic relationships during bargaining.
In particular, his portraits of the prosecutor depict bureaucrats
who are helpless in the face of pressures to bargain. Thus, since they are
constrained to bargain they must minimize their losses in each case, by
establishing rules of trade with each other. In this view, bargaining is
an administrative routine which allows them to trade away the right to
trial for potential change in charges or in sentences. It appears, then,
that the significant element is the guilty plea, which is the currency by
which the defense is thought to make bargains.
In this regard it is valid to suggest that what the model may be
describing is a process much like the concept of economic exchange, which is
often borrowed to provide a descriptor of social interaction. As it is
used in economics, exchange merely implies that the value of a good for a
buyer and a supplier is mutually agreed upon and the "exchangibility" of
the good is variable by the traditional laws of supply and demand.67
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As used by Homans and others to explain social behavior the con-
cept of exchange is modified from its purely economic meaning.68 The most
critical difference is that in a social exchange services, not goods, are
being traded. Since service is not a good with a clear value, the expecta-
tion of return is less clear in terms of both its nature and its timing
than is true in an economic exchange. Peter Blau, who makes use of the
concept of exchange in the Dynamics of Bureaucracy argues that " social
exchange.. .entails services that create unspecified obligations in the future
and, therefore, exert a pervasive influence on social relations." 69 Thus,
since there is not necessarily any advance agreement on the precise nature
of the return, both parties have to believe that they will gain from the
exchange.
It seems fair to assume that bargaining as a bureaucratic routine
could be an exchange of this kind. Both the defense and the prosecutor are
bound to "efficiency" and recognize the value of the guilty plea as a
mechanism for getting cases rapidly disposed. The defense can then offer
the prosecutor a chance to avoid trial in trade for either future favors
or for a sentence concession in the case at hand. Except for this basic
outline, however, this model implies little else about the dynamics of the
bargaining process -- how the prosecutor and defense negotiate,-what deter-
mines the decision to bargain, how often each kind of currency can be spent,
whether other personnel are involved in the exchange, or in fact, why the
process must be an "exchange" at all and not merely a unilateral act of
the prosecutor.
Because he is primarily interested in the relationship of bargain-
ing to the formal tasks of the court, what Blumberg does flesh out is the
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process by which the exchanges between prosecutor and defense are con-
cealed. The exchange made between defense and prosecution is conducted
consciously, but in violation of the formal goals of the court, especially
due process. Blumberg believes that the prosecutor and defense -- and the
rest of the court -- see the need to deliberately conceal bargaining. To
this end they have developed at least two justifications for the ways in
which defendants are processed -- that the court deals with defendants who
are already "beaten" and that treatment is the goal of the criminal process.
In particular, Blumberg points out that court personnel often
portray defendants as defeated not by the court but by their social back-
grounds:
A defendant in [court] is really beaten by the
deprivation and limitations imposed by his
social class, race, and ethnicity. These in
turn preclude such services as bail, legal
counsel, psychiatric services, expert witnesses,
and investigatorv assistance. In essence, the
concommitants of poverty are responsible for
the fact that due process sometimes produces
greatly disparate results in an illmatched
struggle. 70
A related justification is that the courts must focus on the defendant's
treatment, not on his offense, if the defendant is to be rescued. Thus,
the court can explain why it spends more time on the disposition-of the
cases than on the formal process of determining quilt.
Blumberg's hypothesis that court personnel would develop justi-
fications for their use of exchanges rather than trials is largely con-
sistent with what other organizational theorists have found in institutions
which process people. In his analysis of total institutions Erving Goffman
contends that, wthen an organization is driven to process its human products
Rqmq
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efficiently, its personnel must "depersonalize" them and treat them like
"inanimate things," or fail to maximize production.71  At the same time,
to fend off hostility from clients and observers of the process, the staff
must have available a rational perspective to be espoused as the philosophy
of the institution. The resulting "theory" about what the institution is
doing, according to Goffman, is technically unnecessary, but it "rational-
izes activity, provides a subtle means of maintaining social distance from
inmates, and a stereotyped view of them, and justifies the treatment accorded
them. ,72
In the case of bargaining in the courts it is clear that notions
of the clients' backgrounds and their need for treatment could indeed supply
a "rational perspective" with which to justify the process. What is not
evident is the degree to which court personnel are aware that they are
making "exchanges," deliberately conceal bargains, or even knowingly
justify bargaining on grounds such.as these.
Bargaining as negotiated reality
While it has been fairly common to recognize that the courts
bargain about the outcome of a case by exchanging favors, it is less often
acknowledged that the reality of a case might also become the focus of
bargaining. A few studies have posited that court personnel jockey with
each other to present the defendant to the court in ways that are calculated
to encourage a favorable disposition. This focus on the way in which the
court defines the defendant comes less from classic organizational theory
than from the theories of deviance and labeling that call attention to the
importance of the way in which a criminal is perceived and "labeled."
Applying this tradition to the problem of bargaining suggests a second
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model of bargaining which ties the issue of disposition to the presentation
of the defendant's moral character. As Emerson has portrayed it, however,
this kind of bargaining is limited to a brief encounter at the point of
dispositional decision and is limited in its perception of the interests
court officials and defendants pursue.
While the exchange view of bargaining has its genesis in the
traditions of bureaucratic theory, this model has its roots in the litera-
ture of social policy and particularly social work. It takes as its unit
of analysis the decision points at which a client's problem is defined and
service is offered. These decisions become particularly important to
understand, since the standards by which services are actually dispensed
.often remain implicit -- even to the agency itself -- and thus, often dif-
ferent from its stated standards. According to Martin Rein, organizations
like the courts may distribute services on the basis of criteria of which
even they are not aware.73 This perception is significant, since,as Rein
argues, agencies do not merely respond to a problem presented to them by a
client, but instead they define the problem, the service required, and the
appropriate moral attitude that should be taken toward the client.74
In the literature of criminal justice, this perspective on
organizations is transformed into theories of deviance and labeling. This
tradition posits that deviance and crime, at least in part, are the products
of the way in which agents of social control define and respond to people
who come into contact with the criminal justice system. Particularly
evident in observations of the juvenile justice system, for example, this
perspective asks how it is that juveniles are identified by the system and
how "labels" are applied to them.75 The assumption is that the way in which
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these youth are classified by criminal agencies is important not only for
understanding the agencies themselves, but also for understanding the
"causes" of juvenile delinquency.
Applied to the courts, then, this tradition leads to a focus not
on the tasks of the courts or the relationships among court personnel, but
on the processes by which the courts define a defendant's problem and,
implicitly, decide what "service" he will receive. The best illustration
of this approach is in Robert Emerson's study of the juvenile courts.76
Emerson describes the ways in which a court classifies a defendant's
charactfr, behavior, and potential. Because these classifications will
determine how the juvenile's case will be disposed, court personnel may
each try to influence the way in which the court sees him. It is from this
process, then, that bargaining can be said to emerge. Court personnel
present competing views of the defendant and bargain over the "reality"
of the case.
Bargaining in this instance is clearly different from that
described by Blumberg, though neither model exists in enough detail to make
a full comparison possible. Emerson focuses on stages in the process of
defining a defendant, omitting any explanation of why this kind of negotia-
tion occurs, or precisely how court personnel participate in it;- Unlike
the view that bargains are conscious exchanges of currency, this perspec-
tive sees bargains as conscious -- and tacit -- attempts to shape the court's
perceptions of a defendant. What the prosecution and defense negotiate is
the way in which the court will view a case. They apparently accomplish
this not by direct contact with each other but by "pitches" and "denuncia-
tions" made about the defendant in court and designed to "negotiate" what
the court believes.
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Bargaining as it occurs in this model focuses only on defining
two aspects of the defendant: his potential for "trouble" and his moral
character. The court's attempts to perceive "trouble" in a defendant
illustrate how the way in which the defendant is to be viewed becomes a
matter for negotiation. Emerson believes that the court must identify
"trouble" because it costs the court time. A defendant who presents an
active or potential threat, as measured by his charges and record, will
require more complex disposition by the court. Anticipating this problem
by labeling some defendants as "trouble," "establishes a sifting process
to alloCate time, efforts, and resources among delinquency cases.. Un-
troubled cases require little effort."77
This becomes more than a process of definition, though,because
at the same time that the court is making this independent assessment of
trouble and,therefore,of the kind of action that needs to be taken, the
victim, the complainant, and other actors involved in the case may have
arrived at their own evaluation of the seriousness of the case. It is
likely that depending on his interest in the case each observer will see
the defendant as representing a different degree of trouble. Most for-
tuitous for the court, of course, is for the assessments of court personnel
and complainants to coincide. When there is a discrepancy between the views
held by the complainant and the court, however, the complainant must be
"cooled out" and convinced that the court's assessment of trouble is
accurate and the action proposed is appropriate. If the complainant proves
to be difficult to convince, then the court must often change its concep-
tion of the action to be taken, and thus, of the defendant's moral character.
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If the case is to be disposed, then, all the personnel in the
court and the complainant must at least agree to a common view of the
defendant. Emerson believes that court personnel not only perceive the
importance of the defendant's image, but intentionally direct their pre-
sentations of the defendant to convince each other that a particular con-
ception of the defendant is valid. When they cannot agree on "trouble,"
then, they must escalate to a negotiation over moral character -- the
social circumstances of the defendant and his family, his criminal history,
his motivations for committing crimes, the kind of criminal behavior he
exhibits, and his personality in court.
It is at this point that Emerson's model of negotiated reality
becomes especially ambitious in its assumptions about court personnel. Not
only do they calculate their presentations of defendants, but their know-
ledge of how to affect the disposition of a case extends to an elaborate
set of defendant stereotypes which they believe leadi to predictable case
outcomes. If the person making the presentation is sympathetic to the
defendant he may make a "pitch," an effort designed to obtain a disposition
which is more lenient than might seem appropriate, by creating an image of
the defendant as "normal" or "ill." If the goal, on the other hand, is to
work toward a severe disposition, a member of the court may make-a presen-
tation which is a "denunciation," serving to depict a defendant as a
hardened criminal. In the case of assault, for example, Emerson suggests
that the denunciator would want to demonstrate that the offense was in
reality a mugging, and therefore, the act of a hard-core criminal. 78 The
pitchmaker, on the other hand, might choose to depict the assault as a
simple fight between two people, not the defendant attacking a victim.
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Emerson believes, then, that in the eyes of court personnel,
these stereotypes of defendants are important not only because they evoke
images of morai character but also because they have direct consequences
for the disposition of the case. There is motivation for court personnel
to make pitches or denunciations because they believe that control over
the reality of a case leads to control over its disposition. A defendant
who can be shown to have a "normal" moral character will predictably get
a different "break" than one who appears to have a "hard core" or "dis-
turbed" character, and these categories carry precise meanings in the per-
ceptions of court personnel. A "normal" moral character is one which is
like the majority of the population except for a few isolated acts. In
-contrast, the "hard core" character consciously and maliciously pursues
illegal acts. Finally, the "disturbed" personality is "driven to acting
in senseless and irrational ways by obscure motives or inner compulsions."79
The actions of personnel in the court Emerson observed appeared
to be premised on the assumption that a defendant established to be "normal"
would have the best chance of being handled routinely by the court and,
perhaps, receiving probation or a suspended sentence. The defendant who
is successfully depicted as "hard core" is a strong candidate for incar-
ceration or other kinds of institutionalized treatment. A courtwhich has
been encouraged to see a defendant as "disturbed" can justify circumventing
the usual correctional facilities, in favor of programs which stress re-
habilitation through psychiatric care or other forms of therapy.
Emerson's pitchmakers and denunciators, then, count on their
abilities to predict the court's dispositional behavior and gauge their
performances to depict normal, hard core, or disturbed defendants. Their
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opportunities to shape the defendant's image occur during the deliberations
over the defendant's offense and his history. They can establish that the
defendant has a hard core criminal character if his offense can be shown to
have been professionally planned, if it contained a high degree of risk,
or if it appeared to involve "vicious" behavior. A normal motivation for
committing a crime, on the other hand, is personal gratification, whereas
a "disturbed" character is shown by acts which appear "bizarre" to the
court. 8 0
Since the court is apt to wonder what the defendant's "potential"
is, his criminal history is the second important reality to be investigated.
The defendant's prior offenses, attitudes, school and employment records,
family background, friends, or sponsors, are all assumed to point to his
potential for change. A denunciator hoping to establish that the defendant
has a criminal character would use these indicators to show that the de-
fendant has had a consistent criminal career which has become progressively
more serious, now reaching a hopeless stage. The pitch, on the other hand,
might attempt to depict a defendant who was at a turning point and,
therefore, a strong candidate for rehabilitation or,a defendant whose
social history displays a strong potential for a "normal" life.
What Emerson may have provided is a narrow and interesting slice
of the criminal process. While other parts of his book do deal with the
rest of the juvenile court proceedings, they do not trace the genesis or
the conclusion of negotiations over the reality of a case. Instead, they
treat this stage as an isolated process of definition and labeling. While
it is possible that the court engages in this kind of negotiation at a
single stage, Emerson's presentation of the negotiated reality still raises
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a number of questions. What are the influences of arrest and extra-court-
room conversations on the court's perceptions of the defendant? What
determines whether a lawyer plays the pitchmaker or the denunciator? What
determines whether a member of the court accepts a pitch or denunciation?
While these questions may be unfair to Emerson's purpose in depicting a
labeling process, they are critical to rounding out this view into a model
of bargaining.
The conflict model
While bargaining might appear to take place only where there is
a meeting of the minds between members of the court, there is actually
strong disagreement as to the relationship among the bargainers. Even
studies which essentially accept Blumberg's organizational focus cannot
concur that the prosecutor and defense attorney enjoy a cooperative rela-
tionship -- or that they are in conflict. The primary case for a conflict
model of bargaining is made by Blumberg and his colleagues who see bargain-
ing as a bureaucratic routine enforced on its participants by the coercive
power of the social organization of the court.
The argument that the court operates on a conflict model is
probably an inevitable result of viewing the.courts as a bureaucracy.
Weber believed that the nature of the bureaucrat is that "in thd great
majority of cases he is only a simple cog in an ever moving mechanism
which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march."81 Echoing
this view Blumberg takes as a premise that court personnel are controlled
by the court to keep them in line with its goals and needs, and thus, that
their personal judgment and initiative are, indeed, limited. In particular,
according to Blumberg they must be regulated by a system of discipline and
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a set of uniform perspectives because otherwise they will fall prey to
doubts about the "validity, purpose, and rectitude" of the operation of
the court.82  Elements of Weber's rational-legal authority serve to
provide these controls and perspectives. In particular, three major kinds
of bureaucratic authority were observed by Blumberg to exist in the courts:
manipulation as a supervisory device, authority by complicity, and the "pan-
opticon effect."
Far from being seen as free agents, then, this view depicts a
group of people who are tightly controlled by the structure of the court.
This structure is built on an assumption of conflict between each actor
and the rest of the court. At the same time that they are told that they
work in a democratic environment, the "free professionals" who work in the
court are controlled by manipulation through sanctions for questioning the
goals or values of the court. In this way the image of the court as a
place where professionals represent clients and where the only guidelines
are justice and codes of professional ethics is perpetuated. In practice,
Blumberg believes, lawyers especially are heavily censured when they fail
to honor the needs of the court for bargains. Punishment may take the form
of denial of favors from prosecutors, limitation of access to judges, or
lack of cooperation from police witnesses.
When these personnel do bow to the authority of the court, the
result is that they bargain and they are bound into the court bureaucracy.
Emerson found that the pressures to search for shortcuts and to increase the
number of guilty pleas entered universally pointed the way to bargaining.
Once the practice is adopted by a member of the court, he is ironically
caught by his complicity and in theory, then, amenable to more control from
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the court. This process is especially vividly described by Blumberg in
reference to the treatment of new employees, who are initially threatening
to the court because they are unsocialized to the norms of the court. By
slowly introducing the new member to the convert practices of the court and
urging him to participate in them, the court can bind him, too, by his
complicity in illegal practices.
A final aspect of the court which Blumberg thinks is critical to
the control of personnel is what he calls the "panopticon effect." This
is a term borrowed from Jeremy Bentham's proposal for a circular prison
with a central watch tower from which inmates could be observed at all
times. Blumberg argues that the uniquely public character of the court's
activities is analogous to Bentham's panopticon:
Everyone in the criminal court like the pan-
opticon inmate genuninely feels he is being
observed at all times -- and at the same
time is observing others...[Court personnel]
arrange their official behavior to suit the
F3
expectations of those who will be 'watching'.
The implication is that bargaining remains covert in part because court
personnel must make it appear to observers that they are acting in accord-
ance with the formal goals of the court. Thus, they are controlled by the
openness of the court.
The model of bargaining that Blumberg presents is that of behavior
which is imposed on personnel by their participation in the life of the
court. Court personnel bargain because they are manipulated to do so, and
bargaining is, in turn, a manipulation of the defendant and of other per-
sonnel. Bargains then become exchanges among personnel who relate to each
other on a "conflict" model. Lawyers and prosecutors exchange favors with
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each other, but according to Blumberg only because there are sanctions for
failure to bargain. Because the lawyer and prosecutor are in conflict, the
lawyer must trade his right to bring a case tc trial for any future assur-
ance that he can get the schedules, information, and predictability of
sentence that he needs to defend a case. The prosecutor, on the other
hand, may exchange the possibility of conviction for protection against
the defense, which may demand too many trials.
The cooperative model
A counter-hypothesis concerning the relationships among court
personnel is offered by Skolnick and others.84  It begins with essentially
the same premise as Blumberg's model, that the large case loads in the
court are responsible for creating the need to bargain. While the conflict
model assumes that bargaining can be maintained only if the court controls
the behavior of its personnel, Skolnick suggests that in the face of pres-
sures on the courts, personnel will make a free choice to cooperate with
each other. Skolnick, in fact, describes the court as a system "where
professionals will see greater advantage in cooperativeness than in
conflict."85 For him bargaining is a reciprocal relationship between the
defense and the prosecution that is based on.cooperation rather than
Blumberg's essentially conflict-based bureaucratic.authority.
The secret of prosecutor-defense cooperation under this model is
the way in which their jobs are structured; their roles are such that there
is no reason for conflict between them. In the prosecutor's case, for
example, depending on the organizational structure of a given court, he may
be responsible in varying degrees to political authorities, to the Superior
Court, to the District Attorney's office, and to the public. To present to
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all of these groups the image that he is doing his job, the prosecutor does
not have to win each case, but he certainly cannot lose too many. This
aspect of the prosecutor's role removes him from any direct conflict with
the defense, since it is not necessary that cases be won, and gives him an
incentive to work with thedefenseto maximize the probability that neither
will "lose" a case.
A second traditional aspect of the prosecutor's task is keeping
the calendar moving, and Skolnick suggests that the wise prosecutor depends
on guilty pleas rather than trial as the predominant mechanism for disposing
of cases rapidly. At the same time he must also obtain a respectable number
of convictions through trial, and this requirement forces him to predict
.which cases he has the best chance of winning and which ought to be bargained.
According to one observer the decision is guided by an assessment of the
gaps in his own proof, the availability of credible witnesses, and the image
of the defendant.86 Having the defense counsel engage in this calculus
jointly with him gives the prosecutor the advantage of virtual certainty.
that he is bringing the "right" cases to trial.
In Skolnick's view the advantages accruing to the defense would, of
course, be similar except that the defense must respond to pressures arising
from his role as defender of his client as well as from his position as a
member of the court community. As a good advocate the lawyer is expected
to earn his fee (where there is one) and to keep the client satisfied. By
some definitions this means that the lawyer has to work to prove the inno-
cence of the client. Skolnick believes that the lawyer's role in the court
organization alters this expectation somewhat. Since he also must be com-
mitted to saving time, resources, and expense in the courts, the lawyer has
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the same obligation to bargain as the prosecutor. When the lawyer does
bargain he becomes not an advocate for the innocence of the client, but an
advocate for his freedom from severe punishment.87 By working cooperatively
with the prosecutor he can fulfill his role in the court community, while
at the same time assuring that his client will emerge with only a light
sentence. With advice from the prosecutor as to the~probable disposition
of the case the lawyer can describe to his client the way in which the case
will be handled, act as a coach "preparing the client to meet behavioral
standards acceptable to officialdom,"88 and give the impression that he has
earned his fee.
Whether the lawyer's decision to make this concession is, in fact,
the choice of a "free" professional is not at all clear. Skolnick's
defense counsel may be as constrained by the pressures on the court as are
the personnel described by Blumberg. In each model, the prosecutor and
defense bargain because they must see that cases are processed efficiently
at the same time that they make a minimal effort to prove that they are
fulfilling their adversarial roles of prosecuting cases or defending clients.
Skolnick's assumption that relationships between prosecutor and defense are
cooperative and Blumberg's premise of conflict are only different in the
degree to which they attribute structural coercion to the courts~ As long
as Skolnick's prosecutor and defense counsel have roles with the very
specific demands Skolnick describes, they can "cooperate." Any change in
the interests Skolnick depicts might result in a relationship which was
essentially conflicting and, in bargaining,only if pressures from the court
were escalated.
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The defendant as bargainer
Just as the defense counsel can be viewed either as a partner or
an adversary to Lhe prosecutor, the assumptions made about the behavior of
the defendant can similarly vary. The defendant is often viewed both as
a passive object to be processed by the courts and as an active participant
in his own case. The question of which role the defendant plays is important
not only because it has implications for the bargains the defense and prose-
cution can strike, but also because it may indicate whether he is indeed
being coerced, manipulated, or stigmatized. The critical issues are to
what extent the defendant makes a conscious, willing exchange in the bargain-
ing process, what he trades away, and to what extent the bargain is made
only by the prosecution and the defense.
While the view that the defendant is an active participant in the
bargaining process is consistent with any of the models of bargaining, it
is most logically associated with a conflict model.' Positing that court
personnel must be controlled through the use of manipulation, complicity,
or other forms of bureaucratic authority requires the belief that without
control they will question the validity of the system and cease to meet its
needs. In the same way, then, the defendant can be seen as threatening to
the court because he is able to question what is happening to him and per-
haps to subvert the activities of the court. As Goffman suggests in his
analysis of institutions which "process human products," unlike other kinds
of products, human objects are in a position"to perceive and follow out the
plans of the staff"and thus hinder them effectively.89
In the courts the defendant's attempts to affect the course of the
criminal process have been assumed to take three general forms: insistence
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on a trial, direct bargaining, and negotiation of the reality of the case.
Ohlin found that defendants would most often try to manipulate the lawyers
by threatening to plead not guilty and demand a trial. 90 This is most
likely to happen, according to one study, when the defendant sees himself
differently from the definition offered by the court and thus, distrusts
the court process.
Rather than trying to thwart the court by refusing to bargain,
the defendant may also attempt to win by designing and trying to implement
his own bargain. Many defendants are thought to be quite knowledgeable
about how to use the bargaining process:
[The defendant] learns that tactical maneuver
and delay, the ability of counsel to wear
down the [prosecutor], to exploit lazy or
over-burdened district attorneys, and to
steer the plea before the right judge can
have more to do with the outcome than the
facts of his offense or anything in his
record.91
This level of aggressiveness is most often associated with defendants who
do not have defense counsel. Represented defendants may also attempt to
bargain on their own, but more often this defendant is expected to use his
knowledge of the process to manipulate the actions of his lawyer, by
hoarding information from him or by threatening him.
Emerson's model of bargaining as negotiated reality also allows
for a third role for the defendant-bargainer. At the same time that
court personnel are attempting to influence the presentation of the de-
fendant's character through pitches and denunciations, the defendant may
also deliberately affect the court's assessment of his character. 9 2 Here
the defendant employs conscious strategies to stave off the effects of
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denunciations from members of the court. Varying by the amount of aggres-
siveness demanded of the defendant, there are three types of strategies
which Emerson believes defendants use: innocence, justification, and
excuses.
Maintaining innocence is a way for the defendant to refute the
accusations which have been made by denying that he had any connection to
the offense. In this way the defendant attempts to cast doubt on the
reasonableness of the case presented by the court, and thus, to negate
any conceptions of moral character the court might have developed, based
on the alleged offense. This is a difficult strategy for the defendant to
maintain, though, because it does not discredit the entire basis on which
the court has established a sense of moral character. In fact, Emerson
believes that what the defendant offers in terms of protestations of
innocence is still evaluated against what the court has already determined
about his moral character. If, indeed, the court decides that the evidence
against the defendant is strong enough that innocence is not possible, for
the defendant to continue to insist upon his innocence might result in his
appearing "unrepentant." Thus, by declaring his innocence the defendant
could weaken further the court's assessment of his moral character.
Because innocence is a dangerous strategy, most defendants,
according to Emerson, rely on justification or excuses. The defendant who
uses justification to explain the offense admits that his crime was wrong,
but suggests that there were circumstances which serve to mitigate it. In
this sense the defendant is actually redefining the act and in the process
trying to redirect the court's assessment of his moral character. Finally,
the most frequent strategy employed by the defendant is to offer excuses
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for the behavior represented in the crime. Excuses deny responsibility
for the offense, thus making the judgment of the defendant's character
less harsh. Among those excuses observed by Emerson were that the de-
fendant was under duress at the time, that his involvement was accidental,
that the act was committed by someone else, or that the act might be
blamed on the social circumstances of the defendant.93 In each case the
effect is to deny the connection between the act and the moral character
of the defendant; while the defendant may have committed the crime,it is
no reflection of his moral character.
The evidence that defendants do threaten their lawyers, initiate
bargains and offer protestations of innocence and justification in court
is quite convincing. What can be inferred from these active roles in
bargaining is less certain. Though defendants threaten to go to trial, it
is not really clear whether this is a deliberate manipulation of the
criminal process or a desperate reaction to their distrust of the court.
This question is even more critical in Emerson's model where a great deal
of knowledge about the dynamics of the criminal process is attributed to
the defendant. Emerson appears to assume that because defendants make use
of excuses and justifications they have calculated their impact on the
court. These attempts by the defendant may, of course, shape the reality
of the case, but the contention that this shaping is the result of a deliberate
strategy is not well substantiated.
The passive defendant
Perhaps contradicting Emerson and Ohlin are caricatures of the
defendant as passive. One view argues strongly that the court system
necessarily bewilders defendants; anothermore cautiously,that defendants
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usually acquiesce to the will of the lawyers. This is perhaps the more
common view of the defendant during bargaining, that he is the object of
the negotiations, but not a participant. Whether this perspective is
valid is central to the discussion of the equity of the bargaining process
for the defendant. Does the defendant actually understand the reasons why
he must plead guilty? Does he participate in the decision to bargain in
any real sense?
There is some support for the view of the defendant that depicts
a bewildered, naive person, vulnerable to the pressures of the court.
Though this perspective is consistent with either the bureaucratic author-
ity or the cooperative model of relationships among court personnel, it is
more often part of the discussion of the cooperative arrangements made
between the prosecutor and the defense counsel. In part, this is true
because this is a model that accepts the lawyer as a free professional, who
is not manipulated by the court. As a professional, the lawyer cannot be
led by his client, who is lacking in legal expertise or knowledge of the
court.
The President's Crime Commission report offers a number of reasons
why it is inevitable that a defendant will be bewildered and passive when
he appears in court.94 Because of the wide variations in the practices of
courts, the report argues, even the "jailhouse lawye?'cannot predictably
understand his situation. The defense counsel may also be handicapped by
the disparity among courts, if he represents a defendant in a court in which
he has never practiced before. Because the defendant and lawyer may be
unaware of the procedures particular to a court, they could both be un-
successful in proposing a bargain without this specific information. The
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result is that the defendant in a criminal case is very likely to be con-
fused and unable to be an active participant in his own defense, much less
a bargainer.
A slightly less extreme view says that the defendant does, indeed,
not bargain,but that he is still a knowledgeable and willing participant.
Even Blumberg's model requires that the defendant know enough to act out
the role for which he is coached by the attorney. Blumberg sees the de-
fendant's appearance in court as a conscious role performance in which the
defendant knowingly "cops out," but in a manner that will be acceptable to
the court.
The'cop-out' is, in fact, a charade during which
an accused must project an appropriate and accept-
able degree of guilt, penitence, and remorse. If
he adequately feigns the role of the 'guilty per-
son' his hearers will engage in the fantasy that
he is contrite and thereby merits a lesser plea...
What is actually involved, therefore,is not a
'degradation' or a 'reinforcing' process at all,
but rather a highly structured system of exchange
cloaked in the rituals of legalism and public
professions of guilt and repentance. Everyone
present is aware of the staging,including the
defendant.95
Somewhat surprisingly, Blumberg posits that the defendant is
willing to participate in this charade because he can rationally assess his
situation and weigh his chances. The defendant is seen as having an aware-
ness that it will be difficult to fight the state by electing trial, whether
or not he is innocent. Blumberg extends this argument far enough to suggest
that the defendant understands"the great statistical probability of convic-
tion"96 in a trial and thus, the comparatively better odds under a bar-
gained plea. By implication, too, the defendant knows what the role of the
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prosecutor and the lawyer ought to be and expects that they will work
cooperatively to formulate bargains.
According to most observers the model example of the "rational,"
but passive defendant is the professional criminal who is a "regular" in the
court community. Because of his experience with the court organization
this is the kind of defendant who is presumed not only to understand the
virtues of bargaining but also to know best how to assist court personnel
in working out a bargain. Often these defendants know the sentencing
judge, the prosecutor, and the police, and they can enter into the informal
meetings leading to bargains. Like the jailhouse lawyers who provide legal
advice to their fellow inmates in prisons, these "regular" defendants are
thought to have an extensive understanding of the statutes, rules of
evidence, and procedures relating to their cases. Thus, they will recog-
nize a good bargain, but they will not disrupt the order of the court by
trying to participate in the bargaining process.
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Chapter III: Research Questions and Methodology
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Questions for Research
The debate over the nature of the bargaining process raises many
as yet unanswered questions about what bargaining is and how it affects
the courts. The validity of the reformers' assumptions about bargaining
is especially critical in the case of those who advocate negotiated justice
and the recognition of bargaining as a formal decision making process. To
evaluate this reform the critical issue for empirical study is whether
there exists a bargaining process which contains such characteristics that
it can indeed be harnessed to the goals of the court. Most observers have
seen due process as the important goal to be retained and the one which
bargaining is least able to fulfill. The overall question -- which cannot
be addressed directly -- istherefore,whether there is a "due process" of
bargaining or whether one could reasonably be achieved through reform.
To provide the kind of information which will be necessary if
we are to make normative judgments about bargaining, we have conducted an
empirical study of the criminal process. Though our study began with no
firm hypotheses about bargaining it was guided by five questions which
seemed to us most central to the evaluation of negotiated justice:
What role (if any) does the process we have
defined as bargaining have in the courts?
What is the structure of bargaining?
What is the role of each of the court per-
sonnel in the bargaining process?
What is the role of the defendant?
What is the impact of the bargaining
process on the courts, the defendants, and
the personnel of the courts?
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While expressing these research interests as separate questions
provides a convenient way of presenting our research design and findings,
it is true that they proved to be highly interconnected and overlapping
concerns. Collectively they express what for us was a preliminary attempt
to understand and evaluate the process of bargaining. What is the nature
of the structural and political roots of bargaining? What variables seem
to determine the occurrence and the shape of bargains? How successful is
bargaining in fulfilling the criteria and goals traditionally expected of
a system of justice?
The role of bargaining in the courts
What role, if any, does bargaining play in the processes of the
criminal courts? What seems to have caused bargaining to appear in these
courts? Did it arise as a necessary adaptation to changes in the court?
Is it a temporary aberration or -- perhaps -- has it become the dominant
mode of dealing with criminal cases? What kinds of cases appear to be
bargained, and what variables seem to control the decision to bargain?
What functions does it seem to serve for the court?
The most fundamental question as yet unresolved about the role of
bargaining in the criminal courts is whether, in fact, there is such a
practice. Much has been written about its impacts and methods of regula-
tion, but its existence seems still to be subject to some controversy. We
conducted our observations, then,with the existence of bargaining as an
open question, at least insofar as we observed the entire criminal process,
not merely those stages at which bargaining is most often assumed to happen.
The question of the origin of bargaining in the courts is even
more difficult to address because it is virtually impossible to idertify a
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time in the history of the courts when there were not reportedly bargains,
"fixers," or some other form of covert disposition of cases. For this
reason the question is often refocused not to ask for the root causes of
bargaining but to ask whether it is an inevitable result of the structure
of our criminal court system.
Most observers of bargining have either assumed that it is, in
fact, a necessary reaction to the shifts in the goals of the court or that
it is merely a temporary and curable aberration in the operation of the
courts. Though both arguments do see bargaining as a response to structural
problems in the courts, they differ in their opinion that it is a necessary
response and,thus, that it cannot be eliminated. To suggest that bargain-
ing is an inevitable reaction to the structure of the courts is to argue
that the goals of the court could not be achieved under the adversary
system, and therefore, that bargaining has emerged as the operating model.
If the goals of the criminal process are assumed to have remained fairly
constant and the adversary model desirable in its own right, on the other
hand, then bargaining is an aberration of the criminal court. It has been
suggested that the causes of this distortion in the court can be sought in
its administration -- either in a shortage of resources or in a failure to
provide adequate regulation of decisions. -
It was clearly not feasible for us -- within a single case study -
to determine whether bargaining is, indeed, either a response to changing
goals or inadequate resources. Instead, we depended on more intermediate
measures and asked how it was that court personnel used bargaining and how
well bargaining seemed to be fulfilling the formal goals of the court. By
observing the instances in which court personnel bargained, for example,
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we tried to determine whether bargaining is most strongly associated with
the reduction of delay, the negotiation of reality for correction or
treatment purposes, or perhaps yet other possible functions. We also
tried to be sensitive to whether bargains are attempted under unusual
pressures, either of "procedural" overload or an overload of cases resulting
from rising rates of criminal arrest.
Making observations which could lead to judgments about how well
the court fills its formal goals is clearly more difficult. If the ques-
tion is raised as to whether the bargaining process accomplishes deterrence
and rehabilitation as well as sentencing, then, it would be beyond the
reach of our data. A literal interpretation of the question would require,
for example, that workable measures of deterrence and rehabilitation
existed. Even iMore difficult would be the task of determining that it was
indeed bargaining which had led to the fulfillment of these goals. In the
absence of such measures it has been generally impossible for any study to
decide how well trial serves the ends of rehabilitation and deterrence,
much less how well bargaining can meet the correctional goals of the
criminal justice system.
What we attempted to ask, then, was the slightly less ambitious
question of whether the factors which appeared to determine bargains were
consistent with the goals of deterrence or rehabilitation. An acknowledgedly
weak, but traditional standard for deciding whether any means of sentencing
tried to consider deterrence is whether the "punishment fits the crime."
The assumption here is that deterrence is somehow achieved when criminal
acts receive condemnation consistently and in proportion to their severity.
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Bargained sentences then, could appear lenient in terms of the offense
charged and on these grounds, might be thought to have no deterrent value.
There is evidence that the degree to which deterrence is being
pursued as a goal may be as much reflected in the behavior and attitude of
court personnel as in the sentence itself. In her observations of court-
room behavior, for example, Maureen Mileski found that in those cases in
which the bargained sentence was perceived to be lenient, the judge tended
to maintain a harsh demeanor toward the defendant, in a sense substituting
lectures and reprimands for punishment in the form of a severe sentence
Thus, if there is a conscious effort to consider the goal of deterrence
during the bargaining process, it should be observable in the encounters
of court personnel and defendants, and in the attitudes which the actors
express toward the offenses with which defendants are charged.
For assessing the degree to which rehabilitative goals were being
taken into account, we intended to make similar observations of the atti-
tudes and deliberations of court personnel during bargaining. In partic-
ular, we tried to evaluate the notion that bargaining is actually a means
of individualizing sentencing, taking into account the background of the
defendant and having the flexibility to alter the charge and the sentence
as it seems appropriate to a particular defendant's correctional needs. We
hoped to observe enough of the bargaining process to decide whether court
personnel were really guided by correctional goals. Is disposition really a
focus of the sentencing process during bargaining? To what extent are cor-
rectional alternatives considered, in comparison to other more court-centered
factors which may influence the bargain? To what extent do court personnel
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actually perceive that they are working toward a rehabilitative goal when
they negotiate a bargain?
The structure of bargaining
An issue closely associated with notions of the due process of
bargaining is what it is over which people in the courts are bargaining.
Two models dominate current discussion: that bargaining focuses on ex-
changing services, largely within the context of sentencing; and that
bargaining focuses on the negotiation of reality with an eye to develop-
ing individualized treatment for the defendant. Whether bargaining is
susceptible to regulation and could thereby be made consonant with notions
of due process hangs, in part, on the answer to this question.
We felt that we could address directly the question of what it is
that court personnel exchange, by observing overt offers during their con-
versations and by remaining sensitive to possible "tacit" offers -- watch-
ing for patterns of bargains among the same personnel. The negotiation of
reality, however, is less easy to watch. Our hope was to collect enough
conversations in which the actors in the court were presenting the "facts"
of a particular case so that we could compare versions of the defendant,
the offense, and the defendant's potential, and see how it was that they
changed as the criminal process progressed. During interviews especially,
we intended to look for direct evidence that one actor was trying to in-
fluence another to change his perception of "reality."
At a more detailed level, the question of how bargaining is
structured becomes not only what the object of the bargaining is, but also
what "currency" it is that actors in the bargaining process offer one
another. The guilty plea has, of course, been the focus of most studies
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of bargaining. The evidence points to the existence of many others -- in-
formation, favorable case schedules, friendship -- and we felt that these
would be observable directly in conversations about bargaining. Whether
the major currency offered is actually the guilty plea or something else
should have implications for the due process of bargaining. Are the
currencies used by the bargainers primarily their own? The defendant's?
Does the defendant understand what is being traded? Do currencies vary
from case to case? What variables are likely to affect the choice and use
of currencies?
The role of court personnel in the bargaining process
Because bargaining is a product of interactions among court per-
sonnel, it is clearly shaped by the identity and interests of the members
of the court who participate in it. Though models of bargaining assume
that bargains are made between the prosecutor and the defense attorney,
there is no reason to believe that other court personnel are not involved,
or even that the prosecution and defense are the key actors in the process.
A critical issue is whether the concentration on the behavior of prosecutor,
defender, and judge is justified, or whether the range of participants is
in fact much wider, narrower, or variable from case to case. The more wide-
spread and variant a phenomenon like bargaining proves to be, the more
difficult may be its regulation.
Whatever personnel are involved in the bargaining process, their
behavior during bargaining is dictated by their interests in the criminal
process. Observing the juvenile court, Edwin Lemert defines interests as
"specialized values or claims that persons or groups have on others or on
material things for service, time, attention, use, and employment. Interests
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connote immediacy and valuing of something as a means to an end."2 While
Lemert was able to measure the interests of members of the juvenile court
directly from the open debates which arose over its reform, the interests
of court personnel in this study must be inferred in the context of their
attitudes and actions during bargaining, the roles they play, the patterns
of initiation of bargains, and the interactions among participants.
In particular, other studies have argued that these relationships
and attitudes are best described by asking whether they are based on con-
flict or on cooperation. The interests of the prosecutor, the defense
attorney and the judge have been consistently depicted in most descriptions
of bargaining as built primarily on the basis of a conflict relationship.
The prosecutor's concern is assumed to be the maintenance of a conviction
rate and the speed with which cases are processed. It has also been posited
that the responsibility of the prosecutor as a public servant urges him to
focus on maintaining the image that he does not lose cases, but does not
necessarily demand that he prove that he can win cases.
The interests of the defense lawyer are seen as ambivalent, alter-
nating between the need to cooperate in whatever activities might please
the court and the specific need to defend a client in the same court. How
he balances these two roles may be dependent on the nature of his relation-
ship with other personnel. If there is inherent conflict between the defense
and the court, for example, the lawyer may be able to act as a true adversary
toward the prosecutor, but he could experience difficulty in securing the
information and services of the court.
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If he behaves in ways that are not acceptable to the court, does
this prevent him from access to the bargaining process? Are lawyers who
design aggressive defense strategies, make lengthy statements, or other-
wise consume court time excluded from bargaining, or does the relationship to
the court change as cases change?
If, on the other hand, the defense attorney works cooperatively
with the court he may be in a position to negotiate sound bargains for the
defendant, but perhaps at the expense of the single-minded representation
of the interests of the defendant. Under a cooperative model the defendant
is presumably represented by a lawyer who already has a complex web of
relationships which may shape his decisions3. The critical issue in this
model is whether a'lawyer bound by a history of organizational obligations
and battles can negotiate a bargain that is in the interest of the defendant.
In what ways is the character of the bargaining process different when it
takes place between lawyers and court personnel with longstanding personal
relationships than when it happens between lawyers and other personnel who
have only occasional contact?
It is argued, for example, that public defenders assigned to a
court are much more likely to develop long term cooperative contacts with
the court than are private lawyers who are paid by the defendant or who
are assigned occasionally to the court on a voluntary basis4. Do public
and private lawyers appear to have different kinds of relationships with
other court personnel? Are public defenders more likely to work coopera-
tively with the court and more apt to develop and accept bargains than
are private lawyers?
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The judge's role is equally ambivalent. He is both the giver of
justice and the administrator of the courts. As the guardian of due
process he must maintain a procedurally correct image, appearing to sen-
tence defendants without such external influences as bargaining. On the
other hand, he is clearly required to demonstrate that the court is func-
tioning smoothly and that cases are efficiently cleared. How much overt
involvement in bargaining can the judge afford? Is his major interest in
bargaining the efficient processing of cases? Does the judge attempt to
enforce a due process of bargaining?
The role of the defendant
In most discussions of bargaining, the role of the defendant is
rarely even as defined as those of other actors in the courts, especially
those of the judge, defender, and prosecutor. In particular, whether the
defense counsel is portrayed as a protector or advisor to his client or is
seen as an "agent mediator" who "cons" his client into pleading guilty, the
expectation of most observers of the courts seems to be that the defendant
is a passive observer of his own trial or plea process. A few studies,
though, do suggest that the defendant knowingly participates in a charade
and is active in his own defense. The kind of regulation which would be
needed to insure that bargaining was protecting the defendant's rights
clearly depends, in part, on the role of the defendant in bargaining situa-
tions. Does he have an independent voice in the outcome of his case? To
what extent does he bargain with his lawyer? What are the grounds on which
he bargains?
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When the defendant is attributed purposeful behavior during bar-
gaining the focus would logically seem to be on his need to avoid convic-
tion. In fact, interpretations of the defendant's interests in bargaining
have been diverse and not at all in agreement that the defendant bargains
only to escape conviction. As often as it is assumed that the intent of
defendants who bargain -- and who are bargained -- is to avoid conviction,
it is suggested that they bargain to minimize the amount of penal time they
will be given, to remove a damaging criminal label, to modify a criminal
record, or to encourage consideration from the court in a related case or
5
charge
Just as it is difficult to determine the interests of court per-
sonnel, the evidence on which to decide what interests do guide defendants
during bargaining is scant. The problem is further aggravated in the
instance of the defendant, since defendants in no way constitute a group
with the ability to participate in the academic debate over bargaining and,
thus, to express their interests in the issues that emerge. Instead, this
study must be dependent on discovering the interests of defendants from their
behavior during bargaining. How willing are defendants to enter into a de-
cision to bargain? What appear to be their attitudes toward the concept of
bargaining and toward court personnel? What currencies do they offer to
those with whom they bargain? What are the purposes of the bargain they
participate in? How does the way in which the defendant defines himself
compare with the image which he must convey in court?
Other studies lead us to believe that we may find that a descrip-
tion of defendant interests must be disaggregated further by defendant
"types." Distinctions have been drawn, for example, between experienced
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and naive defendants, between innocent and guilty defendants, and among
defendants of different socioeconomic characteristics and with different
types of offenses. The most attention has probably been directed toward
the interests of the experienced or professional defendant.6 This kind of
defendant is seen as legal-wise and cognizant of how to avoid trouble in
court. Since his interest is thought to be primarily to minimize the
length of the sentence he is given and to reduce the apparent severity of
the offense in his record, the experienced defendant is assumed to use
bargaining aggressively and eagerly. Is it true, on the other hand, that
the inexperienced defendant has a different set of interests or perhaps no
opportunity to bargain at all?
Many unanswered questions exist about other types of defendants,
as well. One writer found that black defendants were more likely to demand
trials since they mistrusted the offer to bargain and felt that their best
interests lay with the chance to fight the case in a trial and to try to
win7. It is equally possible, however, that the kind of offenses with which
black defendants are likely to be charged are those which are less likely
to be bargained. Do defendants charged with different types of offenses
have different interests in the bargaining process? How do interests in
bargaining appear to correlate with the socioeconomic status or the race
of the defendant? Finally, are defendants who see themselves as innocent
less likely to engage in bargaining than those who believe that they are
guilty? Is the interest of the "innocent" defendant most centrally to prove
his innocence?
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The impacts of bargaining
The differences in form between bargaining and trial are widely
recognized. Compared to the highly structured trial model, bargaining
appears to be informal, largely hidden, and primarily non-adversarial.
What i-s less well-known is whether these differences in form have measur-
able impacts on either sentencing or the defendant's experience in court.
Is there any consistent set of differences between pleaded cases and cases
taken to trial? Does the bargaining process have observable impacts on
the defendant or other personnel?
Some observers argue that there are no distinctions between the
kinds of sentencing decisions made during bargaining and those made after
trial. The assumption is that even trial judges make sentencing decisions
on the basis of "non-correctional factors," since they must be influenced
as much by the culture of the courts in which they sit as by variables
relating directly to the defendant and the offense8
Another view, though, focuses on the latency of bargaining,
arguing that decisions resulting from a bargain must be influenced by non-
correctional factors to an even greater degree than are the sentences of
trial judges. Since bargaining is a "hidden" process, it has no provision
for the defendant to present his case publicly and,thus, no assurance that
the facts of the case will be fully revealed. This is taken as evidence
that court personnel will take advantage of the lack of scrutiny and
recommend sentences that are not based on "equitable" criteria.
There is no agreement about what factors do determine bargains,
just as there is no consensus as to how sentencing decisions are made. We
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hoped to discover the basis for bargained decisions by observing court per-
sonnel in the process of bargaining. Are bargains made solely on the
basis of relatioiships and obligations among court personnel or do their
deliberations take into account the individual characteristics of the de-
fendant and the offense? If the defendant and his crime are part of the
considerations which give birth to a bargain, are the factors considered
essentially correctional in nature? One description of courtroom encounters
for example, suggests that bargains are calculated, in part, on the basis
9of the defendant's level of disrespect for the court . Still another
analysis argues that court personnel use stereotypes of defendants to
10dictate appropriate bargains
The remainder of the debate over the impacts of bargaining focuses
on its consequences for the well-being of the defendant, rather than for
the particular sentence levied. A few supporters of bargaining have, for
example, contended that the court process is inhumane and bargaining is
less likely than trial to have stigmatizing effects on the defendant. The
evidence most usually offered is that the trial is designed as a kind of
"degradation ceremony,')1 trying to assure that the criminal process is
deterrent by impressing the defendant with the severity of his crime. Even
on these grounds it is not clear whether bargaining is more "humane" than
trial. While it may free the defendant from participation in the trial
ceremony, for example, it could actually substitute perfunctory treatment
and a mandatory confession of guilt for the stigmatizing effects of trial.
The long term impacts of bargaining are clearly immeasurable
within the scope of this study. Several studies have tried to establish
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that the impacts of any appearance in court are undesirable and may extend
beyond the expectable sanctions which arise from a criminal record.
Skolnick and Schelartz,for example,found that even a defendant who appears
in court and is acquitted of a crime may experience difficulty in finding
employment, as a result of the stigma associated with adjudication by the
12
criminal court
There is evidence, however, that the direct, and more easily
measurable effects of being processed by the criminal courts may be equally
important. Theory which has focused on the ways in which institutions
"label" their clients suggests that the definition the court gives to a
13defendant and his problems may exert significant impacts on the defendant
In particular, the manner in which the court views the defendant may in-
fluence the way in which he sees himself or in which others view him. To
understand how bargaining affects defendants who are its object, we may well
ask how court personnel view defendants. How do court personnel describe
defendants whose cases they bargain? What types of defendants do they
perceive? What attitudes toward defendants do they express when they are
in the presence of the defendant?
Some observers have suggested that the most critical point for
gauging the relationship between the defendant and the court occurs during
the guilty plea. Officially, of course, the plea is a statement of the
defendant's factual guilt and can be accepted only on that basis. In
practice the distinction between legal and factual guilt appears to be
ambiguous for the court. What is the defendant's understanding of the plea
as an admission of guilt when he enters a plea as a bargaining device? In
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effect, the plea is also thought to constitute an acknowledgment that the
action taken against the defendant was legitimate and that the defendant
is ready for correction, but does the plea convey these meanings to the
defendant?
A position worth testing is that offered by Blumberg who argues
strongly that the defendant understands the plea as a necessary charade
and nothing morel4 . As evidence he suggests that after his experience in
court the defendant will typically see himself as an essentially good
person who might have acted guilty in court, but who really was innocent
and can quickly reassert his innocence. To what extent do defendants
perceive that they are part of a charade while their cases are being
bargained? Do defendants see and describe themselves as innocent even
while they are formally entering a guilty plea?
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Development of the Case Study
The concerns that first led us to examine the phenomenon of bar-
gaining in the courts also led us to formulate a very ambitious set of
research questions. Because we were studying a process which has had only
a sparse history of previous investigation and for which there is no well
developed theory, we were enticed into asking more global questions than
common sense might have dictated. Since our interest was in using our
results to evaluate a reform, moreover, our questions tended to deal with
the systemic aspects of bargaining -- those variables which might have
consequences for its impacts on the organization of the courts. For both
of these reasons we were encouraged to undertake an exploratory study of
bargaining, looking not so much for tests of hypotheses about bargaining
as for indications of what are the critical variables that guide the bar-
gaining process.
In this respect we choose to do what Gans has called a recon-
naissance15 or what Weiss refers to as the "holistic" approach to social
research. 16 The study we set out to do most closely resembled that
described by Gans in The Urban Villagers:
This, then is not a scientific study, for it does
not provide what Merton has called compelling
evidence for a series of hypotheses. It is rather
an attempt by a trained social scientist to de-
scribe and explain the behavior of a large number
of people, using his methodological and theoretical
training to sift the observations, and to report
only those generalizations which are justified by
the data...Properly speaking, the study is a
reconnaissance, an exploration of a community to
provide an overview, guided by the cannons of
sociological theory and method, but not attempting
to offer documentation for all the findings.17
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Like Gans we were concerned with describing what we anticipated
would be a complex phenomenon, drawing its dynamic from the behavior of a
number of people, and discernible only through participation in the life
of the courts. Rather than isolating particular elements of the bargain-
ing process for observation -- even if we had had the inforation on
which to make that kind of selection -- we wanted to know how all the
elements fit together and how bargaining as a process "worked." Thus, we
set out to observe a large number of cases being processed by the criminal
courts and to sift from our observations a description of bargaining.
Because of their proximity, our research was conducted in the
Massachusetts District Courts. As the next section will show our attempts
to observe the dynamics by which criminal cases were processed ultimately
led us to employ several forms of data gathering, including statistical
analysis of available documents pertaining to criminal cases, interviews
with a wide range of personnel of the courts, and direct observation of
the operation of the courts. Analysis of each kind of data was under way
throughout the period in which our data was being collected, and the
results were compared with the questions we were asking and the data
obtained from other sources of information. At each stage, we were able
to redefine our questions and to focus our observations with greater con-
fidence. The specific path which this process followed is detailed in
the next section.
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Organization of the research
Like so much of social science research our case study owes its
being less to carefully preplanned investigations, than to chance. All
studies of the courts are frustrated by the difficulty of breaking through
what is described in police research as the "blue curtain." Ours suffered
doubly from the problem of getting access to information about the courts,
since we were asking to observe what everyone agrees is a latent process.
The chronicle of our research,then,is an account of how it was shaped by
our attempts to get access to the bargaining process, as well as a history
of how our research design was conceived. In the early stages of our re-
search our efforts were primarily directed to finding auspices, and in
the later stages, to participating in the life of the court.
Two assumptions guided our search for the best way "inside" the
bargaining process. We felt that at least our first efforts to observe
bargaining should center on the lawyer-client relationship. This seemed a
necessary point of departure not only because studies of bargaining had
suggested to us that the lawyer and the prosecutor were the key actors in
the process, but also because we felt it was important to observe the role
of the defendant as closely as possible. As far as it was feasible, though,
we felt that we should make our observations free from the auspices of either
the prosecution or the defense. At the same timeentry into the closed
community of the court and, especially, to the bargaining process definitely
required an official explanation for our presence in the court.
Our initial approaches were addressed to the administration of
the District Courts, since we felt that with an essentially "neutral" yet
authoritative backing, we would encounter the least bias in the responses
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we would receive and the least difficulty in making our observations. The
office of the Chief Justice of the District Courts offered us their approval
but not their auspices. They responded to our request by suggesting that
a study such as ours would, indeed, be hampered if it were regarded as an
official inquiry of the Chief Justice, since court personnel would feel
less candid about revealing "irregular" behavior.
Our assumption that we would need to observe lawyer-client rela-
tionships in the court eventually led us to groups of private attorneys
responsible for defending indigents in the District Courts. These lawyers
uniformly declined to be observed because they felt that we might infringe
on the privileged relationship between themselves and their clients. Dur-
ing this period, however, the Massachusetts Defenders Committee -- the
State-funded public defender agency -- underwent a significant change in
leadership.18 This led the incoming Chief Counsel and Associate Chief
Counsel to seek basic information on their organization, with the hope of
formulating proposals for reorganization. They were receptive to our offer
to investigate the methods their attorneys and other personnel used in the
processing of cases, including the relationship between lawyer and client.
They, in turn, requested an evaluation of the ways in which their attorneys
collected and used information. The only restriction placed on our work was
that our observations of attorneys' behavior in the courts would be conducted
with the attorneys' consent and knowledge and that the results would be
reported in such a way that individual identities of lawyers and clients
would not be revealed.
Though our chance arrangement with the Defenders did not give us
the "neutral" auspices we thought we needed, it gave us access to the court
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and as a bonus the opportunity to use the files of the organization.
We had not initially planned on analyzing case files, but the presence
of over 90,000 case histories of defendants processed by the District
Courts was too compelling to resist. At this stage we felt that our obser-
vations of bargaining might be greatly facilitated if we could discover in
advance what the variables were that influenced whether a case was bargain-
able, what types of defendants had pleaded guilty, what perceptions of
defendants the lawyers revealed in their notes on cases, and whether the
court, the lawyer, or the offense seemed to exert significant influences
on the outcome of the case.
The first step of our empirical analysis, then, was to draw a
statistical sample of closed cases from the Defenders'files. 19 Our study
included more than fifty variables which we selected because we felt that
they would act as useful measures of the charges, the defendant's background,
the attorney's handling of the case, the actions taken by the court, and
the outcome of the case.20 As a concurrent step, we traced the "criminal
careers21 of several randomly selected defendants, seeking to trace the
defendants to observe if there were long-term relationships between
Defenders and their clients and whether the outcomes of the cases changed
as the client became more experienced or perhaps involved in progressively
more serious crimes.
As a first effort, designed to give us a quick "reading" of the
results we would obtain, we conducted an analysis of case statistics based
on 300 cases and criminal histories of twelve defendants. 2 2 The results of
these studies were sufficient to convince us that the information contained
in the files would not give us any insight into the process of bargaining.
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In the first place, we discovered that all the variables we had selected
were correlated, so that whether a defendant pleaded guilty, the offense
charged, the socioeconomic background, age, sex, and race of the defendant,
and the outcomes of the case were all highly intercorrelated. We were not
able to isolate any variables which might be said to be correlate uniquely
with guilty pleas. More important, however, the information itself was
suspect. As our later interviews and observations confirmed, these
records -- which were kept by the Defenders on their own cases -- were
artificial. They did not exist to provide the organization with informa-
tion about an ongoing case, but rather more as protection for the lawyer
against any future charges of malpractice. Information which might have
provided us with insight into bargaining and especially, into the lawyer's
treatment of the client and the ways in which bargains were actually made
was largely absent from the files.
What we did learn from this statistical data was that if bargain-
ing was indeed occurring in the District Courts,we would have to observe
it inside the court itself, not through its records. We accepted the
auspices of the Defenders for this purpose, and in the process knowingly
skewed our observations to emphasize the role of the lawyer in the bargain-
ing process. Initially, we tried to gather basic data on the criminal
process and the lawyer's attempts to shape it. We conducted over twenty
interviews with attorneys working in all divisions of the Defenders, in
order to understand the processes by which they prepared a case from the
initial assignment at the district court through the final post-conviction
appeal, and to see at what points "bargaining" occurred.23 Our approach to
these interviews was to ask the attorneys to describe the process they each
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employed in handling a case, then to direct them to describe how cases
and defendants differ, which are the most time-consuming, the most in-
teresting, etc. In each case we were looking for the ways in which
lawyers perceived their clients and the criminal process, as well as for
what they did. As a last step we employed a content analysis on these
interviews to form a structure around which to build our observations in
the courts. In addition, of course, the interviews served the added
purpose of introducing us to the attorneys and indicating what our in-
terests in the attorney-client relationship were.
Interestingly, we experienced a great deal of difficulty in this
effort to communicate with the Defenders. The attorneys were generally
hard pressed to understand our belief that there would be any patterns in
the way in which they prepared cases. One attorney was, for example, con-
vinced that it would be impossible for him to describe the thought processes,
the information, or the strategies which he employed in representing a
client, since he believed that each case was absolutely unique. Other
attorneys were more receptive to our notions, but they, too, stressed the
differences, the specifics of the cases they represented. Since few were
able to generalize their experiences, much of the information we received
was highly anecdotal. Our efforts to communicate, however, succeeded in
enough cases that several of the attorneys invited us to observe their
daily rounds in courtand several others,whom we specifically askedfollowed
suit.
For three months we accompanied these Defenders on their rounds
of the District Courts, participating in their interviews, their conversa-
tions with personnel in the court, their coffee breaks, their conferences
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with other defenders, and their trips to and from court. Our contact with
the lawyers and the court was intensive and, we believe,thorough. We were
able to watch cases at every stage of preparation and in each part of the
formal criminal process. In addition, though we could not observe defen-
dants being arrested or cases being appealed,we were able to hear second-
hand accounts of both processes from the police, defendants, and lawyers
involved. As faithfully as possible we recorded these observations, in-
cluding as far as possible verbatim transcripts of all the conversations
we witnessed.
As we began to see that bargaining did not occur merely at the
plea stage of a case, we began to appreciate the complexity of the process
we were trying to understand. In this respect we were particulary con-
cerned with three methodological problems which arose from our choice of
auspices: whether our presence was altering the "latent" process of bar-
gaining, how to assure that we sampled all the stages of a process that
appeared to include all the personnel in the court,and how to best under-
stand the role of the defendant in the process,when we saw him only in the
presence of his lawyer.
At the outset of our observations we had worried that we would
interfere with the orderly and natural process of bargaining or at least
that we would be unable to take notes on what we observed. Within a few
days, however, we found that our role in the courts was not only accepted
by court officials and defendants alike, but that our presence was, it
appeared, largely ignored. The Defenders introduced us to each person they
met merely as being "with us" [the M.D.C.] and explained that we were
studying the criminal process. Within a week our main problem was avoiding
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assignment of cases, since most of the judges had forgotten that we were
not MDC attorneys. Whatever impact we had on people in the process of
bargaining, then, was probably limited to modifications they would make in
their behavior because the "MDC" was present. Both for these people and
the MDC attorneys themselves, we are confident that we observed enough of
their behavior to assure that we observed the "range" of possible behavior
during bargaining, even if our presence affected particular conversa-
tions or activities.
Because of the obvious complexity of the bargaining process, it
became evident to us that, however accurate our observations, there were
steps in bargaining which were not conducted in the presence of the defender,
despite his central role in the bargaining system. Because we were labeled
as somehow affiliated with the MDC,we could not step out of that role to
observe -prosecutors, police, or other attorneys. We owe our understanding
of bargaining "outside" the lawyer's presence, then, to observations and
data gathered by two of our students with our advice and supervision. Judy
Levenson conducted a study parallel to ours, observing the members of the
Lawyer's Panel -- a group of "prestige" attorneys who volunteer their time
24
to defend indigents in Boston Municipal and Dorchester Courts. Her data
has provided us with a comfortable test of the generalizability of our views
about how lawyers prepare cases. Scott Hebert studied the prosecutors of
25
the Suffolk County District Attorney's office, and we were able to use his
observations to trace the strategies which the prosecutors use to prepare
their cases and their bargaining positions.
Finally, we were, and still are, concerned about our ability to
understand the role and treatment of the defendant during bargaining. We
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had hoped to include conversations with defendants, alone, as part of our
observations and to determine how much they understood about the bargain-
ing process, how they perceived their lawyers, and whether they felt they
were getting a fair settlement. While we were able to observe interviews
with the defenders and their clients, and to discuss the defendants with
each of the court officials with whom the Defenders worked, it became
clear to us that little would be gained by attempting to interview the
defendants themselves.
Two barriers, in our experience, exist to making contact with
defendants who are being processed by the courts. First, while the de-
fendants could understand us as "with the M.D.C.," there was no other
role in which we could talk to them with 'a sufficiently convincing justi-
fication about what is understandably a very sensitive topic. Indeed,
even the Defenders were typically able to get their clients to "open up"
only by deliberate attempts to urge communication, and even then without
any certainty that they were being told the "truth." Moreover, even if a
credible role were available, the difficulties inherent in interfering
in the sensitive relationship between lawyer and client in an ongoing case
might well prejudice the outcome of the case for the defendant. This
ethical problem has led nearly every other observer of the criminal process
to limit conversations with defendants to those whose cases have already
been processed by the courts, and who were in jail. 26 Since for our purposes
the bias in data obtained from convicted defendants would have been over-
whelming, we chose to observe defendants only in the context of our general
study of the criminal process.
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Analysis of the data
Our observations in the courts, combined with our interviews with
the defenders, provided an overwhelming tangle of data, covering more than
600 pages of single spaced notes. The data included not only verbatim
accounts of conversations among participants in the court, but a rich blend
of our own insights into the bargaining process, asides from the lawyers,
partial transcripts from trials, and formal interviews with court personnel.
In light of the distinction that Weiss makes between "holistic studies" and
"analysis," it would certainly seem inaccurate to refer to the process by
which we tried to understand and use this data as "analysis." Clearly, what
we attempted is much more a synthesis of diverse kinds of data leading toward
a holistic assessment of bargaining than an analysis which seeks to test a
hypothesis.
If we employed any particular method for drawing inferences from
our data it was what Glazer and Strauss call a "constant comparative"
method of "analysis."28 Our strategy was to cull through the assembled
materials, seeking recurring patterns of events -- commonly used words;
repeated patterns of bargaining; generally accepted opinions, interests,
and perspectives. But most simply, we read through our notes, underlining
terms which seemed to be of value in understanding the processes of the
courts, attempted to sort them in a useful way, considered their implications
and attempted to see if those implications were consistent with other data.
Often we were able to learn from testing our emerging hypotheses against
our several sources of data. For example, when our observations yielded a
set of categories which defenders and others appeared to employ to describe
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defendants and cases, we tested them against our statistical data, and found
that they were indeed more significant predictors of the outcome of a case
than the more expectable measures such as "length of record." Often, too,
we were led to make additional observations as our data began to point to
a bargaining process.
Our observations of the criminal process and our understanding of
bargaining, then, moved forward together, connected by our discoveries of
patterns in our data. While we had expected to find regularities in the
relationships among professionals, and between lawyers and clients -- which
would in turn describe bargaining for us -- we found that our observations
were clustering around the objects of bargaining rather than relationships
during bargaining. The themes that emerged dealt more with court per-
sonnel's needs for information, for friendship, or for dispositional alter-
natives than with types of defendants or the social structure of the court.
Our attempts to understand bargaining, then, became directed toward trying
to discover the types of bargains struck in the courts we had observed and
the variables which influenced them.
The manner in which we have chosen to report this data is also
clearly affected by the fact that it is not the result of a tightly con-
trolled, "representative," or complete analysis. We cannot verify by any
objective means the representativeness of what we choose to describe; its
validity rests only on our abilities as observers and the care with which
we collected, compared, and analyzed our data.
As one testwe have proposed our theories to several of the people
whom we had inverviewed or observed, and have found that they, in general,
concurred in the presentation we made. To paraphrase a comment of Gans',
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the test of a sociological statement can be that a person familiar with
the situation will say, "Yes, that's obvious. Why didn't I think of that
myself?"29 While none of our respondents were nearly that enthusiastic
about our observations, they were at least not surprised. By this test
our general observations may not be grossly inaccurate, though perhaps this
test also reveals they are not as much of an "unmasking" of bargaining as
we might have hoped.
When we selected cases or quotes to illustrate our findings, we
could not be guided by any systematic indicator of representativeness. It
would be satisfying to say that they are typical or selected randomly
from the quotes and incidents available. It is doubtful, however, that
this is true. Instead, they are an attempt to illustrate what we believe
to be the dominantly operative mode of behavior with respect to a par-
ticular activity. Clearly, they are chosen in part because they are more
vivid, clearly drawn, or presentable than are other examples from our data.
Our purpose in selecting illustrative material is to communicate as clearly
as possible what we feel is a useful view of bargaining, which has important
implications for reform of the courts. At the same time, we have been care-
ful to verify that what we report in our case study are not idiosyncratic
or perverse instances, which might be prone to distort the reality we are
presenting.
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The Setting of the Case Study
The Massachusetts District Courts
Our observations of defendants being processed by the Massachusetts
criminal courts could have taken place nearly anywhere in the complex
system of courts, whose legacy is still strongly that of Colonial Massachusetts.
In fact, the Constitution of the Commonwealth dates from the mid-1700's,
antedating even the U.S. Constitution, and the present court system still
reflects the concepts of judicial organization which prevailed at that time.
Neglecting several special courts, the primary system includes a Supreme
Judicial Court, an Intermediate Appellate Court, Superior Courts in each of
thirteen Counties, and a district level "system" of seventy-two District
Courts. In addition, there is a single, separate Boston Municipal Court
with its own rules and procedures and four Juvenile Courts, one in each of
Massachusetts' largest cities.
When we decided to focus our study on the District Courts we
acquired a research setting which is profoundly affected by the structure
it has inherited. For our purposes, the district level was the only logical
court in which to study bargaining. It is these courts which try better
30
than 94% of all criminal defendants, most of whom are urban and poor.
In this sense, the District Courts seemed to be most representative of the
bulk of criminal courts in this country, both in their clients and their
caseloads.
The structure of the District Courts, however, still retains its
colonial legacies.31 In particular, our research must be seen in the context
of the limited jurisdiction, the generally jury-less trial procedure, and
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a system of appeal through trial de novo, which is characteristic of the
Massachusetts District Courts.
The inheritance of the District Courtsas successors to the
local courts of an era in which Superior Courts "rode circuit" through
their counties, is that they have concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior
Court over misdemeanors and a growing list of "minor" -- one might well
read "common" -- felonies. A second anomaly of the District Courts which
is a result of their history as a local court is the "probable cause
hearing," a quick review of the State's evidence which precedes the
process of Grand Jury indictment in all but the most unusual circumstances.
The concept which underlay the peculiar jurisdictional structure
of the District Courts was that, since a great deal of time might elapse
between sessions of the Superior Court, defendants should have another,
faster way of having their cases heard. It was believed that the existence
of a local court would prevent arbitrary and capricious treatment of
innocent people between sessions of the Superior Court and the Grand Jury
(which, in Massachusetts, is a creature of Superior Court). Through these
local "district" courts, minor miscreants could have their "day in court"
and a final disposition without waiting for the Superior Court, while the
more "serious" felonies would be given a probable cause hearing at the
district level and if "probably guilty," bound over to the Grand Jury
for indictment. Consistent with this philosophy of "quick justice" which
underlay the District Courts in their early forms, the trials were conducted
by a judge, often part-time, without a jury or transcript.
Since the trial at the District Court was initially looked upon
as a device to protect "local people" from irresponsible prosecution, and
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to assure an equitable resolution of minor infractions, the appeal which
the Commonwealth offered was also designed to be rapid and simple, while
still providing a full hearing by the Superior Court. The system of appeal
which was selected -- called trial de novo -- would give the defendant a
completely new trial in Superior Court,which would once again hear the
evidence on the facts and consider points of law. Since the defendant was
given a clean slate in Superior Court, of course, there was also no review
of the original District Court proceeding.
Since its earliest appearance, the District Court System has
undergone many important modifications. The qualifications and salaries
of judges have been upgraded, common procedures have been instituted, and
the office of Chief Judge has been added to create a District Court "system."
Limited provisions for jury trials in the District Courts have also been
made, and the District Courts have become, at least in a very limited sense,
courts of record.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the idiosyncratic nature of the
District Courts of Massachusetts might have an effect on the behavior of
their personnel, which could be great enough to alter the shape or extent
of the bargaining process. We tend, however, to doubt that the impact of
trial de novo and judge-only trials are great enough to invalidate our
conclusions about bargaining. From a limited period of observation in the
Superior Court and from our interviews with the attorneys, we were unable
to detect any systematic, consistent differences between the District Court
and the "trial court," which would have altered our findings. The attorneys,
in fact, contradict each other concerning what differences trial de novo
and jury-less trials make in the processing of cases. Some indicated that
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in Superior Court, "judge shopping" was impossible; others claimed that it
was easier. Some indicated that the District Attorneys bargained less
than in District Court; some said more.
Our attempts to compare District and Superior Courts, though very
limited, indicate that, at least, the attorneys appeared to go through
identical processes, except at trial. At a jury trial, the lawyers' be-
havior does appear to be somewhat more intensely geared to making an impres-
sion of formal adversarial effort than at District Court, since juries are
seen by the attorneys to be more impressed by courtroom histrionics than
are judges. Since less than 20% of all cases disposed of at Superior
Court go to trial, however, and a minority of even that 20% are jury trials,
it is unlikely that the process of impressing a jury significantly alters
the behavior of court personnel.
Dorchester, Cambridge and Boston Juvenile Courts
Our search for specific courts in which to study bargaining was
in part guided by criteria we developed for "representativeness" and in
part by the auspices for our research. In order that our observations might
have a greater chance of generalizability we were looking for courts which
were primarily urban and which had a diverse clientele. We began, then,
with the 23 urban district courts, which process over one half of the total
cases of the District Court. 32 From these, we decided to eliminate courts
which have jurisdictions wholly or predominately within one of the tradi-
tionally strong ethnic neighborhoods of the city. We also discarded the
Boston Municipal Court, which hears cases from the downtown area, two "low-
crime" ethnic neighborhoods, and -- significantly -- the city's "skid row"
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and a large area of comparatively disorganized residential and commercial
development.
When we chose to conduct our research under the sponsorship of
the Defenders, our choice of courts was decreased. At the time we began
our work, the Defenders had ceased to represent defendants in all but three
courts at the district level in the Boston area -- the Third District Court
of Eastern Middlesex at Cambridge and the Municipal Court of the Dorchester
District, and the Boston Juvenile Court. The two District Courts met all
of our criteria, and they were known to have widely divergent reputations
as institutions. The Boston Juvenile Court is a special-purpose court,
devoted to adjudicating charges of delinquency in an area which includes
the jurisdictions of the Boston Municipal and Roxbury District Courts. As
such,we would not have chosen it on the basis of our own criteria, but it
appeared to be very useful for increasing the range of cases we could
observe.
In terms of a structure and caseload Dorchester and Cambridge
Courts proved to be nearly identical. Each handles approximately 15,000
criminal cases and 5,000 to 6,000 civil cases each year. 3 3  At the time of
the study, the Dorchester Court had two full-time justices and one "special"
justice who worked on a part-time basis for a daily fee. In fact, the
special and full time judges were indistinguishable in attendance -- all
three were present from three to four days a week on the average during our
observations. The Cambridge Court -- because it provided a limited kind of
appeal procedure -- was authorized three regular and three special judges.
Because of absences and a death, however, the court usually had the same
number present as Dorchester.
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The neighborhoods represented by the two courts, however, were
noticeably -- and for our purposes, fortuitously -- diverse. The Dorchester
community at the time of the study was divided nearly equally between two
neighborhoods -- white and black -- and its economic conditions were even
more depressed than those in the city of Boston as a whole. Cambridge
District Court, on the other hand, serves the City of Cambridge and the
suburban Towns of Belmont and Arlington. This is not to say that Cambridge
does not have its share of poor neighborhoods and housing projects, which
have for several years been the focus of extensive racial and social unrest.
In this respect, there was some overlap in the populations with which each
court actually dealt, but the suburban and university populations of
Cambridge allowed somewhat more diversity in the populations served by the
court.
Though we were satisfied that the caseloads handled by the two
courts were similar to those in other urban misdemeanor courts, there might
be grounds for charging that Dorchester Court and especially, the Boston
Juvenile Courts are "unique." At the time of our study there was an exten-
sive and successful campaign to remove a judge of the Dorchester Court.
Among the allegations made was that the judge had "consistently and repeat-
edly violated the rights of poor people appearing in criminal sessions" 34
by failing to follow rules of procedure set by the Chief Justice of the
District Courts of Massachusetts. The fact that his behavior was so extreme
that it resulted in his removal has left many observers of the courts con-
vinced that the Dorchester Court was particularly corrupt and, hence, unique.
While we did observe that individual judges each had idiosyncratic patterns
of behavior, our comparisons between Cambridge and Dorchester convinced us
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that Dorchester was in no wayunique, especially with regard to the uniform
observation of procedural rules. In fact, we came to believe that the
peculiarities of individual judges -- at least in the Massachusetts
system -- do not have an inordinate influence on the patterns of bargaining
which occur in their courts.
What makes Boston Juvenile Court seem unique is that it is limited
to delinquency cases. The court has a Chief Judge and one other full-time
judge and, at the time of this study, two special justices who participated
irregularly in the proceedings of the court. In addition to the usual
court personnel described in the next section, the "BJC" also had several
resources unique to it -- a psychiatric evaluation clinic, more carefully
selected probation officers trained to deal with juveniles, and priority
in access to outside helping agencies such as the Boston Court Resources
Project. These resources may, indeed, have had an influence on the
quality of treatment that defendants received. Our observations indicate,
however, that the structure of bargaining in Boston Juvenile Court was not
affected by these differences, or at least, it did not diverge from what
we found in the other courts.
- 189 -
Methodological Issues
Despite the fact that our study was hampered by a lack of theo-
retical base and by our own difficulties in watching a latent process, we
are confident that we have an honest -- and we hope useful -- analysis of
bargaining in three Massachusetts Courts. Our desire to generalize from
this data to provide a basis for evaluating negotiated justice as a reform
forces us to acknowledge a number of philosophical and methodological
problems. In addition to the methodological issues we have already dis-
cussed -- our identification with the lawyers' perspective, our sparse
contacts with defendants, and our use of participant observation -- there
are a number of other problems which should constitute a cautionary note to
our findings.
We see five major areas of concern to users of this case material.
The most insoluable relates to the fact that we came to see truth in the
courts as inherently Imdiscoverable and the process of bargaining itself
as latent. With these two assumptions we are also forced to a position of
great scepticism about the validity of our own observations, since they are
a product of the same system whose observability we doubt. At a more con-
crete level, our method, since it is "post-factum" theorizing from a single
case study,leaves us with an interesting model, but with little certainty
as to its validity, generalizability, or even "accuracy." Finally, we
must face a serious ethical problem arising from the extent to which we
were able to tell our informants about the purposes of our research.
Our observations cast very serious doubt that there is anything
such as "truth" in the criminal courts. Witnesses to nearly every "criminal"
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incident with which the courts deal were unable to agree to the simplest
facts. At a higher level of abstraction, the information which the courts
collect is usually contradictory, and often "artificial" since it serves
a number of latent functions for the court.35 Because of the latent uses
of information in the courts and the need for informants to distort what
they report, there are several probable limitations on our data. It is
clear, for example, that we have had to impose our own biases in order to
organize data which is "suspect," others have misled us intentionally or
innocently, and our memories have altered still other observations in ways
we cannot test. Finally, of course, the statistical data which we have
employed as a "check" on our observations is itself an output of this very
system.
A second important consequence of the "Through the Looking Glass"
qualities of information in the courts is that our model of bargaining
borders on being a "total" theory. Since we claim that truth is undiscov-
erable in the courts and that evidence produced by the system is distorted
by the process we are describing, we probably make it impossible to refute
our own theory. Any evidence which might contradict our model is also
disclaimable on the grounds that it is probably distorted. It is impos-
sible, for example, to refute our contention that the reality of a case is
negotiated at all points in its processing. To be sure, any observations
we made of a case could be argued to be the product of a negotiation: both
agreement and disagreement among court personnel over the facts of a case,
for example, could be assumed to be evidence that negotiations had taken
place.
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Were we studying a less complex process, we might face the charge
that our model is neither validated nor (perhaps) validatible. While
planners who try to develop an understanding of prospective reforms must
always face this problem (for, after all, it is impossible to conduct an
experiment on a reform before the 'eform is tried), we are not thereby
exonerated from the difficulties which a reconnaisance study imposes on
those who use it. 36 We frankly have no way of testing whether or not our
model of bargaining is valid without conducting a separate empirical study
using a methodology more amenable to the refutation of hypotheses. In
particular, while we may have illuminated the question of "how it all works"
with our case study, it is impossible for us to establish whether our case
study includes a typical sample of bargains and bargaining roles, either
for the courts we studied or for a range of other courts. We have already,
of course, outlined the steps we have taken in trying to limit the likeli-
hood that our results are wholly inconsistent with "reality," but these
techniques do not gives us the traditional kinds of comfort about the
credibility of our results.
The final problem we faced is an ethical dilemma probably common
to all social scientists observing latent processes. The ethics of obser-
vation ordinarily argue for an open announcement of the observer's interests
37
and identity. In observing a process such as bargaining, however, there
are also serious ethical and practical grounds for withholding that infor-
mation. The bargaining process is one which may shape the defendant's life
for several years -- arguably for the rest of his life. Moreover, it is a
latent process -- it contradicts the formal ideology of the courts. There-
fore, an outsider observing the bargaining process is faced with the
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following dilemma: to disclose that it is bargaining which is being studied
may resolve the problem of deceit, but it might very well alter the behavior
of the bargainers, the course of the case at issue and the future of the
defendant; to withhold identity reduces the researcher's imposition into
the bargaining process, but at the risk of "using" the people who are being
observed.
Faced with this dilemma, we chose to deal with each person in the
process as openly as possible. We did let the attorneys we observed know
that we were studying the ways in which they prepared a case for trial or
disposition, though we did not indicate that our emphasis was on bargain-
ing (n part because we were not at the time certain that that was the
principal focus of our study and in part because we feared that to bring
up the issue of bargaining might alter their handling of a case.) With
all other personnel of the courts we maintained silence concerning our
identity and purpose except when questioned about who we were. In those
instances, we answered all questions truthfully but did not volunteer more
than necessary.
It is with the defendants that our deepest ethical concerns lay.
The difficulties of explaining our role would have been the most serious
with them, and it was also with them that there was the greatest risk of
influencing the bargaining process. We therefore generally relied on our
attorney-escorts to explain that we were "with them," that the information
we gathered would in no way be used against the clients, and that we were
studying the ways in which cases were prepared.
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CASE STUDY: BARGAINING IN THE MASSACHUSETTS COURTS
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Organization of the Case Study
Our observations of plea bargaining confirm that the practice
is indeed prevalent in the Massachusetts District Courts; but more
importantthat bargaining at other stages of the criminal process is
pervasive. The structurecontent and outcome of these bargains, moreover,
appeared to be affected by nearly every aspect of the criminal process:
the participants, their interests, the crime alleged, the background of
the defendant, and many others. From the moment the Commonwealth
initiates criminal action against a defendant until he has received a
final judgement and disposition -- indeed, sometimes even for years
afterwards -- the-defendant's case is subject to a series of complex
negotiations. To understand the impact of bargaining on the criminal
courts, then, it was necessary to look not only at the process of bargain-
ing which takes place between the prosecution and the defense immediately
prior to trial but to examine the entire process of criminal adjudica-
tion in the District Courts.
Bargaining among court personnel not only appears at each
stage of the processing of a case, but each stage is characterized by a
distinct mode of bargaining -- a unique configuration of actors and
interests. For this reason, we have chosen to present our case material
in the sequence of the criminal process. This method of organization is
intended to underscore the way in which bargaining changes at each stage
of a case, and at the same time to illustrate the interdependencies of each
manifestation of the bargaining process. Bargaining, in fact, appears to
be cumulative, building from a chaotic situation at arrest toward a
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highly structured understanding of reality and a settled prescription for
professional action (a "plea bargain") at the end of the criminal trial.
In the cases handled by the defenders in the District Courts of
Massachusetts, the sequence in which defendants are processed appears to
be divided into four distinct stages, which are marked by changing relation-
ships between defendants and court personnel and among the court personnel
themselves: initiation of prosecution; arraignment; preparation of the
defense between arraignment and the day of trial; and the events of the
day of trial. The case study which follows will examine each of these
stages separately, indicating how negotiations are altered as cases are
processed.
The process by which cases are handled is, of course, not the
only important determinant of the content of negotiation. Many other
factors intervene. Clearly, in a court which holds public hearings and
trials on all crimes from murder to overtime parking, court personnel
develop a wide range of interests in bargaining based on their percep-
tions of the importance to their professional lives and to their constit-
uencies of the outcomes of cases. Within each profession and interest
group in the court, of course, there are variations in the approach to
bargaining based on the background and attitudes which they bring to the
case. Finally, the background of defendants, too, has important con-
sequences for the handling of a case. These variables will be examined at
each stage of bargaining to trace their shifting influence on the shape
of the bargaining process.
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Initiation of the Prosecution
The court's activity concerning a crime officially begins when
the judge or clerk signs a complaint formally alleging that a person has
committed a particular crime. The mechanism with which the court will
deal with the crime, however, is influenced by the events which take place
before the signing of a complaint. In particular, the path which a
defendant's case will follow is to a great extent "set" by the type of
offense with which he is charged and the way in which the police or other
officials react.
This initial stage is by far the most diverse of all stages in
the processing of,,cases. Typically it is seen as involving the police
officer and the defendant and consisting of the process of arrest,
booking, and formal lodging of charges. In fact, a variety of other
mechanisms may be involved, and the actors might also include the proba-
tion officer, the assistant district attorney, or even the judge. Our
observations reveal at least four distinct modes by which cases were
initiated, in addition to the more elaborate "planned arrest.": the
police being called to the scene of a crime; the police watching court
proceedings for "familiar" defendants; chance encounters between police
and suspects; and formal civilian complaints.
The planned arrest
Only 15% of the cases we observed could have been seen as the
result of a carefully planned strategy of investigation and arrest
developed by coordination between the police and the District Attorney's
office. The limitation of the resources of both organizations limits the
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crimes for which an elaborate investigation can be mounted to a small
fraction of all crimes, and special attention must, be given to those
particular crimes which might arouse public interest. Typically, the
kind of crime selected for concentration is limited to murder, arson of
a dwelling, rape, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of
heroin with intent to sell. To these crimes the police and District
Attorney assign specialized units of highly trained and experienced
officers and attorneys who employ specially developed techniques. The
result is,that in the case of these major crimes, there is a distinctive
mode of behavior used by the police which includes the process of inves-
tigation, arrest, interrogation, booking, and complaint, and which does
not tend to occur in other kinds of cases.
Typically, the police first decide to direct attention to a
case when they obtain information -- usually from a regular informant --
that a crime will be committed, has been committed, or is regularly being
committed. An arrest warrant, a search warrant, or both are sought,
usually with the help of the District Attorney's office and, once obtained,
used to authorize a "raid" which often results in the arrest of several
people and the confiscation of considerable evidence. From that point on,
care is taken by the prosecution and police to protect their case by
adherence to court-sanctioned procedures, and by employing the defendants
regarded as less "important" as witnesses to the major crime,in exchange
for dismissal of the minor charges against them.
At arrest, then, the attention of the police is particularly
focused on a wide-ranging search for information, witnesses, informants,
and potential defendants. Once the arrest has been made, the activity of
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the police becomes narrowed -- concentrating on employing resources less
to gather information and more to "protect" the case and assure the con-
viction of the defendant. Two cases illustrate this process and also show
how this pattern of arrest can set in motion factors critical to the
adjudication of a defendant's case.
One group was being sought on both local and Federal levels for
possession of narcotics with intent to sell. The initial step the police
took was to swear out a warrant to search the home of John Doe, alias
"Henry" at a specified address because, in the words of the policeman's
affidavit supporting his request for the warrant:
a reliable informant who has proved reliable
in -the past... has been in the dwelling
located at [Address] on several occasions,
and on each of these occasions has observed
large quantities of Heroin, and..the occupant,
known to my informant as "HENRY", sell same
Heroin....
Working from the warrant issued on the basis of this affidavit,
the police then entered and searched the house described in the warrant.
They found not "Henry" but a woman named Carolyn Hill and her six children,
and in another room over 250 grams of heroin, and quantities of apparatus
for "cutting" the narcotic.
At the station house, the police interrogated this unexpected
defendant -- Carolyn Hill -- especially trying to establish that she knew
several people, "Jesse, Amos and Rico" or could "locate Henry" -- a line
of questioning they pursued heavily both at her apartment and at the
station house. At each point, the police took a great deal of time
interrogating the defendant,and from their questioning the police obtained
Carolyn's contention that the suitcase and briefcase which contained
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heroin had been put where they were by "Henry" and a friend of his and
that "Henry" was a new boyfriend of Carolyn's, who sometimes lived there,
but used the apartment mainly as a mailing address.
Later the same day the police arrested Henry Kursley on the
assumption that he was the "Henry" in the warrant. He in turn was
interrogated extensively by the police, especially concerning his relation-
ship with Carolyn -- in particular, how long they had been together. He
explained that they had been together for six years and that four of
Carolyn's six children were his, though since being here, she had taken
a new boyfriend. He also admitted that he was using her apartment as a
mailing address. Though Mr. Kursley insisted vigorously that he had had
no prior contact with heroin, the police also questioned him extensively
about instances in which they alleged he had sold heroin to one of them.
When they had completed this line of questions, they turned to the ques-
tion of whether he knew "Jesse, Amos, and Rico." According to the
defendant, they said, "You can go free if you know about them, but if you
don't cooperate, you'll do forty." Although flatly denying knowledge of
these men or of the incident, the defendant was charged with possession of
heroin with the intent to sell. In this instance the police made the
decision to initiate criminal proceedings despite the fact that at the time
of arrest Henry did not have possession of the heroin.
For the next several days, the police watched Carolyn's apart-
ment, searching everyone going to or near it and arresting those for whom
some basis of arrest could be found. On one occasion, three friends of
Carolyn's came to the apartment. As they left, the police stopped them
and searched their car and their personal effects. When they found a
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small quantity of a substance they believed to be heroin in the purse of
one woman, they arrested all three -- two for "possession with intent to
distribute" ard the other with "being present." The police knew they had
very little grounds for the arrests, but they also knew that the three
were friends of Henry and Carolyn and would be more useful as witnesses
if faced with serious charges of their own.
The case outlined above is typical of a carefully planned arrest
by the police, especially in the use of warrants and preplanned arrests
of co-defendants. It illustrates the tendency of the police to try to
turn defendants against each other and to offer them immunity in exchanqe
for information; at this point the thrust of police activity is directed
toward maximizing the amount of general information that can be obtained
from a defendant. The case is also typical, on the other hand, since,
like Henry, most defendants arrested for major crimes are too "legal-wise"
to accept the offers made by the police at this stage.
An example of a less sophisticated defendant involved in a
planned arrest and asked to become an informant is the case of Richard
Lauphinee. Offered $300 to burn "about $3000 worth" of a building (pre-
sumably by its owner), the defendant "set up" the building by setting out
gasoline and rags, returning at night to set the building afire. A
neighbor, when he saw the fire, notified the police that he had seen a
stranger at the building that afternoon, and, based on his description of
the defendant and his automobile, they arrested the defendant a few minutes
later. It was on the basis of several items of circumstantial evidence
(his hat, which the witness had described, the fact that his socks and
pants smelled of gasoline) that the police were able to justify his arrest.
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They took him to the station house, where, although he was informed of
his rights, he confessed to the arson, explicitly stating that he had
done it for money, but refusing to produce sufficient evidence to allow
the police to arrest the man who paid him. As Lauphinee's attorney pointed
out later:
Lauphinee talked because he was inexperienced.
He just didn't have any idea how important
that was. Now that he's seen how weak the
police story is without that confession, he's
beginning to regret that he talked. Now he's
backed into an ugly corner -- he has to talk
or he'll get about 10 [years] in Concord
[Massachusetts Correctional Institute], but
if he talks and they don't get his backer,
he's in hurt -- he could get wiped out.
Although the police need this kind of information to increase
the chances of prosecution, they too recognize the dangers to a defendant
in becoming an informant -- that the defendant could get "wiped out." As
an incentive to the defendant to take the risk involved in informing, the
police may tend to use a strategy of combining very high charges (as in
the case of Richard Lauphinee) with the promise of freedom if the defendant
informs on his friends, acquaintances, or codefendants. To the extent
that they are organized or experienced, the defendants may resist this
strategy at least until they are dealing with the Superior Court District
Attorney.
Arrests on patrol
Most crimes, however, are too common and have too little visi-
bility to most of the public for the police to make heavy investments in
an active strategy to arrest defendants. Though most defendants are
arrested at or very near the scene of their alleged crimes and the police
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are often called to the scene, there are rarely organized informers in-
volved, and rarely any witness but the police officers who arrest the
defendants. Arrasting officers, moreover are usually assigned to patrol
units rather than specialized investigation details and make the arrest
with no more than two officers at the scene.
The defendants in these cases are, like the police, somewhat
less organized and sophisticated about the process of arrest and interro-
gation than are defendants in preplanned arrests. Still they have often been
arrested several times before, so they are moderately familiar with
the encounters which will take place between themselves and the police.
In this kind of arrest, however, contact with the police is less formalized
and police attention is directed to the ad hoc apprehension of defendants
rather than to the planned pursuit of information.
The conditions under which arrest for crimes like property
offenses take place tend to reinforce whatever tendencies toward tension
and suspicion between police and these experienced defendants may already
exist. In general, the situation is an unoccupied building, after dark,
and both the defendants and police may well be surprised by the encounter.
Unlike the police role in major crimes, the police in these cases typi-
cally cannot plan the apprehension of defendants, are unfamiliar with the
areas in which they must make the arrest, and are patrolmen, not investi-
gators. The result is that after the arrest there will usually be dis-
agreement between the defendant and the police about what happened at the
arrest, and defendants in this kind of case very often complain of police
brutality and failure to inform the defendant of his rights.
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A good example of the kind of encounter which take place between
police and defendants in arrest and booking of a property offense is the
Tilson and Wall case. The two co-defendants had been observed by neighbors
"fooling with the mailboxes" at a six-family apartment building. When
the police were called, the two patrolmen who answered the call, being
unsure of what they might find, split up, one going up the front stairs,
the other going around to the back of the building. In the dark, the
second officer, according to his testimony, saw the following:
On the terrace of the second floor, one door
ajar and the lights on in the apartment. The
door was standing ajar by about four to six
inches, and I could see that there were fresh
wood marks in the doorframe. I also saw those
two gentlemen Ereferring to the defendants] in
the apartment looking around like they were
deciding what to do next. I climbed onto the
balcony and told them to freeze. The short
one, who was holding a screwdriver, went to
the right into the bedroom. I put the taller
one into the wall and told the other one to
come out or else. The short one came out.
I then advised them of their rights, and they
understood.
On the basis of the patrolmen's observations both defendants
were taken to the station house where Tilson,the "taller" defendant
was booked for breaking and entering in the night time. Quinon Wall, the
shorter defendant, observed with the screwdriver, was charged with less
serious offenses -- possession of burglar's tools and breaking and enter-
ing in the day time. Because the detail of the patrolman's observation
was considered sufficient, no lengthy interrogation took place at the
station house,and complaints were issued without question on the charges
on which both were initially booked.
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As related to their attorney, the defendants' version of what
happened as they were being arrested differs in several significant details
and points of emphasis from what the police describe. First, despite the
contention of the police that the event took place at about 7:15 PM and
was thus a "breaking and entering in the night time," the defendants claim
that it occurred at about 4:30. They also claim that the screwdriver
which the policeman claimed Wall was carrying and using as a "burglarious
instrument" was in fact lying on the floor of the bedroom. While the
policeman claims that he held Tilson against the wall to force Wall back
into the kitchen, the defendants claim that they had chosen not to run as
they could have, and that the policeman had hit Wall in the mouth and
beaten Tilson on the back and stomach. They also contend that the
Miranda warning was never given. Both did, however, admit to their
attorney that they had chosen the apartment for breaking and entering and
had broken in with the intention of stealing enough money or goods to
support their need for drugs.
Warrants issued in court
Many police take advantage of time spent in court by routinely
watching the proceedings of the court and searching for the defendants
wanted by the court for complaints already issued. One defendant we
observed who was being arraigned for drunkenness, for example, was
recognized by one of the police in the court and was served with a default
warrant for several breaking and enterings reaching back over the previous
15 months. In an instance like this, of course, there was no confrontation
between the defendant and police officers, but the nature of the evidence
which the police would present and the type of defendant involved would
be similar to those described in the Tilson and Wal 1 case.
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The fact that charges are initiated against a defendant by this
mode (or by arrest during patrol) rather than through planned arrest has
important consequences for the outcome of the defendant's case. First
since there is no witness but the police, the police have no need of using
the defendant or his acquaintances as informants. Similarly, the police
are much freer in the presentation of their case, and can and do take
liberties to bolster its strength. There is general agreement among
defendants and most court personnel, for example, that in this kind of
case the police often embellish their stories, especially when the
evidence in the case is weak. Many defendants complain that the police
also "plant" physical evidence, such as weapons or stolen goods, and
claim non-existenf resistance to arrest and assault and battery on a
police officer.- The defense attorneys generally recognize this
phenomenon, and as one of the district attorneys said, "I have to turn
to the experienced police to get help in figuring out if I'm getting a
solid case or if it's one that the police have built up."
A second consequence of the weak case that may result from this
kind of arrest is that the police may attempt to encourage the prosecutors
to overcharge in order to induce a guilty plea, and thus, forestall trial.
It may be the case, for example, that Wall was "overcharged." Possession
of burglarious instruments is a more serious charge than breaking and
entering in the day time, and likely to urge Wall to consider pleading
guilty to the breaking and entering charge.
Chance encounters
The largest group of cases before the District Courts of
Massachusetts is made up of cases which are initiated as a result of chance
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encounters between defendants and police as they perform their normal
patrol. The decision to arrest and seek a complaint against a defendant
is based on whatever information the police officer can obtain from visual
inspection of the defendant or from a cursory frisking for weapons.
Arrests in this category, therefore, tend to be confrontations between
defendant and officer, and it is quite common that the two know each other.
Indeed, a typical case -- that of Brant and Garvey, who were
arrested for possession of dangerous weapons -- began apparently because
the police officer recognized Brant. As the officer described it to
Brant's attorney:
I went after them because I saw something that
looked like a shotgun on the tall one [rant].
This guy is a real bad actor. I don't know
what they told you, but it's for damn sure
they weren't going down to Brigham's for an
ice cream cone lugging that arsenal. I knew
that we had seen him before....
Brant himself described the earlier encounter in an interview
with his attorney:
Brant: Yeah, I've met him [the patrolman]
before -- I seen him around, driving
a yellow Pinto.
Att: Have you ever had a run-in with him
before?
Brant: I don't know -- maybe I did.
Att: Well, have you ever been to court before?
Brant: Yeah, I got taken in by Jordan's for
trespassing or something like that.
They said I'd taken a shirt from them,
but they didn't find it on me, so they
just made it a trespass.
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Att: Was this cop in on that one?
Brant: Yeah.
The conversation with Brant indicated further that Brant's
apprehension by the police may have taken place because the police felt
that he had "gotten off too easy" in the prior encounter at Jordan's. Since
the arrest began -- according to both the police and the defendants -- by
the police stopping the two as they were walking down the street and
ordering them to hold their hands up, there is some evidence to suggest
that the police indeed knew Brant as a "bad actor" who was likely to be
involved in criminal activity, and was "due" an arrest.
Civilian complaints
In sharp contrast to the prearraignment histories of cases
brought to court by the police are those cases which are initiated by
civilian complaint -- often the defendant's spouse or friend. If the
police are involved at all it is only in those instances in which there
is physical violence, and,as a result, there is seldom a police officer
who is a material witness or who in fact has a strong personal interest
in the outcome of the case.
The case of Herbert Fefferman is typical of this pattern of
initiation. The defendant had been under treatment at Boston City Hospital
for alcoholism and psychotic depression for an extended period before the
case was opened, and had previously been granted a general discharge from
the Army for substandard intelligence. His wife, however, felt that he
was making inadequate progress in his efforts at rehabilitation,since he
had become delinquent in his attendance at a halfway house at which he was
an outpatient.
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Believing that the courts could provide adequate incentive to
get her husband active in his rehabilitation again, Fefferman's wife came
to the court for assistance. The clerk suggested use of restraint order
requests and a non-support complaint, since the family (defendant, wife,
and five children under eight) were on welfare. At this point, the wife
was persuaded to sign and submit the non-support complaint, but she re-
fused to sign the restraining orders. Thus, when the defendant was served
with a summons to appear in court to answer the complaint for non-support,
his wife immediately went to the court to try to withdraw the complaint.
The court refused, and the defendant was arraigned.
From the position of the prosecutors and police the close associ-
ation between defendant and the complainant makes these cases disruptive
to the court, and less desirable than other modes of initiation. As an
Assistant District Attorney put it, "The family cases are the worst. You're
damned if you do, damned if you don't. If you prosecute the case, you're
attacking her husband and she'll jump all over you, but if you let him go,
she'll call downtown and complain that she can't get justice."
The impacts of arrest or complaint
Following one of these modes of initiation, a formal filing
process marks the introduction of the case to the courts. The complainant --
whether civilian or arresting officer -- goes to the Clerk's office and
swears to the Assistant Clerk that a set of facts which constitute the
commission of a crime are true. At this point, no matter what factual
disputes have arisen, the Assistant Clerk checks only to see that the
alleged crime is substantially and geographically within the jurisdiction
of the court.
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The arrests, encounters, and complaints which bring a case into
the court are important even beyond their role in initiating the case.
The way in which a criminal case becomes a formal matter for the court's
attention also determines, in part, the interests which court personnel
will have in the prosecution of the case, the strategy which will have to
be followed to build a case, and even the information that each actor in
the case will probably need to collect. In this sense, as we will see,
they provide the initial trajectory to the bargaining process.
Indeed there are some evidences of direct bargains between police
and defendants even at this stage. In planned arrests, especially, the
police may overtly offer the defendant a chance to be forgiven some of his
charges if he will'agree to provide information. Overcharging by the
prosecutor is a similar attempt to urge the defendant to agree to be an
informant, or a witness in another case. If the defendant does consent to
cooperate with the prosecution, he can often obtain a reduction in his
charges or a concession at sentencing.
Even more important than these traditional types of bargains are
the interests which are loosed at arrest and which begin to point toward
later bargains. In planned arrests, for example, the level of resources
which the police must invest give them a strong stake in seeing that the
case actually results in a conviction. Even from the beginning, then, the
police are likely to be willing to give easy concessions to the defense at
least as they affect the sentence the defendant will receive. Similarly,
the mode by which arrest on patrol or at a chance encounter takes place is
very likely to result in conflict between the defendant and the police over
the facts of the case. This sets in motion a clear need for both sides to
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consider negotiating over the "story" in the case -- so that they can avoid
a direct confrontation over facts in the courtroom. As the next section
shows, these initial conditions of a case will have immediate impacts on
the defendant's fate at arraignment, as the police, the defense, and the
prosecutor begin to assert their interests and search for information.
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Arraignment
On the day set for arraignment the court conducts its first
formal consideration of the complaint and the case. As we have discussed
earlier, the arraignment serves a number of purposes. Formally it is
focused on assuring that the defendant has the opportunity to know the
precise charges against him and the identity of his accusers, on recording
his plea to the charges, on setting a date for the trial, and on arranging
a system of security to insure that he will appear in court for the trial.
If the case has been initiated by the police or a civilian without arrest,
these procedures are especially important to the defendant's most basic
understanding of his situation. Even if he has been arrested the defendant
may not know what his charges are, since the specific charges may depend
on whether the police hope to use him as an informant or on how strongly
they need a verdict of guilty. In most cases, however, arraignments are
actually quite brief and perfunctory, with the defendant still unaware of
what he faces.
The procedures which each court chooses to follow at arraignment
are evidently clear to regular court personnel, but defendants rarely
appear to understand. On a typical day in court when over twelve
defendants were arraigned, only three knew where to go in the courtroom,
or when to stand or sit. It was clear, for example, when four of them
tried to leave the court after being ordered to post money bail, that they
did not understand even the most basic meaning of the arraignment procedure.
The arraignment process, then is very much a procedure in which
defendants can most often .be seen as confused and passive subjects. Each
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court maintains its own unique interpretations of arraignment procedure and
leads the defendant through them formally, and with little explanation.
Although the defendant may not understand what has happened to him at
arraignment, a number of events critical to his case take place at this
stage:- the entering of the plea, the assignment of counsel and the setting
of bail. The particular configuration of decisions made at arraignment
will tend to reflect the predictions court personnel make about the probable
trajectory of the case, and, in the case of bail,will in part determine how
the court will come to view the defendant.
Entering the plea
The initial step of the arraignment -- the reading of the charges
to the defendant and entering his plea -- is officially the central purpose
of arraignment. It is usually conducted in such a way, however, that the
defendant cannot help but realize that his participation is ceremonial at
best. When his name is called, the court officers identify him and bring
him to the place where he should be standing, tell him to remove his hat
if he is wearing one, and guide his actions through the process. At the
same time, the clerk is reading in a barely audible and very rapid voice
the fairly complicated formal complaint such as that we observed in the
case of Ronald Noire:
Complaint number 863; Ronald Noire, you are
charged with robbery not being armed, in that
in violation of Chapter 265, Section 19 of
the General Laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, while'not armed, you did by
force and violence rob John Woodens of
forty-two dollars in U.S. currency and one
bottle of whisky of value $1.55, the property
of John Woodens, 143 Centre Street, Milton,
Massachusetts on January 13, 1973.
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Without any further explanation the judge then asks for the
defendant's plea and, before the defendant can respond, the clerk announces
that, "In the absence of counsel a directed plea of not guilty will be
entered in the defendant's behalf by the Court." At this stage most
defendants still remain unaware that they have been arraigned or that a
plea has been recorded in their behalf.
Appointing counsel
For the indigent defendant the next stage focuses on the appoint-
ment of counsel. In contrast to the rather cursory approach of the court
to the issues of announcing the complaint and receiving the defendant's
plea, the process of appointing counsel is largely taken seriously, though
the grounds on which decisions about counsel are made vary significantly
from judge to judge. What appears to be common to all the judges is the
sense that the presence or absence of counsel wil.1 significantly affect
the course of a case. Thus,implicit policies toward the assignment of
counsel range from by-the-book decisions to overt bargaining between judge
and defendant to avoid assigning counsel at all.
The most formal of the district court justices, for example,
will inquire first of the probation officer whether he believes from his
interview that the defendant is indigent and, based on that report, will
assign counsel or warn the defendant that it is his own responsibility to
obtain and pay for a lawyer. This procedure is, of course, the closest to
that dictated by national standards for the assignment of counsel, but even
here the weight of the decision may rest on the report of the probation
officer and the way in which the probation officer presents the defendant.
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Other judges tend to rely much more heavily on their own inter-
changes with the defendant in court. Many judges, for example, merely ask
the defendant if he has a lawyer and if he says, "no',' ask if he needs one.
If the defendant says, "yes," the judge will then ask if he can afford
one. Receiving a negative response, the judge may assign the Massachusetts
Defenders or another court-appointed counsel. Some judges even more
explicitly discourage defendants from asking for appointed counsel. One
judge in a suburban court is reputed by members of the Massachusetts
Defenders to urge defendants not to ask for counsel by offering to handle
their case immediately or assign counsel, with the threat being that the
defendant may be unable to make bail.
Despite these variations the majority of courts, however,
apparently prefer to deal with represented defendants and, whatever their
procedures, routinely assign counsel.
Setting bail
The court turns next to the issue of bail. If the judge intends
to alter the original station house bail decision by increasing bail, he
must hold a formal bail hearing. Under these circumstances, the defense
counsel will first enter the dock and conduct a brief interview with his
new client. The content of the interview is sparse; the Defender introduces
himself, asks the defendant questions about his term of residency in the
area, his employment, and his record. Typically, the defendant will want
to know what is happening to him, but the content of his questions will
depend on the defendant's knowledge of the court and the process. One
defendant, for example, put his concern this way: "Will this judge hold
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me?" The Defender replied, "Don't know -- he's not the type to really lay
it on you unless he thinks he needs to." Others expressed the same issue
in terms of how much his crime was "worth" in this court, or emphasized
that they had never defaulted (by not appearing in court) or if they had,
that they had always come back voluntarily. The attorney will, just before
returning to the courtroom, routinely tell his client what he is going to
say and assure him that he will return to conduct a longer interview and
discuss the client's problem as it looks then.
If, on the other hand, there is to be no bail hearing the Court
merely returns to its monotone reading of the formal statement of
recognizance. An elaborate two-sentence statement is called for, and the
distinction between being incarcerated and being free to go is expressed
only in the difference between the clerk reading "with surity" or "without
surity" in the middle of the statement. On the basis of this kind of
statement, few defendants observed knew whether they had been released or
jailed, and several had to be removed, not understanding that they had
been released on their own recognizance.
The bail decision is much more complex than other events in the
arraignment process. To a great extent the entering of a plea and even
the assignment of counsel are allowed by most court personnel to remain
fairly ceremonial, largely uncontested acts, since both decisions can be
altered at any point in the case. The defendant's bail status, however,
is viewed by most defenders, prosecutors, and judges as highly reflective
andin a self-fulfilling way, determinant of the strength of the
defendant's case.
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In theory bail decisions are guided by the principles of the
Massachusetts Bail Reform Act of 1971, which was an attempt to make the
criteria for bail decisions uniform. The Act stresses the importance of
considering the community ties of the defendant, his prior record, and
patterns of violence which might represent a threat to the community or
to the defendant himself. These criteria do in fact play a role in the
court's assessment of the defendant, but they do not constitute the
primary basis on which decisions about bail are made. In fact, bail
decisions appear to be the result of implicit negotiations in court
between the defender and the prosecutor.
In the cases we observed defense attorneys attempted to present
their clients in ways calculated to result in the granting of personal
recognizance or-in the setting of bail, depending on the attorney's pre-
diction of the strength of the case and on his need (and the need of other
actors) for information. If the attorney feels that the defendant has a
probability of conviction, he will not usually present a vigorous portrait
of his client as a person deserving of bail. It appears that both the
defense and the prosecution have a tacit agreement to avoid making a strong
argument in too many cases, and thus, in a case in which the odds of defeat
are high each must conserve his opportunity to fight later by not making a
strong case for bail.
Henry Kursley's case provides a good example of an instance in
which the defense doubted the information his client had given to him, and
thus, the strength of his case. In addition, both the attorney and the
prosecution realized that the police had a major stake in interrogating
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the defendant and,thus, in having him remain in jail. Thus, Kursley's
bail hearing proceeded rapidly:
Defense counsel: Your Honor, the defendant has
come from New Jersey seeking
employment as a long-haul truck
driver. He has connections to
the community in that he intends
to marry Carolyn Hill and is now
supporting her children and re-
ceiving unemployment compensa-
tion while he seeks work. He
has no prior record.
Judge: Do you have anything else to say?
Defense counsel: No, Your Honor.









for sale of heroin
and flight to avoid
prosecution. We
request a high bail
be set.
The judge signed an order imposing bail, and the Clerk announced $25,000
bail.
This unusually high bail was, of course, appealed immediately by
the defender, but there were several issues raised by this brief hearing
which the defender apparently chose not to pursue. In particular, the
ADA's assertion that the defendant was wanted on federal charges of flight
must have been influential in the bail decision,but could not have been
substantiated if the defender had challenged it. The defender, who later
commented on this bail hearing, indicated that he was concerned that he
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hadn't fought hard enough, but commented that, considering the charge and
the defendant's brief history in Boston, he had felt that further effort
would have been futile, and, considering Kursley's own abilities at
negotiating with the police, not critical to the case.
In less serious cases, especially those in which the police have
no particular stake in information which the defendant has, the efforts of
the prosecution to hold a defendant tend to be less vigorous, and the
efforts of the defense, correspondingly, tend to be stronger. Thus, the
patterns of argumentation used by the attorneys tend to correlate strongly
with the bail decision of the court. It seems reasonable to suggest that
there is a mutual interaction between the attorneys' projections of the
court's behavior and the pattern of behavior itself. If the defense
attorney does not make a strong argument for bail because he thinks the
defendant may be convicted, the defendant is not likely to be granted
bail, and the odds that he will be convicted are increased.
The bail decisionthenis definitely constrained by the strategy
used by the actors in the hearings, the strength of their presentations
and their own influence in the court structure. The role of the judge in
the bail decision, however, should not be discounted. Since the attitudes
toward bail vary so greatly among judges, it is certainly true that in
some courts judges will impose very high bail or refuse bail despite the
arguments of the defense. Within a single court, for example, Judge King
has a generally agreed reputation for leniency in setting bail, whereas
Judge Scott has a reputation for setting very high bail, especially on
Saturday, when no public defenders are in the court. Judge Scott, for
example, set bail at $7500 on Stephen MIaynes, who had no prior record,
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whose contacts with the community were strong, and whose offense was
larceny of $6.50 of gasoline,a relatively minor offense. Typical of
Judge King's bail decision was one in which he released a defendant in a
receiving stolen goods case, even though the defendant was a potential
witness to a murder and had an extensive prior record, and there was
strong pressure from the police to have him held. In still another de-
cision, Judge King released a defendant on personal recognizance for
breaking and entering a dwelling in the night time, in order to allow
him to appear in Quincy District Court to face a default warrant for
another breaking and entering charge. While these two judges are
probably extremes of bail philosophy, they do illustrate the power which
a judge has in this part of the processing of a defendant.
In most' cases, however, these differences in judicial attitudes
toward bail are well known to the regular personnel in a court. Both
defenders and prosecutors can often jockey case schedules to insure that
they make presentations before a judge whose bail philosophy will not
conflict with the outcome they want. Because defenders and prosecutors
see the attitudes of judges toward bail as being highly correlated with
particular types of crimes and their perpetrators, they can also some-
times influence a bail decision by the type of presentation they make of
the defendant, his crime, and his "type."
An example of this type of influence is illustrated by the case
of Tilson and Wall. The two defendants were charged with breaking and
entering a dwelling and possession of burglarious instruments. Both had
extensive records including outstanding probation, although neither had
been involved in violent crime or defaulted in a prior case. The judge
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in the case, however, was unwilling to release either one. At this point,
Tilson was represented by a volunteer private defense counsel, and Wall
was represented by the Massachusetts Defenders. The two attorneys took
divergent approaches to the ball hearing; the private counsel chose to
argue from the bail statute that his client was entitled to release on
recognizance, and he listed Tilson's characteristics which favored
release. The Defender, in contrast, began his argument for personal
recognizance by stating that Wall was a heroin addict who wanted to be
cured, and that he had agreed to participate in a local drug treatment
program. In this way, the Defender was able to divert the issue from
a question of releasing a "housebreaker" to allowing a "repentant"
drug addict to participate in a withdrawal program.
Appealing the bail decision
In recognition of the possibility that bail hearings at the
District Court might produce widely disparate decisions, the Bail Reform
Act provides for a process of "immediate" appeal of bail decisions by
petition to the Superior Court sitting in the county in which the District
Court is located. Procedures vary slightly from court to court and
county to county to accommodate local conditions. In Suffolk County, for
example, appeals for indigents are taken to the Superior Court by the
Suffolk County Bail Appeal Project on the basis of petitions filed by
court-appointed attorneys in the District Courts.
Bail reductions were obtained by this process in nearly half of
all appealed cases from Dorchester Court and a large number of those not
effectively reduced were changed from bail with bonded surity to cash bail
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roughly equivalent to the cost of the bond. Thus a defendant might have a
$5000 bail (for which a $250 premium bond would have to be put up) changed
to $250 cash only bail. The net effect of the decision for a poor family
is that the bail bondsman no longer is needed, and the family is saved the
expense of his fee.
The defendant who appeals his bail decision from Dorchester
Court, however, may be thwarted by a number of problems in the operation
of the appeal system. First, Dorchester Court Officers are instructed to
return prisoners to Charles Street Jail, not, as in other District Courts,
directly to Superior Court if they have an appeal pending. Second, the
Clerk's Office, according to the Public Defenders, "lose" or "forget" one of
the necessary papers in a majority of cases, so that appeal must be delayed
until the missing paper is found. Of the cases we observed in which an
appeal from bail had been taken, there were delays or completely neglected
appeals in a large number of instances. While one defendant's appeal was
heard in two days, for example, his co-defendant never had his appeal
heard in the week between arraignment and trial. Still other defendants
have had their appeals ignored completely.
The defendant's situation may be further complicated by the fact
that if he is wanted by several courts, whether for outstanding defaults,
violation of probation (which can occur at the discretion of the probation
officer upon arrest), or an arrest warrant for a new crime, he is held
separately by mittimus papers ("mitts") from each of the several courts.
Each has a status with respect to bail, and paying the bail for one court
merely frees the defendant from that mitt; if others are still in the
pre-arraignment stage, the defendant will be taken to the second court for
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arraignment and the setting of bail. For a defendant who has committed
several crimes in a short time or who has been on suspended sentence from
several courts, the process of securing arraignment on all charges can be
both costly and time consuming.
The impact of bail
The nature of the bail decision -- and thus, the effectiveness
of the bail appeal system -- is critical to the defendant to an even
greater extent than the monetary penalties which bail imposes. It is clear,
for example, that the bail decision is most important for the effect it has
on the ensuing steps of the trial process. Our analysis indicates that
the pre-trial status of the defendant, while highly correlated with the
defendant's crime, age, and prior record, does not represent merely a
reflection of those variables, but in fact is a significant independent
predictor of trial outcome (even when these correlated variables are
controlled for).
In part, according to our statistics, this significant correla-
tion is "explained" by a high degree of correlation between the pre-trial
status of the defendant and the plea entered at trial, since 85% of
defendants in jail before trial plead guilty, while only 46% of those
on personal recognizance do so. As the following sections will show, our
observations of court personnel indicate that the statistical correlation
between pre-trial status and plea is largely explained by the impact that
the defendant's pre-trial location has on the defendant's own decisions
and self-image, and on the strategies available to the prosecutor and the
defense counsel.
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The most important impact on the defendant in the long run may
be the psychological effect of his isolation on the ensuing processing of
his case. Because he is isolated from family, friends, and his job -- if,
indeed, he still has a job -- delay in his trial bears very negative
immediate consequences which naturally affect his decisions concerning his
defense and make him likely .to plead guilty. Compounding this pressure is
the knowledge, which experienced defendants will understand and pass on to
the less experienced, that the time spent awaiting trial is very likely to
be "dead time" -- that is,time which is not credited to a jail sentence.
The defendant's desire to avoid spending "dead time" is likely
to be increased by the kind of environment found in most jails which house
defendants awaiting trial. Charles Street Jail, which incarcerated most of
the defendants we observed who were detained prior to trial, is apparently
typical in its physical condition. At the time of this study, the Jail
was recognized by everyone including the Sheriff of Suffolk County as
being totally inadequate, both in sanitary conditions, and in efficiency
of operation. Its most widely known characteristic is, as one of the
Defenders put it, that "Charles Street is about as tight as a Swiss cheese.
The prisoners can buy anything -- and just about anything they get, they
buy." Judging from the several defendants we observed with fresh "track
marks" (from shooting heroin), following incarceration at Charles Street,
it is possible that "everything" includes drugs as well as the food,
toiletries, laundry, and cigarettes which are openly available for sale
inside the Jail.
A final pressure on the defendant to plead guilty and minimize
time spent in jail is the impact of his incarceration on his family. To
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secure release, an indigent defendant's family must dig heavily into
limited resources and deal with an obscure and complex system of bail.
District Court bail is generally "bonded" bail, requiring that a 5% bond
be submitted to the court by a bail bondsman but Superior Court usually
imposes "cash bail" which calls for a small cash deposit -- comparable to
the bail premium on District Court bail. The difference to the defendant's
family is that the Superior Court system allows them to get their money
back after trial, but the District Court system means they will lose much
of their money. Unfortunately, as we have seen, the process of bail appeal
to Superior Court is both slow and unreliable.
To make it even more difficult for the family to understand and
deal with the complexities of the defendants' bail situations, the bail
bondsmen often put considerable pressure on them. The bail bondsmen are
aggressive about soliciting clients, and wait at the District Courts and
the Jail for the families. The pressure they apply to urge families to
bail their prisoner causes many to put up a bond on a high bail before the
cumbersome appeal process can review the bail imposed. Many of the
defenders contend that the bondsmen will actively deceive families about
the defendant's status, collecting a fee to post bond when the Superior
Court has reduced the bail to the cash equivalent bail or bailing a
defendant knowing he has another "mitt" which cannot be removed for several
days, but telling the families otherwise. One Defender -- a black woman --
described being solicited on her way to interviews with defendants at the
Jail by several bondsmen who said they could "get her man out right away"
for a small extra fee.
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Many of the impacts of the defendant's pre-trial status on the
attorney's approach to the defense, of course, arise from these psycho-
logical pressures on the defendant. In addition,the physical presence
of the defendant in jail has practical consequences for the defense's
case. A defender whose client is incarcerated has less chance to "stall
out" prosecution witnesses, to build a solid client-attorney relationship,
or to bargain with the same assurance that his client can hold out for a
good settlement. The client's mere immobility, of course, has a major
impact. It is much more difficult for the attorney to seek out defense
witnesses than it would be for the client,who is more likely to know them.
Dispositional bargaining based on the client's success with a treatment
program, of course, depends on the availability of the defendant and hence,
his freedom from jail. Finally, the appearance of the defendant in the
dock at trial has an effect on the conduct of the defense. The attorney
is less able to confer with his client during the trial or hearings; his
client's appearance after being in Charles Street will make the presenta-
tion of moral character more complex; and the attorney must cope with the
impression made by the fact that his client is plainly labeled by the court
as unworthy of trust to appear at trial.
At the same time that pre-trial incarceration limits the ability
of the defense to build a case, there is considerable advantage for the
court if the defendant remains in jail. The court officials most con-
cerned with the pre-trial status of the defendant, of course, are the
police and the prosecutors. A defendant in jail cannot, as a prosecutor
put it "get to your witnesses," or commit another crime which would
embarrass the District Attorney's office. More directly, though, the
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defendant is convenient for further negotiation and has a great incentive
to cooperate if he has evidence the State needs for its case. Judges
have a general concern -- which several of them articulate in open court
while setting bail -- for "protecting the community" from "dangerous"
defendants; protecting defendants (such as drunks) who are most dangerous
to themselves from hurting themselves, and devising a bail decision which
will be sustained in Superior Court (though any conflict between these
criteria is usually resolved in favor of incarceration.)
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Initiation of the Defense .
The arraignment, then, though often perfunctory, nevertheless
is an important first stage in the negotiation of a case. At arraignment,
the charges are formally defined and lodged, the defendant and his attorney
meet and in some cases begin to define their relationship to each other,
and the court demonstrates to the defendant his helplessness in the face
of legal formalism. Perhaps most important in setting the structure of
the following stages of the process -- the defendant has been jailed,
bailed, or released on his own recognizance. Thus, arraignment defines
the actors and some of the variables controlling their future relations,
acts as a vehicle for a preliminary set of bargains, and begins to define,
in terms the court can use,the events which are alleged to constitute a
crime.
It is necessary, then, to explore next the structure of the
relationships among actors involved in a case between the arraignment and
the trial. Who are the dominant actors at this stage? What kind of
bargaining goes on between them as the case nears its trial date? What
interests are they pursuing? What aspects of the case are typically
negotiated at this point?
The role of defense counsel
From the moment of appointment, the defense counsel replaces
the police and the District Attorney as the dominant court official in the
process of negotiation of the case -- a place he holds until the day of
tria.l. In that period, the Assistant District Attorney who will prosecute
the case and the judge who will hear it are not yet assigned, and formally,
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the court regards the case as being in a state of suspension awaiting the
preparation of the defense for trial. Hence, the defense attorney is
both formally and situationally responsible for initiatives in gathering
information and thereby shaping the issues at trial. The activities of
the attorney after arraignment, then, are directed toward-choosing and
implementing a strategy for handling his case.
The motivations of attorneys in choosing a strategy for con-
ducting a case and in deciding how much effort a case deserves are, of
course,diverse. Some are, no doubt, motivated by their need to conform
to the culture of the court in which they serve. Some regard their main
objective as social change in the courts. The Lawyers' Panel, for example,
was conceived as a device for calling attention to the inequities of the
District Court by increasing the number of private, influential lawyers
who had contact with the lower courts.
Members of the Defenders, too, often see themselves as playing
a conscious role in changing the courts. As a whole, of course, they vary
greatly in the extent to which they see their objective as social change
or "getting along with the people in the court" or "winning." Some regard
legally complex cases as the "best" to defend and, thusthe most worthy of
effort, and others are more interested in the process of dealing with
clients whose prospects for rehabilitation seem good.
Despite the diversity of basic motivations, however, a single
theme runs through the descriptions all attorneys give of their thoughts
in preparing a case: they want to avoid being surprised by what happens
in court -- or in the argot of the local courts -- they want to prevent
"being croaked." To that end, the Defender places the most stress on a
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complex information gathering process before the case is to come to trial.
He wants to find out as much as he can about the defendant and the case,
even to the point of anticipating any points that might be raised by the
prosecutor or the judge. The first step in this process, then, is for the
defense counsel to interview the defendant and, as efficiently as possible,
form a first impression of him.
Typing the defendant
The way in which the attorney uses the first interview with a
defendant and, indeed, the manner in which he conducts the rest of the case
are to a large extent dictated by the fact that he has limited resources
with which to defend a large number of clients. Many defenders contend
that most of their clients can actually be defended with relatively little
expenditure of time. One Defender estimates that 50% of his cases are
"in and out -- one interview and then nothing until the case comes up.
The rest take a lot of time." Others estimate that as many as 80% of the
cases call for a minimum of effort. Based on our study of the Defenders'
records, the cases to which they allocate extensive effort probably con-
stitute less than 15% of the total caseload. Thus, the strategy an
attorney designs for a case may be initially determined by the amount of
time he chooses to allocate to it.
The effectiveness of a defender, then, may in part be dependent
on his ability to identify the cases to which he will need to devote his
efforts -- whether because they are important to him or because they are
likely to cause him "trouble" by "getting him croaked." Apparently the
most common technique used by defenders for deciding rapidly how to approach
a case and how to allocate time is to use a set of categories to sort
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defendants and crimes, on the basis of the first interview. One Defender,
for example, dismisses the importance of non-support cases by contending
that they are "all junk." Another feels that the "real pro is the best
kind of defendant to have." Most Defenders seem to have such a set of
constructs for "typing" their clients at the outset of their preparation
of the case. The particular characteristics they each use to sort cases
areclosely tied to their motivations and theories of how defendants come
to commit their crimes, and these categories are then strongly reflected
in the strategies the Defenders pursue.
Perhaps the most common criterion an attorney uses for sorting
out cases which will require extensive preparation is the defendant's
charge. As one Defender put it, "The charges sort the cases out. Use
without authority, larceny, shoplifting are all junk." The Defenders see
this as a useful sorting mechanism because the proof required varies
according to the charges ("In a 'B and E', you merely have to find out
where the kid was caught and whether and how the building was secured,")
and because the different kinds of crime implyas we have already seen,
different pre-trial behavior by the defendants ("In an armed robbery, it
is likely that [the defendant] made a statement to the police; in an A
and B, it is likely that he did not.") A variation of this way of looking
at cases is to assess the likely conditions of arrest for a crime. ("We
often have to defend people caught in the ac.t. There's just nothing you
can do for this kind of case.")
In addition to aspects of the case, defenders also describe
personal characteristics of the defendant as being important in assessing
a case. Two aspects of the defendant are most often mentioned as
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important -- whether the defendant is likely to be "cooperative" and
whether he is of a type who can get a "good out." Both because the
attorney is concerned with the amount of time a case will require and
because he needs to assure that the defendant will follow the strategy
he selects for handling the case, the defendant's probable cooperativeness
is seen as a critical determinant of strategy. The defendant's experience,
his crime, his personal background, and the court in which the case is to
be heard all provide for the lawyer a kind of calculus for deciding
whether a defendant is likely to be a good client. Younger and less
experienced defendants, for example, are seen by the attorneys as being
inherently "hard to get along with." Minors are considered by many
attorneys the most difficult of this group; "[they're] white teenagers
hanging around on the streets. Some of them think they know what they're
doing, but if they have a record, they're pretty good."
Just as in some respects the most desirable of the juvenile
defendants are those with records, the defendants most universally seen
as good clients are the "old pros." One attorney explains that these
highly experienced clients are good clients for much the same reasons that
less experienced defendants are regarded as bad: "They know the ropes and
whether to trust you or not. They also know how much to tell you. This
kind of defendant gives you everything you need." Thus, attorneys seem
to consider good clients to be those who understand the criminal process --
and thus, whose level of hostility toward the attorney is likely to be low --
and who are able to give the attorney the kind of information that will
prevent surprise.
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The predictions of the defenders as to who will be difficult
defendants are often based on the defendant's crime. Some describe this
linkage in very vague terms:
"Rapists are the hardest to judge." "The dumb
defendants don't know the right story to tell
and they are hard to deal with." "I hate non-
support cases the most." "I have the losers
of society -- the drunks, the auto cases."
Others are more precise about the differences in clients:
"If a kid is a truant, he isn't likely to
talk with the lawyer at all. The same is
true of runaways. Those with little con-
tact with lawyers will have no faith in the
attorney that they have been assinged."
In each case, though, there is a clear feeling on the part of the Defenders
that particular crimes tend to be associated with defendants who will
behave in ways that will thwart the attorney's efforts to build a case.
Assessing the degree to which he will be able to "get along"
with the defendant may provide for the attorney a rough measure of how
much time the case may take to prepare, and in fact, how much effort the
defendant "deserves." Many defenders we observed also make a more explicit
attempt to calculate the odds that the defendant will be easy to "get off."
Is this a defendant who will be a "good out?" Is he likely to be seen
sympathetically by the court? For their own purposes, at least, attorneys
often answer these questions by considering some additional characteristics
of the defendant: his medical condition, his age, and again, the crime he
is accused of committing.
From the attorney's point of view a medical record can be seen
as er an advantage or a disadvantage to a defendant in court. One
experienced attorney felt that defendants were "generally organically
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flawed" and therefore usually not successful candidates for rehabilitation,
since their difficulties were not within their control. The majority of
attorneys, however, seize upon a medical problem associated with the
causes of a defendant's crime as an important piece of leverage for
developing a favorable disposition. Alcoholism, drug addiction, or
psychosis can be invoked as justification for regarding a defendant as
being in need of treatment rather than correction. Especially in the case
of drug treatment programs, the lawyers believe that the court is apt to
be lenient with a defendant who is "sick" and who volunteers for a treat-
ment program.
Medical problems are not the only personal characteristics which
defenders calculate will evoke sympathy from the court and,thus,indicate
a "good out." Judges are seen by the defenders as being more lenient with
juveniles and youth than adults, for example, in the expectation that they
are more likely to respond to rehabilitation:
"I would prefer to work with kids. If a
fourteen-year old and a twenty-two-year
old commit the same crime, the fourteen-
year old will get all the breaks. So if
there is no other way, if you have a kid,
you can work on the sympathy of the Court."
While age or medical condition may be likely to induce leniency
in court, these factors must be weighed against the type of crime the
defendant is accused of committing. Most defenders indicate that their
experience supports the notion that particular crimes are consistently
dealt with harshly while a second set is predictably less apt to arouse
hostility in a court. Simple assault, breaking and entering not in a
dwelling, disorderliness (unless an assault on a police officer is involved)
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and possession of a dangerous weapon are regarded by the defenders as the
offenses which are most likely to result in a "good out" for a defendant.
In part this is thought to be the case because these are crimes which do
not as generally arouse public sentiment as do violent crimes or "offenses
against public morality." Perhaps more important is the theory that
these crimes are committed by the kinds of defendants who are likely to
arouse sympathy from the court.
At the root of the defenders' approach to sorting and categorizing
casesthen, is often the belief that the defendant's charge communicates
predictable information both about the defendant's character and about his
chances in court. Whether the defendant is likely to be cooperative and
whether he is apt to receive a favorable disposition from the court are
both gauged by the attorney largely on the basis of the type of crime with
which the defendant has been charged. At least at this initial stage in
the processing of a case, moreover, the defender is apt to base his
strategy largely on a theory of what works for handling each type of crime
and its associated type of defendant.
Time, schedule and structure of the preparation of the defense
Having assigned the defendant to a category, attorneys report
that they then decide how much time to allocate to the case and how to use
the time they will spend. Each Defender has his own theory about why he
cannot spend equal amounts of time on each case and,rather, why some types
of cases have "priority." Some posit that they can have the most personal
impact by concentrating on cases that make "legal points," some reason
that defendants who are most likely to go to trial most need attention;
- 239 -
still other lawyers try to gauge the degree to which a client might be
hurt by a case,and thus, need protection.
Our data, in fact, does not support the notion that the degree
of effort a lawyer makes in a case actually determines the case outcome.
The level of activity of the lawyers as reflected in their case files has
proven to be uncorrelated with the final plea, the type of defendant, the
seriousness of the consequences of the crimes, the finding or disposition,
or whether the defendant defaulted or otherwise failed to cooperate.
Regardless of whether the time an attorney devotes to a particular
case substantially changes the outcome of the case, the question of alloca-
tion of time is still central to his thinking about the strategy by which
the case is managed. It appears to be critical to the operation of the
court structure that attorneys do not defend all cases with equal vigorous-
ness and effort and that special attention be reserved for these cases which
are important to the attorney -- whatever his criteria. Thus, attorneys
are careful to set aside particular types of cases for special effortand
the court generally takes seriously the lawyer's priorities, unless he
abuses the privilege by making too many cases seem "special."
Within each case the attorneys also try to maintain priorities
as to how much effort should be devoted to each element of strategy.
Within the group we observed we found at least three types of strategies
for preparing cases, each stressing a different set of priorities for the
gathering of information. At the heart of each of these approaches to the
building of a case appeared to be a distinct philosophy about the proper
role for the lawyer. One strategy stresses the construction of a strong
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legal case, another emphasizes the efficient processing of cases, and the
third seems to build toward diagnosing the defendant.
The first approach to organizing a case is best illustrated by
Brownlow Speer, who heads the Lawyers' Panel. He expresses a strongly
held belief that the lawyer's role in defending a criminal case in the
district court should be basically the same as that of a civil lawyer --
focused on the issues of law and fact as they appear to the attorney
and on making use of the formal procedures open to the defense. He
contends that the defense lawyer should be guided by the following schedule
in preparing a case: obtain a copy of the complaint, locate and record
the defendant's record, interview the defendant, determine from his
statement whether the state can prove the defendant's guilt legally,
investigate the technical elements of the crime (day or night time,
motions to suppress evidence, validity of the search warrant or search
without warrant), review the defendant's quality as a witness, and finally,
prepare a defense. The emphasis here is, of course, on giving priority to
those pieces of information which will justify an aggressive defense and
allow the use of formal courtroom procedure.
Other attorneys, who tend to be more concerned in their own
practice with the efficient processing of a large number of cases, depend
more on intuition gained from the interview with the defendant, using an
initial discussion with the defendant to reveal both the defendant's
knowledge of the incident leading up to the case and his willingness to
negotiate. One Defender follows an initial interview with the client with
a check of the Commonwealth's case, a discussion of a plea with the
District Attorney, and finally, a second interview with his client to
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discuss the possibility of a plea. But only if the client persists in
asserting his innocence and demanding trial will a lawyer with this per-
spective make use of formal procedures like motions and discovery or of
courtroom strategy.
A final model, proposed by attorneys whose perspectives on their
practices focus more on their efforts to understand their clients and,
thus, select an appropriate disposition for them, emphasizes an assessment
of defendants' characteristics which will in these attorneys' minds most
directly affect the outcome of the case. As a result, they recommend that
an attorney ought to obtain as much. background on the defendant and on the
crime as possible, and have the client tell his own story. Since there
are likely to be discrepancies between the defendant's story and other
sources the lawyer must try to make both types of information coincide by
attempting to convince the defendant to change his presentation of the
case and by testing the implications of the contradictory sources of
information. As a general guideline for this approach to preparation one
attorney suggested:
"Everything must strike you as consistent....
At this point, then, you analyze the case..
the most basic decisions are the plea and,
if indicated, is the case ready to go to
trial?"
Despite differences in the conception of the lawyer's role, it is
clear that each of these attorneys attempts to gather substantially the
same information: defendant's record, police and defendant's version of
the crime and arrest, background information on the defendant, and the pro-
visions of law with regard to the crime alleged. Their perceptions of the
goals they are fulfilling, however, leads them to develop different schedules
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for gathering that information, and to use the information for purposes as
diverse as justifying treatment alternatives or filing formal motions.
These types of strategies which attorneys perceive that they us.
in gathering information for a case do describe the general differences in
emphasis that we noted in their pre-trial activities. The specific
methodologies used by the defenders in organizing their search for infor-
mation, however, rarely resemble the ideal models described by the
lawyers. The actual process of preparing the case -- both in allocation
of time and in the specific kinds of information sought -- is in fact
affected greatly by the interests of other actors in the case and by the
surprises which any particular case brings. In fact, these constraints
force most lawyers to compromise any pre-set model and depend on a more
ad hoc approach to case preparation.
A case involving two defendants -- Hill and Baylor -- illustrates
these constraints on the lawyer's ability to predict what strategy he will
use to build a case. As is fairly typical in cases involving indigents,
the attorney was assigned the case from the "court list," so that he did
not participate at all in the arraignment. After he had finally obtained
the formal complaints, the lawyer then interviewed each defendant at the
Defenders'offices. Through these interviews he discovered that the two
who had been assigned to him as "co-defendants" were in fact not arrested
together, but were only tenuously associated by the police since they had
been both arrested in conjunction with the same narcotics raid. He further
found out that there had been two other co-defendants with defendant
Baylor, who had been arrested in the same car with her.
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At this point, then, the lawyer's efforts had to be focused on
understanding the details of the case and the complex relationships among
the actors. He checked with the probation officers to compare their records
with the defendants' assertions about their criminal histories and checked
with the District Attorney's officer to obtain further information about
the "parent" case -- the one from which the two unrelated arrests had
evolved. At that point he also copied the search warrant, the complaints
on each of his defendants, and the affidavits which supported the search
warrant.
Before the trial, the attorney's job was complicated by the fact
that one of the defendants chose to hire a private attorney. This change
necessitated that the defender meet with the new attorney -- with whom he
must work -- and at this meeting he discovered that the co-attorney had
chosen to follow a stragegy of suppressing evidence. They were able to
agree that the private attorney should prepare a motion, especially since
it was his client who might have been illegally searched. In the interim
the defender arranged for the Probable Cause Hearing to be held before
what he thought would be a sympathetic judge. At the hearing, however,
the Assistant District Attorney presented the issue as being the defendant's
possession of heroin and had the case continued pending additional labor-
atory analysis of the heroin.
The defender's strategy in a case like this one, then, must
survive the incompleteness of the information he has and respond to the
shifting interests of other actors. In many of other cases we witnessed,
the defenders were surprised by an anomaly in the case and forced to
modify a pre-planned strategy. The defender's pre-trial investigation
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process was deflected, for example, in one case because the defendant had
confessed under apparently Constitutionally acceptable conditions to the
specifics.of the crime with which he was charged.
In another case a defendant, who was wanted for an assortment
of major and property crimes as well as for a witness to murder, compli-
cated the defender's plans for defending him by disappearing for a while
in the middle of the case. That case was further complicated by the fact
that several of the charges were introduced well into the process of
earlier cases involving the same defendant, so that while he was being
arraigned on one set of charges, he was served with default warrants for
others, and being tried for yet another crime.
The Defenders expect that these kinds of surprises will occur
in many of the cases they defend. Despite the fact that a case will
unfold slowly -- and often in surprising directions -- the lawyers
still contend that they pursue a definite strategy in building a defense.
They must be flexible in the face of new information, but they still
stick to a general approach to the preparation of cases -- dictated by
their own motivations, their typing of the defendant, and a sense of
priorities for their time. In the next section we will see how the
Defender pursues his strategy to collect the information he thinks he
needs, and most important, how information becomes the object of
bargaining,
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Information and Negotiation with Court Personnel
While the order in which the defenders prepare their cases and
the kind of information they want are subject to many modifications as the
case unfolds, the sources from which they collect information remain
constant. Whatever specific pieces of information the case requires, the
defender will still need factual data about the case and intelligence about
the interests of other actors in the court. In particular, he will need
to know how and why the defendant came into court, what the legal status
of the case is, what the defendant is like, and what perceptions other
court personnel have in each of these areas.
In each instance, defenders believe that the information is
clearly best gathered from two independent sources -- the defendant and
the court official who knows most about each specific aspect of the case
(the police officer, clerk, and probation officer respectively.) Only
very rarely is there a third party to a case whose knowledge is more exten-
sive than these sources, and the defender's approach to these "civilians"
will be analyzed separately. The defender's early strategy, then, is
usually addressed to ensuring that he can reduce whatever discrepancies
he discovers between the versions of a case as seen by the court officials
and as seen by the client. Typically, it is with the court personnel and
the records which they maintain that the attorney begins.
The complaint
For the attorney, the most basic information about a case should
be contained in the complaint. It is especially significant because in
most cases it contains the official version of the name, alias (if known),
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and address (also if known) of the accused; the crime alleged, with
specific reference to the state relied upon by the complainant; the loca-
tion, time, and circumstance of the offense; the name of the complainant
and his address or organizational affiliation; and the names and addresses
of witnesses (though not necessarily all witnesses.) If this document
were readily available the defender's search for information would clearly
begin with a strong factual base. Often, however, information in com-
plaints is either lost, misinterpreted, or never recorded at all.
In crowded courts, especially Dorchester, copies of complaints
occasionally get lost and are often misplaced for periods long enough to
inconvenience the attorney. As one lawyer put it, "The clerk's offices
are a problem -- slow in gettinq records. You often get (them) after
they're no longer useful." Perhaps even more of a problem is the prevalence
of hand copying of information in the process of Dreparing the complaint. A
defendant named Millis, living at 21 Worcester Street, was recorded on the
complaint as living at 21 "Wareeslis Street" as a result of misread hand-
writing. Since the only record which the court retains from each case is
the complaint, the findings and rulings of the court are also written by
hand on the face of the complaint, with the result that the status of the
case is often unclear, especially after the fourth or fifth appearance.
Finally, in many cases, even if the information is recorded and
legible, it may be of little use to the attorney. For example, in some
cases such as non-support or juvenile offenses, the specification of the
charge is essentially only a restatement of the allegation -- stating only
that the defendant is charged with "failure to support" or perhaps, with
the status of "being deliquent." Often, too, the witnesses to a crime are
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not all recorded on the complaint, so that it is difficult for the attorney
to know whether the prosecution, too, has access to information which his
client has disclosed to him.
The result is that despite the seeming centrality of the complaint
it is impractical for the attorney to rely on it heavily except in those
cases in which the defense must be essentially "legal" -- focusing on
formal legal procedures in the case rather than relying on a presentation
of the defendant's character. For these cases, the attorney is apt to take
extensive care in locating and recording the content of the complaints,
since he will probably need to respond to the legal language of the
statute and to file motions which refer to the details of the charge.
The police
In some instances, perhaps the most important piece of informa-
tion the complaint yields is the identity of the arresting officer. Of
all the actors in court, the police provide the defender with the most
factual information about the case, and more important, with the best
insight into the probable strength and direction of the State's case.
Most attorneys agree that they are highly dependent on the police for this
kind of factual background:
In the District Courts, the facts come from
the police. The police will give you every-
thing you need. We don't need any investiga-
tive staff. At least in the time I've been
in District Courts, I've never run across
that kind of case.
The cops in Cambridge are wonderful. They
sit down and tell you all about the case.
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For this reason, the defenders usually interview the police as
early as possible in the period in which they are establishing how the
defendant came to be in court and what the legal case is. The supervisor
of Defenders in the District Courts emphasizes the need for getting to
the police officer early:
"You must always be sure to get to the police-
man within the first day. That will give you
a sense of the holes in the State's case... .I
place little faith in what the defendant says,
but I can get a tremendous amount from a fair-
minded cop."
In the crimes for which the police have invested considerable
resources to round up defendants and bring them to trial, attorneys are
likely to make an exception to the generalization that the "cops are
wonderful." Generally, police are reluctant to share information about
these crimes with the defender. Since much of their information involves
informants, police may reason that telling the defense of the informant's
testimony in advance would invite intimidation of their witnesses, or
at least result in an acquittal and,in their view, jeopardize the informant.
In one case, for example, the District Attorney chose to indict a defendant
directly, rather than allow him to have a public probable cause hearing.
His intent was to protect the information that would be offered by
informants by "saving" it for the Superior Court case.
Many attorneys -- both defenders and prosecutors -- report that
often the police will also "clam up" to protect a weak or illegally
gathered case. They reason that the police could not discuss illegally
gathered evidence with the defense for fear that the illegal nature of
the search or interrogation will become evident to the defense counsel.
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If they "clam" up, however, andthus, the defender does not discover the
nature of the evidence until trial, it might be impossible for the lawyer
to reconstruct the situation in sufficient clarity that doubt could be cast
on the policeman's testimony.
While in these situations the policeman is trying to protect his
case by hoarding information, he may also not cooperate with the defender
because the policeman has had a prior association with the defendant.
Especially if the policeman has arrested or tried to arrest the defendant
previously, he may have a strong personal interest in this arrest. There
is also a strong chance that the defendant resisted arrest, further
intensifying whatever personal stake the arresting officer may feel.
Because this situation is most likely to arise with status crimes, more-
over, little or no tangible evidence will be needed to support the
officer'sstatement at trial. Thus, the police officer's perceptions
become as important as the facts of the case.
While the attorneys view the police as a factual resource they
are also acutely aware of the likelihood that the policeman has his own
strong stake in the case. At the same time that they are gleaning the
facts of the case -- as the police see them -- the attorneys are also
consciously assessing a number of aspects of the policeman's attitude
toward the case. Most critical, of course, is the degree to which the
policeman has a strong opinion on what the disposition in the case should
be. The Defender in a drug case, for example, made use of the fact that
the police were sympathetic to the defendant to propose a drug treatment
center as a disposition. The Defender notes:
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"Lt. Crocker is the gentleman who arrested
the D [the defendant] on this charge and
was instrumental in getting the case con-
tinued for two years."
Since it is usually the case that the police have strongly held
opinions in a case, the defenders must also try to gauge the extent to
which the policeman is likely to stick to his original story when he
testifies in court and the extent to which he and the prosecutor are
likely to be in agreement. By checking the extent to which an officer
feels that the defendant can be treated as harmless, or better yet, in
need of treatment, for example, the attorney may be able to put moral
pressure on the police officer not to be more harsh at a later stage. In
this regard, it is also possible for the attorney to discover what the
long-run interests of the police are -- whether, for example, they are
looking for the defendant either as a witness in this or another case, or
as a defendant in another case,and whether their attitudes toward the
defendant are likely to change.
The second issue of strategic importance that can be gleaned
from the police is the extent to which the police and prosecutor are at
odds. At the time of this study, the police, who had for the entire
history of the District Courts prosecuted all cases themselves were being
largely replaced with prosecuting attorneys. One lawyer advised using
the resulting rivalry to develop sources of information:
Play on the rivalries between the police
officers and the [Assistant District
Attorneys] dropping a casual remark about
the one to the other. The person will
often respond eagerly and you end up
getting a lot of information about your
case.
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In addition, of course, it is important for the attorney to identify a
rivalry between police and prosecutor so that he can use the inclination
of the more syipathetic of the two to apply pressure to the other, in and
out of court.
The interview with the police, then, can in a number of respects
be the most significant determinant of the attorney's strategy. Whether
the police will actually cooperate with the defender and reveal the kind
of information which he would find useful is, of course, dependent on the
"stakes" the policeman has in the case. As a general rule, the defenders
do not expect to obtain reliable factual information from the police in
cases in which they have invested considerable resources in the collec-
tion of information, in those instances in which some of the information
is weak or illegally gathered, or when the police know the defendant well.
When the police case is very strong, on the other hand, the police may be
very cooperative about sharing information, often with the hope that the
defender will be persuaded to urge the defendant to plead guilty rather
than go to trial. Finally, there are cases in which the police have less
strong attitudes toward the case, and can be urged to cooperate with the
attorney.
The distinction between those cases in which the police will be
protective of information and those in which they will deal openly with
the defenders is clearly fine. The most obvious situation in which the
police are eager to reveal their case to the defense is when it is very
strong. When the police have solid evidence, for example -- like a confes-
sion which will stand up in court and, perhaps, convince the defense counsel
to advise his client to plead guilty and turn state's evidence on a "bigger"
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defendant -- they will be eager to share their information. Police may be
equally willing to share documentary and physical evidence in almost any
case, since this does not reveal their strategy or the real strength of
their case.
A less clear and more typical instance of police-defense cooper-
ation occurs when the police have no strong commitment to a disposition,
though they may still need to protect some aspects of their own case. A
good example of this kind of situation -- and how the attorney discovers
the precise limits of the policeman's willingness to share information --
is the case of two co-defendants who were accused of breaking and entering.
The attorney established that the primary concern of the arresting officer
was the safety of the victim and to some extent the rehabilitation of the
defendants. In interviewing the police officer in the case, the attorney
was able to determine that the two defendants had not resisted arrest, nor
had they taken anything, but were rather arrested inside the apartment
which they had broken and entered. During the course of the interview the
attorney also tested the policeman's interest in a drug program for the
defendants, saying that he and the probation officer were thinking of
trying to place the defendants in a drug program in Topsfield. The officer
indicated that he didn't much care, but that he would certainly not oppose
it.
When the lawyer began to ask how the police had handled the case,
however, he discovered the point at which the policeman would resist
giving information. The officer claimed that he had given the defendants
their rights and had only had to put the larger up against the wall with
a gun at his head to effect arrest. He was especially silent about
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witnesses and the seizure of contraband'-- failing to mention the existence
of two witnesses who had called the police to the scene or evidence
concerning a burglarious instrument which the defendants were alleged to
have had. This exchange indicated to the defender the wisdom of emphasiz-
ing in court the placement of the defendant in a drug rehabilitation
program and avoiding any legal issues of evidence or arrest procedures.
In general, then, the arresting police officer is a useful source
of information about the crime, and especially in cases in which he knows
the defendant, he has an important stake in the outcome of the case. By
talking early to him, the attorney gets an independent check on the
defendant's version of the case and subsequent police and prosecution
versions. An early interview also allows an attorney to determine whether
the police officer will be amenable to negotiation over the disposition,
sympathetic to a negotiated settlement, rigidly opposed, or completely
indifferent.
The process of obtaining information from the police, of course,
carries with it implicit obligations. Specifically, it is agreed by both
the police and the defenders that the information which they each pass on
to the other can't be used against them in court. To a large extent, then,
a defender pays for the information he gets from the police by agreeing to
protect them from a vigorous investigation of any admitted irregularities.
As a result, attorneys who are contemplating basing their defense on sup-




Because the probation officer fills the triple role of pre-trial
investigation and reporting, supervision of the defendants, and inter-
court liaison, he is -- next to the policeman -- the most important person
with whom the attorney must talk and work out the case prior to going to
trial. Several of the Defenders routinely arrange their schedules so
that they can arrive at court before the opening of the session and
negotiate with the probation officers (who are less busy then than at any
other time of the day.)
With the probation officers more than any other of the personnel
of the court, the attorneys develop personal friendships and generally
pleasant relationships. One lawyer, for example, often spends her breaks
in Boston Juvenile Court with the probation officers and other "helping"
professionals, and another attorney admits to regular conversations on
"Celtics or Bruins" with the probation officers in his court. As we shall
see, these informal relationships between defense and probation officer
seem, in part, calculated to insure that each gets the favors he needs in
court, but they are also a result of their mutual interests and similarity
of education and perspective.
The record
The most fundamental reason why the defense and the probation
officer must develop a working relationship is that the defense attorney
needs the defendant's probation record, both as a formal source of facts
and as an informal check on the lawyer's own perceptions of the case. If,
for example, the record revealed the existence of outstanding probation or
default warrants, it would change the defendant's status before the court,
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raising new problems for the defense -- whether to try to get the defaults
cleared separately, have them consolidated with the more recent offenses,
or bring the present charges to trial quickly to open the way for the
defendant to resolve the other charges. The record, too, can be used by
the attorney to determine whether the defendant can testify in his own
defense. If he has no record or only a minor and unrelated record, then
the lawyer reasons that the defendant can testify without having the
record color the court's perceptions of the testimony. If, however, he
has a serious or closely related record, the judge is unlikely to believe
the defendant,and his appearance might prove to be more detrimental than
beneficial.
In addition to alerting the defense to legal complications in
the case, the record is also central to the lawyer's unfolding intuitions
about the defendant. First, it gives the defender an efficient means of
"sorting" defendants beyond the typology he can develop by using the com-
plaint. It also gives the defender an (almost) objective -- and usually
detrimental -- set of facts against which to test the validity of the
defendant's statements to him. Finally, the record may identify the
known aliases of the defendant, which occasionally give the lawyer the
opportunity to know of other current or recently past offenses by his
client under one of those other names.
Unfortunately, the record is simultaneously the most important
piece of personal information on the defendant and the most difficult
document to locate and assemble correctly. In a number of the cases in
our study the records were unavailable at critical times. In one case,
for example, the defendant was going to trial in a few minutes, and there
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was a contention by the prosecution that he had an outstanding probation
violation for armed robbery. Since the defender did not believe the
prosecutor, he went to the probation officer in charge of the case and
asked him for the record. It took nearly thirty minutes for the probation
officer to locate the record,which had been put out of alphabetical order
in the list of the day's cases. In another case, the same attorney found
that the probation office had lost several of the "continuation cards"
used to record an extensive record. The resulting record was chaos --
appeals were recorded for offenses for which no initial trial existed,
and cases were left in the middle of their course.
The problem of inaccurate or missing probation records appears
to arise only in part from overworked personnel and an unwieldy paper
record keeping system. More than anything else, records are made obscure
by the efforts of the defendants themselves. When most defendants are
faced with the rising prospect of jail which accompanies a lengthening
record, they are apt to begin using an alias or to change some detail of
their personal history, such as date of birth, parents' names, place of
birth, etc. The experienced defendant realizes that this can be a very
effective strategy since the record is the only document which connects
him to his personal and criminal history, and it is precisely this history
which will have a significant impact on the defendant's sentence.
Defender-probation officer relationships
Because of its clear importance to the defense's case, the record
becomes an issue over which the probation officer and the defender must
bargain. The defender finds himself in need of the information the record
supplies, but without the ability to secure a complete, accurate version.
- 257 -
Because the probation officer "knows" the defendant, moreover, he often
becomes the court's interpreter of the record and the defendant's character,
and in this sense, can heavily influence the dofendant's disposition. In
short, the probation officer is an actor who must be dealt with by the
attorney, since the probation officer not only has a stake in the outcome
of the case, but also has the power to recommend a disposition for the
client.
The probation officer's relationship with the defender is
influenced in part by the role the probation officer must play in the
court. As the supervisor of defendants on probation he is expected to
maintain a good record of supervision, evaluated by the number of his
probationers who are subsequently arrested, especially for violent crimes.
As the person to whom the court looks for recommendations concerning dis-
position, on the other hand, the probation officer is expected to propose
dispositions which are likely to be acceptable to the other members of
the court.
The first of these interests seems to encourage the probation
officer to pursue a comparatively conservative pattern of recommendation,
since his likelihood of having a "bad" probationer rises with each poor
risk he takes. On the other hand, he is pressured by the necessity of
developing a bargain which the defense will accept, and he must try to
find a safe placement which will allow the defendant the maximum freedom
consistent with the prosecution's interests.
Probation officers are, of course, not wholly (or even dominantly)
motivated by these interests. They often share with the defenders a con-
spicuous interest in the defendant's well being. Since the defendants are
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often personally known by the probation-officers, they often have a long-
term concern for the best resolution of the problems which they feel
underly the behavior of the defendant. Also shared with the defenders,
of course, is a concern by some probation officers to avoid unnecessary
conflict between their positions and those of the other personnel of the
court.
The defender and the probation officer, then, meet with some
shared interests but also with some personal objectives and some background
which they have experienced separately in preparing the case. The result
is that often the defender and the probation officer bargain with each
other over the defendant's case. In observing these meetings between the
defense and the probation officer we were able to identify at least four
types of service that the probation officer can provide for the defender
as part of an agreement: interpreting or modifying the defendant's record,
endorsing the defender's actions in court, developing dispositions for the
defendant, and as a"negative service," violating the defendant's parole.
In return, the defender offers his influence to encourage the defendant to
cooperate in the probation officer's recommendation, his friendship with
the probation officer, and his tacit agreement not to fight him in court.
The most typical favor which the probation officer can extend to
the defender relates, of course, to his unique access to complete and
up-to-date records. Especially in cases in which defendants are accused
of serious crimes, the principal issue to be resolved becomes getting the
defendant's whole record together. More than any other group of defendants,
these -are apt to employ aliases and "scatter" their crimes and, thus,
their records into several jurisdictions (an easy feat in Boston, where
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there are eight district level courts, and a single subway ride carries
you through three counties).
In this regard the probation officer can be very helpful to the
defense, if he chooses to do so. For example, while an attorney was
interviewing a defendant, we observed a probation officer come to tell the
laywer and the defendant that he had "heard upstairs that there was a
Federal warrant on [the defendant] for possession of heroin with intent to
sell, and also a fugitive warrant." He reported further that he thought
that the marshals might be on the way. By providing this kind of in-
telligence -- to which the defender would otherwise not have had access --
he helped the defense both in deciding what strateoy to take with respect
to the court and in assessing the truthfulness of his client's story.
Besides helping to get together the "facts" in a serious case,
the probation officer has the power to offer (or withhold) endorsement of
the attorney. Since many of the defendants are likely to have lengthy
records, they often have been working with the same probation officer for
years. It is typical on the other hand, that the attorney has never
before worked with his client, and thus, the influence of the probation
officer can be considerable. In the process of the interview between
defendant Matthias and his attorney, for example, the probation officer
Colis entered the dock and the following exchange took place:
Colis: I've got a warrant for you, #2177 NC;
receiving stolen goods, a color TV
set serial number 15043, valued at
$200, owner unknown, on complaint of
Thomas Mattheson and Courtland Ballard,
police officers. Well, I have to qO
through a bunch of questions with you





(The interrogation continued through the
defendant's personal characteristics; he
and Colis went through it with an atti-
tude of extreme routine)
Colis: Hey, now you talk to this guy,
OK? -- because he's an OK guy.
Say, didn't you ever play for
[one of the professional basket-
ball teams]?
Matthias: No man.
Colis: That's funny, you look just like
[a basketball star].
Matthias: I don't know what you're talking
about.
Attorney: Hey, man, he's pulling your leg.
Matthias: Oh,..yeah. [Laughs]
Following that interchange, the defendant -- who previously had
been distant and even hostile -- turned to the attorney and admitted "I'm
up to my neck and choking," reflecting on his discouragement over his
outstanding warrants for larceny and possession of a deadly weapon. While
it is not clear that Colis' efforts were necessary to Matthias' cooperation
with the attorney, many of the probation officers do consciously employ
small talk of this kind as a method of trying to ease difficult situa-
tions and seem to exert their influence to help attorneys and clients talk
with one another.
Though access to the record is a very valuable currency which the
probation officer can give the defense, his role in the disposition process
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is perhaps an even more powerful tool. Since it is the probation officer
who works with defendants on probation, he is often in a position to
develop correctional alternatives to incarceration and to recommend them
to the court. In the case of the defendant Tilson, for example, the
probation officer had been working for two years to convince Tilson that
he was addicted to heroin and that he needed to break the habit. Before
the attorney had even been assigned to the case, the probation officer
had begun to try to locate a good program for Tilson. At the initial
meeting between the probation officer and defender he filled the attorney
in on the efforts he had made for Tilson. The defendant had been arrested
recently for narcotics (he has a massive record for property crimes headed
by an armed robbery) the probation officer had gotten him and his brother
into The Third Nail, a Roxbury secure drug program. Though Tilson's
brother had taken to the program, Tilson evidently had not and now he had
found Tilson a place in yet another treatment program. "They have a good
program out there and I can get along well with them. They have always
done well for me. And they are out of the city, you know, and there's
nothing for a cat to do up there but concentrate on getting his head back
together."
Implicitly, of course, he was suggesting that the defender should
have Tilson plead guilty in exchange for getting placed in the drug program.
The attorney responded,"This just isn't something that you can walk up to
a person and say, 'Plead guilty on this one and you'll only get five years
suspended sentence.' You can't get that across in two minutes, anyway."
While the attorney appeared to be putting the Probation officer off, his
intent here was probably to allow himself time to check with the defendant
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before continuing with this line of negotiation. Subsequent complica-
tions -- default warrants on breaking and entering charges at Quincy
District Court -- made this compromise impossible in this case, but not
until after both the defender and the probation officer had worked hard
to try to accomplish it.
Refusing to locate a placement for a defendant or failing to
provide the defender with information are, of course, actions which could
be taken by a probation officer who feels that an attorney has not been
sufficiently cooperative with him. Though we observed its use in only
a few instances, the probation officer's power to "violate" a defendant's
probation can be used as an even stronger sanction against the defender.
This authority derives from the probation officer's ability at any time
to issue a summons which indicates that the defendant has committed an
act in violation of his probation agreement. In effect, then, merely
being arrested is sufficient cause for the probation officer to summon the
defendant back into court for reconsideration of his sentence (or finding,
if no sentence has been given), no matter how unjust the arrest might have
been.
In practice, most probation officers do recognize that their
probationers will often be arrested, occasionally without adequate cause,
and that to "violate" them might well be worse for the defendant's hopes of
rehabilitation than to ignore the incident from the standpoint of probation.
The Tilson case is an example of this approach. Tilson's probation officer,
was willing not to "violate" Tilson's probation on another charge in light
of his new arrest on the charge of breaking and entering, provided that he
would participate in a drug program which the probation officer believed
would help the defendant.
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This kind of discretion with regard to violations is, of course,
exercised in the context of a complex set of pressures which lean toward
"violating" defendants. The Wilson case was probably an extreme example
of what the probation officer could accomplish. In the process of
negotiating the disposition, the probation officer at one point said to
the attorney, 'I won't violate him unless I'm forced to -- you know, I
don't really mean that, but they can put a lot of pressure on, and I might
have to do it." In other cases, where the probation officer is himself
not convinced that the defendant is a "good risk," or the charge which
causes a violation is particularly serious, the probation officer may not
hesitate to "violate" the defendant.
Whatever the specific number of incidents of probation violation,
it is evident that the attorneys perceive it as an implicit threat, and
thusthey are led to be even more cooperative with probation officers
when there is a risk of "violation." Because the exchange of services
between the probation officer and the attorney for the defense is an
implicit process, however, it is not always clear how an attorney repays
the favor of a forgotten violation or an advanced notice of "breaks" in
a case. Our observations suggest that there is a tendency for favors done
on one case to imply obligations in ensuing ones. While the parties to
the agreement would never openly recognize this as a formal requirement,
under the guise of being helpful and being seen as "on the ball," as one
lawyer put it, there is some significant evidence that attorneys who are
cooperative also find probation officers more willing to provide informa-
tion and to exercise discretion for their (future) clients.
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Contrasting the experiences of the Defenders with those of the
members of the Lawyers' Panel tends to confirm this impression. The
Defenders, who are in daily contact with probation officers, were usually
able to obtain information and assistance especially on their serious
cases.. Private lawyers, entering the court for the first time, on the
other hand, had difficulties in obtaining accurate records for their
cases of this type, and few indicated that the probation office was at all
useful.
The repayment of obligations owed to probation officers by
defense attorneys appears to take a number of forms, all labeled as
"cooperativeness" by the attorneys. At one extreme the lawyers we
observed seemed to make a general effort to extend friendship to the
probation officers, by making small talk with them and by meeting them
for lunch or breaks in the court schedule. Another level of cooperation,
however, appears to be that the defense attorney tried as often as
possible to urge their clients to cooperate with dispositional alternatives
generated by probation officers and to avoid fighting with them in court.
Though in most cases the judgments of the defense and the probation officer
about what would constitute a desirable disposition tended to coincide, in
a few instances, the need to assist the probation officer resulted in the
attorney fighting less vigorously for a client than he otherwise would.
Probation in non-support and juvenile cases
The close cooperative relationship between the defense attorney
and probation officer appears to make it possible for them to exchange
favors without an explicit agreement. Two exceptions to this pattern,
however, tend to suggest that this kind of implicit bargaining is possible
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only because the defense and the probation officer are essentially trying
to fulfill the same goals within the court. Both are primarily interested
in providing a feasible way to help the defendant minimize the amount of
time he must be incarcerated. When the role of the probation officer
changes radically, as it does in non-support and juvenile-cases, the
relationship between the attorneys and the probation staff is also notice-
ably changed. In particular, because the probation staff in both of these
types of case has an essentially prosecutorial function -- rather than
one more aligned with the defense -- the defense attorney must either
forgo the practice of bargaining altogether, hope for favors only when he
can find especially friendly probation officers or bargain overtly with
a "contract spelled out."
An analysis of the juvenile and non-support cases we observed
illustrates these altered bargaining patterns. Probably because of the
monetary interest of the State in the "crime" of non-support, the proba-
tion officer is part of a separate staff which is responsible soley for
non-support probation. This specialization is justified by the fact that
men are typically held on non-support probation for as long as six years
at a time, and they are required to pay through the court while they still
have dependent children or a wife whom they have not supported without
supervision. The relationship between probation officer and probationer
is, therefore, radically different from that which exists in other cases.
Here, the probation officer is not the defendant's advisor and "helper" but
rather his principle creditor -- since it is he who receives the defendant's
payments. A creditor with the force of the courts already on his side, the
probation officer often comes to describe the defendant as a "deliberate
deadbeat" with the intent of defrauding the court.
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Ironically, perhaps, in light of the association between the
probation officer and the probationer, their relationship is much more
long-lasting in non-support cases than in other kinds of crime. Defendants
convicted on a non-support charge are typically given a six-month sentence
to a ho.use of correction,which is then suspended for six years on condition
of payment of court-ordered support. Because most of these defendants pay
in person in the courthouse, they necessarily have a long-term close
personal contact with their probation officers. One defendant, for
example, had been under court order to pay $50 per week support. When
he was employed -- which was not often -- he apparently paid the $50 on
schedule. Revocation of probation hearings were held at each default of
payment or three months, whichever came first. In each appearance, the
probation officer attended and acted both as prosecutor and as advisor
to the court. In the same period, in which the probation officer had such
consistent contact with the defendant, six different attorneys were assigned
to the case.
Combining this long relationship between probation officer and
client and the inherent interest of the court in the outcome of the case,
it is not surprising that the probation officers in the non-support sec-
tion come to take roles which are more similar to those of the prosecution
than those of other probation officers. In their roles as "prosecutors,"
they encounter some of the same problems of client definition as do the
Assistant District Attorneys. In particular,as in other domestic cases,
the complainant in non-support cases often does not desire to have the
case prosecuted.
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Under these circumstances the pressure is greater for the
probation officer, though, because both the judges of the court and the
Department of Public Welfare do have an interest in seeing that the
defendant is punished -- even if the complainant does not. The court is
anxious to prosecute the case because the judges feel that when a defendant
fails to pay his non-support judgment through the court, the court's
dignity is insulted. There is also pressure from the Welfare Department
because they tend to regard non-support as a form of welfare fraud. Thus,
to resolve the conflict, most of the probation officers in non-support
must develop a "hard" line toward defendants and accept their prosecutorial
functions.
In the face of these pressures on the probation officer, he can
rarely afford to give ground to the defense. A very typical exchange
between defense and probation occurred in the case of Theodore Brown, who
was summoned into court in the third year of his probation, charged with
violation of the conditions of his probation -- failure to pay the court-
ordered support for his family. Brown's attorney tried to talk with his
probation officer, to argue that the defendant had in fact been supporting
the complainant and her children to a greater extent than the court
required, though outside the court's collection system. The probation
officer replied that the issue was not whether the client was supporting
his family but whether he was fulfilling the exact conditions of his
probation, which specifically required that he pay support through the
court. He further indicated that there had been several previous instances
of non-payant, and that he intended to have the probation revoked.
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The experience of most defense attorneys with exchanges like
this discourages them from attempting to argue for leniency on behalf of
their non-support clients, and in fact, causes them to try to avoid
handling non-support case altogether. When they are assigned to a non-
support case, most attorneys we observed respond by fighting with the
probation officer in the courtroom, despite strong sanctions in the
District Court against this kind of open, time-consuming confrontation.
The only exception we observed in this pattern was a particularly gre-
garious lawyer who invested a great deal of time in fostering friend-
ships with non-support probation officers. Even this effort worked with
only two of the probation officers, who found the attorney's friendship
worth some favors. The following exchange illustrates their relationship
to the lawyer:
Pro: Hi, tall Paul; how's it going today?
Att.: Bad night last night.
Pro: Yeah? Say, did you see the Celtics
last night?
Att.: Yeah, stunk, didn't they?
Pro: What's wrong with them?
Att.: Well, first of all, the damn fools were
shooting from the outside all night.
Not only that but Cowan couldn't hit
at all....
(There followed a five minute conversation
among the three discussing why the Celtics
had lost the night before.)
Att.: Well, I gotta take care of a couple of




Att.: I can see it's going to be one of those
days. I've already got another case
where I just found out about a Co-D the
MDC is supposed to be defending. The
guy's been in CSJ since a week ago and
nobody told me.
Pro: Well, you can't win 'em all -- maybe
you'll get one of mine next time.
Except for rare and limited relationships such as this one,
defense attorneys have little to offer a non-support probation officer,
whose main interest is the prosecution of the defendant. The situation
is perhaps even more complex for the attorney in juvenile cases, where
the probation officer is both seeking dispositional alternatives for the
defendant and acting as a "prosecutor." As we have already pointed out,
there is no organized prosecution in cases brought on juvenile status
complaints, so that the probation officer becomes forced into a prosecu-
torial role -- at least insofar as seeing that the defendant receives a
"strong" disposition. Like the non-support probation officer, however,
the juvenile probation officer is also the most likely dispositional
alternative open to the court, (though in juvenile cases it is the lack
of a juvenile correction system rather than the need to have the defendant
employed at a job which limits the use of jail as a sanction.) Like the
non-support probation officers, too, the juvenile probation staff is
isolated and has long-term relations with its clientele.
Since treatment is the critical objective in juvenile cases, the
image the probation officer presents of the defendant's problem is critical
to the disposition of the case. It would be logical, then, for the
attorney to work with the probation officer to shape this image and in this
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way influence the disposition. As the following case illustrates, however,
the juvenile probation officer is likely to see a defendant (other than
a first offender) as the "type" who will require harsh treatment if he is
to be rehabilitated. If the probation officer has strong opinions of this
kind, the defender has little chance to influence the dispositional
decision.
When one attorney heard that a case involving charges of truancy
and stubbornness was coming up, he sought out the probation officer, Ms.
Jones. Ms. Jones opened the conversation by announcing that she wanted to
put the defendant away for fourteen days observation, since the girl had
been "in" before on truancy and stubbornness. She then introduced the
mother of the defendant, and led the attorney and mother into conversation
by establishing that the mother didn't know what to do with the child.
Before the case began, but after he had talked briefly (and
unfruitfully) with the defendant, the attorney reopened discussion with
Ms. Jones:
Att: What do you want on this case?
Jones: I want two weeks examination.
Att: Where?
Jones: Charlestown Y or Judge Baker; rather
have Baker, but they're busy most of
the time. She's been in before a
couple of times, but it doesn't do
any good; she just stands there and
just stares at the judge -- you know
just sort of glares at him, like she
hates his guts.
The discussion continued, with the attorney trying to persuade
Ms. Jones that it was "too late [in the school year] to bring in defendants
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on truancy charges" and that the defendant should be let out until trial.
In each instance, however, the probation officer pushed the image of the
defendant as a highly confused and hostile girl who needed a strong hand.
As evidence she described a shoplifting case in which she claimed the
defendant had been involved. The defendant and a two hundred and thirty-
five pound black girl were, according to Ms. Jones, arrested by a security
guard, who accused them of possessinq stolen goods, and the defendants
had assaulted the security guard. The guard prosecuted the co-defendant
for assault and battery but the defendant was "let go" with "only" a
larceny charge. Thus, Ms. Jones indicated that the fact that the defendant
had, as she saw it, "gotten off" so easily for that case argued against
letting her off "soft" this time.
In the face of the juvenile probation officer's ideology of
treatment combined with her role as the person who sees to it that
defendants don't "get off soft," the attorney was unable to press for
immediate trial or for any alternative pre-trial disposition. Lacking a
separate source of information, he could only appeal for a "good" location
for the pre-trial observation. In fact, he failed even in this effort, and
the defendant was taken directly to the lockup and transferred to Lancaster --
a particularly unpopular institution of the Department of Youth Services,
which its director had been trying to close.
Outside agencies, friends, and witnesses
At this stage in the preparation of a case the lawyer for the
defense is casting out his nets for information -- trying to identify the
positions of actors in the case and looking for support for the defense
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wherever he can locate it or create it. Often the attorney extends this
search outside the court to "helping professionals," to friends of the
defendant, or to witnesses. What he may be looking for from each of these
sources is assistance in endorsing a placement alternative he is planning
to suggest to the court, in defining the defendant as needing treatment
rather than punishment, or in influencing another actor in the case to
shift his position.
In many of the District Courts there are external agencies which
take responsibility for helping to locate placements for criminal defendants.
In cases heard in Boston Juvenile Court, for example, there is a general agree-
ment that personnel of the Youth Services Board's Court Liaison Project
are particularly useful for establishing alternative dispositions which
will be accepted by the judge and probation officer. In other courts,
their usefulness varies, and other community agencies often take the same
role. In Dorchester, for example, the Roman Catholic Church is active in
arranging placements in children's homes operated by the Church and others.
For adult offenders with no prior records, the Boston Court Resources
Project offers diversionary services, including jobs and job training,
counseling, and referrals to places to live. For drug cases, several
groups are active in the courts, especially The Third Nail, a residential
treatment center.
In some instances, these agencies not only function to develop
placements for defendants but they may actually offer their endorsement
of the defendant, thus helping to change the court's image of the
defendant's chances for rehabilitation. In one particularly eloquent case,
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a defendant had incurred the wrath of her probation officer by failing to
admit that she used an alias, until the matter came up in court. At this
point a representative from a referral agency indicated that he and his
agency would "stand behind her...we remain committed to helping her."
This kind of support can provide a strong incentive for a court official to
take a chance on a defendant whom he would otherwise regard as a "bad
risk."
While all of these agencies appear to deal cooperatively with
attorneys working on behalf of criminal clients, it falls to the attorney
to convince the agency that his defendant is properly part of its clientele.
When the attorney makes use of resources like these, then, he invests some
time at this stage in building an image of the defendant and his problem
that will appear appropriate to the services of the referral agency. As
a result, a second task that the attorney often faces is convincing the
defendant to accept the definition of his problem, as it has come to be
defined by the attorney and the agency.
A second group of professionals with whom the defense may be
involved at the pre-trial stage are the physicians and psychiatrists.
They, in general, serve two roles, both also largely oriented to defining
the defendant's personal characteristics. One of these roles involves
deciding whether or not the defendant is competent to stand trial; the
other is diagnosing the defendant's mental or physical diseases in order
to provide the court with a rationale for disposing of a case in an
essentially non-criminal fashion. Though these professionals most often
participate in domestic, non-support, and juvenile cases, they are also
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frequently brought into cases of driving under the influence of alcohol.
One of the defenders, for example, called into evidence the records of
her client at Bech Israel Hospital. He had indeed been charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol, but at the time he had been in a
program of treatment using an anti-abusive chemical which prevented him
from drinking, but which made him appear drunk. Thus, the hospital was
able to provide an alternative explanation for his behavior.
While the lawyer may seek out -- or in some cases avoid -- the
testimony of outside professionals, he is forced to deal with witnesses
and with friends of the defendant. His ability to employ either of these
groups to enhance the image of the defendant in court is hampered by their
complex relationships to the defendant. In the case of witnesses, for
example, they usually come forward only in cases involving rape, armed
robbery, or assault and battery,or when property has been lost,and they
can assist in the identification of stolen goods. Those who most often
serve as witnesses are the victims of the crimes they are testifying about,
and thus, they are likely to have strong feelings about the defendant. In
crimes against the person, this attitude is likely to be strongly against
the defendant; indeed, few need the prosecutor's admonition not to give
assistance to the defender. Witnesses in most domestic and juvenile cases,
moreover, not only see themselves as victims but also are the spouse or
relative of the defendant.
Though there is usually little a lawyer can do to influence a
witness who has been the victim of a crime supposedly committed by the
defendant, the lawyer does intervene with witnesses in domestic or juvenile
cases. In both instances the attorney can usually convince the relative
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that the court will "treat" the defendant's problem, without resorting to
harsh measures. The result of the lawyer's efforts in domestic cases is
that after an initial period of anger most complainants are cooperative
and provide information to the defense with little need for negotiation
beyond the assurance that the defendant will be protected. Since witnesses
in juvenile cases are generally the defendant's parents, they usually do
not want to hurt the child, but they also believe (or have been convinced)
that the court can do the disciplinary work they could not do. Discussions
between defender and witness in such cases, then, also focus less on the
testimony the parent will give than on the nature of the treatment which
the court will propose.
Most lawyers are acutely aware that if witnesses of this type --
or the defendant's family and friends -- are cooperativethe defendant is
much more likely to impress the court as a stable citizen. Experience
shows that a court assumes that a defendant whose family and friends are
supporting him will be a better risk for rehabilitative strategies. With
this kind of assumption, the defenders often invest time not only in
talking with witnesses but in working with the defendant's family to urge
them to play this supportive role. Families are urged to visit the
defendant, provide him with money and food if he is jailed awaiting trial,
and especially, to appear in court with the defendant at his arraignment
and trial. It is likely that the defendant himself benefits from this
kind of effort, to the extent that his own willingness to cooperate in
his defense and his appearance in the courtroom also improve.
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At this stage the lawyer's purpose in dealing with the defendant's
family and friends, and with court-affiliated agencies is similar to his
intent in talking with police and probation officers. In each instance,
the Defender appears to be searching for information which might con-
stitute a "case." What does each actor know about the alleged offense,
about the defendant, or about dispositional alternatives for the
defendant? Closely related, of course, is the defense attorney's need
to know what the interests of these actors are in the case -- whether
they are likely to be supportive of the defendant and of a disposition
the defense might propose, or whether they must, in fact, be cooled
out, avoided, or fought. Even at this point, too, the attorney may be
trying to shape the ways in which these people view the defendant and
the case as much as he is simply trying to gauge their attitudes and
interests.
Information and support in the courts is typically purchased
at a price. As the attorney is trying to learn from these actors and
to line up support for a case, he is also either explicitly or im-
plicitly incurring obligations. Witnesses or family who agree to support
a lenient disposition may want assurance that the defendant will receive
treatment, and the attorney must try to gain their confidence on this
score. Police, on the other hand, may give information with the expec-
tation that the defense will not fight too hard on later cases in which
conviction turns out to be particularly important to the police. Proba-
tion officers perform the service of securing the record and perhaps of
endorsing the client to the court. They appear to know that the attorney
will reciprocate through friendship and cooperation in the dispositional
recommendations the probation officers makes.
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The Pre-trial Interview
The structure of the interview
The formal pre-trial interview is the first time at which the
lawyer must establish a relationship with the defendant whose case he may
already have been preparing. Up until this point the lawyer may have
devoted considerable effort to filling out his own view of the case, its
probable outcome, and the interests of the police, probation officers,
and other actors who will be involved in the case. From a previous brief
interview with the defendant and from the other resources he has consulted
the lawyer may already have developed a strong view of the defendant's
"type" -- his moral and psychological characteristics, his problems, and
his interests. He may even feel that he had a complete view of the facts
of the case, without the benefits of the defendant's story.
However solid a defender's grasp of a case appears, most of
them agree that an adequate defense cannot be built without the develop-
ment of a relationship between the lawyer and his client through at least
one interview. Even the most confident lawyers try to compare the ver-
sions of the case they have developed with the defendant's story, to try
to avoid "surprises" in court. Most lawyers actually depend on the
interview to fill in factual holes in the case, especially with regard to
what the defendant can remember about the circumstances surrounding his
arrest and what he can supply about his personal life that might create
a favorable image in court.
Perhaps an even more important function of the interview is to
establish the grounds on which the lawyer can "represent" the defendant.
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On one level this means that the interview may be used to discover what
the interests of the defendant are so that these can be more honestly
represented by the lawyer in court. In practice, of course, many lawyers
find it difficult to discover what it is the client wants and instead,
assume that his sole interest is to minimize time in jail. Most attorneys,
however, will abandon this as a working assumption for a client who says
he wants a trial. Most will honor their client's interest in taking a
case to trial, even if the client still insists after being warned that
trial could mean an increase in his chances for incarceration.
The interview is critical to the process of representation in
another sense, too. If the lawyer is going to succeed in any courtroom
strategy, he must make certain that the defendant will cooperate with him
in court. Many lawyers use the interview, then, to determine whether or
not they can establish a working relationship with their clients. A
second purpose is often to relate both the lawyer's and the client's
versions of the story during the interview and to make corrections where
the facts or the manner of presentation do not coincide.
Most of the attorneys we interviewed reported -that they con-
sciously pursued some of these objectives in their interviews by develop-
ing a format that would lead the defendant in the desired directions. One
particularly articulate attorney was able to relate to us the format which
he uses as a guide for his own conversation with defendants. Since it is
representative of other interviewing styles and a complete statement of
what might be included, we will report it in full:
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In the beginning the attorney should try to
establish a background of basic data. Most
of it comes directly from the defendant. At
the bail hearing you try to get a sense of
the charges, the defendant's prior record,
and the "file" types of data on addresses,
occupation, etc. At this stage, too, you
make a point of asking the defendant for
the same information you intend to get from
other people. This way you- can begin to
look for contradictions. Even at this stage
you try to press the defendant for information
since even then I know more than he knows that
I know. Above all, I don't assume that the
defendant is lying.
The lawyer should try to direct the defendant
to answer a series of questions. What do the
police know about you? What do you think the
police officer will say at the trial? This is
important since you cannot always get to the
police to find out what they know. Ask the
defendant point blank what he believes the
police observed. Whatever information you
have at the time should be used to probe --
people have poor memories and need some
stimulus to remember. Ask the defendant,
"What did you see?" The next step is to dis-
cover what the defendant was likely to have
said to the police. In an armed robbery case
it is likely that he made a statement to the
police; in an A and B i't is likely that he did
not. Ask him to try to remember any ways in
which he was grilled by the police. "Did you
know the person that you hit? What did you
say about that to the police? What did the
police say to you? What in detail happened
at the station? What in general do you think
will be the police story? Do you know the
officer? Has the police officer ever seen
you before? Did anyone talk to you in court?
Did you see the police talking to any of the
witnesses or anyone else?"
Then you should let the defendant tell his own
story. This is a different type of information
than you get when you direct him.
Next you ask yourself a number of questions. Can
this guy talk? Is he intelligent? Is he perhaps
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hard to hear or understand? To help establish
this you can begin to play verbal games with
the defendant. Find out whether he is likely
to be killed by the DA on the stand.
Next you ask yourself whether or not the de-
fendant has a believable story. Try to es-
tablish impressions of the defendant from
several angles. What is his real problem?
Is it divorce? Is it alcoholism? Play games
with him. Use any information you have to
probe, compare. This is where it all comes
to a head and you begin to sound like an
adversary. You tend to look at things with
a jaundiced eye. It is surprising how many
people lie to their lawyer. They see him as
part of the court.
The process of conducting a complete interview with a defendant
as seen by this attorney clearly involves a staged set of attempts to
obtain information. Each type of data as it emerges is then used as
leverage to probe for new information or reactions from the defendant or
to encourage the defendant to "open up." The attorney conducting this
type of interview is clearly,in turn, probing for the facts of the case,
and then assessing the credibility of the defendant's story. His ques-
tions about the arrest not only round out his knowledge of the case, but
also search for "legal angles" which might be used as strategy. The
lawyer then explicitly turns to evaluating the defendant both as a
potential actor in the courtroom and as a person. In the final series of
comments the defender may be trying to "break" the defendant -- to dis-
cover information that he might have intentionally or unintentionally
neglected to give the lawyer and to pressure him to cooperate.
Though these goals and these kinds of questioning style were
present in nearly all the interviews we observed, no interview was like an-
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other in its detail. This diversity is due in part to the differences in
the personal styles and philosophies of the attorneys themselves, and,
therefore,to the objectives they choose to emphasize in the course of any
interview. Many see, for example, the primary object of their strategy
as being to break the defendant's facade to "get at" the truth. Others
do not believe that they could recognize the truth if the defendant were
to tell it, and will settle for a credible and consistent story; pre-
ferably one which can be reconciled to that told by the police.
Thus, the order in which attorneys ask questions and the time
spent in pursuing each element of the case will vary with the centrality
they give to establishing the "facts" of the case, and their faith in the
defendant's willingness to tell the truth. One attorney, for example,
describes himself as employing a strategy aimed primarily at getting
"facts" from defendants [D's].
The D comes in and tells me his story. I
usually give him as much time as he needs.
I have a format for translating interviews
into files. When the D first comes in, I
usually tell him to just talk about himself
and to ramble on about what happened. I
don't take any notes at first. I try to
establish a little camaraderie with the D;
then I get specific. Then finally I go
through the outline.
The director of the Lawyers' Panel, on the other hand, is less
concerned with determining all the facts of a case than with making an
assessment of possible "legal" strategies. He recommends to members of
the panel that in interviews they concentrate on the details of the events
leading up to arrest, looking always to the question of whether the
Commonwealth can prove its case. Since he feels much more sanguine about
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defendants' truthfulness than do other lawyers, he pays less attention to
the issue of the defendant's truth or credibility than to these technical
aspects of the case. In discussing his "legal" strategy for defense, he
reflects his perceptions of the proper relationship between lawyer and
client. As the person responsible for understanding the legal aspects of
a case the lawyer should work out an advisory relationship, in which he
is careful not to recommend courses of action but to limit himself to
giving information and advising his client of the consequences of alterna-
tive actions.
In addition to the differences in the sense of mission which
lawyers bring to the interview, the defenders tend to articulate dif-
ferences in the interests which they are pursuing and in the influence
they can exert over the defendant. In turn, each defendant appears to
come to the interview with his own set of interests and, perhaps,
strategies, though they may not be as clearly articulated as the
attorney's. Thus, the main dynamic of the interview and the primary
explanation for the differences among interviews is the complex of
interests with which the attorney and the client each approach their
initial meeting.
We have already cited a number of objectives which we felt that
the attorneys were explicitly pursuing when they interviewed clients.
These range from the most general desire not to be "surprised" in court
to the immediate need to get to know the defendant. For the purposes of
analyzing the interviewing process we will concentrate on three interests
that seem to be common to all the attorneys we observed. Foremost, of
course, is the attorney's need to create a relationship between himself
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and his client which insures that the client will cooperate, especially
in court. A second purpose which appears to guide the interview is the
need to obtain information about the client and the crime, while also
urging the defendant to adopt an acceptable interpretation of that infor-
mation. Finally, the lawyer also feels that he must try to assure that
the defendant will accept the disposition he has in mind -- to redefine
the defendant's goals in such a way that they can be feasibly met within
the constraints imposed by the court and the abilities of the lawyer.
While the attorney does not expect to accomplish all these
goals in an interview, he does bring to the interview a large number of
attributes which may influence the defendant greatly. The lawyer has
the definite advantage of a knowledge of the law and the court, license
to act with authority within the court structure, and experience with
similar sets of facts and personal presentations gained from representing
other clients. Perhaps more important, he can offer the client access to
other members of the court community who would otherwise be unavailable
to the defense. Through this contact with other court personnel the
attorney can also bring to the interview information gathered from
sources independent of the defendant. Clients tend to be highly
influenced by the lawyer's "inside" knowledge of their cases and to lose
much of their ability to hoard information when the lawyer is able to
contradict their stories. Finally, in every lawyer-client interaction
there is an implicit threat that the lawyer will withdraw from the case,
which the defenders occasionally invoke with recalcitrant defendants.
In contrast, of course,the interests of many defendants are not
well-practiced,and defendants are not usually aware of the influences they
- 284 -
can bring to bear on the lawyer. The initial motivation for the defendant's
behavior during the interview seems most often to be the need to decide
whether the lawyer can be trusted and thus to 'test" him. Many defendants
do, of course, come to their interviews with explicit faith in their
attorneys, but most seem to spend some time evaluating the lawyer before
discussing any particulars of the case. If the defendant decides that he
can enter into a dialogue with the attorney about the events of his arrest,
he often has a second objective -- to present himself and the conditions of
his arrest in the most positive possible fashion, as he gauges it.
In fact, of course, the defendant's position in the interview
can be quite strong, and in a number of ways, he is more able than the
lawyer to shape the course of their meeting. The defendant, for example,
brings to the interviews first person knowledge of the events at issue in
the case and, of course, of his own identity and character. To some
extent, too, he brings a degree of monopoly power over that information,
though the defendant may not be aware of how to use it, since he does not
know the scope of the attorney's knowledge of the case. Finally, he brings
the ultimate power to refuse to compromise his perceptions of the alleged
crime and of his own character, even if his refusal means that a successful
presentation cannot be made to the court.
Given his lack of knowledge of the court and of these possible
strategic advantages, then, the defendant most often bases his conduct in
the interview on his own perceptions of the reliability of lawyers, his
notions of what attitudes he ought to express, and his conjectures about
what information is most likely to be harmful, if it is revealed. For
many defendants, behavior in the interview is conditioned by these
- 285 -
perceptions rather then any articulated plan. As the defendant becomes
more experienced in the ways of the court, however, he may begin to
negotiate with the lawyer with a well-articulated, distinct strategy of
his own.
The pre-trial interview, then, becomes a meeting of the complex
interests of the lawyer and the defendant. By virtue of the kinds of
influence which each can exert, moreover, the interview can tend to
resolve some of the conflicts among the interests and attitudes of each
side. This process is, of course, rarely explicit, especially on the part
of the defendant. In each interview we observed, however, we were able
to see the control of the meeting shift constantly between defendant and
lawyer, as each exerted the influences he had available. In nearly every
instance, the lawyer emerged as the dominant figure in the relationship
and to some extent "taught" his client what their relationship should be.
Even more striking were the changes in the definition of the reality of
the case which occurred during the interviews. Often the interchanges
between the lawyers and clients not only altered the facts of the case
into a common version, but they also tended to modify the way in which
the defendant viewed his problem, his interest, and the disposition in
the case.
Patterns of bargaining in the interview
In the three cases that follow we try to illustrate this process
of bargaining between lawyer and client. Though all the interviews we
observed revealed the attorneys trying to assert their interests in the
attorney-client relationship, we have selected a set of interviews which
are particularly illustrative of the three major objectives we attributed
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to the interviewing attorneys: shaping the facts of the case, "selling"
the defendant on a dispositional alternative, and attempting to obtain the
cooperation of the defendant. At the risk of losing representativeness,
we have also selected cases in which the defendants were somewhat exper-
ienced; to illustrate as vividly as possible the roles played by defendants
in pursuing their own interests.
An interview between the defendant Henry Kursley and his
attorney illustrates a lawyer's attempt to use the interview as a basis
for establishing and shaping the defendant's version of the facts of the
case. The interview is also a good example of the kind of relationship
which develops between a lawyer and an experienced defendant -- who has
an interviewing strategy of his own. In fact, defendants like Kursley
who have already participated in the life of the court are considered by
lawyers as being easiest to handle, since they "know the ropes" and under-
stand what the lawyer is trying to accomplish. In most of the interviews
we watched, the defendant lived up to this role expectation. Many were,
of course, more wary than the attorneys had expected, but the most
uncooperative of these were also the ones who faced the most serious
charges.
Kursley's case was typical of the "seasoned" defendants repre-
sented by the defenders. He was assigned to the Massachusetts Defenders
after he had been arrested for possession of heroin with intent to sell,
and he was alleged to have a prior history of drug related offenses.
The attorney [A] began the interview with the defendant [D] by
introducing himself:
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A: Hi. I'm your lawyer -- I'm from the
Massachusetts Defenders Committee.
My name is Paul 'lanckowski. What's
your name?
D: Willie Kursley.
A: I thought they said "Henry" Kursley
upstairs.
D: (Firmly) My full name is William H. L.
Kursley.
Even at the very outset, the attorney and defendant were beginning
to employ strategies designed to influence the interview. They both knew
that the entire drug raid in which Kursley was caught was based on a search
warrant authorizing the search and detention of "John Doe," alias "Henry."
Thus, the defendant was apparently preparing his position so that he could
deny that he was referred to as "Henry" and, moreover, showing that he
was unwilling to cede autonomy readily to the attorney. The Defender, on
the other hand, had shown the defendant that he would not allow superficial
discrepancies to go unnoticed. By responding so quickly, too, he might
have alerted the defendant that he understood that it was the name "Henry"
which was at issue.
The attorney then pursued another question which further developed
background facts and at the same time may have given him another chance to make
clear his relationship with the defendant.
A: Where do you live?
D: I'm living with my old lady,...
A: (Interrupting) Don't tell me. She's
Carolyn Hill.
D: Yeah! How did you know that?
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The defendant seemed quite surprised by this, since he had not
known that the court was aware of his relationship with Carolyn Hill. The
attorney movea to try to retain his advantage in the exchange by getting
quickly to the critical issues of the case, while the defendant was still
impressed with the fact that the lawyer knew a great deal about the case
already.
A: Where is that?
D: 109 Stanwood St.
A: How much junk did they get you with?
Once again, the attorney was moving to try to take advantage of
the fact that he thought he had gained the initiative in the conversation.
By changing the topic quickly to the arrest and by asking the question in
such a way that it implied the defendant's guilt, he was probably trying
to shake the defendant into presenting his version of the story in a way
which could be harmonious with prior evidence. The defendant, however,
stuck to his effort to dissociate himself from the crime:
D: None. It was my girl friend's house. I
didn't know what they were talking about.
All I know is that they came charging in --
I was alone in the house -- and busted me
for having drugs.
A: Do you use drugs.
D: Hell, no. I ain't never been on Horse --
never touch the stuff.
A: Ever arrested?
D: No.
Having pursued the defendant's answer in terms of its implica-
tions for his use of drugs, the attorney turned to the defendant's associa-
tion with the house at Stanwood Street.
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A: What were you doing at the house when they
arrested you?
D: Making a visit. I stay a couple of days
at Carolyn's house, and sometimes stay
downtown at the Midtown (motor hotel).
Carolyn has another boyfriend who some-
times stays with her for a while.
The defendant appeared to present the other boyfriend as a
technique of offering an alternative to himself as "Henry" in the warrant.
In addition, he seemed to.be making an effort to regain an equal footing
in the conversation. Thus the attorney refused to respond directly to the
defendant's initiative, but rather asked about other aspects of the police
version of the crime:
A: Did you ever leave any clothes there?
D: No.
A: The police report said something about
a suit.
D: Well, it wasn't mine.
A: You ever leave any bags there?
D: No.
The defendant indicated at this point that he was merely "trying
to remember the important things," and set out again to take control of
the interview. The attorney tried to get him to admit some further con-
nection to the Stanwood Street address. After further denials from the
defendant, however, at least at this stage, it became clear to the
attorney that he was not going to get any additional information about
the alleged crime.
It is at this point -- given the defendant's solid unwillingness
to acknowledge any association with the crime -- that this case is somewhat
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atypical of interviews with experienced defendants.. Other defendants of
this type are more open about giving information, though the most experi-
enced of them refuse to admit directly their involvement in criminal
activity. In other interviews, one defendant, for example, went through
the details of his participation in several armed robberies and accessory
activities to a murder, and another went so far as to explain not only his
role in an arson but also to identify the person who paid for the arson.
Thus, Kursley's initial reluctance to admit any involvement in
the drug case may require some explanation. It may be, for instance, that
he was not in fact the person sought in the arrest warrant (though, as we
will see in the course of the interview, this theory is unlikely to be
valid). Another possibility is that he might have realized that his case
could not be helped by telling his lawyer of his involvement. Unlike other
defendants, he probably could not turn his information in for freedom: if
he were "Henry" he would be the object of the whole series of arrests and,
thus, probably too large a figure in the total prosecution effort to be
released. Since the attorney, moreover, demonstrated unexpected knowledge
of the facts he may have convinced ursley that so much of his case was
already known that there was no advantage to a confession of guilt at this
point.
Whatever the reasons for the defendant's recalcitrance, the
attorney had to abandon the question of the defendant's arrest for the
moment. Changing tactics yet another time, the attorney turned to ques-
tions about the defendant's background -- age, record, education, etc.
This shift was probably designed to develop some of the information the
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attorney neededto break the defendant's concentration on the facts sur-
rounding his arrest,and to deflect the defendant's attempt to take con-
trol of the interview by forcing him to answer short questions. The
attorney then returned to his original line of questioning:
A: Let's get back to the point at which you
were arrested. What happened next?
D: My girlfriend came in and asked, "Come to
turn yourself in?"
A: Did you ever bring a bag or briefcase into
the apartment?
D: No. They must have been left by Carolyn's
other boyfriend.
A: The warrant states the owner of the bag as
being the one who is selling H.
D: Well, it isn't me.
At this point, the attorney dropped this tack, apparently
satisfied that in court the defendant would be able to stick with this
part of his story, and turned to the arrest. With little guidance from
the attorney, the defendant told of the arrest, booking, and interrogation.
One brief portion of this description shows several characteristic tech-
niques of expert defendants in anticipating the kinds of information they
can safely give their attorneys:
D: Well, they [the police] kept asking me ques-
tions about Carolyn and how I knew her, and
about the others. They said, "You can go
free if you know about them, but if you
don't cooperate, you'll do forty." Then,
they took me to the print room for an hour
and a half. I got questions from one and
then from the other -- all the time like
that. One said I had sold him drugs. The
other said something about a federal
marshal having been there at some hotel
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and having seen me sell to him. He also
said that I had met with Jesse at some
hotel I've never been to.
This brief statement performed several tasks simultaneously for
the defendant. It alerted the attorney to areas in which he might fruit-
fully bargain for information with the prosecution; without indicating any
admission, it showed the attorney what the police information is apt to be
in areas in which the attorney had not indicated that he had any prior
knowledge; it alleged extensive interrogation which, combined with the
defendant's prior claim that he was not told his rights, might provide the
basis for a defense based on violation of the defendant's rights in the
arrest.
Apparently satisfied that the defendant's account of his arrest --
while not necessarily "true" -- would provide a solid basis for building a
case, the attorney returned to the question that had continually dominated
the interview -- the relationship between Kursley and Carolyn Hill. In
the process of answering the attorney's questions, the defendant remained
insistent that the other "boyfriend" had been the one to bring the heroin
into the house, while he quickly assured the attorney that "[the boyfriend's]
a real nice guy -- decent to the kids, too." At the same time that the
defendant described Carolyn Hill's "new boyfriend Henry" the defendant
admitted that three of the children were his own and remarked, "They all
call me 'dad.'"
In apparent hope of approaching the question of the defendant's
"family" indirectly, the attorney next turned to the defendant's finances.
In response to his questions, the defendant observed that they "got by":
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D: She gets a little help from the welfare,
and I'm on unemployment compensation. I
got my first four checks all at once, and
she had gotten two months' welfare payments,
so when they arrested us, we had $700 in
cash in the apartment.
Following a probe of the defendant's employment (he's an "Asphalt
truck driver") and reasons for coming from New Jersey to Boston ("better
pay"), the attorney terminated the interview by explaining to the
defendant that the case would be continued for a probable cause hearing.
He reassured his client that the probable cause hearing was not a trial,
but only a hearing to determine whether enough information had been pre-
sented to warrant a trial in Superior Court.
On the basis of this interview the attorney entered in his
running narrative of the case the following observation:
D'S STORY: D states that he knows Carolyn
Hill, that he has been going
with her for approximately
six years, that he has four
children by her, and that he
and Carolyn had moved up from
New Jersey. He plans to marry
Carolyn Hill some day, he had
no knowledge of any heroin
being stored in the Hill apart-
ment, and he feels that it was
some other man, another boy-
friend of Carolyn's. He denies
having anything to do with the
heroin, or ever using heroin or
ever using any other kind of
drugs. He states that his pro-
fession is a truck driver, long-
haul, and that he heard the pay
was good and that is why he moved
up here.
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COMMENTS: Concerning Willie H. L. Kursley or
A. K. A. Henry Kursley. Problems
with Mr. Kursley's statement. He
talks about $700 being in the
Carolyn Hill apartment, stating
that $500 of this was Carolyn
Hill's welfare check and $200 being
from his unemployment checks, seems
like a lot of money for the D to have
being unemployed or even that the
Co-D Carolyn Hill had being unem-
ployed. Also Henry is very philo-
sophical about this third party guy
that supposedly was a friend of Anna
Gordon who has been visitinq his 6 -
8 year girlfriend, Carolyn Hill. He
doesn't seem to be at all upset that
Carolyn Hill has been hussling some-
one else.
It is my opinion that Henry Kursley is
the one that's involved with the brief-
case of heroin in the Carolyn Hill
apartment. This is certainly what the
police think.
It was primarily from the interview, then, that the attorney
built his reconstruction of the arrest and his estimation of the defendant's
probability of guilt. His deduction concerning the defendant's involve-
ment with the briefcase full of heroin is most interesting in this respect.
It may explain why the attorney spent so much of the interview pursuing
Kursley's relationship with Carolyn Hill. It illustrates, moreover, the
extent to which the lawyer's conclusions at this stage were drawn from very
limited information about the case and the defendant.
The interview is particularly interesting in the complexity of
interlocking bargaining which it illustrates. In a sense, each question
and answer represents a small bargain in which the participants struggle
with each other for the control of the conversation. At a somewhat more
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expansive scale, they are negotiating reality -- about the arrest, about
the identity of the defendant and his social contacts, and implicitly about
the shape of the defense. Finally, at the broadest level, the defendant
may be attempting to bargain for as large as possible a share of the
defender's time and talent by presenting his case as interesting and him-
self as worthy of a vigorous defense.
While Kursley and his lawyer negotiated the "facts" of his case,
bargaining in the pre-trial interview can be much more explicitly concerned
with developing agreement about dispositional alternatives to jail. An
interview with a defendant accused of several breaking and entering
offenses, and arrested in possession of allegedly stolen goods illustrates
this kind of interchange. The interview had been proceeding through a
series of routine questions supplied by the Defenders to assure that all
lawyers with the Committee obtain the necessary minimum information about
each client. When the question of drug usage came up as part of this
format the Defender probed the issue, and began to build toward a treatment
disposition:
A: You into drugs?
D: Yeah, heroin.
A: Shooting or popping?
D: Shooting.
A: In heavy?
D: In real good.
A: You should begin to think whether you want
to request a drug examination.
D: Yeah, I will [said without enthusiasm].
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A: Well, think about it. They are supposed
to have a reasonable place; you know, not
great, but not bad either.
D: Yeah, that's what I heard, too.
A: How bad is the habit? I mean, about how
many bags a day?
D: I don't know. See, the people I buy from,
they are in it big. They sell in quantity.
I buy a quart from them for a hundred.
A: Hey, you know that's a good way to get
busted for selling?
D: [No response].
A: So you're cutting it yourself?
D: No. I just buy in quantity; you know, they
.just don't bag it into dimes. I get it in
big bags and use it that way.
A: Do you sell part of what you get?
D: No.
A: You hip to what you're into?
D: Yeah, I'm hip.
As with many of the interchanges between lawyer and defendant
each actor appeared to be trying to accomplish several purposes at once.
The attorney was simultaneously expressing his views and advice on the
defendant's drug habit and trying to enlist the defendant's assistance in
a strategy which he had decided would be necessary to keep this defendant
"in the street" -- even in light of his record, unemployment, and undeniable
habit. Finally, the attorney was demonstrating to the defendant that he
understood the drug culture and could speak its language sufficiently that
he could communicate with him. The defendant, in turn, seems to have been
countering by assuring the attorney that, at least at that time, he
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considered the drug culture not altogether negative. In fact, he spoke of
his suppliers with some touch of awe for being in so "big."
Having attempted to plant the idea of a drug program as a suitable
beginning of a rehabilitation program, the attorney abruptly shifted the
focus of the interview to the facts surrounding the arrest. He did this
by suddenly warning the defendant that the case might have dire conse-
quences: (this comment followed directly after the defendant had said,
"I'm hip.")
A: Man, this looks like it's heading for
Concord. [Correctional Institution]
D: Why?
A: It all depends on this B&E. Were you
arrested in the car?...
By introducing the situation surrounding the arrest as the
pivotal point in whether or not the defendant would go to Concord, the
attorney seems to have been trying to put pressure on the defendant to
see that the options open to him were likely to be a drug treatment pro-
gram or Concord. The attorney continued the interview, shifting from dis-
cussion of the circumstances of the defendant's arrests and warnings about
how damaging the evidence was to return regularly to the issue of a drug
program as an alternative to Concord.
While all these lawyer-client interviews move toward a clarifica-
tion of the roles each will play, some interchanges between the two are
devoted solely to this objective. For the lawyer, this clarification of
roles is a necessary preparation for an appearance in court, since he must
be able to rely on the defendant's cooperation. The interview between the
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defendant Brant and his attorney provides a vivid, though extreme, case
of a lawyer attempting to urge his client to cooperate with him.
Brant and his co-defendant Garvey had been charged with breaking
and entering. At the first interview the lawyer met with the defendants in
order to resolve their bail status. Initially both had been put on high
bail, largely because Lee Garvey had some outstanding probation. Since
the defendants had been brought from Charles Street Jail to the court for
trial (though a lack of ballistician's report had forced another continuance)
they were anxious to secure their release. Thus, the attorney began their
first interview of the day by telling them about progress in clearing up
their bail situations:
A: OK, now, I think we're going to get you
out. [Talking to Lee Garvey] I just got
a call from Charles Wiley, and he says
that the probation in Stoughton is
finished and that the Superior Court
"pro" is the only thing on you. That
way, she [the Judge] has no reason to
hold you.
[David Brant at this point was making
negative comments about getting out.]
D Brant: I've just got to get out of here.
It's driving me crazy.
A: We can't go to trial on the case because
the ballistician isn't ready.
D Garvey: It don't make any difference, that
thing couldn't shoot anyhow.
A: [To Brant] I gather you couldn't make the
$250 cash bail. [Lowered by Superior Court
on appeal from $15,000 set by the District
Court].
D Brant: Hell, no. If I could have, do you think
I'd still be here? What kind of stupid
question was that?
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A: David, I'm in no mood for your attitude. If
you want to get out, you're going to have to
tell me what I need to know and trust me.
To break the tension, the attorney turned to Garvey and got
information from him for use in trying to get his bail reduced during
their a.ppearance in court. When Brant seemed to have calmed down the
attorney returned to asking him how long he had been in the area. Brant
didn't answer.
A: A year? Two? Five? Ten?
D: You might say so.
A: Might say what?
D: Oh, what fucking difference does it make?
I ain't going to get out of here unless I
bust my way out.
A: How long, David?
D: [No answer.]
The attorney tried to ask questions about the defendant's background, but
the only statement Rrant gave was that he had been in the Marines, and
that he "might" have been back in Boston ever since.
Deciding that further efforts to probe into the defendant's back-
ground would prove as futile, the attorney went to the courtroom to wait
for the Garvey-Brant case to be.called, and despite his difficulties with
Brant, to try to negotiate the defendants' bail. When the case was
announced, the prosecutor argued that he was not ready for trial, and he
requested a continuance for a week. When the defense counsel requested a
reconsideration of the bail, the Judge agreed to hear argument on bail
continuation.
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A: Your Honor, considering the fact that
Mr. Brant has no prior record and
Mr. Garvey has never defaulted and has
a job which he is in danger of losing,
I would like to ask the court to reduce
bail on both defendants to $1000 personal
recognizance.
P.O.: [Addressing the Court] That man isn.'t
David Brant; he's David L. Smith.
J: [To A] Didn't your client tell you this?
A: No, Your Honor. To be honest, he has been
an uncooperative client.
C: This case will be put on second call.
It was clear that this exchange with the court had humiliated
the attorney. Being "croaked" in this way has serious implications for
both the attorney and the clients. After that incident, moreover, neither
defendant could be put on bail, since in the eyes of the court personnel,
they were part of a single case and there was "something wrong" with the
case. The attorney perceived that he lost prestige and credibility as a
member of the court community, and feared that, in future cases, he would
be required to have much more detailed assurances of information to con-
vince the court of a defendant's worth.
After this encounter, the attorney and the two defendants left
the courtroom. At this point David Brant began to scream at the attorney:
D Brant: It's crushing me -- I can't breathe.
I'm going to bust out of this fucking
place -- I'm going to bust out, do you
hear? It's more than I can take.
They're trying to pin it all on me.
They said they were going to pin it on
me good....
A: [Yelling] David! Now cut out the shit and talk
to me. What's going on? Who is David Smith?
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[The defendant was at this point incoherent,
both raging and crying]
A: David! David! Who is David Smith?
D: He's my cousin.
A: What do the cops have on him?
D: [Resentfully] I wouldn't know. I never
see him.
The conversation was regularly interrupted by outbursts of rage
from the defendant, who kept screaming about the "screw job" the "fucking
pigs" were doing to him. It was difficult, therefore, for the attorney
to get information from him about Da-vid Smith,despite the fact that the
focus of the case had shifted to determining the defendant's identity.
The defendant continued to maintain that David Smith was his
cousin who might have a serious record -- though he had no idea what for --
and that he thought David Smith was in jail somewhere, though he didn't
know where. The attorney left, saying,
A: Look, David, you've really screwed your-
self by not telling me these things. If
I had known, I could have planned how to
deal with them, but as it is, I just can't
help you. Now, I'm going to check out what
the police have about this "cousin" of yours,
then I'll be back.
The attorney's investigation revealed that the officer who had
identified Brant as Smith indicated that the police had been "looking for
him" because he was a "bad actor." The officer himself had spent some
off-duty time hunting down the records on Brant and had identified him as
Smith by his fingerprints. The probation officer further indicated that
Smith/Brant had an extensive record under five other aliases. He was able
to give the attorney a fairly conclusive piece of evidence -- a surrender
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of probation warrant made out to Jason Smith, David L. Smith, Jackson L.
Smith, Daniel Smith, and David Jackson as well as to David L. Brant.
Armed with this warrant, the attorney returned to the lockup and
called David Brant over to the gate of his cell. When Brant received the
document, he became quite violent, crying and cursing.
D: That thing don't belong on me. They just
trying to hand me all that shit -- this
belongs to somebody else. Why don't they
go out and find him and leave me alone.
Don't you lay that on me. It ain't no
fucking business of mine.... They just
trying to keep me in here....
A: David, if you keep this up, I can't be
your lawyer. Now, I'm leaving. [Turns
to go]
D: Like -- be my lawyer.
A: If I do, you're going to level with me.
No more bullshit.
They then sparred over the defendant's identity. The defendant
tried to argue that he was responsible for only some of the things done in
the name of David L. Smith, claiming that he was none of the other people
named in the warrant. The attorney was able to get him to admit progres-
sively more about his activities, however, until he had tacitly admitted
them all.
This case provides an extreme example of the tactics a lawyer
will employ to establish rapport with a difficult defendant. In this
sense the interchanges between the lawyer and Brant negotiate neither the
case nor its disposition, but merely whether Brant will allow himself to
be represented at all. The lawyer's efforts in part show this need to
develop a minimal relationship with Brant before he will represent him,
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but perhaps also show the need of lawyers to "break" their clients, when
the stakes are high enough to create a risk that they will be "croaked"
in court. The energy with which the attorney in this case pursued the
question of David Smith's identity was certainly due in part to his
embarrassment over having been surprised by the court's knowledge of the
defendant's aliases. (It is also important to note, however, that despite
his peeve over this lapse in court, the attorney did vigorously represent
both defendants in the bail hearing immediately following.) Because of the
tense nature of the attorney-client relationship, this case is also able to
suggest the importance of the attorney's ultimate power to refuse to repre-
sent a client, and the perception of even the most difficult defendant that
the lawyer is somehow necessary to survival in court.
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Preparation of the Case for Trial
The stage at which the lawyer's attention may finally be directed
to creating a strategy for defense is the period immediately before the
case comes to trial or the defendant waives trial. It can be the most
critical stage in the processing of a case, since in effect the trial is
the playing out of the strategies which are developed during this phase.
During this period all the decisions which directly shape the trial or
"bargain" following a plea of guilty are made: the choice between plea
and trial, the legal strategy to be followed in the case, the assignment
of the judge and the prosecution, and the negotiations with the prosecuting
attorney.
For a study of bargaining this is also the most important stage,
since it is here that the attorney makes use of all the bargains he has
developed previously and for the first time engages in open bargaining
with the court. In his search for information, the attorney has usually
bargained with the police and the probation officer to obtain the "facts
of the case." In the process, he has undoubtably gauged the positions of
both of these actors and entered them into his calculus about the odds of
conviction in the case. If the interview has worked, moreover, the
attorney may have succeeded in influencing the attitudes of the defendant
toward the case and in preparing him for what the disposition is likely
to be. With this background, the lawyer must for the first time ratify
the decision to take the case to trial or to have the defendant plead
guilty "for considerations." Either declaration results in open bargain-
ing with the prosecution, whether in the courtroom or outside.
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Plea-trial decision
Though the lawyer and client discuss a number of options for the
strategy and disposition of the defendant's case, the first point at which
the lawyer perceives that there has been a decision made is when they elect
to take the case to trial or they choose to have the defendant plead guilty.
Lawyers describe this decision as evolving from a process in which the
lawyer and client review the case together, and the defendant decides
whether to admit guilt in exchange for a "bargain" appropriate to the case.
The fact that the defendant knowingly makes this decision is critical to
the lawyer's perception of what the plea-trial decision ought to be. In
fact, most lawyers contend vigorously that they do not allow a person who
denies guilt to plead guilty (though some feel that the standard should be
less actual guilt than the recognition that a judge and jury would probably
find guilt). One Defender went so far as to say the following:
A lawyer usually considers his first obliga-
tion to get his client "off" if he is not
guilty. To get the lightest possible sentence
for a defendant might mean having him plead
guilty to an offense even if he is innocent.
While these lawyers argue that the decision is made entirely by
the client, when they describe the plea-trial decision, they speak in
terms of the criteria which "you" -- the lawyer -- must consider when
"you decide whether or not to plead [guilty] your client." In fact, this
ambiguity about who makes the decision is explained by the lawyers in terms
of the client as decision maker with the lawyer as advisor. As one
defender put it, "the attorney lets the defender choose, but informs him
of the odds of winning the case. It's important for me for the defendant
to choose a strategy that will win -- after all, it's no fun to lose."
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Our observation of this pre-trial period, however, suggests that
neither the defendant nor the client actually makes the plea-trial decision
at this stage. Rather, the "plea-trial decision" meeting between the
lawyer and his client constitutes nothing more than a ratification
ceremony for the necessary result of previous negotiation. The entire
pre-trial process has been one of bargaining for information and a process
of mutual adjustment of personal interests on the parts of the attorney,
defendant, police, and probation officer. From this process a mutual
understanding has usually grown up between the defendant and the attorney,
regarding the odds of conviction in. the case and the types of disposition
that are feasible. Discussion between them about whether to bargain or go
to trial, therefore, must be seen as ultimately being merely a part of this
process, not a distinct decision making step.
In fact, even if a firm decision were made at this point alone,
it would still be constrained by the prospect of future negotiation. In
the District Court, as we shall see in the section which discusses the
trial, the distinction among forms of "trial" (probable cause hearing,
plea ceremony, adversarial trial, and even juvenile hearing) are often
quite blurred. In this setting, all forms of trial become extensions of
the negotiation process, so that there is not a real choice between trial
and bargain at any point.
Why then do attorneys insist that they do make a plea-trial
decision at this stage? The answer in some cases may lie in the attorney's
need to strengthen his relationship to his client. By presenting the
defendant with two options -- "plead guilty or go to trial" -- and providing
advice which tends to make one choice clearly preferable, the attorney may
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gain several important advantages in future negotiations with the client.
First, the decision does reduce the range of possible options in a still
complex negotiating situation. Because the defendant must choose the
strategy to be followed, too, his interest in the outcome of the case may
be altered; from here on, the defendant may be more likely to identify the
strategy as "his." This involvement of the defendant in the attorney's
stance for negotiation reduces one major potential area for surprise -- it
is now much less likely that the attorney will be "croaked" by his client's
defection from a bargain. Finally, the process of ratification of the
bargain strategy tests the relationship between attorney and client. More
than any other stage in the criminal process it serves to foster the
relationship of dependency and trust which the defendant may feel for his
lawyer, since the client can see for himself that the lawyer is "only
doing what I told him to do."
Preparation of the defense
Even if the lawyer and the client have agreed that the case should
be pleaded rather than tried, the defender nearly always prepares the case
as if it were going to trial. Failure to prepare for the eventuality that
the bargaining process might not work or for some other reason the case
might actually go to trial is seen as an invitation to get "croaked."
Whatever the plea-trial decision, then, the lawyer will construct at least
a rudimentary legal defense at this stage, based on his assessment of how
strong the prosecution's case appears and whether the facts of the case will
suggest a refutation of the charges.
For most cases, there is general agreement on both sides to a
set of facts, and those facts are often sufficient to justify a finding of
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guilty. A slightly smaller number of cases presents a clear problem of
fact or law based either on disagreement about the facts or even an
agreed flaw in the prosecution's case. Finally, there are cases in which
the defendant claims to have or be able to produce facts which would
refute.the Commonwealth's charges totally. It is generally on the basis
of the defender's assignment of a case to one or the other of these groups
that he structures his preparation of the legal defense for trial.
In cases where both prosecution and defendant agree in principal
that there are sufficient facts to support conviction, the defender tends
to rely on a long established set of standard responses which attorneys
have developed to attack a "solid" or "pat" prosecution. An example is
that the attorney may point out that the defendant's arrest was a "cliche
arrest." Just as defendants are accused of using "cliche alibis," --
defenses used so often that the court finds them incredible -- individual
police often repeat testimony. During the trial, then, the attorney may
plan to question the credibility of the police officer or other complainant,
pointing up, for example, the fact that the same police officer has testi-
fied to the same facts time and time again. Another common strategy in a
case of this type is to try to elicit from the prosecution witnesses
extenuating information for the defense. For each of these strategies the
defender may prepare a brief agenda for cross-examination.
For those cases in which defense and prosecution disagree on the
facts in a case, a somewhat more aggressive preparation is required.
Typically, the disagreement will fall into one of three areas: the
legality of arrest, search, or entry and the behavior of police officers
during each of those stages of the arrest process; the identity of the
- 309 -
defendant, particularly if the identifying witness is a civilian who does
not know the defendant; and the adequacy of the prosecution's evidence to
cover all the elements of proof required for conviction. In any of these
cases, but especially for cases of false identification, the defense must
not only prepare an attack on the prosecution's case but also mount an
affirmative defense, if the case is to be won. Despite the legally
recognized standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" required for con-
viction, the defense cannot be satisfied with depending on casting doubt
on the prosecution in any of these cases, since there remains in the courts
an operating presumption that the police had "some reason to pick your
defendant out of all the people in the city to arrest for this crime."
The most time-consuming and -- because of the lawyer's fear of
being croaked -- the riskiest type of case for the defender to prepare is
the one in which the defendant claims to have a positive defense. Pre-
paration then means locating and interviewing witnesses whom the defendant
identifies. Defenders consistently suggest that locating witnesses,
especially in poor and black communities,is the most difficult of the tasks
they face. As one defender put it, when your client only knows that "a
dude numed 'Shorty' saw the whole thing" and that "He hangs at that corner,"
finding the witness is nearly impossible. Cultural differences between the
lawyer and his client come to the fore here especially, and as a result,
if the defendant is free before trial, the attorney usually tries to have
his client do much of the work of finding witnesses.
Once in the defender's office, the witnesses have to be inter-
viewed. Again, this is a most difficult task, since, unlike the defendant,
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they are not under any real pressure to work with the attorney, yet he must
cross-examine them even more closely than he must his own defendant and
with less corroborating evidence. Because of the danger that witnesses
will not appear for the trial or that they will be impeached during cross-
examination, the attorney cannot build the defense solely on the testimony
of witnesses. Instead, where a positive defense must be developed, the
lawyer is usually faced not only with finding witnesses but also with con-
structing a second defense, if he wants to assure a strong case.
Assignment to the judge
Between arraignment and trial, the initiative for shaping the
criminal process lies primarily in the hands of the defense attorney -- and
to a lesser extent the probation officer and the police. Until the day of
the trial, in fact, many of the other court personnel are not even named.
In particular, neither the judge who will hear the case nor the Assistant
District Attorney who will prosecute it will have been designated until
then. As a result, both the final preparation of the case and any direct
negotiations over the plea must wait until the identity of these actors
is known. This information allows the defense attorney to employ last
minute tactics which are at his disposal to affect the outcome of the case,
such as "judge shopping."
The identity of the judge -- and thus the ability to shop for a
judge -- is seen as critical by the attorneys because of what they per-
ceive to be great differences in sentencing philosophies among judges.
Part of the case preparation strategy, then, is to try to have the case
scheduled before a judge likely to be sympathetic to the type of defendant
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the attorney is representing and the disposition he has in mind. In this
regard, the attorney must reckon with the Assistant Clerk, since the
weighty responsibility for assigning cases to individual judges falls to
him through his job of making out the day's docket. This same clerk acts
as the Clerk of the First Session, where arraignments are. generally held
and in the (usual) case that two or more sessions of criminal business are
required, he refers cases to the other sessions.
The strategies which attorneys use to jockey for a preferred
judge range from a very tacit kind of negotiation to open bargaining with
the clerk. Tacit bargains usually involve being ill or occupied with
another case when the case is being called; asking for "second call" to
"bargain" a case which, in fact, the attorney intends to take to trial; or
simply, as one Defender put it, "being nice to [the Clerk] a guy nobody
else in the court will speak to." In any of these ways, the attorney may
be able to stall a case scheduled before an unfavorable judge, though the
same kinds of strategy are clearly being used by the prosecutor who may
see a particular judge as too permissive for a case which seems important.
In the District Court, he may engage in his own tacit judge shopping, by
asking for a continuance on the grounds that lab reports haven't arrived
or, in an extreme case, go to the Grand Jury without a probable cause
hearing to avoid a reduction on a plea.
There were several cases which we observed in which attorneys
used explicit mechanisms to influence the assignment of the judge. The
following interchange between a Defender and an Assistant Clerk in the
hallway of Dorchester District Court illustrates an explicit request for
a change in judicial assignment:
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A: Dick, is Troy going to sit today, or is this
his golf day?
C: He just came in.
A: Which session's he going to be in?
C: [Nods toward second session door]
A: Do you have the Olford case? It's going to be
a plea -- it's the kind he'll like.
C: OK, I'll see that it gets on the list for His
Honor.
Whether an explicitly requested favor or a diversion to avoid a
particular judge, these strategies are not open to all attorneys, and they
must be rationed by those who can use them. In particular, only those
attorneys who are "regulars" in the court even attempt the process, since
it is by no means obvious to an outsider which clerks are apt to be willing
to move cases for an attorney, nor would an outsider lawyer know what the
peculiarities of each judge are.
For those "regulars" who participate in judge hunting, too, there
are limits which most lawyers recognize. Although the "toughest" judges
are usually the slowest in processing cases, there still must be some cases
handled in their sessions. Thus, each defender must take his turn in pre-
senting a case before them. Since both prosecutors and defenders are in
the business of judge swapping, moreover, each side must agree tacitly to
use the process only when it seems important and "fair" in terms of the
numbers and kinds of case moved. The prosecution, for example, is not
likely to object too strongly when a case involving a breaking and entering
of a dwelling is moved away from Judge Troy -- who is acknowledged as a
"bear" on such cases. In turn, the defenders tend not to object when a
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serious case for which probable cause is to be decided and on which there
is little disagreement is placed before Judge Scott, who,among the judges
available, is recognized as being most prone to find probable cause in
almost all cases.
In a sense, then, there are two kinds of bargains being struck
at the same time in the process of judge shopping. At one level, the
attorneys who have a case moved are tacitly bargaining away their right to
complain in the future when a case is adversely affected by an opponent's
successful attempt to be assigned to a sympathetic judge. More directly,
there is an explicit bargain by which the clerks are able to keep two or
three sessions moving smoothly without irritating any of the judges, in
exchange for their assistance with a matter of considerable consequence
to the lawyers.
Assignment of the Assistant District Attorney
The second assignment made just prior to the day of trial -- that
of the prosecutor -- is also the object of bargaining. Both the police and
the Assistant District Attorneys themselves have a strong interest in
influencing the matching of prosecutors to cases. In this instance, the
responsibility for assignment falls not even to a clerk, but to a law
student intern. Each afternoon when the list for the day is published, the
intern at the Assistant District Attorneys' office posts the docket and
assigns a prosecuting attorney to each case. Cases scheduled in this way
include only the felonies and selected "serious" misdemeanors, and they
are, at least formally, assigned to attorney-prosecutors on the basis of
their experience. The police prosecutor -- a sergeant regularly assigned
to the court -- handles the bulk of misdemeanor trials.
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The police, in particular, have an interest in the effectiveness
of the prosecutor in obtaining convictions, and thus, in which prosecutor
is assigned to a case. If they do not belicve that an attorney can handle
the prosecution of the case to their satisfaction they can and do persuade
the supervisor of the District Court prosecutors to reassign the case to
someone more of their liking. The supervisor himself can also assign the
prosecutors to cases based on his assessment of their abilities to deal
with particular defenders or judges.
The prosecutors, themselves, of course, have strong preferences
for the kinds of cases they want to be assigned. Each of them has police
officers and types of defendants with whom they can work well and others
whom they find difficult. Because they all have private civil law prac-
tices in addition to their responsibilities as prosecutors, they also have
a strong interest in having a set of cases which will not interfere with
their private practice (although when a conflict arises, their prosecutorial
duties do take precedence).
All of these influences on the assignment of the Assistant
District Attorneys have the effect of reinforcing the structure of in-
terests in the criminal courts. In this respect they do not significantly
alter the lawyer's ability to prepare a defense, since he has usually
anticipated the interests of the actors involved. For cases in which the
police have a strong stake in the outcome, they are able to obtain the
"hardest" prosecutors. The prosecutors most adept at bargainingmoreover,
tend to want the most "bargainable" cases and to know how to get them. Thus,
the remaining routine cases are apt to fall to the prosecutors with the
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least inclination to negotiate and, according to some court personnel, the
least talent for legal argumentation.
Preparation of the prosecution
In contrast to the defense counsel, the prosecution typically
can mount only a very brief effort to gather information and to build a
courtroom strategy. In fact, except in the case of planned arrests in the
most serious cases, the prosecutor's search for information is unlikely to
extend beyond the arresting police officer and the complaint. By far the
greatest constraint on his activities is that the prosecutor is usually
assigned a case the day before the trial is scheduled. Since many prose-
cutors also have extensive private practices, the time he could devote to
any one case is limited, whatever lead time he was given.
Because he must ration the time he spends on a case, the prose-
cutor will depend heavily on the information he can glean from the com-
plaint and the information and assistance he can coax from the police.
Like the defender, his first step is to check the complaint -- an efficient
source for the essentials of a case. He also consults it in an official
capacity, since it is the job of the prosecutor to review the complaint to
make certain that the case is in the correct judisdiction, that the details
of the complaint are all correct and correctly spelled, and that there is
no evident procedural error in the manner in which it was drawn up.
The arresting officer is probably the most important source of
the prosecution's case. Typically, the arresting patrolman is also the
complainant and the witness,and he often has the only supporting evidence --
some tangible evidence which can be placed at the scene solely through
his testimony. In these cases, his only preparation consists of going
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over the story with the arresting officer, looking for glaring inconsis-
tencies, judging from his own recollection or the advice of his colleagues
and senior police officers how reliable the arresting officer's cases have
been, and in this way deciding whether to offer a bargain. What he hopes
to get from the police in these brief meetings is their version of the
facts of the case, their assessment of the defendant, and their feelings
about an appropriate disposition of the case, including their interests in
information or a "string" on the defendant.
The only exception to this pattern of investigation are those
cases in which arrests are preplanned. These instances provide the prose-
cutor his only chance to prepare a vigorous prosecution. Typically, police
confer with the prosecutor early in the development of a "proactive"
investigation and keep him abreast of the development of the case. Often
they consult with him about the case's strategy -- the adequacy of the
information and the tactics to be employed in protecting the convictions
in the case. Since a serious case of this kind will undoubtably be
resolved in the Superior Court the prosecutor's activities are focused on
protecting the case in the District Court and, if possible, convincing
minor defendants to "go state's evidence" early in the process, when their
effectiveness will be greatest.
Whether the prosecutor is involved in this kind of active strategy
or merely piecing together a routine case, he makes the same assessments
of his case as the defense counsel does for his own case. Is it solid,
dependable, and not likely to surprise him in court? His actual legal
basis for evaluation is unlikely to consist of more than a cursory reading
of the statute, since he doubtless has four or five other cases pending and
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he has probably gained a working knowledge of the statutes. Instead, he
concentrates his assessments on the strength of the police story and on
the nature of the civilian witnesses, if there are any. He will ask
whether the police have embellished their version of the story, whether
this is indeed a case which the court will be willing to hear, and whether
the police have obviously violated procedural due process to the extent
that the case will probably be thrown out. He will want to know whether
the civilian witnesses are being threatened. Are they going to have a
change of heart in court; are they likely not to show up if the case is
continued?
While a particularly weak case might dissuade the prosecutor
from preparing it for trial, the actual plea-trial decision may be made on
different grounds. To a great extent the prosecutor must remain sensitive
to the external pressures on him. An incentive to take the case to trial
may be the insistance of the complainant if he is a civilian. A case
covered by the news media must be viewed as a more serious trial prospect
by the prosecutor than one that had received no publicity. Counterpres-
sures to consider trial may come from the Superior Court, which is always
badly overloaded and encourages cases to be settled at the District Court
level.
If the prosecutor does decide that a case should not go to trial,
he has many more options open to him than does the defense. He can offer
the defendant a reduced charge or a~ recommendation of a lenient sentence.
As an even stronger incentive he can withdraw prosecution altogether. The
negative sanctions in his power are also clearly persuasive to the defense.
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It is within the province of the prosecutor to impose a direct indictment
in serious cases or to pile up potentially "dead time" on the defendant,
by continuing the case indefinitely.
Prosecutor-defender bargaining
Immediately before a case is to come to trial the prosecutor and
the attorney for the defense often meet to negotiate a settlement to the
case. They both approach this meeting with some feeling of urgency, since
their ability to avoid surprises or defeat at trial is dependent on how
fully they can together prearrange the presentation and the outcome of the
case. The process by which they come to this kind of agreement in the
case may be as brief as a few words exchanged in the lobby of the court-
house or as long and complex as both sides can endure. With each new case
the shape of the bargaining process appears to vary, depending on the
factual disagreements the defense and prosecution discover, the intensity
of their interests in the case, the defendant, and even what each side had
for breakfast.
Common to all the exchanges we observed was the tacit understand-
ing that agreement should be achieved as quickly and efficiently as pos-
sible. As in other aspects of the social life of the court there are
strong sanctions against vigorous argument in the bargaining process and
against very frequently rejecting an easy compromise. The result is that
bargaining between defense and prosecution appears to proceed through four
stages, each an escalation of the previous one, but with the attempt made
to reach a bargain at as early a stage as possible.
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Initially, for instance, both sides attempt to assess each other's
cases and the intensity of interests in the case. The hope is that a very
strong or a very weak case on either side will indicate grounds for a
compromise. Barring agreement, the two parties may then discuss the
details of the case, particularlythe character of the defendant and the
likely disposition. The next phase responds to a failure to reach a
mutually agreeable dispositionby returning each attorney to his "corner"
to improve his position in the case. The final step is usually a very
pressured compromise.
The stages of bargaining
The first attempts of the prosecutor and the defense to reach
an agreement in a case focus on a comparison of each of their cases and
on their hopes for the outcome of the case. Usually they share a desire
to see a bargain reached at this stage, and are eager to find a marked
difference in the strength of the cases or'a common conception of what the
disposition might be.
The most explicit part of this process is the discussion of the
facts of the two cases and the evidence collected thus far. The art of
this conversation can be very delicate since, without divulging the details
of his own presentation, each lawyer tries to determine the weaknesses of
the opposition case. In the process of comparing versions of the case, the
discussion usually turns to the defendant's moral character and thus may
also become a negotiation about the character of the defendant. As one
prosecutor put it, "Whether the defendant is just a guy who ran into some
bad luck or instead he's a bad apple" is a critical issue behind the discus-
sion of the positions each side takes. Likewise, the issues to be decided
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in assessing the strength of each other's cases boil down, according to
the same prosecutor, to "whether the case is reliable or it's something
fabricated by the cops."
Whether either side ought to forgo trial because of a weak case
can be fairly quickly -- though delicately -- determined by this process.
Whether either side will agree to end the negotiation at this stage, even
when a weak case exists, is a function of a complex set of interests which
may surface in some cases. Certainly the tacit assumption is that where
a compromise is possible it should be accepted, but strong personal or
professional interests in the case, or unusual characteristics of the
case itself may sometimes override the need to bargain quickly.
Since the prosecutor and the defense often know each other well,
they are aware of the kinds of professional and personal pressures that
may affect their ability to bargain with each other. Personal factors
affecting the bargaining process may range from the prosecutor's interest
in clearing his cases quickly when private practice is pressing him for
time, a police officer's interest in adding a day of court time to his
pay, and defenders' need to minimize the time spent on most cases. The
bargaining relationship between the prosecutor and defense may also be
altered by the extent to which the defender has become personally involved
with the defendant and thus will bargain more or less vigorously, depend-
ing on his affection or antipathy to the particular defendant. The strongest
form of personal pressure on the prosecutoron the other hand, arises when
the defendant appears to have some grounds for a civil suit against the
arresting officer for false or illegal arrest. A credible threat of
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countersuit from the defendant is perhaps the greatest incentive to the
prosecutor to give ground to the defense.
Both sides are also subject to pressures arising from the struc-
ture of their roles in court. Professional pressure on the prosecutor,
for example, comes from the belief that the assistant district attorney
will "catch hell from downtown" for a poorly handled case, especially one
which irritates the police or the complainant. The Defenders and Panel
members are under less direct pressure, since they are under less public
scrutiny, but they still appear to feel a sense of professional failure at
a case which does less well than it should. Unlike the prosecutor, they
must face the problem that if they fail it is their clients who pay for their
errors, often in years. Thus, the defenders are most inflexible about
compromising with the prosecutor when the client faces time, and the
prosecutor's bargaining is stiffest when the police or public are aroused
about a case or when a complainant is insistent on a vigorous prosecution.
The bargaining process is, of course, constantly in the shadow
of these influences, though neither side is free to invoke them often.
The prosecutor will see that he wins just enough cases to satisfy "down-
town," and the defenders may try hardest to protect defendants who risk
the most time in jail. A more immediate kind of pressure to drive a hard
bargain sometimes arises from the situation which the case itself presents.
These influences tend to be special problems which are not directly
relevant to the facts of the case, but which tend to put pressure on one
or the other side to bargain with unusual eagerness. The defense, for
example, is most typically put in an unfavorable situational position when
the defendant is in jail awaiting trial and thus, by his presence in jail,
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"appears guilty." Similarly, when it looks as if the case could be drawn
out by continuances, each side may be pressured to find a speedier solu-
tion through bargaining. The prosecutor, likewise, is subject to situa-
tional pressure to cede to the defender when a major witness is an under-
cover informant or is an unreliable or impeachable witness.
A defendant in special jeopardy, a missing piece of evidence
for the prosecution, or any of the ever-present personal and professional
problems faced by the two sides can prevent an easy bargain in a case.
When no agreement is reached initially,they must make a second and more
thorough attempt to resolve their differences. This usually means trying
to develop a common theory about the defendant's character and problems
and negotiating a proposal for disposition. The real hope of the defense
in this process is often that the defendant can be portrayed as a person
who is not dangerous, who is salvageable, and whose charges, therefore,
could be safely reduced or dismissed.
Unlike the informal discussion in earlier stages of bargaining,
the questions raised about the defendant at this point are addressed by
reference to the written documents in the case. Often the attorneys will
read and consult the defendant's record. They may consider in detail the
defendant's history of probation, and look for other cases pending -- in
the same court and in other courts. Finally, they will determine what the
chances are that the defendant would go to jail, considering his prior
record of offenses.
When the prosecutor makes this calculation -- and thus gauges
the possibility that he will offer a charge reduction to the defense -- he
balances the possibility that a dangerous criminal might be released, who
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would otherwise go to jail, against the prospect for a more successful
rehabilitation for that defendant. If, in his judgment, the charge reduc-
tion will not seriously endanger the community or will probably be bene-
ficial, then he is usually willing to be liberal about reductions. On the
same basis he may also offer the defense a "consolidation" of all charges
against the defendant -- clearing all his offenses at once.
A special instance of this kind of bargaining prospect occurs
when the police want the defendant as a witness or informant and thus, are
more interested in his testimony than his punishment. Under these cir-
cumstances the major issue in deciding whether charge reduction or dis-
missal is possible is the likelihood that the person to be convicted could
be incarcerated on the basis of the defendant's testimony. If he were not
successfully incarcerated, the defendant could be in danger, and the
defenders are clear that their professional responsibility as lawyers
extends to their advice concerning such a potentially risky endeavor. At
the same time, the prosecutor is apt to be unwilling to reduce charges
against the defendant unless he does agree to testify, thereby sometimes
making the possibility of offering testimony attractive despite its pos-
sibility of risk.
If the prosecution is not convinced that the defendant is a good
prospect for reduced charges, the defender may try to portray the defendant
as someone with special rehabilitative needs. What the defender must be
able to show is that the defendant has a problem which requires treatment,
more than he deserves punishment, and that he will be a willing (and
likely successful) participant in his own treatment. If the defendant has
already been successfully involved in a rehabilitative effort, the attorney's
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chances of selling a program are, of course, enhanced. As usual, too,
the enterprising attorney who has located a program which will accept the
defendant is more likely to convince the prosecution.
Most cases, are in fact, settled during one of these attempts
at bargaining. Defenders and prosecutors develop a good working knowledge
of the "prices" that will accrue to settlement of cases with particular
types of defendants and offenses, and both usually know how to make an
offer that will succeed. In those few cases in which agreement over a
bargain is not yet possible and trial is not viewed by both of them as an
appropriate option, the process may change from a cordial discussion to a
full scale confrontation. Strategically, the only choice left to either
is to find a mechanism for increasing the pressure for a settlement.
The two strategies most often employed to induce a bargain are
judge swapping and the process of continuance. By changing the judge who
will hear the case either lawyer may increase the pressure on the other.
This route will be followedfor examplewhen the defender knows a judge
who will probably be especially sympathetic to the kind of defendant he
is representing and who is not likely to allow the prosecutor a conviction.
Using the process of continuance, on the other hand, exerts pressure by
extending the length of the case. Either on the grounds of a missing
witness or evidence in the form of official records and reports the
prosecutor can request that a case be continued. Especially in cases in
which the defendant is incarcerated while awaiting trial, this kind of
delay in trial places a great deal of pressure on the defendant. Defense
lawyers, of course, can also request continuances when the defendant is
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free awaiting trial, but they less often have reasonable grounds to seek
a continuance. Thus, they may find it a less reliable device for urging
the prosecutor to bargain.
Only in those instances in which he must drive a hard bargain
is the -prosecutor likely to use a more powerful strategy. Especially in
those cases in which he knows that the Commonwealth has a weak case but
still wants the defendant to be given a record, or in cases in which he
does not want the identity of his witnesses to be discovered in advance of
trial, he can bring direct indictment against the defendant in the
Superior Court, bypassing entirely the District Court procedure of probable
cause hearing. This action has the effect of depriving the defender of a
probable cause hearing and,thus,of adequate information with which to go
to trial in Superior Court. Armed with this kind of pressure the prosecu-
tor can often increase the likelihood that the case will be settled by
bargain.
If a successful agreement has not been reached after the process
has been escalated to this stage, the attorneys may make one final attempt
to review their positions and try for a complete bargain. This process is
handled in the same way as previous encounters, except that both sides
now operate under overwhelming pressures to find a compromise, at the same
time that the prospect of reaching no agreement looms large. At the end
of this stage, then, prosecution and defense may have negotiated anything
from total agreement over facts and'outcome to a sharpened awareness of
how sweeping their disagreements are. The instances in which the bargain-
ing process remains unsuccessful are few, but when they occur, they must
be resolved during trial.
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Types of defense-prosecution bargains
The characterization we have offered of the bargaining process
between defense and prosecution emphasizes the complexity of the variables
which shape the process and the difficulty of predicting its outcome.
Though the types of relationships which can take place between the two
attorneys in any particular case are indeed complex, the majority of
bargains can be divided into discernible types. In fact the strongest
predictor we did find of the kind of bargain that would be struck is the
nature of the defendant's offense. Because the charge to a great extent
dictates the strategy and the stakes of both sides and is seen as indica-
tive of a type of defendant, it appears to relate closely to the nature of
the prosecutor-defense agreement.
Classifying these bargains by the category of offense reveals
three general types of compromise. In serious cases, bargains are most
likely to be for information essential to the prosecution and to give the
defendant a chance to reduce his otherwise predictably high penal time
through charge reductions. Bargains struck in property and narcotics
offenses are also likely to be for reduction in charges, but the prosecu-
tion usually asks that the defense agree not to argue the case and that
the defendant agree to treatment. In domestic cases bargaining appears
to change radically and become a mechanism for creating a disposition
rather than a real resolution of differences between prosecution and
defense.
Bargains which exchange a reduced charge for information needed
by the prosecutor occur primarily in those cases which the court sees as
serious. These "serious cases" are those which are rarely brought to final
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disposition in District Court, and rather are only there as an intermediate
step in their adjudication. Where bargaining occurs in these cases, the
practice is for the prosecution to give the defendant a "soft indictment"
in Superior Court, in return for his willingness to give testimony or
information, usually about a second defendant.
It is the serious cases in which a bargain for information is
most likely because of the emphasis the prosecutor must place on bringing
these crimes to justice. Most kinds of bargains, in fact, would be
unacceptable in serious cases. One prosecutor suggested, for example,
that there is a tacit prosecutors' "code" which prohibits reducing the
charge for almost all crimes included in the "major" category, and thus,
greatly limits the possibility of bargains over the charges. Because
information is so critical to the conviction of defendants in major crimes,
however, this tacit code does allow the prosecutor to trade incriminating
evidence on a major defendant for reduced charges for a "secondary"
defendant.
When the pressure on a prosecutor is great to convict a defendant
in this type of case, he may take a number of steps to protect information
held by a secondary defendant. First, he may issue a direct indictment to
prevent district court personnel from interfering with his witness and
then hold him with continuances to assure that he is safe from interference.
His guiding premise is that given a chance the principal defendants in the
case will threaten his witnesses and that the prosecutor must at all costs
guard the information-.
The intensity of the prosecutor's need for information in these
cases -- as illustrated by his elaborate system of protecting informants --
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forces on the defense a bargain it cannot easily reject. Because of the
seriousness of the charges in these cases and the likelihood that the
defendants have extensive records, the defense has almost no other route
to bargaining, outside of trial. In this sense, the lure of reduced
charges in Superior Court is not inconsiderable. In addition, the prose-
cutor's liberal use of direct indictments and continuances may force the
defense to comply with the proposed bargain.
In spite of these pressures, the defenders we observed did dis-
courage their clients from taking a number of bargains of this type.
While the offer of soft indictment is attractive, it was weighed against the
probable safety of the defendant from endangering his case. Clear rules
appear to exist among attorneys for deciding whether or not their clients
should accept these bargains. As one attorney put it:
The ground rules for going state's evidence are
1. be sure your testimony will suffice to
put the other defendant away
2. only bargain with the DA [prosecutor]
assigned to your case at Superior Court
3. have your lawyer there
4. don't talk at the first meeting
5. tell nothing about anything but the case
where you're the witness
A second kind of bargaining for reduced charges trades away not
information, but rather the right to argue the case at all. The situation
which best fosters this kind of bargain tends to be property and narcotics
crimes which are haunted by weak, unarguable cases on both sides.. This is
often true because there are usually no "civilian" witness and no evidence
- 329 -
in property and narcotics cases, and the cases tends to rest heavily on
the testimony of arresting officers. Given the tendency of police to
embellish their story before talking with the prosecutor, the Assistant
District Attorneys often becomes somewhat skeptical of the police case,
and therefore willing to bargain rather than risk a weak presentation in
court.
The position of the defense is often very similar. Not only is
the defense unlikely to have a secure factual case, but also the testimony
in narcotics and property cases is apt to be the word of the police against
the word of a defendant who has an extensive record. The court's percep-
tion of the defendant's moral character and criminal history, moreover,
tends to raise the pressures on the defense to bargain. It is an important
factor in the sentencing process, for example, that most of these defendants
have extensive records, making an aggressive defense difficult and the
likelihood of incarceration farily high.
The pressures often leave both sides nearly equally inclined to
bargain. Because of the extensive records of these defendants, bargains
often center around the consolidation of charges. The prosecution agrees
to recommend that sentences which would be given for a number of charges
be collapsed into a single sentence. In return the defense attorney does
not bring the case to trial and often urges the defendant to accept a
place in a treatment facility.
The Tilson and Wall breaking and entering case is an example
of favors a defendant may receive for agreeing to participate in a treat-
ment program. Tilson, who had an extensive record, several outstanding
charges, and an admitted $100 a day habit, promised to join Concord's drug
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program. As a result he was able to get consolidation of three breaking
and entering charges. In addition a violation of probation offense was
consolidated and cleared for a single "six year" sentence to Concord
(which will mean in practice that he will spend one year at Concord).
The agreement between prosecutor and defense to bargain in these
cases is in a sense a recognition that since the facts will allow neither
one assurance of winning, they are better off minimizing losses through a
bargain. Domestic cases and juvenile cases present quite a different
bargaining situation. Bargains happen in these cases with the prosecutor
most often absent altogether and the probation officer as prosecutor. The
"prosecution" is likely to bargain, sometimes because of disinterest,
but more often because of the very strong court sanctions against punish-
ing a defendant of this type. These are bargains that are used less to
reduce differences between prosecutor and defense than they are employed
as a way of fulfilling the court's responsibility to defendants in need of
treatment, especially where dispositional alternatives are limited.
Domestic cases are a good example of cases which foster bargain-
ing over a disposition and change the roles predictably played by court
personnel during bargaining. Since each member of the court seems to be
searching for a solution to the defendant's problem, formal bargaining as
we have outlined it here simply does not exist. What discussions occur
between the defense counsel and the prosecutor (if there is one) focus
only on how the presentation will go in court. In the absence of a prose-
cutor, the probation officer takes more of a prosecutorial role in dis-
cussing cases with the defender. The judge, who in other kinds of cases
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tends to stay more or less out of the province of negotiation, tends to
become very concerned with the details of this kind of case, with the
extent of the defendant's understanding of the case, and with his chances
of fulfilling his part of the bargain which other court personnel are
proposing.
In addition to this confusion in roles, there are several other
factors which tend to suppress the more usual forms of bargaining in
domestic cases. The strongest is that the prosecutors see themselves in
a situation from which they can't "win." Since the complainant is often
also the defendant's wife, relative, or friend, any bargain the prosecutor
can feasibly make will be unsatisfactory. Thus, most of the Assistant
District Attorneys happily use the excuse that they haven't time for minor
cases so that they can avoid domestic cases whenever possible. The with-
drawal of the attorneys-prosecutors from the cases, of course, also tends
to reduce the chance of formal bargaining, since the police who prosecute
the cases the A.D.A.'s leave are not usually as likely to bargain. In
non-support cases, especially, the pressure on the police not to interfere
with a search for disposition is increased by the unusual status of the
probation officer as complainant, prosecutor, and Commonwealth witness as
well as probation officer.
In the absence of any explicit bargaining process in domestic
cases, however, a system of tacit bargains has developed based on a gen-
erally understood set of regularized dispositions for domestic cases.
Non-support cases, for example, are by agreement handled by a six months
sentence suspended for six years; non-violent behavior which seems disturbed
or which is accompanied by a record of mental disease will most often
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occasion a one-year continuance on condition of out-patient treatment at
a mental clinic. For a defendant convicted of assault and battery on a
spouse, the case is typically continued or the defendant is placed on
probation (depending on how many previous A&B's the defendant has on his
record). If an amicable resolution of the quarrel is reached before trial,
or if the complainant wishes to withdraw prosecution, the case will be
dismissed -- sometimes after a continuance.
The intent of these bargains is not only to resolve the complex
interests in the case, but also to develop new alternatives to the criminal
sanction. The disposition of juveniles, for example, was complicated at
the time of this study by the loss of incarceration as a dispositional
alternative, since the Department of Youth Services had shut down their
residential "industrial schools." For a juvenile committing a major crime,
of course, the state provides an option for prosecution as an adult and a
prison sentence upon conviction, but this is reserved as a severe sanction.
As a result, court personnel often use incarceration awaiting trial as a
substitution for the incarceration which would have taken place if correc-
tional alternatives were available. A second result of the scarcity of
traditional correctional options is that bargains for rehabilitative place-
ments in controlled environments (half-way houses, for example) dominate
the bargaining which does exist.
We observed even more creative use of tacit dispositional bar-
gains in domestic cases. In most cases court personnel choose to help the
defendants by continuing these cases for great periods of time -- as much
as six years and occasionally more -- under condition that an essentially
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civil remedy is carried out. For example, a woman who was regarded by
her neighbors as a nuisance and charged with trespass had her case con-
tinued for a year on the condition that she "stay away from [her neighbors]"
for the year.
The structure of pre-trial bargaining
Even these tacit bargains in domestic and juvenile cases are
more open illustrations of the bargaining process than we have seen in
previous stages. With the pressure of an impending trial or plea cere-
mony, the prosecution and the defense move from indirect negotiations
over facts and interests to more overt bargaining over the disposition
of the case and the shape of the trial. In this sense, this stage cor-
responds most closely to the more typical conceptions of plea bargaining
as a direct exchange between prosecution and defense -- with the prose-
cutor offering reduced penalties and the defense conceding that the
defendant should plead guilty.
In fact, however, even at this point in the bargaining process,
the negotiations we observed still barely resembled this more expectable
model. There is certainly not a single instant at which the defense and
the prosecution decide whether or how a case will be bargained. As we
have seen, the defense counsel, in effect, bargains with the defendant
over the possibility of a guilty plea, and lays the groundwork for the
defendant's cooperation in the bargaining process. At this point, too,
the defense and the prosecution may both bargain rather openly with the
clerk or interns who assign judges and Assistant District Attorneys,
respectively -- in the hope of prearranging a favorable hearing for the
case. Finally, the form which the negotiations between prosecutor and
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defense take are much more extensive than a simple concession in the
case at hand. They may bargain for information, for dispositional
alternatives, t6 minimize lossess, to cool out witnesses or complain-
ants, or merely in anticipation of future favors. The process by which
concessions emerge is often complex and lengthy, and always in the shadow
of the professional interests of each side and their competing concep-
tions of the defendant. As we will see in the next section, even the
agreements that are the hard won products of this very intricate set of




In the context of the full sweep of events by which the court
arrives at a decision concerning a defendant, the trial -- whether in the
guise of an adversarial confrontation or of a "plea ceremony" -- must be
seen as no more than a single step in bargaining over the outcome of the
case. From the instant of apprehension until the case is finally called
for trial, the officials of the court have been sifting facts, impressions,
and moral character types, testing and negotiating over personal and
political pressures, and resolving or isolating areas of disagreement.
By the time the case comes to trial, either a decision concerning the
nature of the defendant and the events which has led to his appearance
as a defendant has been consummated or the range of possible decisions has
been explored and reduced to two or three options.
It would be an errorhowever, to assume that, merely because the
trial is imbedded in the bargaining system of the court, it has no impact
on the course of negotiation. While many cases pass through the trial
stage quickly and with no perceptible impact on the participants or the
outcome of the case~many others are radically altered during their time
in the courtroom. Even in those cases in which the effects of the trial
are not observable, the case was often altered discernably by the nego-
tiations conducted in anticipation of the trial. The very presence of a
new actor in the case -- the judge -- also increases the influence of the
trial itself and sometimes changes completely the balance of interests in
the case.
The trial is imbedded in the web of bargaining in a case not
only because it may alter the previous course of bargaining but also
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because it is also the object of bargaining. Whether the case comes to
trial, to a probable cause hearing, or to a "plea ceremony" is determined
intentionally and unintentionally by prior negotiations. The prosecutor's
decision to charge a defendant with breaking and entering in the night
time rather than the day time, for example, is often the outcome of
bargaining. By choosing to charge the defendant with the more serious
crime -- falling under the jurisdiction of the Superior Court -- the
prosecutor has made it necessary for the case to be given only a probable
cause hearing, not a final trial in the District Court. The distinction
between juvenile hearing and criminal trial is similarly negotiated by
the defender and the probation officer in dealing with juveniles charged
with serious felonies; if no satisfactory placement can be developed, the
juvenile can be tried as an adult rather than in the more informal
juvenile hearing.
Precisely because the trial itself is part of the negotiation
system of the courts, however, the distinctions among the several types of
formal trial (probable cause hearing, juvenile hearing, "adversarial"
trial) are less significant than they would be were the district court
proceedings rigidly structured. To some extent, of course, the form of
the trial does limit the object of the negotiation which can take place
within it. Negotiating about disposition, for example, would be inappro-
priate in a probable cause hearing at which no disposition could be reached,
and bargaining for information would be inappropriate in a plea ceremony.
In general, however, what distinctions might exist among the forms is
blurred by the informality of the court. In the District Courts, for
instance, an attorney may change his client's plea at any stage in the
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proceedings, or the judge may change the charges against a defendant so
that his case can be decided by the District Court, even though the trial
began as a probable cause hearing. As a result, the course of a "trial"
and the strategies and bargains pursued by the participants in the case are
more affected by their interests and the unresolved conflicts which need to
be negotiated than by the form of the trial.
Our interest in trial, then, is not so much in the differences
in process which might occur in the alternative forms of trial, but in
the role of trial as a stage in the bargaining of a case. Because trial
is in part a playing out of bargains previously made, what actually occurs
in the courtroom appears to depend heavily on the strength and explicitness
of the prior bargain. Where the bargaining process had been incomplete
before trial or where a bargain is violated, these differences will be
worked out during the trial itself. Completed and tacit bargains require
only that their rationale be "sold" to the judge in order to be ratified
at trial. In the following cases, we will examine the effects that each
kind of bargaining status -- completed, tacit, violated, and incomplete --
nas on the bargaining which takes place at trial.
Cases with settled bargains
When the prosecutor and the defense come to a strong agreement
about how a case should be resolved, the bargain almost always includes the
defendant pleading guilty. In the courtroom, then, the presentation of the
case usually includes only a brief substantiation of the defendant's guilt
followed by a proposal for the agreed upon disposition. What is expected
of the prosecutor and the defense in this process is that they act as
advocates for the agreement rather than for their clients, since it is felt
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by most court personnel that with all areas of contention resolved, the
clients' best interest lies in the attorneys' success in selling the
bargain to the judge. Their hope is to assure that just enough evidence
is presented to convince the judge of the credibility of the "reality"
which they have negotiated. In most cases they are successful and the
judge ratifies what they propose, though as we will see the probable
reaction of the judge must be gauged carefully and anticipated in the
presentation.
A narcotics case involving a college student illustrates the way
in which a settled bargain is handled in court. The student, caught in a
raid on an on-campus living area, was found in possession of two "bennies"
comparatively mild stimulants, but nevertheless controlled substances.
Since the search warrant used by the police was indeed broad enough to
cover the evidence presented, the defender had chosen to bargain. She
agreed to a guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance and in
exchange, was to be given a dismissal of a charge of receiving stolen
goods (the pills) and the cooperation of the prosecution in recommending
to the judge that the student not be convicted, but that instead the case
be continued for six months.
The manner in which the defender presented the bargain in
court -- first perfunctorily conceding the probability of guilt and then
indicating the basis for lenient disposition -- is typical of the court-
room ceremony for settled bargains. She first indicated that her client
would admit to facts sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty. The case
then continued as follows:
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J: May I have the summary of the evidence to
support this admission?
DA: Officer Green.
C: (Swears the officer in)
DA: Directing your attention to (time), please
tell the court what happened.
PO: Myself and Officer Milano were assigned to a
narcotics detail. Having obtained a search
warrant, we proceeded to (address) and
entered and searched the building. Among
others, we found (defendant), who appeared to
be in an excited state, and three tablets
were in his desk. These are the tablets, and
here is the laboratory report on them (Hands
both to the judge). They are class A con-
trolled substances.
A: Was the defendant apparently incoherent?
PO: No, ma'am.
A: Was he abusive, or did he attempt to resist
arrest?
PO: No, ma'am.
A: Thank you, no further questions.
J: May I hear arguments on disposition?
A: Your Honor, I would like to plead extreme
mitigating circumstances. My client is a
solid and responsible member of the com-
munity. He is a junior at (University)
preparing to enter law school. He has a
wife and two children, so that he must work
a full day in addition to his full time
study. On the day of the arrest, he had
worked an eight hour day, attended classes,
and was studying.for his finals. While he
now realizes that it was foolish, he took
some pills to stay awake to study. I would
like to enter into the record these docu-
ments. One is a citation which accompanies
his Distinguished Service Medal, the second
is the citation for his third Purple Heart,
and the third is certification from the
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Veterans' Administration that he is 80%
disabled as a result of his combat in-
juries sustained in Viet Nam. The Dean
of [University] has kindly consented to
come to testify in the defendant's
behalf if Your Honor would care to hear
him.
J: I don't think that will be necessary.
What is his prior record?
PR: No prior record, Your Honor.
J: Would you (the attorneys) please approach
the bench?
C: (Following the conference) On the charges
of Receiving Stolen Goods, the case is
dismissed. The complaint of possession
of controlled substances is continued
rfor six months.1
Even in a case where an agreement between prosecutor and defense
counsel is set, there is a possibility that the judge will not accept the
premises underlying the bargain. To a great extent the bargain must strike
the court as justifiable on the basis of the evidence in the case,and the
defendant must not appear to be "getting off easy." An example of
judicial rejection of a bargain occurred in a case involving possible
mistaken identity. Before the case went to trial, the police, prosecutor,
and defender went into the dock to see the defendant, who was charged
both with drunkenness and, in a separate incident, with breaking and
entering and larceny -- which he claimed his cousin had committed. Since
the defendant in the breaking and entering case had been arrested and then
had defaulted on bail, there was some possibility that this defendant in
the dock might indeed not be the person the police had arrested in that
case. Since the officer agreed that the defendant was in fact, not the
- 341 -
person found at the scene of the break-in, the prosecutor and the defender
agreed that the defendant should be acquitted on the breaking and entering
and larceny charges and that the drunkenness offense ought to be dismissed.
At trial, however, the judge rejected this testimony:
A: Your Honor, this is a case of mistaken
identity. The arresting officer identi-
fied the defendant as not the same per-
son he arrested, and the DA agrees.
J: Don't you tell me about the prosecution's
case. Get the DA.
DA: Your Honor, this case should be dismissed,
as the person in the dock has been identi-
fied as not being the person arrested.
J: Who is the police officer?
DA: Officer O'Rielly.
J: Then get Officer O'Rielly.
PO: This is a case of mistaken identity, Your
Honor. The person here is not the same
as the one I arrested.
J: Please let me see the photo (The officer
had the "mug shot" of the man arrested.)
Having looked at the photo and the person in the dock, the judge commented,
"I don't know; they both look like the same person to me, but we'll dismiss
the B and E." Clearly not convinced by the argument, the judge not only
did not acquit the defendant, but by only dismissing the breaking and
entering case he left open the possibility that the defendant could be
called in on the same case again and tried for the same offense.
The enterprising and careful lawyer can evidently often anticipate
the kind of bargained reality or disposition that a judge might reject.
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When rejection of a bargain seems a risk, the attorney may try to establish
testimony that would show that the bargain has a strong, justifiable
evidentiary base. Most often he may try to show that there are
extenuating circumstances surrounding the defendant's offense. The case
of a defendant who had been arrested on a disorderly person charge on the
final day of a three-year probation for possession of heroin illustrates
this tactic. In order to prevent the old drug charges from being reopened,
the defender had bargained for a guilty plea in exchange for a fine for the
disorderly person charge and dismissal of the drug charges. Because a
fight had been involved, the attorney coUld not merely propose his bargain,
but he had to demonstrate that the fight was not serious.
At the trial the attorney began the proceedings by announcing
that this was to be antadmission" (of facts sufficient to warrant a guilty
finding) and that he wanted to point out at the outset of the hearing that
the outstanding probation on his client was on a nearly three-year-old
drug charge. The judge then asked the police officer to testify, which
he did:
I was called to [the scene] at [time] where
there was an altercation in progress. I saw
the defendant in a group of people having an
argument. He was swinging a cane. I ordered
the group to disperse, and they did. I later
arrested the defendant with the cane still in
his possession walking back toward the scene.
A: Officer Green, do you believe from your own
knowledge that this was a family argument;
basically a domestic matter?
PO: Well, the argument began as a family dispute.
I believe that if I had not stopped it, it
would have spread.
- 343 -
In this interchange, the attorney was apparently trying to have
the police officer enter mitigating information about the situation of
the defendant's arrest. In his earlier conversation with the attorney,
the policeman had agreed to testify that the problem was only a family
quarrel. In court, however, the officer appeared to realize that this
arrest could be called into question if it had been "only a family
dispute," and he asserted that it could have become more serious. The
attorney allowed him this change without pressing it directly, and tried
instead to establish that no one was hurt by the fight:
A: So you are saying that it started as a
family argument but might have gotten
out of hand if you had not acted when
you did?
PO: Yes, sir.
A: Did anyone to your knowledge receive any
injuries?
PO: No, sir, there were no injuries.
A: No further questions, Your Honor.
Following this brief encounter, the attorneys conferred with the judge at
the bench and the clerk read the decision, which showed that the attorney
had been successful in supporting the bargain with proof of extenuating
circumstances:
C: In the complaint of possession of heroin,
the court dismisses the charges, and on
the complaint of being a disorderly per-
son, the court finds you guilty and fines
you $50. Be sure to speak with the proba-
tion officer on your way out of the build-
ing to arrange for payment of your fine.
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The main intent of the attorneys in this kind of case, then,
seems to be convincing the judge of the equity of their agreement on a
bargained outcome. Of course, the extent to which one or the other lawyer
must argue for his position depends on which judge hears the case and how
close their agreement conforms to the court's general notion of the
"normal" outcome for the type of case being tried -- that the defendant
is not "getting off too easy," that there is some evidence to support the
plea, and that the disposition is justified. The difficulty of selling a
bargain is affected by the credibility of the attorneys' claim not only
that it is fair, but also that the two attorneys have thought it out care-
fully. A bargain which is not enthusiastically endorsed by both attorneys
or, as in the next section, is a "tacit" bargain which the attorneys can-
not really claim to have worked out in advance, is subject to a great
deal of judicial scepticism.
Cases with a tacit bargain
When a bargain can be rejected despite its careful preparation,
it is easy to see that a tacit bargain would leave the attorneys in a
very weak position at trial. Tacit bargains -- those in which the defendant
pleads guilty without knowing the disposition will be -- most often occur
when a case is assigned to a lawyer immediately prior to trial. In a cir-
cumstance like thisthe lawyer may depend heavily on his knowledge of the
prosecutor and the kinds of disposition the prosecutor will accept. He
will usually make the assumption that the prosecutor will accept a standard
solution to the type of offense involved and that the defendant will cer-
tainly be better off with this tacitly bargained solution that with try-
ing to fight the case.
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In most instances the prosecutor will indeed understand the solu-
tion the defender is proposing and cooperate with him -- even if they have
no time to confer outside the courtroom. The problems in tacit bargains
stem less from the attorney-prosecutor relationships and more from the
uncertainty of what will happen to them in the courtroom. As the follow-
ing case shows, tacit bargains place attorneys in grave danger of being
"croaked" and demand flexible strategies of argument from them.
In the typical pattern of cases which use tacit bargains, a
defendant charged with driving under the influence of alcohol came to
court without an attorney. The court, after some chiding, assigned
counsel , and following only a ten minute recess , was ready to try the case.
While he was not able to confer extensively with the defendant durinq this
period, the assigned counsel did discover that his new defendant was
drunk. The only route open to the attorney was to enter a guilty plea for
the defendant and hope that the defendant's condition would not be dis-
covered by the court. In this regard, he made plans to rest heavily on
the defendant's right to remain silent and to argue that the defendant
would be a good candidate for treatment.
Thus, the appointed counsel (a regular non-M.D.C. attorney in
Dorchester) announced that his client "admitted to facts [sufficient to
warrant a finding of guilty]." After brief supporting testimony from the
arresting officer and the probation officer's report of the defendant's
lengthy record of alcohol-related offenses, the judge invited statements
on disposition:
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J: Do you want to make any statements regard-
ing disposition?
A: Yes, Your Honor; the defendant is employed
and supports his family; he has been dry
for eight months...
J: I don't care how long he has been dry --
his kind cannot be allowed to drive and
he must learn that he cannot control his
problem.
Among court personnel this judge is known to impose harsh sentences
on "driving under" cases in the belief that this charge is serious and that
drunk drivers are a serious community hazard. Most other members of the
court community regard the charge as somewhat less serious, and agreement
to undergo treatment at the Alcohol Safety Action Program (ASAP) combined
with probation or continuation constitute the "normal" resolution of the
charge. At this point in the trial, both the prosecutor and the defender
worked to promote the "normal" resolution of the case and at the same time
to keep the defendant from speaking in court:
A: Your Honor, I believe that ASAP would be able
to help my client.
DA: We would have no objections to his assignment
to ASAP on continuance, Your Honor.
J: Don't worry, if I'm going to let him out on
probation at all, he's going to have to be
in ASAP. (To the defendant:) Do you know
what that means?
A: Yes, Your Honor, he does.
J: If you don't mind, I'm talking to the
defendant.
A: Your Honor, if you want, I'll be glad to




J: Look. If he doesn't understand, how can
he participate in the program? And I
can't tell if I don't talk to him. Now
do you want him to get into probation?
During this conversation the prosecutor was conferring with the defendant,
explaining ASAP to him.
At this point in the case, the attorneys appeared to be effec-
tively allied in a defense of a tacit bargain -- securing a place for the
defendant in the ASAP program. At the same time the judge was trying to
negotiate a harsher disposition based on her assessment of the moral
character of the defendant. In the process of attempting to work out this
conflict, the defender was forced into a role of trying to convince the
judge to accept the bargain being offered at the same time that he appeared
to be making a vigorous stand on the legal issue of the defendant's right
to remain silent. When the judge showed obvious irritation at what she
thought was the defender's overly eager protection of the defendant's rights,
the defender made a last effort to alter her attitude toward the defendant's
character and its implications for disposition:
A: Your Honor, we request that you let this
case go on continuance without finding
with the ASAP program. It is, after all,
acceptable to the Commonwealth.
J: No, I'm going to enter a guilty finding in
any event to be sure he loses his licence.
A: But, Your Honor, that will interfere with his
holding a job.
J: Well, there are such things as busses, and lots
of productive people walk to work. Either one
is healthier than drinking and driving.
A: (Confers with the defendant and prosecutor)
Your Honor, that would make it impossible for
my client to go to work at his present job.
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J: That's too bad. He should have thought of
that before getting drunk. He'll just have
to get another job.
Throughout the course of this conversation, the defendant had
been smiling. When the judge finally noticed it, she turned to the
defendant:
J: You really think this is funny, don't you!
D: (Silence).
J: Do you understand that I will send you to the
farm for six months on top of everything else
if you don't straighten up? (To the attorney):
He's drunk right now, I think. I simply won't
continue with this. Willie, do you promise me
you won't drink until you come back here?
D: (Nods head.)
J: Are you sure?
D: (Nods vigorously.)
PR: Now Willie, you know that means you can't drink
even on St. Patrick's Day. (General laughter
in the court -- the defendant is black.)
Though this case was resolved in the direction of the bargain
proposed -- probation combined with treatment at ASAP -- the tenuousness
of the attorneys' position was clear. In tacit bargains of this type they
must substitute a mutually understood set of common solutions for the
creation of an unique strategy appropriate to the case at hand. This
standard solution must serve not only as a basis for presenting the bargain
to the court, but. for explaining the defendant's moral character and
justifying the use of the rehabilitative device.
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In this kind of bargain, then, the attorneys do not merely act
out a previously written script, but they must make ad hoc responses to
what are often surprising events. The two factors which may represent the
greatest change for them from the conditions under which a settled bargain
is acted out are the fact that they do not control the flow of argument
in the case and that the defendant and the judge may interact -- without
proper coaching of the defendant. In this case, for instance, the lawyers
had to remain flexible in the face of constant shifts in foci. A case
which began as an apparently routine "admission of guilt" shifted into a
conflict over the proper disposition of the case. From there, the attorney
and judge first disagreed over the defendant's right to remain silent and
to have counsel speak for him, then debated the issue of whether the
defendant was essentially a hard working family man or essentially a drunk.
For the lawyer the impacts of not having time to assess and,
perhaps, train the defendant can be even more staggering. In this case it
is clear that had he had the opportunity the attorney would have at least
tried to prevent the defendant from appearing in court while he was drunk,
and thus, improve greatly the strength of the case. The difficulty of
predicting the exact personal reaction a judge will have to a defendant --
whether coached or not -- is also illustrated in this case. Though the
judge clearly discovered that the defendant was drunk, in that final
interchange, the defendant took the role of "cute drunk" -- that is, he
smiled at the judge, "mugged" for her, and took a very submissive attitude --
while the judge took on a parental and much less adversary air. Somehow,
despite her well-recognized dislike of alcohol, the judge seemed im-
pressed by the submissiveness displayed by the defendant, and she apparently
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assumed from this attitude that he would respect the court enough to remain
sober.
Cases with violated agreements
Attorneys who participate in bargains are under strong pressures --
not only from their peers, but also from the rest of the court -- to hold
up their end of the agreement. The equilibrium of the court to a great
extent appears to depend on the ability of court personnel to rely on the
sanctity of bargains and to avoid the disruption that a violated agreement
causes in the courtroom. When an attorney does violate a bargain in court,
other court personnel may try to rescue the situation and make the bargain
work despite the defection of one of the participants in the bargain. In
addition, attorneys who violate bargains can be punished by the court in a
number of ways -- ranging from a very unpleasant experience at trial to a
loss of future access to information and negotiation.
One case we observed provides an especially good illustration of
the impacts of a violated agreement on a trial. In this instance the
prosecution and the defense had agreed that a case involving a charge of
drunkenness and a charge of "making threats" would be dropped on the grounds
that the prosecution did not wish to prosecute the case. Perhaps in the
face of pressures brought to bear on him from the wife who had filed these
charges against her husband, tha prosecutor changed his mind and called the
case up for trial without warning the defense counsel. When the case was
announced the defense counsel was surprised and quite angry.
A: (To the other defenders beside him) What
the hell is this thing doing coming up
now? I thought they [the prosecutors]
had agreed the complainant didn't want a
trial.
DA: Ready for trial, Your Honor.
- 351 -
A: (Again to those near him): Oh, Christ --
here we go again! (The particular prose-
cutor in this case had a reputation for
being unreliable.)
The clerk swore in the witnesses, who looked as surprised as the defender
had a moment earlier. When it dawned on the complainant that they were
going to trial, she began to cry, saying that she "didn't want [her] man
sent away."
The prosecutor called her as his first witness, and she de-
scribed -- as well as she could through her sobbing -- what she termed
a "drunken brawl." After two sentences, the judge interrupted to cross-
examine:
J: I'm not sure I understand you. Are you
saying that you, being sober and detached,
observed a drunken brawl, or are you saying
that you and he were both participating in
a drunken brawl with someone else?
W: I was drunk and fighting, too.
Next, the prosecutor asked her to testify that she had been sent
to the hospital as a result of her injuries. She testified that shortly
after the fight, she had been admitted to Doctors' Hospital. The judge
stepped in again, asking just what kind of treatment she might have been
receiving. In reply, the witness admitted that she had been taken to the
hospital for psychiatric examination and treatment, and not for physical
injuries incurred in the fight.
By now the constant surprises in the case and the reluctance of
the witness and the complainant had reduced the trial to chaos. Both
witnesses for the prosecution were crying hysterically. The defense counsel
was trying to calm them down and advise them how best to patch up the
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situation, while the prosecutor stood alone in the middle of the courtroom
doing nothing. To attempt to return some sense of order, the judge spoke
to the defendant:
J: Do you want three months at Bridgewater or
two years at the [Deer] Island"
D: (Staggering to his feet, revealing that he is
very drunk) Can I speak in my own defense?
J: You may, but whether you can? I don't know.
D: I don't want to go to the farm. I can dry
up by myself.
J: (To first witness) Do you think that's true?
W: Well, Your Honor, I don't know. The drinking
stops and starts in two to three month inter-
vals.
A: Your Honor, if it please the court, I don't
believe this defendant is able to participate
in his own defense....
J: (Addressing the defendant) How do you think
you are going to be able to dry up by your-
self if you can't even participate in your
own defense?
D: (Mumbles).
At this point, the other prosecution witness decided she wanted
to speak for the defense. Although he protested that he didn't really
want to hear it, the judge allowed the woman to testify for the defense,
and she pleaded with the judge not to send her brother-in-law to Bridgewater
(the state "farm" for alcoholics convicted of drunkenness). After checking
with probation, the judge dismissed the charge of making threats, con-
tinued the drunkenness for two days, set bail at $1000, and commented that,
while Charles Street Jail wouldn't help at all, at least it was better than
anywhere else he could have sent the defendant.
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As the witnesses and the defendant left, the judge turned to the
prosecutor and said in a heavily sarcastic tone, "Mister [Name]. May I
suggest that, the next time you get the idea that you'd like to bring one
like this to me, you forget it." Following that interchange another of the
prosecutors came up to the prosecutor and "chewed him out" in the now-empty
courtroom for taking up so much time, violating an agreement to bargain,
and irritating the judge. Later in the same day, the Massachusetts
Defenders met and decided that there would be "no further negotiations with
him [the prosecutor] until he learned to keep a bargain."
In addition to the evidence it provides of a strong sanction
which the members of the court will apply to those who violate the standalrds
of behavior which are commonly accepted for the bargaining process, this
case demonstrates the extent to which the trial itself can become a bar-
gaining forum. Because the prosecutor failed to carry out the role in the
bargaining process which other personnel of the court felt he should have,
others filled in the role he vacated. The judge, for example, undertook
the process of seeing that the moral character of each actor in the case
was portrayed, while the defense counsel negotiated the complainant's
interests in the case. Finally, in a sense, the judge took the lawyers'
accustomed role of trying to reduce the length of the hearing in addition
to playing his own of participating in what he gathered would have been
the "normal" negotiated settlement of the case.
This case illustrates the degree to which a disagreement which
arises unexpectedly at trial disrupts the court. Bargaining roles are
severely altered, and strong sanctions are applied to the offending party.
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The cases in which there is known in advance to be no settlement, however,
do not cause a similar disruption in most instances. Personnel of the
court apply a different set of standards to behavior in these cases,
primarily because they are able to anticipate the disagreements that may
arise.
Bargaining at trial
Cases come to trial, rather than being settled by a plea of guilty,
when the attorneys either do not bargain at all ormore frequently, when
they try, but fail to complete a bargain. Even when a case comes to trial
with no bargain or with one that is yet incomplete, it is still being
processed by a system which recognizes bargaining as its dominant mode of
behavior. To one extent or another, then, the trial itself becomes a
forum for bargaining the case, though the bargaining process is definitely
constrained by its transfer to open court, with its formal adversarial
structure. As a result bargaining during trial takes place within rudi-
mentary outlines of the formal notion of adversarial confrontation.
The kinds of bargains which are made in this framework are best
characterized by the area of disagreement they attempt to settle. When
attorneys come to court without a complete bargain, they rarely disagree
about all aspects of a case, but rather their differences most often focus
on the disposition, the character of the defendant, or the facts of the
case. When the bargaining process is transferred to the courtroom, then,
the interactions of the attorneys, the judge, and the defendant are often
centered on one of these areas of disagreement. The particular area being
discussed appears to determine the character of the bargaining process.
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Bargains over disposition and over a defendant's moral character tend to
be conducted openly and as recognized matters of opinion. Bargains
centering on interpretations of fact, however, are more often styled to
resemble the adversary process, and in this sense, made tacitly.
Cases in which the attorneys are known to be in substantial
agreement about everything but the disposition provide the most consistent
examples of explicit bargaining in open court. In this type of case, it
is quite usual for the judge to talk to the defendant in the courtroom,
offering him the chance for a non-criminal disposition in return for a
promise that he will "go straight." The degree to which the judge conducts
this bargaining process as a formal exchange with the defendant or merely
enters into conversation with the defendant, of course, depends on the
seriousness of the charge being bargained. In either instance, it is
clearly the case that the judge considers the disposition a matter of
opinion, not fact, and thus, often a suitable object for bargaining, even
in open court.
In an attempt to discover how complete a bargain the attorneys
have reached, for cases of this type the judge generally begins with a
bench conference about the case and a discussion of potential dispositions.
At this stage, the judge will generally indicate a preference for one or the
other of the two attorneys' proposals. Because the defendant's motivations
are usually critical to the decision, the judge will often address him in
court and test out a dispositional option on him. This process can be a
very tight, formal bargain between the judge and the defendant, as in the
following trespass case:
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J: Do you think that you can stay away from
these people if I let you out?
D: Yes, Ma'am. I've been to the Hospital
[Boston State] a lot, and they've done
a lot for me.
J: That's what they (a representative of the
hospital and the probation officer) say,
but these people (the complainants) want
me to put you away so you'll stop bother-
ing them. Will you go the the Hospital
regularly if I let you go?
D: Yes.
J: All right.
C: This case is continued for one year, until
February 26, 1974, on the condition that
you do not trespass on the property of
[complainant] and further that you attend
one year of therapy at Boston State Hospital
on an outpatient basis.
J: You understand that you must stay away from
these people for a year or you will be
brought back here and sentenced.
D: Yes.
J: And you understand that if you don't go to
your sessions at Boston State Hospital, you'll
come back here?
D: Yes.
The interview may also, however, be much lighter in tone -- though
not necessarily less serious in consequences, as this case of a defendant
charged with drunkenness indicates:
D: Good morning, Your Honor.
J: Good morning, Charlie. How did it happen
this time?
D: Well, Your Honor, I got my veteran's check
yesterday, [every time he came in, he
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thought that he had just gotten his check]
and I had one drink at the tavern.
J: One, Charlie?
D: Well, maybe two, then, but no more. I
can't hold it anymore.
J: Go ahead. Where did they pick you up?
D: [Address].
J: But, Charlie, that's not on your way home.
D: No?
J: No.
By this point -- if the conversation has gotten this far -- the
judge usually has decided whether he thinks Charlie can make it home. If
not, he continues the case for two days, stipulating that the case is
continued "for dismissal," and sets a $10 cash bail. Otherwise -- if he
thinks he can go home -- the following conversation takes place:
J: Charlie, I'm going to have to send you
away. You're not getting sober. Which
would you rather have this time, thirty
days at the Farm, or six months at the
Island?
D: I don't need to be locked up, Judge, I'm
sober now. Just let me go home.
J: OK, Charlie, just this one last chance.
But if I see you in here tomorrow, it's
right off to the farm with you.
It is in dealing with Charlie and others like him who constitute
a continuing caseload of people whose problems are not "clearly criminal,"
but appear to be regarded by the judges as emotionally unstable or physically
ill, that the judges seem to turn most often to bargaining openly with the
defendants, offering to let them out into the community in exchange for a
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promise not to return in the immediate future. The other circumstance
which tends to induce the judge to enter into open bargaining with the
defendant is a case in which the attorneys either disagree about the
defendant's moral character or need to impress the judge with the extent
of the defendant's incapacity to make moral judgments.
Though the moral character of the defendant appears to be as fit
a subject for bargaining in open court, it is more tacit than bargaining
over the disposition. As a problem for the court, determining moral
character is unarguably similar to the problem of disposition since it is
also accepted by court personnel as' a matter of opinion more than of
evidence. In this, sense the concept a court has of the defendant can be
bargained by the ways in which the defendant is presented in court and
by any resulting changes which occur in the court's view of the reality of
the defendant. At the same time, because it is a conception of reality
that is being bargained rather than a concrete proposal for action, the
process is not as structured or as explicitly traced as bargaining over
disposition. What is clear is that during trial both attorneys and judges
may become involved in trying to present new formulations of the defendant's
moral character. Attorneys rely heavily on efforts at cross-examination
of witnesses or on direct interrogation of the defendant to convince the
court of the defendant's character. Cross-examination is an especially
common tactic for assuring the court that a view of the defendant's
character is validsince through it an attorney can select only the most
favorable characteristics for presentation.
Direct judicial interrogation of defendants to determine moral
character occurs most often in those cases in which the defendant is
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presented as being "sick" by the defense attorney, who hopes to argue for
treatment of the disease rather than punishment for misdeeds. Under these
circumstances, the interchange between the judge and defendant tends to
focus on whether the defendant is prepared to fulfill the requirements of
the trdatment program being proposed. The other instances in which the
judge raises the question of the defendant's moral character are those in
which the defendant is a "regular" in the court and the judge and defendant
know each other as individuals. In such instances, the judge will talk to
the defendant to bring himself up to date on the defendant's attitudes and
motivations. Though the following interchange took place, not at trial,
but at a bail hearinq, it suggests the quality of these interactions between
defendant and judge:
J: Hi, Jimmy, Are you behaving yourself?
D: No, Your Honor.
J: Not really, eh?
D: Well, there's not much to do in here
[the dock].
J: If I were going to let you out, would
you run?
D: Gee, I don't know. You know me,
though -- every time I run, I come
back. You never had to bust me to
get me back.
From conversations which the defendant in this case had with his
lawyer before this hearing, it is clear that he perceived that by appearing
open and ingenuous with the judge he could convince the judge that he was
a good risk for probation -- and that he wouldn't "run." In effect, the
defendant was conducting a knowing bargain with the judge. From the fact
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that the judge released the defendant without any further hearing despite
the strong desire of the prosecution that he be held, we can only conclude
that the judge accepted the version of his character that Jimmy presented,
especially when it was bolstered by the promise that he wouldn't run.
The extent of the court's tendency to allow moral character to
be determined in this informal manner is further demonstrated by its
failure to make use of competency hearings. In theory, the District Court
structure provides for competency hearings to determine what sense of
moral responsibility the defendant perceives and to ask to what extent he
can be held responsible for his actions. In fact, however, few competency
hearings are ever held in the District Courts, largely, it seems, because
the judges tend to dislike what they characterize from the bench as attempts
to interfere with their authority to determine a defendant's moral character.
Indeed, even when competency is formally raised as an issue at trial, the
judges tend to depend on their own negotiations with the defendant.
An example of this kind of bargaining involved a young man charged
with larceny by means of a check. His attorney had arranged for psychiatric
observation of the defendant, and the examining psychiatrists submitted to
the court their written opinion that the defendant was unable to distinguish
right from wrong as a result of a combination of "diminished reasoning
power" and "depressive psychosis." The defendant was interrogated, over
his attorney's objections, by the judge:
J: Do you know what you did?
D: Yes, Ma'am.
J: Did you know that the check wasn't yours?
D: (Mumbled).
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J: Would you do it again?
D: (Hopefully) No Ma'am.
J: Then, didn't you know it was wrong?
D: (Appeared to be trying to understand;
looked puzzled).
A: Your Honor, I must insist that if you want
to ask my client any questions, you address
them to me. I will be glad to consult with
my client and convey his response to you.
J: And I must talk to him if I'm going to know
if he understands the difference between
right and wrong.
Unlike cases in which the disposition or the defendant's character
are at issue, cases brought to trial because of a disagreement about the
facts or the means by which the prosecution's evidence was gathered are
less subject to direct bargaining in open court. For one thing, it is far
easier to bargain about a matter which the formal ideology of the court
recognizes as being legitimately opinion than to attempt a bargain about
facts, which the court may see as being absolute and objective. In addi-
tion, arguments about the facts of a case can be viewed as casting doubt
on the accuracy or, possibly, the honesty of court officials, especially
the police, and cannot therefore easily be negotiated.
The attorney who wants to alter the court's conception of the
facts in a case, then, is more bound to the adversarial model then he is
in other bargaining situations. The attorneys we observed tended to use
such explicitly adversarial techniques as cross-examination of their own
witnesses andespecially, prosecution witnesses to convince the court that
the "facts" of the case exist in conflicting versions. By trying thus to
present a single version as having special utility for the court -- because
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it justifies a disposition, casts doubt on another member of the court, or
depicts a defendant's character in a new way -- an attorney can sometimes
bargain with the court to accept it.
The case of two defendants in a "B and E" and is typical of one in which
an att6rney tried to bargain with the court to accept facts favorable to
his defendants. Since the bulk of the case had been bargained successfully,
the prosecutor led the arresting officer through only a minimal presenta-
tion of the facts of the case:
DA: Directing your attention to the time of [the
alleged crimes], would you tell the court
what you observed?
PO: On notification by radio that there was a
cause of trouble in the hallway of 86
Ithaca Street, we proceeded to that address.
When we arrived there we received certain
information that two black youths had been
fooling with mailboxes in the hallway of
84 and 86 Ithaca Street and that they had
just moved before we had arrived on the
scene and had gone to the rear of the
building.
DA: What did you observe there?
PO: I observed on the terrace of the second
floor -- on the terrace one door ajar and
the lights on in the apartment. The door
was standing ajar by about four to six
inches, and I could see that there were
fresh wood marks in the doorframe. I also
saw those two gentlemen (referring to the
defendants) in the apartment looking around
like they were deciding what to do next. I
climbed onto the balcony and told them to
freeze. The short one, who was holding a
screwdriver, went to the right into the next
room. I put the tall one into the wall and
told the other one to come out or else. I
then advised them of their rights, and they
understood.
- 363 -
DA: Did you talk with them?
PO: No sir, we did not converse with them.
DA: What happened then?
PO: We notified the owner of the building.
DA: Did you notify the owner of the apart-
ment?
PO: Not at that time, sir. The owner was
away and one of the men waited until
she arrived about an hour later.
DA: No further questions your honor.
He then put the owner of the apartment on the stand to show that the
defendants had broken into the apartment and had not been granted per-
mission to enter.
The defender focused his cross-examination for facts on the police
officer. Since his clients had readily admitted that they had broken and
entered the building, he had no purpose in trying to shake the policeman's
testimony about that aspect of the crime. They denied, however, that they
had actually used the screwdriver to break in, and thus, the defender
concentrated on that issue in cross-examination:
A: Where did you say that you located the
screwdriver?
PO: We picked it up in the bedroom.
A: Where in the bedroom?
PO: On the floor in the corner.





A: So that it is possible that the defendants
might not have used it.
PO: That is possible, sir.
A: Did you see the defendants using the
screwdriver?
PO: No, sir.
A: So that, to your knowledge, they may not
have touched the screwdriver?
PO: Yes, sir.
This approach to the conflict over the facts of the arrest was
by far the most effective for the defender. By using the prosecution's
witnesses, the defender could not only place reasonable doubt on the con-
tent of the testimony- but also leave the impression that the prosecution
has been overzealous in negotiating disposition and characterization of
the defendant. In effect, the defender is both presenting the judge with
information which could be used in negotiation about the charge of pos-
session of burglarious instruments and about the disposition of the case.
The defender in this exchange was also attempting to indicate
that the arresting officer might have been overzealous in his interpreta-
tions of evidence. In effect he is trying to change the "facts" of the
case by redefining the characters of the actors involved.
This approach is often employed successfully by defense attorneys
in cases which involve crimes which carry major moral stigma. A classic
example is the defense of a rape case by cross-examining the victim con-
cerning evidence that she had enticed the defendant or, as in one case we
observed, merely showing that she had not shown any hostility to the defendant:
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A: When did you say this took place?
W: at 10:30 in the morning of (Date).
A: Where did he pick you up?
W: I don't know really; about three miles
from Harvard Square, I think.
A: Were you hitching?
W: No. He stopped to offer me a ride. I
never hitch rides.
The attorney continued the questioning in this line, showing that
the girl had taken a ride of several miles, including several stops, all
away from Harvard Square, which she had said was her destination. Having
discussed the details of the intercourse, which included the defendant
leaving the automobile at one pointthe defender asked about what happened
afterwards:
A: What happened then?




W: We drove around for a little. He let
me out near the bus line....
In this way, the defender was able to present an alternative version of the
moral character of the defendant by questioning the character of the victim.
Through this strategy he succeeded in obtaining a dismissal of the case even
though the prosecutor had produced adequate technical evidence of resistance
to argue that rape had indeed occurred.
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Bargaining, then, constitutes the basis for the court's behavior
during the "trial" phase of dealing with a criminal case, even in those
instances in which the attorneys do not prearrange a bargain. It is at
trial, too, that the interaction between adversarial structure of the
court and the bargaining process come in most obvious contact. The nature
of that interaction appears to be largely complementary rather than con-
flicting; indeed, the presence of the adversarial norm merely forces
members of the court to bargain with each other through more tacit modes
and then only in circumstances in which one actor or another ostensibly
is seeking relief for his constituency or client through the adversarial
process.
While the trial constitutes both a forum for completing and
ratifying previous bargains and tacitly developing new ones, the process
of issuing a finding and imposing a disposition for the case constitutes
an even stronger instance of the same phenomenon. A similar distinction
arises here, too, between cases with a completed bargain and those for
which the adversaries still do not wholly agree -- those with a settled
bargain are merely ratified by the Court, while those still at conflict




While formally distinct, the processes of coming to a finding of
guilt or acquittal and the imposition of sentence or other disposition on
the defendant are really seen by members of the court as a single process;
indeed, the attorneys speak of the outcomes of their cases in terms which
mix findings -- acquittal and dismissal-- and dispositions -- a variety of
suspensions, continuances, and sentences -- in a single set of "outcomes."
These outcomes are, of course, closely related to the bargaining system.
The outcome of a case has long been seen as the main object of
the plea bargaining process. In the district courts which we observed,
however, it served not only as the object of much of the bargaining which
we have already described, but also as yet another link in the bargaining
chain. This second relationship between outcomes of cases and the bargain-
ing process arises from the court's use of what we have chosen to label
"intermediate" findings and dispositions. The court employs findings of
"filed" "continued without a finding," and "dismissed" and dispositions
such as probation or suspended sentence as devices to extend the court's
influence on a case after disposition. Through this continuing informal
supervision, the court can arrange dispositions which lie beyond the scope
of the criminal code -- including informal injunctions against particular
acts, required restitution, and enforced medical treatment, among others.
The role of finding and disposition as a resolution of bargaining
conducted during the pre-trial and trial periods varied little from our
expectations. In the cases we have already discussed, the outcome tended
to fit the bargain struck. We did observe two divergences of the practice
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in the district courts from the patterns we had expected. First, the
extent to which outcomes of cases were influenced by the actions of the
attorneys and other court officials in prior cases was much greater than
we had anticipated. Sanctions for violating the court's informal norms
of behavior appeared to be applied not only to the case in which the
violation occurred, but to all the remaining cases for that attorney -- or
sometimes for the entire Massachusetts Defenders Committee -- for the day.
In one example, a Defender pursued a vigorous defense of a non-
support case, basing his case on the premise that the defendant had not
received counsel at the earlier stages of the case. In doing so, he had
attacked the credibility of the non-support probation officer. The result-
ing trial was tense and long, and the judge became noticeably irritable as
the case wore on. When the defender had exhausted the last possible due
process issue, the judge found the defendant guilty and asked for arguments
on disposition.
J: What do you have to say for your client
before I make a decision about disposi-
tion of this case?
A: Your Honor, I want to appeal for a second
chance for my client. He has been recon-
ciled to his wife, and they are now living
together. He spends much more than the
court originally ordered on the support
of his family. He just didn't know that
he had to pay it through the court. If
you let him stay free, he will continue
to keep his job and support his family...
J: (Interrupting) I am thoroughly uninter-
ested in your client's problems or whether
he is supporting his wife. This case is a
borderline case of contempt in the proceed-
ings I have just seen here themselves. Not
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only that, but he [the defendant] has shown
utter contempt of court through his failure
to keep one of the promises he made when he
was here before. You are not asking for a
second change for your client, but a fifth
or tenth chance. I do not intend to let him
think that he can get away with making light
of the Court's orders. I am sentencing him
to two years at the House of Correction.
It was clear, from the judge's tone and from the fact that she
addressed this statement to the defender, not his client, that it was he,
not the defendant, whom the judge accused of "making light of the Court's
orders." Nor was her displeasure limited only to that Defender. In cases
later that day, the same judge who had presided at that trial imposed
$15,000 bail in a case of driving under the influence of alcohol and
sentenced a seventeen year old girl to two years in the House of Correction
for a first offense of use of an automobile without authority. In both
instances, the judge commented that, "If you Defenders want to fight this
Court by the book, I will start using the book, too."
In addition to the degree that judges punish court personnel at
this stage, we were also surprised by the degree to which cases which went to
trial were not punished by significantly worse dispositions. In effect,
the process of bargaining does not appear to give as much advantage to
those who avoid trial as we would have expected. in part, this result
appears to follow from the pervasiveness of the bargaining process; there
simply is no adversarial system operating as competition to the bargaining
system. Since trial is also bargained it does not have significantly
different implications for case outcomes.
The dispositions of cases in the district courts, then, may
reflect accurately the concerns of the court for the bargaining process.
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Cases are generally dealt with by bargain, and sanctions are administered
not so much for insisting on trial but for creating strains in the relation-
ships which underly the bargaining process. These sanctions, moreover,
tend to attach to attorneys, not defendants, and it is only in very serious
instances that the defendant is punished through the finding and disposi-
tion of the case for his attorney's breaches of-the normative system.
The finding and disposition process also serves to continue the
bargaining system beyond the termination of the trial. This second function
arises since the judge in a District Court has far more options in making a
finding than simply "guilty" and "not guilty." In fact, only slightly more
than half of the cases (51%) handled by the Defenders are terminated by
findings of guilty (45%) or not guilty (6%). The rest are usually resolved
by the intermediate findings; continued without finding (12%); filed (7%)
and dismissed (25%). None of these "findings" prohibits the court from
reopening the case in its discretion, none leaves the defendant with a con-
viction on his record, and yet, each can be employed by the court as a
mechanism for "keeping a string" on the defendant. Among those found guilty,
too, the court has considerable discretion in making a disposition of the
case, and most findings of guilty are coupled with dispositions which leave
the defendant "in the street" subject to continued "good" behavior. Sixteen
percent of the defendants found guilty are placed on "straight" probation --
that is, probation without a specified penalty for violation of its condi-
tions. A more common disposition (36% of guilty defendants) is probation
accompanied by suspended sentence to a house of correction or state cor-
rectional institution.
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Fully seventy percent of all cases, then, are disposed of by
outcomes which represent release of the defendant "to the streets" under
the continuing supervision of the court. The specified details of the
outcome, of course, reflect the strength of each side's bargaining during
the case, the skill of the attorneys who arranged the settlement, and the
judge's willingness to subscribe to the bargained outcome.
A common feature of the intermediate findings and dispositions
is that they include an agreement on the part of the defendant to parti-
cipate in an ongoing "bargain" with the court, in which he is released
from formal custody in exchange for promising to comply with some limita-
tion on his behavior -- typically participating in a program or agreeing
not to bother someone -- which the court could not formally require. In
these cases, the judge is always careful to impress the defendant with the
seriousness of the promise he is making and the penalties for breaking it.
The continued bargain which intermediate sentences represents
also shows itself in a second form -- exchange of an intermediate sentence
for an agreement not to appeal the decision of the District Court. Because
Massachusetts law allows for an appeal to the Superior Court in the form
of a trial de novo -- allowing an entire new hearing of the facts as well
as the law of the case -- the right to appeal a case can become "currency"
for bargaining. The defense can employ it as an "escape hatch" from deci-
sions which they regard as having been unjust (or worse than they can
expect to receive at Superior Court.) In fact, the defense may even pur-
sue a conscious strategy of going to trial at the District Court in order
to obtain information or improve their bargaining position at Superior
Court.
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The prosecution, on the other hand, is under great pressure to
try to keep cases from being appealed to that badly overloaded court.
Judges of the District Courts, too, often attempt to keep cases at their
level, both because too many appeals from one court may be regarded as a
sign of poor court management and because a high rate of appeal suggests
to the judge that his authority is being undermined.
The mechanism by which the court discourages appeal, of course,
varies with the development of the case -- in particular, whether the case
was fully bargained or not. When the outcome is explicitly bargained, the
defense is constrained by the ethics of the bargaining system to live with
the bargain. Cases which are not resolved by the court until trial,
though, are more often resolved by a disposition which contains a further
tacit bargain. One case, for example, which involved a person charged
with breaking and entering and with drunkenness, was resolved in such a
way that the defender, while he disliked the outcome, could not afford to
appeal the case. The defendant had been identified by the police as not
being the person arrested for the breaking and entering. The judge had
doubts of his innocence, however, and wanted the case to be held within the
court's jurisdiction, not permanently settled in the defendent's favor.
She, therefore, dismissed the breaking and entering and "filed" the
drunkenness, thus leaving the case open and implicitly holding the threat
of a jail sentence for the drunkennes over the defendant's head should he
take an appeal of the breaking and entering finding. Whether bargained in
advance or imposed at trial, though, this approach to reducing appeal is
highly effective, since less than 14%of the Defenders' cases at the District
Court are appealed.
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Chapter V: Findings and Conclusions
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The Role of Bargaining in the Criminal Courts
Bargaining, it is clear from our case study, not only does exist
in the Massachusetts District Courts, but it is also the basic mode of
interaction among members of the courts and between them and the defendants
they process. It is not confined either to the exchange of a plea of guilty
for a reduced or altered sentence or to the negotiation of moral character --
though we observed many bargains made with these purposes. It is not only
that bargaining dominates the decision making processes of the courts -- as
many critics have noted -- but rather that it is the only mode in which
decisions are made, whether the case is formally bound for trial or for
resolution through a complete bargain.
It is clear, in other words, that bargaining is far from being
an aberration within an otherwise functional adversarial court or even an
adaptation of that truth-finding process brought on by severe administra-
tive burdens. Our case study showed that, while the courts were busy, they
were not so heavily burdened that cases were severely delayed, and defen-
dants or prosecution clients who actively sought the trappings of adversarial
process could probably have it if they chose to. Bargaining was in no way
seen by court personnel as an alternative to the adversarial treatment of
a case, but rather it was viewed simply as the process by which cases were
resolved.
As the mode by which decisions are made in the courts, bydefini-
tion, bargaining fulfills whatever goals the courts fulfill. Our observa-
tions indicate that bargaining enables the court to make efficient deci-
sions and even maintains it as a symbol of justice. As a decision-making
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process, bargaining emerges as a natural response to the ways in which our
institutions of justice are structured. It is clear, for example, that
the decisions which the court is forced to make occur not in the logically
prespecifiable order which is called for in the adversarial model of the
courts. Adversarial justice presumes the existence of accurate records,
truthful (and present) witnesses, evenly balanced adversaries, and problems
which fit easily into the categories of the criminal law. Yet,the reality
we observed in the courts is that the information with which the court must
work is unreliable, surprise is a constant risk, and the order in which
aspects of the case must be addressed cannot be specified in advance.
In light of the particular organizational environment of the
courts, then, a workable process of decision-making must be able to develop
stochastically -- that is, it must be able to follow a path which is modi-
fiable during its course and able to take into account previous events in
a case. A stochastic decision-making system in an organization with special-
ized personnel, moreover, implies a mechanism which allows the focus to
shift from one member of the court to another as the decision-making process
evolves. Our case study shows that bargaining as we have seen it does
fulfill these requirements and,in this sense, alone "meets" the goals of
the court.
Even more is required of bargaining, however, since the courts
are expected to act not only as a decision-making system but also as a
symbol of justice. Because this society does not recognize bargaining as
a legitimate means for levying justice, it is inevitable that -- for the
time being -- the more public of the bargaining processes remain implicit
"I
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or pre-rehearsed. The observations we made confirm that the bargaining
process can fulfill this requirement as well, and does so precisely by
becoming implicit or indirect during the processing of most cases in open
court. Strikingly, when the pre-trial bargaining process fails through
inadequate preparation or an abrogated bargain, court personnel do bargain
explicitly in the courtroom, but they ordinarily limit this kind of bar-
gaining to cases which by the court's definition are minor. Thus, the
bargaining process allows for the possibility of working out some incom-
plete bargains in public, without sacrificing the court's adversary image
in the majority of cases.
In this sense, then, bargaining does fill a number of the formal
and informal goals of the court -- both those which relate to its internal
maintenance and those which describe its relationships with external
agencies and the "public." During our observations we observed the follow-
ing functions being performed through bargaining,and there may well be
others we failed to recognize.
Swift processing of cases: Notwithstanding our contention that
the court did not employ bargaining principally as a mechanism
to relieve its caseload, it is undeniably true that if all cases
went to formal "adversarial" trial there would be an impossible
load on the District Courts. By allowing the parties to a case
to work out in advance the issues that would consume time during
trial, case processing is definitely facilitated. Because bar-
gains allow only those actors immediately concerned with an
issue to negotiate its resolution, bargaining also reduced ex-
tensively the amount of time court personnel were required to
devote to any single case.
Allocation of resources among cases and personnel: Because they
are limited, it is clear that the court's resources -- time,
information, and influence -- are distributed (or redistributed)
through the bargaining process. We observed clear bargains
between attorneys and their clients, for example, concerning
how much of the lawyer's and client's time would be allocated
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to developing a defense for a case. Likewise, the favors
which we observed personnel of the courts offering each
other act to reallocate the court's time and the neces-
sarily limited access to particular judges or information.
Organization of the court: Since bargaining ties actors --
including defendants -- into a series of agreements which
have consequences for future cases, it defines functional
solidarities among the members of the court. Through these
relationships, moreover, the division of labor is further
adjusted so that actors each share reasonably the bureau-
cratic duties of the court.
Individualization of the treatment of defendants: Since all
factors in a case are fair game for bargainers, the consider-
ations which yield bargains are at least individualized.
Given its flexible scheduling, bargaining also tends to in-
crease the time between arrest and trial available for de-
veloping sentencing alternatives. The bargains we observed
were, indeed, based primarily on correctional recommendations
arising from the unique circumstances of the case at hand.
Protection of the surrounding community: By the use of a
diverse mix of intermediate sentences, treatment opportun-
ities, and correctional alternatives including incarceration,
the courts through the bargaining process can sentence accord-
ing to a fairly consistent notion of which defendants are
likely to be recidivists. Because of its flexible ground
rulesthe bargaining process enables judges and prosecutors,
especially, to fashion a set of standards for treating de-
fendants which is sensitive to what they see as the local
communities' beliefs about crime and criminals.
Management of relationships between the court and others --
the public, other agencies, and the clients of the court:
By its flexibility, bargaining allows for adjustment of the
court's activity in response to changing pressures from
public media, police, and complainants. We observed, for
example, bargains which served to aid the police in their
pursuit of serious felons, and bargains which allowed reso-
lution of the complex interests of complainants who soughtjudgments against friends or relatives. Similarly, we
observed bargaining in open court which served to convince
court-related helping professionals that defendants were,
indeed, fit clientele for the service they offered and that
they were "worthy" of treatment.
Regulation of the bargaining process itself: Bargaining is
a self-regulating process. As we observed it, the sanctions
against misbehaving personnel were meted out regularly by the
court society for failure to observe the ground rules of bar-
gaining, but not necessarily for the attempted use of trial.
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The Structure of Bargains
Purposes of bargains
We had hoped to discover that there were, indeed, recurrent "types"
of bargains, which would then provide a convenient basis for our normative
assessment of bargaining. Instead, we found that bargains can be described
only by a complex matrix of variables, relating to the purpose behind the
bargain and the currency offered to implement it. Rather than the narrow
interpretation of bargains as a means to reduced sentences for the defen-
dant, we found that the bargaining process was just as often used to affect
the place of court personnel in the court or to alter the facts of the case.
The purposes we were able to infer from the bargains we witnessed, in fact,
relate to the personal relationships within the court, to the "reality" of
a case, and directly to the strategy of the case, including its disposition.
Standing with other actors: Bargains which have this purpose
focus on interpersonal exchanges, particularly those between
lawyer and client. The participants bargain primarily over
their own interaction, with each one trying to increase his
autonomy and power and define the "place" to be occupied by
the other actor.
Presentation of self: This category includes those inter-
changes in which one actor -- usually the defendant --
attempts to persuade other actors to accept his assertion
of identity. This includes both those bargaining inter-
changes in which the defendant attempts to employ, or deny
an alias, and those in which he portrays himself as helpless,
ill, a responsible citizen, etc. It also includes, of course,
the processes by which the court personnel, too, try to pre-
sent themselves to the court -- as competent or as holding a
particular set of "cards." Their purpose is usually to con-
vince other court personnel to give up early in the face of
their advantage or to present a hard line to actors who might
want to renege on bargains. (This kind of bargaining, of
course, should be kept distinct from that directed mainly at
gaining control of future bargaining.)
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Allocation of court resources: This bargaining focus is an
important variation on bargains over the presentation of self.
In this mode, however, there is a clear understanding that the
object of the bargain is not to convince someone to take any
specific action based on conceptions of the position or char-
acter of another actor, but rather to elicit another actor's
attention by demonstrating that a case or person is profes-
sionally interesting or otherwise worthy of increased consid-
eration. Among lawyers, for example, cases which can be shown
to raise legally interesting points are likely to draw atten-
tion and resources. Similarly, defendants can be portrayed as
salvageable are much more apt to be allocated time by the court
than are the proven "losers."
Reconstruction of "reality": We discovered a number of bargains
which fit the category some observers have described as "nego-
tiating reality." Bargains with this purpose face a lengthy
process of negotiation in which each pair of actors attempts to
reduce the degree of conflict between them about what "facts"
of the case they are going to agree are somehow "true."
Access to information: Two important subsets of bargains about
information exist. One set is related to the lawyer's strategies
for preparing cases and directed at gaining or withholding infor-
mation which might be critical to the case's disposition. Another
bargain of this type is more often employed by the police who give
favors in return for information about other cases or defendants.
Future actions of participants, especially at trial: This is bar-
gaining as it is usually envisioned. It includes among other things,
the classical "plea bargain" in which the defender or defendant
agrees to plead guilty, while the prosecutor agrees to recommend a
more lenient sentence, give a reduced charge, or perform some other
service for the defense.
The future treatment of the defendant: While not recognized by
most observers who concentrate on bargains over the plea, we see
this as a separate -- but equally important -- entity from the
classic plea bargain. Here court personnel negotiate with each
other over possible dispositional alternatives. Unlike the plea
bargain, the only concessions offered are modifications in the
dispositional preferences of each side. Because of its disposi-
tional focus this mode involves more the probation officer
and the defense than the prosecution, except to the extent that
the latter holds unusually strong feelings about the dangerous-
ness of the defendant.
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Currencies
These seven categories of bargain illustrate the pervasiveness
of bargaining in the life of the court. Some aim toward hard-nosed agree-
ments about action in a specific case, and others less directly toward
defining and defending the rationale for the chosen mode of action. Just
as many, however, relate to the general maintenance of relationships with-
in the court, including its needs for information and defined rules for
interaction. To be sure, a number of the processes we identified as bar-
gaining were more nearly focused on creating goodwill in the court than on
developing any clear consensus about a particular case.
No matter how directed, each bargain does seem to imply that two
people will agree to offer a service -- or forego one -- in exchange for a
favor, service, or surrender of a service on the part of another actor.
There is a limited range of favors and services which an actor can offer
within the constraints of the courts. We regard these as the "currencies"
of bargaining. Like the purposes of bargains they relate both to the needs
of court personnel to maintain the court community and to process specific
cases.
Present services: These are currencies which are acquired and
exchanged during the processing of a case. Typically they in-
clude information about the "other side's" case, the records
of the defendant or similar information, the power to release
or incarcerate a defendant, and the ability to move or continue
a case.
Future services specified in the present: This is the tradi-
tional bargained plea. It focuses on the promise to plead
guilty, exchanged for the guarantee that a mild sentence will
be recommended.
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Unspecified future service: A typical agreement of this type
occurs when a "regular" agrees to plead a client guilty with-
out obtaining any explicit statement of the corresponding
service to be rendered (but in which it is clear that the case
will be handled in a "typical" manner). A popular example is
the clerk who moves a case for an attorney without any indica-
tion that he has incurred an obligation in the present case,
but with the implicit understanding that the attorney has
taken on a general obligation not to overuse the favor and to
accept adverse decisions on cases for which it is another
attorney's turn for a favor.
Social recognition: Especially in the case of non-attorney
members of the court, favors were often granted in exchange
for continuing friendship and contact extended by attorneys.
This form of currency appears to be used not only by the
attorneys but also by other members of the community, in-
cluding the defendants themselves.
Acceptance of an adverse- presentation of reality: Defendants,
witnesses and police officers in particular, are able to gain
concessions from others in the system by modifying their pre-
sentation of reality to conform to the interests of other
actors.
Acceptance of a submissive role in negotiation: Defendants in
particular, and all actors in the bargaining system from time
to time, find that the currency most useful in dealing with a
more powerful actor is the acceptance of the other person's
dominance in their relationship.
Bargaining without currency: Submission can be taken so far
that it no longer truly represents a conscious currency. The
defendant who enters the court and pleads guilty without
reference to any understanding of the court may be bargaining,
but without currency. He is dependent on the tacit agreement
among personnel that a plea will yield a light sentence, but
he is too removed from the process to be using the plea as a
"currency."
While it would be possible for bargainers to employ any of these
currencies in exchange for services or favors, our observations show that
there are typical currencies used to bargain over each kind of object. The
unwritten rules of the court dictate which currencies are appropriate for
which kinds of bargain. The more aggressive bargains, usually over the
preparation of a case, usually demand more tangible currencies --
information or direct services. Bargains which merely serve to define or
cement relationships on the other hand, are most typically consummated with
less tangible favors, such as acceptance of a conception of reality or
social recognition.
Mismatches between the purpose of the bargain and the currency
used most often arise when two actors are engaged in a bargain without hav-
ing reached an agreement about its intended object, or when, even after an
effort, they cannot agree at all. Typically, actors who conflict in this
way do so either because one doesn't understand the "rules" or because the
circumstances of the case force them into conflict. When members of the
court, for example, are censuring one of their number for previous failure
to bargain in good faith, this may interfere with his own bargaining agenda.
In these instances, the exchange of negative services between a recalci-
trant bargainer and the other members of the court interferes with the need
to bargain over the defendant's future treatment. The court may punish the
bargainer by refusing to give a lenient disposition at the same time that
he is trying to bargain for a sentence concession. Ironically, the cur-
rency the bargainer is using is not his own, but rather it is the defendant's
future.
An even clearer example of the reasons for mismaitched bargaining
occurs in cases in which the defendant refuses for a long time to settle
the relationship between himself and his attorney. The resulting bargain-
ing tends to follow a pattern in which the attorney, forced by the pressures
of the formal case processing schedule, is necessarily bargaining over such
concrete issues as the final disposition of the case, while the defendant
is still trying to assert his dominance in their relationship. The
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resulting bargaining typically is acerbic, and -- until the defender em-
ploys what would ordinarily be inappropriate currencies -- unfruitful.
Because of the level of disagreement involvedthe in-court processing of
these cases often necessitates explicit bargainingand most court personnel
regard- this as threatening to the stability of the court.
Factors influencing the structure of bargaining
So far our model indicates the way in which the purposes of a
bargain and the currencies used may be related. To some degree it is true
that bargaining proceeds under fairly consistent assumptions about what
kinds of currencies should be used when a particular object is sought. In
the complex world of the court, however, neither the purposes of bargains
nor the currencies available at any one time follow a predictable pattern.
Both the purposes the court personnel have for bargaining in any particular
case and the kinds of currency they can summon are dependent on factors
which relate to the case at hand, and to the structure of the court. At a
minimum our observations indicated that the offense and the stage at which
the bargain is being made are at most the influential determinants of the
resulting bargain, though issues resolved prior to the bargain, the de-
fendant, and the special interests of the court personnel are also
significant.
The strongest influence on the bargains sought in a case is,
of course, the type of case being handled by the court. If for no other
reason, it is ultimately the type of arrest and the limited sentencing
options which the court has for each kind of offense which define the end
points of the "chain of bargains" in a case. From these "end points" come
the issues which must be resolved and the reality which must be negotiated
before the court can levy a sentence.
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Without excessive generalization, it is possible to identify
clusters of bargaining issues which are most commonly found associated
with each type of crime.
Major crimes: Most negotiation focuses on access to informa-
tion and the reconstruction of reality. Bargaining with the
defendant is not necessary, since the defendant is generally
experienced enough to be clear about- his identity and how to
present himself. The prosecutor cinches the direction bar-
gaining will take because at this stage his greatest need is
for information. His interests on this score are immediate
rather than concerned with future actions of personnel at
trial or the disposition of the case due to the District
Courts' lack of final judgment about these cases.
Property and narcotics cases: These cases probably include
the widest range of bargaining purposes. Less time is spent
on issues of access to information and more of the reconstruc-
tion of reality and negotiation about future action and dis-
position. This is necessary because by the nature of the
arrest process there is more uncertainty about the "facts"
of the case, at. the same time that in the majority of the
cases the District Court must prepare to bring a final judg-
ment. Here, too, there is the most bargaining for the
lawyer's'time and resources since the stakes are high.
Nuisance cases: More than in any other type, bargaining in
nuisance cases is focused on the reconstruction of reality.
The presentation of self and standing with other actors are
also important in this kind of case, since more of the de-
fendants are unfamiliar with the role expected of them.
Negotiation with the defendant is necessary, too, because
he is arrested after a complaint and likely to regard his
arrest as an unwarranted imposition growing out of a per-
sonal animosity.
Domestic and assault cases: The focus of bargaining in these
cases tends to be the definition and resolution of the inter-
ests of the defendant and the complainant. Much of the bar-
gaining then, attempts to work toward a compromise in which
the defendant is treated and the complainant satisfied that
justice is done. Bargaining over the moral character of the
defendant, too, is clearly a necessary element of these cases,
since to make his compromise work the defense attorney (and,
at times, the prosecutor as well) must illustrate that the
defendant is worthy of the particular correctional or treat-
ment option which has been proposed.
I
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Juvenile cases: Since the formal charges against juveniles
and "joyriders" rarely involve complex rules of evidence or
any "legal" strategy the primary concerns of bargaining in
these cases are the presentation of self by the juvenile and
the way in which he is to be treated by the court. Rarely
does an issue of information, access to resources, or the
future action of participants in the bargaining process re-
quire bargaining, since in juvenile cases these aspects are
sufficiently well settled by tacit agreement that no bargain-
ing is necessary.
The formal requirements of the legal system for the apprehension
and sentencing of defendants with particular crimes does exert influence
on the bargaining process. Despite the discretion given to the police and
the courts, offense categories still place limits on arrest, adjudication,
and as a result, bargaining. To personnel in the criminal justice system,
for example, a major crime demands serious prosecution, and bargainers are
as much bound by this constraint as any other actors. In a similar fashion,
the stages of the criminal process exert their own strong influence on
bargaining. Since the formal organization of the court requires that de-
fendants move through a preordained set of decision processes, bargaining,
too, is shaped by the formal requirements at each stage. Crosscutting the
influences of the offense type the stages of the criminal process also
dictate the purposes and appropriate currencies for bargains.
Before arraignment. During this period, the defendant and the
police, or on ocassion the prosecutor, must anticipate the preparation of
a case and bargain about the acquisition of information. Typically, this
bargaining takes place during interrogation at the station house, and
focuses on the circumstances of the arrest and the alleged offense. At
this point some defendants react strongly to the police story and try to
present their own versions of reality or of themselves. Since the police
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are known to violate bargains made at this point, most defendants are aware
enough of the workings of the criminal system that they will not participate
in bargains until at least the period following arraignment.
Arraignment. At this first formal presentation of the defendant
to the court, the bulk of bargaining naturally concentrates on the defini-
tion of the defendant's personal character. This may take the form of an
attempt to define him as a passive participant by emphasizing the formality
and seriousness of the arraignment. At the same time either lawyer may try
to affect the setting of bail by presenting the defendant as "dangerous" or
as "trustworthy." Ancillary bargains which co-opt a member of the court
into accepting one of these presentations of the defendant also take place
in the arraignment.
Initiation of the defense, negotiation with court personnel, and
pre-trial interview. Bargaining during the period between arraignment and
trial is dominantly the negotiation of the relationship between the defender
and the other actors, aimed at laying the foundations for the defense's
strategy. For the conduct of the defense, the most important of these
relationships -- and the one most likely to be difficult -- is that between
the defendant and his attorney. Once this relationship is negotiated and
relationships have been established between the defender and his circle of
bargaining partners he can move on to the actual preparation of his case.
Initially, the important issues to be resolved through bargaining are the
character and identity of the defendant and the facts surrounding the case.
If he is successful in obtaining agreement about the reality of the case,
the defender attempts to build on these shared perceptions to reach consensus
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about the future actions of the participants at trial -- in effect, bar-
gaining the "choreography" of the public trial. In this way, too, he is
able to rehearse the defendant's performance at the "plea-trial" decision.
The plea bargain. At the first contact between the defender and
the prosecutor, there is almost always a set of negotiations which leads
in most cases to agreement about the future disposition of the defendant --
the classical "plea bargain." It is at this stage that bargaining is most
clearly aligned with the adversarial model and the traditional goals of the
court -- rehabilitation and correction. The prosecution and defense face
each other with the abiding interest being a fair disposition for the State
and appropriate treatment for the defendant. In addition to the traditional
agreement to plead guilty, the resulting bargain may be a promise to give
information or not to expose questionable prosecution evidence in exchange
for a disposition which is both favorable and suited to the circumstances
of the defendant.
Trial. In sharp contrast to the classical plea bargaining rela-
tionship between prosecution and defense, trial offers new actors a voice
in the direct negotiation about the dispositional decision. These new
bargainers become involved either through ratifying the bargain which has
preceded trial or through direct participation in a separate bargain con-
ducted in the courtroom. The main actors become not the attorneys typi-
cally, but the judge and the defendant (or in the case of domestic, non-
support and juvenile cases, the probation officer). The bargaining usually
focuses on the disposition of the defendant, though attendant bargains
about the moral character of the defendant and to an extent the "facts" of
the case may be necessary to resolve disagreements among the actors.
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Outcome. The finding and disposition of the case represents a
new form of bargain focused on the future treatment of the defendant and
his moral character. At this stage, the defendant may be offered a "soft"
resolution of the case, gauged to meet his need for freedom, and predicated
on the court's agreement about his moral character. In turn, the defendant
may be asked to agree not to cause the court trouble by returning or appeal-
ing his case.
In an extremely loose sense, then, the kind of case being processed
and the stage of the case form a sort of matrix which generally indicates
what kinds of bargaining objects and currencies might be expectable in any
given bargain. The bargaining process, however, as the full sweep of events
from arrest to appeal, does not lend itself to description by a two-dimensional
matrix. Instead, the sequence of bargains in a case depends not only on
the offense type and the stages of the criminal process, but also on a
number of other factors in the environment of the court.
The most significant of these seem to be the extent to which issues
in a case have already been resolved, the experience, prior record, and
cooperativeness of the defendant, and the special interests of individual
participants in the bargaining process. The way in which {hese factors
shape bargaining, however, seems to make impossible the development of a
determinant model of the bargaining process, since they occur in unpredict-
able combinations and interact stochastically to dictate a "process" and a
sequence of many bargains.
Bargaining can be seen as a stochastic process in that the actions
of participants are determined only as a case progresses; each stage's bar-
gains are conditioned by the prior events and decisions in the case. Thus,
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bargaining progresses by moving from conflict to conflict, with each one
dictating the kind of bargain that will follow it, by the kind of resolu-
tion that has taken place.
While a general progression from uncertainty about all aspects of
the case to a settled negotiation of reality does come to exist, there
would be no clear model for describing the particular path a case would
follow in that process. In effect, since information is imperfect in the
courts and the motivations of the actors subject to wide variation, sudden
shifts in the direction of bargaining are inevitable.
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The Role of Court Personnel in the Bargaining Process
So far, we have described the factors which we think determine
the shape of individual bargains, in a process which we see as stochastic.
We have asserted that each bargain has a predictable purpose and currency,
and is somehow determinant of the bargains that follow it. What we have
not described is the dynamic by which bargains seemed to be linked into a
bargaining process, leading to the resolution of a case. What in fact
determines the result of a particular bargain and,thus, creates new con-
flicts or areas of disagreement? Because bargains are in essence a resolu-
tion of conflicting needs and attitudes, they are more than anything else
products of the configuration of interests each bargainer has. While the
purpose of the bargain and the currency used are constrained by the criminal
process itself, the intensity of the conflict the bargain must resolve is
dictated by the interests of its participants. It is these interests we
contend that are the dynamic of the bargaining process, moving it from bar-
gain to bargain and finally to resolution.
What determines the interests of participants in the bargaining
process? In all but a handful of cases we observed, the interests of the
participants, while variable and negotiable, appeared to follow most
directly from their professional stakes in the court. What is important
is that these professional interests were clearly divided -- between the
responsibilities of court personnel as perceived in the adversary model
and as dictated by the social structure of the court. Each official of
the court felt that he would be evaluated according to standards drawn from
the adversarial model of the court. The prosecutor, for example, was bound
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to "not lose," the judge felt pressure to maintain an apparently fair court,
and so forth. In effect, these perceived standards articulate a respon-
sibility to a constituency -- the prosecutor to the State (as represented,
generally, by the police), and the judge to the community which his court
serves. In tension with what they see as responsibilities to their con-
stituencies, however, each sees a clear obligation to the others (and to
themselves) to keep the bargaining system functioning.
These notions of responsibility, in turn, determine both the
entry of participants into the bargaining process and their behavior in
any particular bargain. Generally, a member of the court will become a
bargainer if and when the area of responsibility assigned to him becomes
an issue in the resolution of a case. By this definition, then, the range
of actors who might enter a case is limited only by the size of the court
community, including professionals whose association with the court is only
tenuous, such as physicians, psychiatrists, and even university deans.
Once these actors enter the bargaining process, their interests
in a case may vary greatly depending on the extent to which they have
strongly held opinions about the defendant or the alleged crime or they
think their constituencies do. The amount and kind of currency that a
bargainer will allocate to a particular case is determined by how he balances
his professional loyalties to his peers and his clients with his need to
fulfill his role as a member of the court and a participant in its bargain-
ing processes.
This view of the interests of court personnel has obvious impli-
cations for our ability to build a determinant model of bargaining. Because
any member of the court may see the issues in a case as particularly related
[I
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to his professional stake in the court, the identity and number of bargainers
will vary with each case and each bargain. Typically, bargains have been
described as two-sided, but the ones we observed were conducted among as
many actors as wanted to join in. It is clear, for example, that the
defense counsel usually negotiates with at least the prosecutor, police
officer, probation officer, clerk, judge and defendant. Each of them can,
in turn, negotiate with at least some of the others and with yet other
groups of people.
This complex configuration of bargainers will shift with each
bargain in a case. Their interests are equally variable, depending on the
choices they make between interpreting their adversarial responsibilities
literally and overtly and single-mindedly bargaining. In some cases, the
prosecutor, for example, may look to a bargain as a means of processing a
case quickly or of allowing him to escape from a difficult relationship
with a complainant who isn't certain whether he really wants to press
charges. Similarly, he apparently has as his most basic responsibility
"not losing," and in the vast majority of cases in which it is clear at the
outset that he will "not lose," his interests could shift in any direction.
He may merely want to get out so he can work on his personal law practice;
he may decide this is his time to conduct an aggressive prosecution; or he
may follow the dictates of the police or the civilian complainant.
The loyalties of the defenders are similarly delicately balanced.
Often at the outset of a case they would be most concerned with maintaining
their place in the bargaining process. They may be driven to collect as
much information as possible, both to gain psychological advantage in future
bargaining and to avoid being "croaked" by encountering embarrassing
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information under conditions of surprise. Just as often -- especially in
the later stages of a case -- the defenders will be most concerned with
developing the best possible placement or disposition which could be nego-
tiated for their clients, since in this way they receive the approval of
other lawyers.
It is the inherent nature of professional discretion and peer
evaluation, then, which drives bargainers to identify and resolve the issues
in each case. Though no single actor can control the course of the case,
nor apply his professional judgment to its resolution, the professionals
collectively move the case to a resolution based on a rough consensus of
all interested actors.
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The Role of the Defendant
The course of a case through the bargaining system is propelled
by a dynamic which depends on the interpretation which actors in the court
give to their professional roles. As a result, the defendant's part in the
bargaining process -- whether he is an active or passive participant -- is
reactive. It is nearly impossible for the defendant to take the initiative
in his case, since the courts as a rule both formally- and informally license
the other actors to initiate the steps of the bargaining process, and the
defendant's comparative isolation and immobility further limit his initiative.
Because the course of bargaining is largely determined by profes-
sional interests and definitions of the defendant's character, moreover,
there is yet another limit on the defendant's initiative to bargain. Since
he must adjust his behavior to fit the expectations of other actors, even
the methods of presenting himself to the court are limited. Because the
defendant who wants to affect the bargaining process must define himself
in a way which meets the particular expectations of the court, only a narrow
range of his interests can be accommodated.
Because the defendant is not in control of the bargaining process --
or even of specific bargains -- the experienced defendant has to make a
choice between making a successful play for the attention of the bargainers
and expressing what might be his true interests in the bargaining process.
Our opportunity to decide what these "true" interests of the defendants were
was quite limited, since we did not talk to defendants alone. What many
expressed to their lawyers were interests in solving the personal problems
which may have led to arrest; others were really most interested in returning
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to "the street." In most cases these expressed interests seemed to be less
the product of the defendant's felt needs than of a successful socialization
into his role as defendant and into the range of "acceptable" interests
which the court can recognize. Defendants who could present their inter-
ests in a way that was useful to their lawyers in preparing the case
appeared to exert at least some minor impact on the bargaining process.
Whether they consciously gauged their self-presentations or
merely stumbled through the bargaining process, defendants nearly always
affected the course of bargaining, though sometimes in a less direct manner
than other actors. The defendants we observed exhibited a wide variety of
responses to being involved in a bargaining process. While they were onlv
able to react to others' initiatives, they often knew -- or accidently
discovered -- the leverage points in bargaining. By granting or withholding
information, accepting or rejecting a role or characterization, or even
actively participating in the generation of alternatives for disposition,
the defendant could significantly alter the outcome of a case. Development
of the subtle skills of indirectly influencing a complex process such as
bargaining, of course, takes time, and the inherently reactive role of the
defendant places a premium on experience and intellect.
The outcome of a particular bargain and the flow of the bargain-
ing process is affected by the conscious and accidental reactions of de-
fendants to their situations, though only within the confines of the pro-
fessional interests of the lawyers.- This constraint on the part of the
defendant, combined with the fact that the defendant may indeed be playing
a role, makes it nearly impossible to address the issue which has so attracted
court reformers -- are the interests of the defendant being served by the
I/
- 396 -
bargaining process? Even these reformers have shied away from tackling
this question directly and looked less at whether the outcome of the
process reflects the interests of the defendant and more at whether his
participation is voluntary and knowing. They have generally believed that
by focusing on what seems a more observable aspect of the bargaining
process they can assert that bargaining has (or has not) met the due
process rights of the defendant.
It would be comforting to say that by observing the behavior of
defendants during the bargaining process we could determine whether they
had received due process. Because the defendant plays an essentially re-
sponsive, reactive role, however, it is impossible to determine by observa-
tion whether he understands the implications of his plea -- or any other
deal he makes during bargaining. Since the defendant can only react to the
situation as it is structured by the professional actors in the court, the
question of whether he bargains voluntarily becomes nearly meaningless.
He is involved in a world which is structured by bargaining and the role he
can play is predefined and limited. What we can observe a defendant do or
say at any one point is obviously not only conditioned by prior events in
the bargaining process but by the defendant's own prior experience in the
court.
For all these reasons we cannot say with any certainty that de-
fendant's interests were -- or were not -- served by the bargains they
participated in and received. We can observe that strong among the pro-
fessional interests that influence bargaining there is the obligation to
see that defendants are equitably treated. While bargaining clearly
generates its own standards for fairness, the court does seem to have
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inherent in its normative system a set checks to reduce the danger that
a defendant will be abused. Because the, personnel of the court have a
strong stake in protecting the bargaining system itself from attack, and
because there are so many participants in any case, there is a strong col-
lective incentive for each participant to bargain in good faith with the
defendant and with each other.
Within a system where the pressures on the defendant to submit are
enormous and,at the same time, subtle, court personnel often appeared to
be trying to insure a "fair". bargain for the defendant. Mostly this con-
cern took the form of trying to educate defendants to what they were up
against. Certainly, the defenders we observed played a strong informative
role, making plain the conditions of a bargain to each client, refusing to
enter a guilty plea for a defendant who wasn't willing, and even confiding
to the defendant "inside" information on the bargaining process. It is
especially among juveniles and inexperienced offenders that the greatest
risk of misunderstanding bargaining occurs, since these defendants have
had the least practice at a bargaining role. It is significant that the
personnel of the court, including even the prosecutors and police,in most
instances assume a protective posture toward these defendants, explaining
the bargaining process and its risks. Whether these efforts can be inter-
preted as protection, as socialization to the proper role, or as both, is
very difficult to judge.
- 398 -
The Impacts of Bargaining
If bargaining is, indeed, the only mechanism of decision-making
in the courts, then its reign has many implications for the court, the
defendants, and the process of reform through negotiated justice. The
clearest result of bargaining's dominance is that it gives the court a much
broader set of potential resolutions for the issues which it must address
than either the adversarial model or the model of bargaining which is
assumed in proposals for reform through negotiated justice.
The pervasive kind of bargaining we found appears to have some
considerable benefits for everyone in the court -- the judge, the profes-
sionals who are associated with the court, and particularly, the defendant.
The court, faced with unyielding, contradictory, and absolute demands on
its formal decision processes, is able through bargaining to create the
illusion that it is meeting these demands, while, in fact, making informal
compromises about them. When they bargain, the professionals have the
ability to hold to their formal ideologies, show an adequate rate of
"success" and yet also collectively and efficientlly manage conflict. The
defendant, for his part, typically receives dispositions which are more
individualized than the criminal law formally provides. He also reduces
his risk of serious penalty, and appearsto retain the option of making his
claim of irnocence at a subsequent trial -- without fear of serious
reprisal.
The very characteristics which contribute to the flexibility and
mutability of the bargaining mode of decision-making, however, also create
negative impacts on the court and its participants. Since, through its
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informal processes, the court has abandoned the idea of absolute truth and
adversarial confrontation even in its trial procedures, it no Tonger has
an articulated frame of reference from which to evaluate its decisions.
At the same time, clearly, the ideal of "truth" finding, adversarial con-
frontation and due process still dominate the court's ideology. Under these
circumstances, the court is forced to present itself to its community as a
"jousting ground" for the "champions" of the sides to a legal action.
Because the court operates under a bargaining process which is uni-
versal but also clandestine and clothed in the ideology of adversarial due
process, unusually great strains are placed on the professional personnel
of the court. It is they who must operate the bargaining system and
simultaneously convince their constituencies that the court is meeting the
diverse requirements of its symbolic adversarial system.
The strains of the dual role required of the court's professionals,
in turn, serve to reinforce the existing structure of bargaining. Since
they are formally expected to act as vigorous advocates for a constituency
or client, court personnel are under strong pressure to demonstrate the
pursuit of their special interests. At the same time, other actors must
also prove their professional worth, and the counter-pressure on each pro-
fessional to maintain the bargaining system calls for an acceptance of out-
comes which violate their professional interests but support their bureau-
cratic functions. Each professional, then, is urged both to maintain the
system of bargaining which allows him to deal with his colleagues, and to
deny its existence to maintain his professional standing.
To a great extent, too, these professionals who are well served
by the bargaining process are also its captive. They no longer have an
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alternative to participating in it, but must bargain in order to survive in
the courts. In effect, then, for their professional reputations and pros-
pects for a successful career they must depend on the goodwill of profes-
sionals from all disciplines, with whom they must bargain.
For defendants, too, there are negative impacts.of both the bar-
gaining process and the dispositions it produces. The process is gauged
to train them to react to the professionals' initiatives and appears to
reward a dependent and submissive reaction. Sentences which flow from this
process, too, tend to foster-dependency, since they most often call for
extensive periods of supervisory care or treatment. In effect, they tend
to institutionalize defendants at the same time that they are individualized,
oriented toward rehabilitation, and more humane than the punishments pro-
posed through strict interpretation of the criminal law.
Finally, the flexibility of the bargaining system does allow ex-
traneous considerations and personal animosities to affect a defendant's
sentence. This can happen in bargained cases because it is, sometimes,
difficult for the bargainers to distinguish between the professional and
personal interests of a participant. It may happen, too, during conflicts
among court personnel, when the most efficient sanction for defection of
a professional from the bargaining process becomes the punishment of his
clients.
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Conclusions: The Assumptions behind Negotiated Justice
While it may bring us no closer to solving the crisis in the
courts, our study does suggest that proposals for negotiated justice may
not accomplish what they claim. If for no other reason, they are handi-
capped by a model of bargaining which is not grounded, and which we con-
tend is inaccurate. This miscalculation about the process they sought to
employ as a vehicle of reform obviously has consequences for the success
of their reforms. What are those consequences, and how do we assess them?
What processes should we employ in evaluating proposals for negotiated
justice?
There are three generally accepted means of evaluating reforms in
anticipation of their implementation: analysis of the internal "logic" of
the proposed reform, comparing the assumptions of the reform to the reality
to which it is addressed; comparison of the means employed to the ends
desired, to determine whether the means are appropriate, sufficient, and
efficient for accomplishing the intended goals; and analysis of the probable
impact of the reform in light of the organizational structure of the setting.
Given the limits of our data and the sketchiness of the proposals we are
trying to evaluate we have employed each of these methods, with the hope
that they together will give us enough information to "predict" the success
of negotiated justice.
We begin our evaluation of negotiated justice by looking at the
key assumptions made by the proposals of the ABA and the Crime Commission,
suggesting the areas in which there is wide discrepancy between their
assumptions about bargaining and the reality we observed. In light of that
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reality, we also turn to a detailed analysis of the specific recommenda-
tions of each proposal, showing what implications the faulty assumptions
of the reformers could have for the probable "success" of their reforms.
This analysis then provides the basis for our own speculations about the
possibi-lities for court reform through bargaining and court reform in
general.
If our conclusions are valid, reform efforts which have tried to
regulate the bargaining process will neither- succeed in imposing due
process standards on the bargaining nor will they limit or eliminate the
process itself. Their proposals are based on a conception of a process
which simply does not exist in the courts -- a focused decision process
based on an exchange of the guilty plea for a reduced sentence. What we
see as an oversimplification of bargaining manifests itself in at least
six assumptions made in these proposals:
- that bargaining is either an anomaly or an
adaptation of the decision-rmaking processes
of the court.
- that the bargains produced are either about
pleading guilty for a reduced charge or sen-
tence, about individualized sentences and
treatment, or about the negotiation of
reality and the presentation of the defen-
dant's moral character.
- that the currencies offered in bargaining
are limited to a single pair of exchanged
services associated with each kind of
bargain.
- that the actors who are central to the process
are the prosecutor, defender, and possibly the
defendant.
- that bargaining follows a predictable course.
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- that information about the bargaining process
and about the case is immutable and discover-
able.
In our view the most serious shortcoming in proposals for nego-
tiated justice is their assumption that bargaining is merely an anomaly or
an adaptation of the decision-making system. As its universal use in our case
attests, bargaining is the decision-making process of the courts from arrest
to appeal. In the courts we studied there was no alternative decision-making
perspective from which one could observe the bargaining system. Rather than
being alternatives, the plea bargaining system and the trial-adversarial
system of presenting cases for decision are both manifestations of the same
underlying bargaining system. In light of the court's access to informa-
tion, its diverse goals, and its social structure bargaining is the logical,
efficient basis of the system.
If bargaining indeed underlies all the decision-making processes
of the criminal courts then proposals for negotiated justice face an
irreconcilable contradiction. Each places great faith in the protection
and surveillance made possible by placing one or another actor outside the
bargaining system -- whether judge or ombudsman. In our model of the courts,
an "outside" observer would either be excluded completely from the bargain-
ing system or more likely would be absorbed, much as the adversarial
system itself -- if it ever existed independently -- has clearly been
absorbed. Even monitoring bargaining by trying to compare "bargained" and
"tried" cases becomes nearly impossible under this model, since as we have
seen cases that go to trial are also bargained.
The assumption that bargaining focuses on one of a small number
of prespecifiable topics has also lead reformers astray, guided by the
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belief that they can somehow circumscribe bargaining and either eliminate
it or confine and monitor it. Our study, however, indicates that the bar-
gains in which reformers have been so interested are only a very small and
fairly late sample of the broader bargaining process. By focusing only on
the regulation of bargaining over the plea, for example, reformers ignore
all the bargains which prepare for the plea ceremony and all the negotia-
tions which follow it. Requiring that standards be met at the plea stage
would probably not even disrupt the flow of bargains in a case.
With an eye to levying further controls on plea bargains, the
reformers have articulated fairly stringent standards for the behavior of
the prosecutor, defender, judge, and defendant -- on the assumption, inherent
in the adversarial model, that these four actors are the only ones central
to the bargaining process. Our study, however, indicates clearly that these
four are but a small sample of the actors that give impetus to the bargain-
ing process. Even if it were possible to regulate bargaining, proposals
which detailed the roles of these actors only would leave much of the bar-
gaining process still uncontrolled. Such critical actors as the "helping"
professionals, the probation officers, and the police are largely -- and
we feel incorrectly -- ignored by proposals for negotiated justice, on the
assumption that they have no autonomous role in bargaining.
To be sure, our observation has been that, especially in those
cases in which bargaining follows the most unpredictable course -- non-
support, juvenile, and nuisance cases -- these other actors even dominate
the decision-making of the court, and their autonomous decisions can have
devastating impacts on the future of the defendants. In effect, the struc-
ture of bargaining regulation proposed not only fails to consider important
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actors in the bargaining process, but as a result would provide the least
regulation in these cases which already have the fewest inherent safeguards.
Because it assumes that bargaining is only a single decision
point reached by the prosecution and defense, the model employed by the
reformers also logically sees bargaining as following fairly closely a
prespecifiable pattern of behavior. Our study, on the contrary, suggests
that bargaining is stochastic; that it follows a pattern which varies
according to the successive outcomes of a series of bargains. If bargain-
ing does not flow according to a determinant pattern, it is doubtful whether
a useful set of regulations or standards for the bargaining process could
be formulated.
If nothing else the regulation of bargaining is dependent on the
degree to which -the information used and produced in the bargaining process
is believable, immutable, and at least closely related to the truth. If
there is one clear conclusion of our study it is that information is rela-
tive, mutable, and as much an outcome of bargaining as every other element
of the criminal process. The "truth" about a case is forever shrouded in
an impenatrable fog generated by the distortions of memory to which all
humans are subject, the deliberate twistings of events accomplished by one,
both, or all sides to an issue, and by the simple finitude of humans as
observers of a series of events. While we are unable to state with certainty
that there is no truth revealed by the courts, we do assert that the "truth"
which the court uses to come to its decisions-is a product -- a creature --
of the bargaining process, and therefore a suspect source of enlightenment
about that process.
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It is not sufficient merely to show that the reformers who have
devised proposals for negotiated justice have made general assumptions about
the court process which are unwarranted and which could probably defeat or
at least skew the reforms they propose as overall resolutions of the courts'
problems. To assess this as a method of reform, these proposals must also
be considered as a set of detailed recommendations. To what extent do their
suggestions for regulating bargaining constitute a useful -- though perhaps
poorly grounded -- reform, in the sense that they are tools to remedy obvious
evils in the criminal justice system? We look next at the specific measures
recommended by the American Bar Association and the President's Crime
Commission to control the "plea bargain," the roles played by the prin-
cipal actors, and the procedures employed by the court.
The standards for an acceptable bargain
The ABA proposal sets out two groups of standards, one relating
to the traditional measures of knowingness and the other to the motivations
behind the bargain. Essentially, it would require that the defendant fully
understood his situation and that he chose to bargain either to avoid the
risk of a much more serious charge or sentence or to facilitate a wider
set of correctional options. These regulations seem well-directed, since
they do not basically create or reinforce any major or tendencies we observied
in the bargaining process to interfere with the civil rights of defendants.
It could even have the effect of placing in good currency the idea that a
limited set of goals should be pursued in the bargaining process.
Its impact, as we discussed, may be blunted by the fact that the
bargaining process begins at the very first contact between defendants and
criminal justice personnel. Bargainers may have had a great deal of
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latitude in presenting their cases as meeting these formal standards,
without necessarily conforming to its spirit. In placing faith in these
particular standards, moreover, these proposals also must assume the
existence of an alternative intellectual system which provides support for
the contention that a plea is not acceptable and thus, gives teeth to
regulation. In particular, there would have to be an alternative to
bargaining to which an enlightened defendant could turn if his plea had
been coerced, from which the judge as ex post facto observer could draw
support, and from which a standard with which to measure the fairness of
a bargain could be derived. In short, employing these particular standards
is no more than a charade if under the present court structure there is no
choice being made between bargaining and trial.
The President's Crime Commission sets essentially the same con-
dition on bargains which are reported to the court. They do avoid, at
least in part, the simple reliance on the trial as an alternative against
which to assess the outcome of a bargain, fortuitously depending more upon
the judge's "inside" knowledge of the court and the bargaining process to
assess the fairness of the bargain. This difference may have the effect of
allowing bargains to be evaluated less by adversarial standards, than by
reference to practices within the judge's own court. This standard, then,
trades away whatever regularity an external evaluation would enforce, for
a test which is more realistic given the present structure of the court.
This is not to suggest, of course, that the Crime Commission proposal
abandons the adversarial model completely. Rather, it still holds up
adversarial-trial as an option for the defendant, but grudingly acknowledges
that formal adversarial standards are not realistic.
III
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Reforms based on the roles of the principal actors
Both the ABA and Crime Commission make at least limited recom-
mendations for the roles which should be taken by court officials. As we
have indicated, they both confine their attention to the roles of the prose-
cutor, defender, and judge. In the process, of course, they have also
shaped the role of the defendant through their prescriptions of the roles
of the other three actors, though this is a tacit, rather than explicit
definition. It is in these assignments of role that we have the least con-
fidence, both because of their focus only on the prosecution, the defense,
and the judge, and for their particular assumptions about what those roles
ought to contain.
To an awesome degree, the Bar Association relies on the judge to
take a post-factum interest in the bargain struck, but strictly as a repre-
sentative of the adversarial system. Were there such a set of decision-
making processes as the adversarial process, this role might make sense.
Our findings suggest that not only is bargaining the only operative mode
of decision-making in the courts, but that it places too much power in the
hands of the one actor most able to coerce defendants. In light of what we
identified as the judge's interest in maintaining the order of the court
through his power over the other participants' abilities to remain in the
bargaining system, the ABA's reliance on the judge may actually encourage
resolutions of bargains on grounds directly opposite to what the ABA intended.
There is every reason for the judge to evaluate a bargain for its value as
an efficient tool or as a reward to a cooperative attorney, for example,
as much as for its correctional significance.
A
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Certainly, too, under the ABA proposal there would be a greater
temptation for court personnel to jockey.for a judge likely to approve a
specific bargain. The increased power of the judge under this proposal,
would be also likely to enhance the power of whatever agent scheduled the
cases to be heard by any particular judge. In the courts we observed, the
clerks would be greatly strengthened; in some courts it would be the prose-
cutor whose hand would be strengthened. Certainly, neither of these out-
comes would be consonant with the goals which the ABA articulated.
In addition to its willingness to place considerable veto power
over the bargaining process in the judge's hands, the ABA also implicitly
asks him to evaluate the merits of a bargain on the basis of information
which our study suggests is highly suspect. In particular, their proposal
is careful to prohibit the judge from being an actor in the bargaining
process. This leaves him -- an interested party (and bargainer, in our
experience) -- in the position of having to judge the merits of a bargain
based only on the testimony of participants to the bargain. Our findings
point up the need of court personnel to defend a bargain once it is made,
both because the court community frowns on violated bargains and because
personnel usually believe the reality they have negotiated. Whatever they
tell the judge, then,will probably also be a product of their negotiations,
and it certainly does not provide the basis for an objective test of a
bargain.
The Crime Commission proposal does at least avoid several of the
pitfalls of the ABA's proposal for the judge's role. They allow the judge
to observe the bargaining process at work, thus reducing somewhat the judge's
blindness to the possibility that the facts subscribed to in court are
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artificial. To do so, however, they place the judge in an awkward bind.
He retains some of the same loyalty to the adversarial notions of justice
which permeate the ABA's proposal, but at the same time he is a participant
in the bargaining process. This duality of role is mitigated,in part,by
the Commissions' emphasis on correctional standards for testing the validity
of a bargain rather than comparison to a set of standards based on what
"would have happened" at trial. From our observations, however, even this
concession is still an insufficient recognition of the multiple interests
of the judge. The judge is a member of the court as bound as other actors
into the bargaining system, and he is still quite likely to be a biased
evaluator of bargains.
In our opinion the recommendations of the Commission are not even
salvaged by their insistence that the judge depend on the defendant's word
as the best check or the bargain. Both models of the role of the judge,
in fact, make a common leap of faith by assuming that somehow the judge and
the defendant will be able to communicate, at least to the extent that they
can conduct a ritual averral of knowingness and voluntariness. In our ex-
perience, this is a fragile assumption at best, and it is in precisely the
cases in which there is the greatest risk of coercion that we observed the
greatest lack of communication between judge and defendant.
The power which both models allocate to the judge is not much
diminished by the roles defined for the prosecutor and defense counsel. In
fact, the ABA model outlines only dimly the role of the prosecutor. What
recommendations they do make seem to be drawn mostly from adversarial
assumptions about the prosecutor as the representative of the State in a
two-sided bargaining process. They quite sensibly recognize his discretion
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to determine charges, and they then try to develop devices intended to re-
strict that discretion and subordinate it to the judge's discretion. In
particular, they forbid the prosecutor from conferring with the defendant,
and they limit the grounds on which a prosecutorial bargain can be accepted
by the court.
As a reform, this limited formulation seems largely useless, The
cases we observed suggest that it is very much the police, even more than
the prosecutor, who influence the setting of charges and the vigorousness
with which the case is prosecuted. It is they, more than the prosecutor
himself, who have the greatest interest in the outcome of the case. Because
of the policeman's rolethe ABA's proposal is likely to fail to affect bar-
gaining significantly, and instead, it will still lie within the power of
the police to alter their presentation of a case to suit their interests.
Limiting the discretion of the prosecutor, who is often more aware of the
correctional and mitigating circumstances of a case than are the police,
may even tend to reduce the court's ability to consider the treatment goals
of the criminal process, along with those which focus on community protec-
tion.
The President's Crime Commission proposal appears to view the
prosecutor more as an agent of negotiation than as a vigorous representative
of the State's interests in a case. To the extent that this does recognize
the dominance of bargaining in the courts it represents an advance over the
ABA Standards. What it fails to recognize is the dual loyalty of the prose-
cutor to a "client" -- usually the arresting officer -- and to the court
community at large. While the development of an explicit role for the
II1I1
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prosecutor-negotiator may be a reform in that it might decrease the likeli-
hood that a prosecutor would abuse his discretion, it would probably also
tend to increase the abuses of police discretion and place the prosecutor
in an untenable relationship to the police as a powerful interest group.
Ironically, the ABA Standards barely define a role for the
defense attorney in the bargaining process. What little they do say evokes
the adversarial image of the defender as protector of defendant's procedural
rights. In light of what we found to be the wide ranging role of the de-
fender in the bargaining process, this reform, if it could be implemented,
would severely damage the bargaining system. Our observations indicate
that most defense attorneys would indeed try to take seriously an adversarial
responsibility, if it were a legitimated role rather than the "myth" which
few courts now seem to take seriously. If this occurred, it would badly
upset the balance of power within the bargaining system, since a defender
would be forced to violate his official role if he were to function at all
within the system, and would therefore be subject to continual risk of being
exposed. Perhaps fortunately, the lack of detail supplied by the ABA would
probably prevent this proposal from being implemented. If implementation
was attempted with this role developed no further than this, the defense
attorney would merely continue to behave as he now does and fabricate what-
ever evidence was needed to demonstrate that he had met the standards.
The President's Crime Commission, oddly enough, does not really
draw much of a different model for the defender; its only contribution is
a somewhat greater, but no more useful articulation of the fact that the
defendant participates in bargaining. Like the ABA, too, the Crime Commission
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articulates a role for the defense without ever indicating what the defen-
dant does in the bargaining process. Implicitly, they relegate him to the
role of a non-actor in the system.
In light of the varying roles played by defendants, the absence
of a standardization or reformulation of the defendant's role seems a
vital shortcoming of both reforms -- one which could jeopardize the success
of their other proposals. In particular, the reformers seem to have neglected
the variety of interests which defendants of different kinds obviously have
in the bargaining process, the varying approaches they adopt for dealing
with the court personnel they bargain with, and the degree of autonomy some
of them display in negotiations. Our findings indicate that these are not
inconsiderable influences on the bargaining process.
A common criticism which must be levied against all the reforms
proposed by either group based on the roles of actors in the courts, is that
they are based on a narrow range of bargaining relationships. They are
dangerously limited in their recognition of the power of "peripheral" actors
in the court, and the variety of bargaining situations which arise in any
court of original jurisdiction. Rather than a unitary process, bargaining
is, in fact, a variable phenomenon, moving unpredictably through a wide
range of bargains. Our observations lead us to wonder whether any unitary
set of standards can take into account the range of purposes, currencies,
actors, and interests which might contribute to a particular bargain.
Reforms based on the regulation of procedure
Since the ABA assumes that the judge will, after the fact, assess
the plea produced by a bargaining process, it can largely ignore the process
of bargaining which produced that plea, except to note that the process
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should foster a knowing and voluntary plea. Certainly, it makes no recom-
mendation even remotely resembling a bargaining procedure. The President's
Crime Commission, in comparison, does see the regulation of bargaining as
its main focus and does suggest specific procedural modifications for the
bargaining process: enforced open discovery and free exchange of informa-
tion and attitudes; a record of the bargaining process; and published
prosecutorial bargaining standards.
The Crime Commission's insistence on open access to information
would certainly have the tendency to encourage bargaining which was focused
on disposition, since it hinges on the availability of information about
the defendant and about correctional alternatives. That it would also
reduce other forms of bargaining is very unlikely, in light of the degree
of control which bargainers can exert over information. It seems doubtful,
for example, that the insistence on open information would reduce -- or
even detect -- the defendant's tendency to mask his identity or the police's
insistence on trading charges for information in other cases. Most of all,
it does not appear that any open statement of discovery would discourage
actors in the court from hoarding information or -- indeed -- fabricating
it for bargaining purposes. In any event, discovery procedures certainly
could not be guaranteed to supply the court with "facts" about the defendant
and the alleged crime, which are in any way "true" except that they are
asserted as such. In effect, bargaining about information will not be
eliminated; if anything, it might merely be moved into earlier stages of
the bargaining process -- prior to the start of the regulatory process.
The Commission also proposes that a record of bargaining be kept
by the participants as a basis for review of the plea and the bargain by
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the trial judge. The Commission assumes that such a record will make pos-
sible the same degree of review as the transcript of a trial. While at
first glance this recommendation does not appear to be as "wrong-headed"
as some other proposals for reform, it does seem to have two major flaws.
It assumes that the information contained in. the record would be an accurate
reflection of the bargaining process. Our experience suggests that it is
much more likely that bargaining would still take place much as it does now,
with the exception that what would be placed in the record of bargaining
itself could become a new object of bargaining and a new currency in bargains
which already take place. To the extent, then, that the record is seen by
court personnel as legitimating a version of reality which predictably
could preempt a party's ability to deny it, it would tend to reduce, rather
than increase the ability of the court to officially discern "what happened."
The final procedural reform proposed by the Commission, publication
of the prosecutor's bargaining standards, has the disadvantage of imposing a
set of prespecified standards on the outcomes of bargains which are far too
peculiar to each case to allow for formal prescription. While generaliza-
tions can be made from the perspective of social science about patterns of
bargaining, the stochastic nature of bargaining makes their application to
specific instances dangerous. As we have noted before, the bargaining
process is sufficiently pervasive and stochastic that it can easily "side-
step" efforts at regulation, usually with consequences which suggest that
the balance of power shifts in favor of the person having control over the
ostensibly regulated process.
Structurally, too, the focus on a prosecutor's bargaining standards
seems to be misplaced specificity. Certainly, if standards are to be published,
mIll1
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they should be published by all members of the court who bargain -- presum-
ably at least the judge, probation officer, defender -- and, perhaps de-
fendant -- in addition to the prosecutor. Even if this were done, though,
it seems clear that the balance of advantage among defendants would shift
in favQr of the more articulate, intelligent, and manipulative detendants.
It would probably disadvantage the first-time offender, for example --
hardly the intent of the Commission.
This proposal, then, like the rest of the recommendations of both
the President's Crime Commission and the ABA, is most likely to result
either in a shift in the locus of bargaining or in some cases in an in-
crease in bargaining related activity. Whether the specific recommendation
calls for opening up bargaining decisions to scrutiny, establishing the judge
as a monitor or creating new standards for evaluating the equity of a bar-
gain, these proposals fail to consider the nature of the bargaining process,
at least as it is revealed in our observations. They are reforming what
they see as a constrained decision making process which happens between two
sides in a courtroom. Our data describes a process which is not confined to
the courtroom (or the court) and which is not subject to internal monitoring
devices. As the next section will argue, proposals for negotiated justice
can hope to regulate bargaining only if they recognize that the dynamics of
the bargaining process extend from arrest to appeal and that the diversity
of its participants, whose interests are determined primarily by factors ex-
ternal to the courtroom, is likewis.e extensive.
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Di recti ons for Reform
As we have seen, proposals for reform based on negotiated justice
have, in light of our empirical observations, failed critically to account
adequately for the informal structure of the courts -- particularly with
respect to the pervasiveness of a bargaining mode of decision making and
as the basic organization of tne courts. In effect, while being efforts to
cope with bargaining, both the ABA and President's Crime Commission pro-
posals are in their underlying logic still adversarial models of reform seek-
ing to incorporate limited bargaining into what they see as the "normal"
adversarial operation of the court.
Future etforts at reforming the courts could follow a number of
paths which might avoid the pitfalls of these two proposals for negotiated
justice. They could stubbornly resist the grip of bargaining on the courts
and attempt to reinstate the adversary system; they could attempt to regu-
late bargaining by more grounded approaches to its monitoring and control;
or they could work toward new definitions of the role and structure of the
courts.
Our data will not support projections of the relative desirability
of any of these modes, or indeed the consequences of their implementation.
We can, however, speculate on their feasibility in terms of our observations
of the dynamics of bargaining.
We have argued strongly that, given the nature of the goals the
courts are expected to fulfill, reinstating the adversary system is an un-
liKely occurrance. The court is society's mechanism for settling disputes,
and as such must deal with conflicting interests, uncertainty, and im-
pertect information. The adversary model is ill-adapted to this kind of
I I I I i 1111 1116
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decision making environment, while, on the other hand, bargaining allows
for the resolution of conflict among the several "absolute" values of society.
In this sense bargaining "works" to fulfill the present goals ot the court
and will likely remain as the informal operating structure of the courts
despite any efforts to enforce the adversary model. Certainly, the history
of the courts and of procedural reform supports the contention that bargain-
ing has always been a latent activity of the courts and suggests that it has
long reigned with the dominance reflected in our own case material.
If it is not feasible to operate the courts on an adversary model,
a second direction for reform is that indicated by the framers of negotiated
justice -- the regulation of bargaining to more nearly reflect the spirit
of due process. Our observations do indicate that it is necessary that
bargaining be regulated, but that, even if new rules were based on a more
grounded notion of bargaining, regulation could not feasibly take place with-
in the courts as they are presently structured.
The necessity of regulating bargaining is made clear both in our
own data and in more general critiques of the bargaining process. Our study
has argued that, while bargaining provides an efficient and, indeed, ration-
al method for making decisions, its impacts on the defendant are at best un-
predictable. As we have suggested the defendant is brought into an environ-
ment in which he has no real choice but to become a part of the bargaining
process, he is socialized to play the role it demands, and he is very likely
to be given a sentence which emphasizes treatment for indefinite periods of
time. Perhaps more important, the bargaining process itself is fueled by
the personal relationships and conflicts e.ong court personnel, and any
decision made about an individual defendant is likely to be more a product
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of these idiosyncratic variables than of the merits of the defendant's case.
Certainly any of these characteristics of bargaining could be construed as
inimical to the notion of due process, and even to that elusive quantity
"justice."
Perhaps more easi ty measured is the fact that not only does bar-
gaining appear merely to coerce the defendant, but it in tact appears to sway
the balance of advantage greatly toward the State. Especially in the earli-
est stages of the bargaining process, for example, the overwhelming advantage
lies with the State. in a large number of cases, the State has not only
prior access to most information but also every advantage in obtaining in-
formation from the defendant himself, the privilege of selecting the crime
to be charged, and the presumption of "truth" in whatever the police say in
their negotiations with other actors. While the state's advantage may de-
cline at arraignment, it still holds many of the "cards." Among these powers
are tne .ability to hold the defendant in jail, (while the actors in the court
bargaining system negotiate his case), selecting (in many courts) the time
and judge for "trial" of the case, and withholding much of the evidence from
the defense. This imbalance between prosecution and defense, moreover, is
only weakly compensated by the classic adversarially derived due process
safeguards. In a system of negotiated justice, the right to remain silent,
to compel witnesses, etc. are of limited value since they rest on the in-
accurate assumption that the significant events of a case take place in open
court between the representatives of the two sides to the case. Clearly,
much of what the courts seek to offer the defense as safeguards are eroded
by the extensive bargaining which precedes the appearance of the actors in
court.
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We would on these grounds, then, support the notion that bargaining
must be regulated to protect the defendant from the inequities we have cited
and to insure that the defense has a chance to bargain on equal ground with
the prosecution. Our observations certainly do not indicate that there is
any inherent contradiction between maintaining bargaining as the operating
structure of the courts and levying procedural safeguards to protect the
defendant. In fact,we found that while they may not be effective in main-
taining a balance of advantage with the prosecution nor guarantee the full
exercise of the rights of defendants, the Constitutional limitations on the
State's power to prosecute clearly serve a useful function for those bar-
gaining about the outcome of a case. They act, in effect, as the tools,
tokens, and groundrules of bargaining.
The defense counsel, for example, can offer to make a prosecutor's
case difficult by filing a "raft" of motions, petitions, objections, and
writs and thus strengthen his bargaining position. Moreover, the due pro-
cess limits on acceptable official conduct seem to have some effect on offi-
cial behavior. Since Miranda, Mapp, Escobedo, and the many other similar
cases, the police have, at least formally, been more constrained in their
efforts to obtain evidence and arrest suspects, even if their behavior is
mostly modified in terms of what they will admit they do rather than what
they, in fact, do. In effect, procedural due process safeguards, while
they do not work as they were intended to, work to the defendant's relative
advantage in that they represent a source of currency in the bargaining
system. As such, they are useful but insufficient to maintain the defense
as a reasonably balanced element of the criminal process.
11,111M.
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Where we would part company with those who would choose to reform
the courts by creating a due process of bargaining -- a set of procedural
safeguards to guide the bargaining process -- is that we do not believe that
the leverage points for control ling the bargaining process exist within the
courts. The assumption that bargaining can be affected by rules levied with-
in the court is in direct conflict with the fact that the courts are struc-
tured on an adversarial model, even if they do not use it as a decision mak-
ing mode. The adversarial model assumes that the court consists only of a
"jousting ground" upon which two external organizations -- termed the pro-
secution (the State) and the defense -- come to the court and present their
cases to the court -- which in the .adversarial metaphor is even addressed
as a passive, reactive entity (as in "addressing the Court" in posing motions,
presenting testimony, etc.) In effect, the "Court" consists at most of the
judge and, if there is one, a jury, and their role in the procedings is se-
verely constrained by procedural regulations.
In Massachusetts the Courts are indeed organized as if they were
this kind of advesarial fora. In addition to the distance the prosecution
and the defense stand from the court, even the clerical staff and probation
officers are organizationally decentralized from the control of the "Court"
(using the adversarial meaning of the word here). The clerk is a life
appointment of the Governor and he appoints his own staff. The probation
department is appointed through the authority of the (executive branch)
Department of Probation. While in other courts, tnis organizational decen-
tralization is less stark, few courts have staffs of "helping professionals"
and, except for some appointed defenders (an interesting exception for its
implications for the conduct of the defense) no attorneys are part of the
"Court." In the best adversarial tradition, care is almost universally
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taken to avoid the formation of a bureaucracy, and its attendant systems of
authority, structure, and control.
If the courts indeed operated on an adversarial model, of course,
this mode of organization would be an excellant device for ensuring an
isolated and hence impartial judiciary. Given the dominance of bargaining in
the courts, however, what this organizational structure implies is that the
interests of the actors who participate in bargains are controlled by vari-
ables outside the reach of the court, no matter what rules it levies. More
specifically this mode of organization makes impossible the regulation of
bargaining without some reorganization of the courts and their relationships
to the participants in the bargaining process. We will argue this point on
three gr1ounds: that the present organization of the courts renders the
course of bargaining fixed before a case ever enters the control of the
court; that the lack of leverage over dispositional process forces bargainers
to focus on treatment and indeterminate sentences; and finally that the
interests of the actors who participate in bargaining are all outside the
reach of the court.
As the court is presently organized, the portion of the bargaining
taking place under the court's aegis happens only after the critical para-
meters of bargaining have been set within the (external) organizations which
actually employ (and hence directly reward or sanction) tne bargainers.
As a result, the court is greatly limited in the influence it has over even
the stages of bargaining which come under its control. In particular, for
example, the confessions obtained by police or the psychiatric reports pre-
pared by State Hospitals are very strong factors in the outcome of a case,
as are the pressures brought to bear by the firms which employ counsel or
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the funding agencies which determine ultimately the caseload of the
Defenders (and hence their bargaining style). Yet, formally, none of these
factors is even remotely controlled by the court itself.
The consequences of the nature of the court as "non-organization"
extend forward to the correctional system as well. The fact that correct-
ional decisions of the court can extend only to a range of probabtion, sus-
pended sentences or executed sentences to specific criminal institutions of
correction limits the influence of the court over the bargaining system.
While the courts we studied attempted to extend their authority by a
variety of "intermediate dispositions" aimed at extending courtroom bar-
gaining into the postadjudicative period, these efforts were necessarily
limited.
A third consequence of the non-bureaucratic organization of the
courts is that the actors who participate in the bargaining process derive
their interests not primarily from the purposes of the court, but rather
from the interests of the external organizations which employ them. For
example, the prosecutors' function is dictated to a great extent by the
pressures imposed by the District Attorney's office and its organizational
imperatives. At the same time, they work within the constraints of the
court. This seems to be the root cause of the duality of role which prose-
cutors face -- that of "prosecutor" and of supervisor of detendants.
Similar contradictions exist, especially in the roles of the probation
officer, the "helping professionals" and the police. Each of these groups
of personnel are serving conflicting roles within the court -- sometimes
prosecutorial, sometimes protective of the defendant, sometimes objective
information sources. Other actors, too, to lesser degrees display the
' 1 I l10 6
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same apparent conflicts and discrepancies in their assigned roles within
the court and in their external professional or personal lives.
In effect, then, the agency which the adversarial model sees as
the "gatekeeper" of the criminal justice system the decision-making and
justice-giving system which persumably dictates policy to the other agencies
of the system is in fact, in the bargaining process, capable of neither
decision making nor justice-giving. Both the processes which set the initial
conditions for bargaining and the processes which control the realization
of the disposition the bargainers arrange lie outside the court's purvue,
and few of the critical bargainers are subject to the court's authority.
The courts are rendered ineffectual because they have no means of imposing
control over critical aspects of even the latent (bargaining) process they
are responsible for performing.
On this basis we suggest that future efforts at reform should aim
for a reorganization of the courts which will create what will more greatly
resemble a due process model of bargaining. The symbolic importance of
the courts as an institution and the necessity of procedural rule as the
currency of bargaining (particularly for the defense), however, suggest that
this reorganization should neither tocus on dispelling the adversarial
ideology of the courts nor even on regulating the Dargaining process direct-
ly. Instead, it is our conjecture that the most fruitful approach would
be to work toward a greater centralization of the court's activities which
relate to the bargaining process. This means that efforts ought to be
made to transfer into the organization of the courts some of authority to
sanction personnel and to monitor the bargaining process, thus making
possible the enforcement of a due process of bargaining without employing
6
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clients' outcomes as the sole means of reward and penalty. Our data in
no way allows us to project what the impacts of these kinds of reorganiza-
tions would be. We can suggest where we think the leverage points for
accomplishing greater centralization of bargaining might be -- with the
caveat that they are illustrative and grounded in our understanding of
bargaining, but certainly not in our data.
1. Courts should become more involved in pretrial processes and
posta udTitive decisions. The "interface' between police and
prosecution should be formally pressed as tar toward the arrest
process as is feasible. Prosecutors and detense counsel should De
involved in interrogation of the defendant at the stationhouse, and
the process of release, bonding, or reduction of charges immediately
following arrest. Police self-evaluation and evaluation by the
court should be detached from the "prosecution batting average" to
clarify the line between police and prosecution functions. On the
postadjudicative end of the system, the courts should obtain con-
trol of a wide variety of agencies responsible for postadjudicative
renabilitation, much as they now operate probation. These facili-
ties should, however, be much more directly responsible to the
court than even present probation programs. In effect, we are
calling for the courts to be given operating as well as "decision-
making" responsibility for the entire process from the stationhouse
to release. In a system based on negotiation, if the court is to
ensure some semblance of fair treatment, it must be able to en-
force the results of both the formal and the informal decision-
making processes of the court. To do so without the present prac-
tice of punishing clients for the failures of the professional
bargainers, the courts must obtain, in effect, the power to compel
conformance, and realistically, that requires the ability to hire,
fire, promote, and adjust compensation of those who do the court's
business.
2. The power of the courts over attorneys representing clients
(including the State) snould be greatly increased. The courts
should obtain strong sanctions over attorneys engaged in the bar-
gaining process, perhaps to the point of determining fees based
on the court's opinion of their ability in bargaining their client's
case or even having hiring, firing and promotion power over the
lawyers. Such a proposal would, of course, be anathema In-an
adversarial system, since it might suggest undue influence over
the independent advocacy of attorneys for their clients. in a
court based on bargaining, however, the dissociation of attorney's
reward structures from the authority of the court results in the
court's sanctioning lawyers through their disposition of cases --
an inherently inequitable outcome which can only be remedied by a
reorganization of the court's influence on its attorneys.
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3. Personnel of the court should be assigned duties on a basis
which corresponds accurately to the structure of interests in the
bargaining process. If the court is to function as a conflict
resolution agency among many interests in a case rather than the
impassive forum for the presentation and adjudication of conflict
between two sides to a dispute, the nature of the many interests
must be carefully considered in the design of each actor's role and
reward system. In particular, this organization must be respon-
sive to the variation of participants' interests as the nature ot
cases varies. Specialized staffs responsible for protecting the
various interests in non-support and domestic complaints, for
example, should be established, as should structures for organizing
the protection of all interests in major crimes.
4. Existing procedural due process should continue to be observed
and provisions made for appeal to its safeguards whether from a
clearly bargained case or from one apparently being resolved ad-
versarijly. Since due process provisions are part of the bar-
gaining system, and appear to serve the the interests of justice
both under adversarial and negotiated justice modes of resolution
of cases, these should not be altered in an effort to create a
new and somehow different set of standards of due process. Most
of the due process standards are compatible with the operating
normative system of the negotiated justice model. Their retention,
then, will avoid undue disruption of the present system and con-
sequent unanticipated alterations of the latent normative system.
5. For those so inclined, adversarial trial should remain a theo-
retically open option. While our observations show that even cases
which go to trial are in fact involved in the bargaining system' it
seems clear that the presence of the adversarial model is an in-
tegral part of the bargaining system, serving many functions, from
providing a formally espoused theory of criminal justice through
offering a valuable bargaining tool for each side to reduce the
likelihood of a greatly disproportionate bargain. Finally, re-
tention of the adversarial trial -- however altered by the exist-
ence of the dominant negotiation mode of case disposition -- pro-
vides the function of making the courts seem to be the rational up-
holders of "truth" at least in the eyes of the bulk of citizens
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Contents of Massachusetts Defenders' Committee Case Files
Each case handled by the Defenders is supported by a formal
documentation describing the defendant, the alleged crime, and the actions
taken with respect to the case by Defenders and other court personnel.
Each case is filed permanently by chronological order of receipt by the
Defenders and is retained indefinitely. Access is faciliated by attorneys'
logs and by alphabetical files which cross-reference the chronological
files.
The information contained in each case file is organized into
three parts -- a "face sheet" (attached) which outlines the standardized
description of the defendant and the case proceedings, a "running sheet"
which records each event in the processing of the case, and copies of the
available documentation of the case (e.g., the complaint, the defendant's
probation record, motions, notices of appearance, and affidavits filed in
the case).
The amount of information filed in each case is generally closely
related to the effort put into the case bv the Defender and therefore cor-
relates fairly closely with the legal complexity or severity of the case.
In nearly all cases of assault and battery with a deadly weapon, for
example, the documentation is usually quite extensive, the "face sheet" is
fully completed, and the running narrative contains a detailed explanation
of the attorney's actions in the case. Drunkenness cases, on the other hand,
sometimes even neglect to indicate in which court the charges were filed.
MASSACHUSETTS D




Also Known As: Incarcerated:
Address: Bail:
Residing there how long? Appearance Entered:
Thone: Sex: - Race: Religion: indictment Requested:
Age: Birthdate: Birthplace: Record Requested:
3ingle: Married: - Divorced: Separated: Affidavit Signed:
Dccupation: History of Drugs?
Present Employer: Education:
Military Service:
ow long at present empioyment?
ny probation or parole outstanding?
ny previous record in Mass.?
Any out-of-state record?







Date Arrested: Day of Week: Time:
Charge: (Show complaint numbers also.)
o ~Final Plea: Represented by Attorney:
- Verdict: Name of Judge:
Disposition: (Show on all complaints.)
Date Disposed of: Name of Secretary:
Charge: (Show indictment or complaint numbers.)
Final FRln Represented by Attorney:
Name of Judge: Check here if jury-waived tria. (1 )
Verdict:
Disposition: (Show on all numbers.)










Statistical Study of Massachusetts Defenders' Committee Cases
We began our study with a statistical analysis of a sample of
cases drawn from the files. of the Massachusetts Defenders' Committee.
Since the Defenders' files are stored in numerical order beginning with
the inception of the organization, our selection of cases for analysis
was greatly simplified. We developed an ordered list of 1000 random
numbers between 00000 and 99999 and employed this list to draw cases from
the approximately 93,000 cases on file at the M.D.C. offices. In order
to draw a sample which would yield useful results quickly, a subset of
300 cases was selected by dividing the cases into five grouos and selecting
and coding cases drawn from each fifth until CO cases had been drawn from
each. Analysis of the results of this preliminary sample discouraged us,
as indicated in Chapter III, from continuing this mode of analysis.
For each case, an effort was made to ascertain as much informa-
tion as possible about the defendant, the crime(s) alleged, the court in
which the case was tried (and, if appropriate), appealed, the outcome of
the case, and as far as possible, the processes employed by the Defenders
in representing their clients.
The variables on the attached list were selected as the most
reliable available through the M.D.C. files. Many have obvious meanings and
metrics (e.g., age, sex, number of prior appearances in court), but several
deserve fuller explanation. The "level of activity" of the Defenders was
deduced from the "running sheets" and the documents in the files and was
divided into five levels: no activity, appearance only, appearance and
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interview, interview only, and "extensive activity" (appearance, inter-
view, and some other evidence on research, documentation, etc.). "Why
case was dropped" was used to separate attorney reassignment, appeal,
default, defendant retention of other counsel, and M.D.C. withdrawal from
the case as causes of limited attorney activity. Dates of significant
trial events were recorded as indicators of delay in the court process.
"Interviewer of defendant" was employed as a composite variable, indicating
either whether the attorney, a student, or a professional investigator
conducted the interview (in the event there was one) or whether the lack
of an interview could be traced to defendant failure to appear, late
assignment of the Defender, or Defender choice not to conduct an inter-
view (usually as a result of caseload). The seriousness of crimes is
based on the maximum sentence permitted under Massachusetts law for the
particular offense. Within the same category, the subjective opinions
of the Defenders was employed as a determinant of seriousness.







Crime Charqed (3 most serious)
Finding (3)
Disposition (3)
Defender First Assigned to the Case
Level of Activity













Most Serious Prior Offense (based on conviction)
Number of Prior Appearances in Court
Months Served in D.Y.S.
Months Sentenced to Massachusetts Correctional Institutions
Months Sentenced to House of Correction
Months Sentenced to Probation




Coding and Processing Data
Data was gathered and coded to conform to the input requirements
of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, since it was in opera-
tion -at M.I.T. in April, 1973, and the most effective analytical package
available for processing the data. Coding was accomplished by hand,
employing three coders, each of whom was familiar with the operation of
the M.D.C. and its data storage system. Information which was not avail-
able through the M.D.C. files was sought through oublic records and added
where available. Missing data, which was extensive, was coded in such a
way that it could be identified and eliminated (by pairwise deletion) by
the SPSS package then in use. Where possible, information was coded in
its original form and dummy variables created through the SPSS program to
avoid loss of precision in the original specification of the information
and to prevent error through misclassification by the coders.
Statistical inferences employed in this dissertation are drawn
from statistical tests obtained by employing SPSS to recodify variables
and using its CORREL function to perform the necessary mathematical opera-
tions on the newly created variables. This procedure was employed to avoid
spurious correlations arising from either erroneous codino or insufficient
numbers of cases to support a large matrix cenerated by highly disaggrecated
data. The CORREL function subroutine of SPSS provides a large number of
statistical tests (Chi Souare, C, .S, Lambda, Kendall's Tau [a, b, and c],
Gamma and Eta) from which the appropriate measures were selected for testing
the propositions asserted in the dissertation.
